NCOLN CITY LIBRARIES
3 3045 01790 1873

POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY

THE JOURNAL OF PUBLIC AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

PRC

Ronald F. King — Welfare Reform: Block Grants, Expenditure Caps, and the Paradox of the Food Stamp Program

Walt Vanderbush
Patrick J. Haney — Policy toward Cuba in the Clinton Administration

Gil Merom — Israel's National Security and the Myth of Exceptionalism

Peter Juviler
Sherrill Stroschein — Missing Boundaries of Comparison: The Political Community

Dorothy J. Solinger — Citizenship Issues in China's Internal Migration: Comparisons with Germany and Japan

Margaret Hanson
James J. Hentz — Neocolonialism and Neoliberalism in South Africa and Zambia

Book Reviews

Correspondence

T 1 9 1999

$10.50

Fall 1999

Published by The Academy of Political Science since 1886

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY

Editorial Advisory Board

Henry J. Abraham
University of Virginia

Robert J. Art
Brandeis University

Robert A. Divine
University of Texas at Austin

Jorge I. Domínguez
Harvard University

Doris A. Graber
University of Illinois at Chicago

Richard Haass
The Brookings Institution

Charles V. Hamilton
Columbia University

Hugh Heclo
George Mason University

Akira Iriye
Harvard University

Robert Jervis
Columbia University

Ira Katznelson
Columbia University

Everett Carll Ladd, Jr.
University of Connecticut

Walter LaFeber
Cornell University

Richard Ned Lebow
Ohio State University

Burke Marshall
Yale University

Paula D. McClain
University of Virginia

John R. Petrocik
University of Missouri

Richard M. Pious
Barnard College

Nelson W. Polsby
University of California, Berkeley

William B. Quandt
University of Virginia

David W. Rohde
Michigan State University

Susan Rose-Ackerman
Yale University

Virginia Sapiro
University of Wisconsin-Madison

Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.
City University of New York

Robert Y. Shapiro
Columbia University

John J. Smee
Fordham University

Kathleen Thelen
Northwestern University

Stephen L. White
University of Glasgow

Allen S. Whiting
University of Arizona

M. Crawford Young
University of Wisconsin-Madison

Editorial Assistants

Timothy Crawford

Rose Razaghian

Bridget Welsh

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY

THE JOURNAL OF PUBLIC AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

EDITOR	DEMETRIOS JAMES CARALEY *Barnard College* *Columbia University*
MANAGING EDITOR	BONNIE B. HARTMAN
MANUSCRIPT EDITOR	JEAN HIGHLAND

POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY is a nonpartisan journal devoted to the study and analysis of government, politics, and international affairs.

Published continuously since 1886.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Issued in Spring, Summer, Fall, and Winter, POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY (ISSN 0032-3195) is published by the Academy of Political Science, 475 Riverside Drive, Suite 1274, New York, NY 10115-1274. Subscriptions are obtained through membership in the Academy.

Regular membership: one year, $42.00; two years, $76.00; three years, $100.00; student, $27.00 a year. Libraries and institutions $193.00 a year. Periodicals postage paid at New York, N.Y. and additional mailing offices. Foreign postage is $8.00 additional per year. Volume 114 Number 3, Fall 1999. Special membership: contributing, $75; fellow, $150; patron, $250; benefactor, $1,000. *Contributions are tax deductible.* Credit cards accepted: American Express, MasterCard, and Visa.

Manuscripts, books for review, and editorial correspondence should be addressed to the Managing Editor, POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY, 475 Riverside Drive, Suite 1274, New York, NY 10115-1274. Correspondence about advertising and reprint permission should be addressed to Loren Morales, Business Manager, The Academy of Political Science, 475 Riverside Drive, Suite 1274, New York, NY 10115-1274.

PREPARATION OF ARTICLE MANUSCRIPTS: *PSQ* is a fully refereed journal. Manuscripts and footnotes should be double-spaced throughout in 12 point type and submitted in triplicate with a 200 word abstract. Place all tables, figures, and notes at the end of manuscript. Manuscripts over 40 pages will not be refereed. Authors who want their manuscripts returned must enclose postage.

PUBLISHED INDICES: A title page and an index of articles and book reviews appears in the Winter issue of *PSQ*. *The Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature* lists articles from 1886 to 1953 and *The Social Science Index* has articles dating from 1953 to the present. Articles are also listed in *ABC Pol Sci*, *The International Bibliography of Political Science*, and the *Public Affairs Information Services Bulletin*. Articles are abstracted in *United States Political Science Documents*, *The International Political Science Abstracts*, *Historical Abstracts*, *Urban Affairs Abstracts*, *Political Science Abstracts*, *America: History and Life*, and *Lancaster Index*. Book reviews are listed in *The Book Review Digest to Social Science Periodicals*, *Book Review Index*, and *Book Review Digest*.

ELECTRONIC SOURCES: University Microfilms has *PSQ* on CD-ROM dating from 1989 in their *General Periodicals on Disc* and the *Social Science Index on Disc*. Information Access Company produces *PSQ* full-text on their *Academic Index* dating from 1993. JSTOR archives the full-text of *PSQ* articles and book reviews from 1886 to 1994 online at http://www.jstor.org.

ACADEMIC PERMISSIONS SERVICE: Prior to photocopying items for educational classroom use, please contact the Copyright Clearance Center, Customer Service, 222 Rosewood Drive, Danvers, MA 01923. (978)750-8400.

ORDERS: Back issues of *PSQ* and reprints of articles may be ordered from the Academy. Single issue when available, $12.50; single article, $10.50. Checks should be made payable in U.S. dollars to the Academy of Political Science. Credit cards accepted: American Express, MasterCard, and Visa.

Postmaster—send address changes to Political Science Quarterly, 475 Riverside Drive, Suite 1274, New York, NY 10115-1274.

Copyright © 1999 by The Academy of Political Science. All rights reserved.

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 7-36315.

Printed by Capital City Press, Montpelier, Vermont.

Visit our Home Page
at its new address:
http://psqonline.org

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

CONTENTS

PSQ • Volume 114 • Number 3 • Fall 1999

Welfare Reform: Block Grants, Expenditure Caps, and the Paradox of the Food Stamp Program
RONALD F. KING 359

Policy toward Cuba in the Clinton Administration
WALT VANDERBUSH
PATRICK J. HANEY 387

Israel's National Security and the Myth of Exceptionalism
GIL MEROM 409

Missing Boundaries of Comparison: The Political Community
PETER JUVILER
SHERRILL STROSCHEIN 435

Citizenship Issues in China's Internal Migration: Comparisons with Germany and Japan
DOROTHY J. SOLINGER 455

Neocolonialism and Neoliberalism in South Africa and Zambia
MARGARET HANSON
JAMES J. HENTZ 479

Book Reviews 503

Reference Books and Other Publications of Interest Received 544

Correspondence 545

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

BOOK REVIEWS

Sheldon Garon, **Molding Japanese Minds: The State in Everyday Life** — Akira Iriye — 503

Niall Ferguson, **The Pity of War** — Robert Jervis — 504

Campbell Craig, **Destroying the Village: Eisenhower and Thermonuclear War** — Robert A. Divine — 505

Patrick J. Maney, **The Roosevelt Presence: The Life and Legacy of FDR** — Matthew J. Dickinson — 506

Keith Krehbiel, **Pivotal Politics: A Theory of U.S. Lawmaking** — L. Sandy Maisel — 508

George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, **A World Transformed: The Collapse of the Soviet Empire, The Unification of Germany, Tiananmen Square, The Gulf War** — Thomas A. Schwartz — 509

Devin T. Hagerty, **The Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation: Lessons from South Asia** — Jordan Seng — 510

Robin Kolodny, **Pursuing Majorities: Congressional Campaign Committees in American Politics** — John R. Petrocik — 511

Darrell M. West and Burdett A. Loomis, **The Sound of Money: How Political Interests Get What They Want** — Theodore J. Eismeier — 513

V. Lance Tarrance, Jr. and Walter De Vries, **Checked and Balanced: How Ticket-Splitters are Shaping the New Balance of Power in American Politics** — John J. Pitney, Jr. — 514

Steven Gregory, **Black Corona: Race and the Politics of Place in an Urban Community** — Wilbur C. Rich — 515

Avigdor Haselkorn, **The Continuing Storm: Iraq, Poisonous Weapons, and Deterrence** — Gideon Rose — 516

H. W. Brands, **What America Owes the World: The Struggle for the Soul of Foreign Policy** — James McAllister — 517

David M. Reimers, **Unwelcome Strangers: American Identity and the Turn Against Immigration**; and Noah M. J. Pickus, ed., **Immigration and Citizenship in the 21st Century** — Peter Andreas — 518

William A. V. Clark, **The California Cauldron: Immigration and the Fortunes of Local Communities** — Enrico A. Marcelli — 520

Steven L. Burg and Paul S. Shoup, **The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention** — Richard M. Wilcox — 521

Martin S. Sheffer, **The Judicial Development of Presidential War Powers** — Louis Fisher — 522

William M. LeoGrande, **Our Own Backyard: The United States in Central America, 1977–1992** — Richard Stahler-Sholk — 523

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Stephen Hopgood, **American Foreign Environmental Policy and the Power of the State** J. Samuel Barkin 525

Paul Gordon Lauren, **The Evolution of International Human Rights: Visions Seen** Kathryn Sikkink 526

Lawrence S. Wittner, **Resisting the Bomb: A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement, 1954–1970** Maurice Isserman 527

Charles F. Andrain, **Public Health Policies and Social Inequality**; and Antonia Maioni, **Parting at the Crossroads: The Emergence of Health Insurance in the United States and Canada** Ann Lenhard Reisinger 528

Anne Sa'adah, **Germany's Second Chance: Trust, Justice, and Democratization** Brigitte L. Nacos 530

Nicholas Greenwood Onuf, **The Republican Legacy in International Thought** A. James Reichley 531

Jean M. Yarbrough, **American Virtues: Thomas Jefferson on the Character of a Free People** Jack P. Greene 533

Martha K. Huggins, **Political Policing: The United States and Latin America** Mark Ungar 534

James L. Guth, John C. Green, Corwin E. Smidt, Lyman A. Kellstedt, and Margaret M. Poloma, **The Bully Pulpit: The Politics of Protestant Clergy** Clyde Wilcox 535

Christopher Coker, **War and the Illiberal Conscience** David L. Blaney 536

Latif Abul-Husn, **The Lebanese Conflict: Looking Inward** Fawaz A. Gerges 537

Christian Joppke, **Challenge to the Nation-State**; and Michael S. Teitelbaum and Jay Winter, **A Question of Numbers: High Migration, Low Fertility, and the Politics of National Identity** Mark J. Miller 539

Victor E. Tokman and Guillermo O'Donnell, **Poverty and Inequality in Latin America: Issues and New Challenges** Howard J. Wiarda 541

Andrew Linklater, **The Transformation of Political Community** Mark F. N. Franke 542

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

From the Editor:

In this issue . . .

RONALD F. KING examines the connection between welfare policy and budget policy, analyzing block grants as a complex form of fiscal constraint. He shows why the food stamp program ultimately was not transformed into a block grant as part of the 1996 welfare reform, and he argues that the tension between entitlement protection and spending control has not yet been resolved.

WALT VANDERBUSH and PATRICK J. HANEY examine the dynamics of making U.S. policy toward Cuba during the first Clinton administration. They argue that, rather than being dominated by the executive and a powerful ethnic interest group, in this period Cuba policy became enmeshed in electoral politics and a struggle for foreign policy power between the Congress and the president.

GIL MEROM challenges the Israeli belief in national security exceptionalism. He compares strategic and moral dimensions of Israeli security with those of other states and concludes that the notion of Israel's national security exceptionalism is unfounded.

PETER JUVILER and SHERRILL STROSCHEIN reintroduce the recently neglected concept of the political community as a model in the comparative analysis of state formation, adaptation, and failure. They argue that regime stability and democratic consolidation depend upon the inclusiveness of community boundaries of shared allegiance and identity, rights, and commitments in the face of class, ethnic, and transnational differences.

DOROTHY J. SOLINGER compares the migration regimes in China, Germany, and Japan, all of which have shared a xenophobic basis toward "foreign workers" (in China's case, including its own peasants) along with a drive to develop economically at almost any cost. She identifies common factors that have limited the application of rights for these people, and, through comparison, uncovers conditions that may make for improvements over the longer haul.

MARGARET HANSON and JAMES J. HENTZ examine the negotiations over the ownership of neoliberal economic policy ideas diffused by international financial institutions in Zambia and South Africa. Domestic policy dialogues prove to be an important mechanism through which political coalitions identify with new policies and are a more effective mechanism for domestic policy change than is external financial coercion.

DEMETRIOS JAMES CARALEY

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Welfare Reform: Block Grants, Expenditure Caps, and the Paradox of the Food Stamp Program

RONALD F. KING

According to the "Contract with America" issued by the House Republican Conference in September 1994, the party's blueprint for welfare reform would include a cap on the "spending growth of AFDC [Aid to Families with Dependent Children], SSI [Supplemental Security Income], and numerous public housing programs, and the mandatory work program established under the bill." The cap would equal "the amount spent the preceding year for these programs with an adjustment for inflation plus growth in poverty population." Food stamps would not be included within the cap, but instead would be consolidated with a number of other nutrition programs into a block grant to the states, "funded in the first year at 95 percent of the aggregate amount of the individual programs."[1]

In the House version of the Personal Responsibility Act passed by the new Republican majority in March 1995, AFDC, child and foster care, school meals, and special nutrition aid for pregnant women and young children would all be transformed into block grants to the states funded approximately at current levels. Yet the block grant option intentionally was rejected for the food stamp program, which would be retained as a federal entitlement with its expenditures capped. Unless overridden by explicit legislation, program obligations could not exceed the amount of the current Congressional Budget Office estimate, adjusted only for the provisions of the welfare reform act.[2]

[1] House Republican Conference, "Contract with America," *Legislative Digest*, 24 September 1994, 31.

[2] U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Agriculture, *Food Stamp Reform and Commodity Distribution Act*, 104th Cong., 1st sess., 1995, H. Rept. 77, 17.

RONALD F. KING is associate professor of political science at Tulane University. He has written on tax and welfare policy issues and is currently completing a project on entitlement budgeting.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Senate and final versions of the 1995 welfare bill maintained this curious reversal from the original "Contract," in which AFDC would be transformed into a block grant while food stamps would become a capped entitlement. Regarding budget status, the main change made to the food stamp program in conference was the specification of fixed dollar ceilings. Expenditures would be authorized for seven years, with a fixed maximum of $25.4 billion in fiscal year (FY) 1996, declining to $24.6 billion in FY 1997, and then rising slowly to $29.8 billion by FY 2002. The secretary of agriculture was instructed to monitor projected outlays and to report regularly to the House and Senate Agriculture Committees. "If the Secretary finds that program funding requirements for a year will exceed allowed obligations, the Secretary must direct States to reduce allotments to the extent necessary to stay within the obligation limits for the year."[3]

President Bill Clinton vetoed this version of the welfare bill on 9 January 1996, claiming that it "was designed to meet an arbitrary budget target rather than to achieve serious reform."[4] The farm bill enacted in March 1996 authorized food stamp appropriations without any mention of an expenditure cap through FY 1997. The revised Personal Responsibility Act passed in midsummer and signed by the president simply extended this authority through FY 2002. Similarly, the balanced budget agreement of 1997 negotiated between Congress and the president contained no cap provision affecting food stamp expenditures, not even a specified ceiling on the growth of mandatory outlays. Therefore, although threatened throughout the 104th Congress by more stringent forms of budget rule, the food stamp program ultimately retained its standing as a full welfare entitlement. In essence, it is a story of what did not happen.

This article will consider food stamp politics and policy during the recent era of welfare reform.[5] First, it analyzes block grants as a complex budget arrangement involving a fixed appropriation from the federal government to the states, a formula distributing this appropriation among the states, and a set of

[3] U.S. Congress, Conference Committee, *Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1995*, 104th Cong., 1st sess., 1995, H. Rept. 430, 632.

[4] William J. Clinton, "Message to the House of Representatives Returning Without Approval Legislation on the Welfare System," 9 January 1996, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, William J. Clinton, 1996,* 23.

[5] For a general history of food stamp politics and policy, see Ardith L. Maney, *Still Hungry After All These Years: Food Assistance Policy from Kennedy to Reagan* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1989); Kenneth Finegold, "Agriculture and the Politics of U.S. Social Provision: Social Insurance and Food Stamps" in Margaret Weir, Ann Shola Orloff, and Theda Skocpol, eds., *The Politics of Social Policy in the United States* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 199–234; Jeffrey M. Berry, *Feeding Hungry People: Rulemaking in the Food Stamp Program* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1984); Maurice MacDonald, "Food Stamps: An Analytical History," *Social Service Review* 51 (December 1977): 642–58; Gilbert Steiner, "Stamps for the Hungry," *The State of Welfare* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1973), 191–236; Nick Kotz, *Let Them Eat Promises* (New York: Anchor Books, 1971). For details regarding food stamp program design and welfare effects, see James C. Ohls and Harold Beebout, *The Food Stamp Program* (Washington, DC: Urban Institute Press, 1993); Maurice MacDonald, *Food, Stamps, and Income Maintenance* (New York: Academic Press, 1977).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

autonomous spending decisions by the states which might or might not prove adequate to meet recipient need. Each of these elements was controversial. Next, the article considers the fate of food stamp expenditure controls during the legislative battles of 1995-1996, examining the reasons why the program escaped devolution to the states and then tracing the retreat in Congress from a block grant to caps to restored entitlement. In the end, program spending reductions resulted from a number of small, separate, and substantive cuts in eligibility and benefits rather than from any change in budget procedure.

Expenditure caps previously had been applied to the food stamp program, from FY 1978 through FY 1990.[6] Renewed caps, whether in the aggregate for all welfare spending or in particular for specific programs, had been part of dissenting budget resolutions during the 102nd and 103rd Congresses. Block grants for food stamps had been proposed under President Ronald Reagan's New Federalism initiative and remained visible in conservative policy platforms. Nevertheless, the principal outcome from the latest, frantic period of welfare reform—both for food stamps and for federal welfare spending overall—was a series of bottom-up cuts affecting individual provisions but no effective top-down limitations upon entitlement status. Much attention has been devoted to the case of means-tested family assistance, as AFDC was transformed into the Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) block grant to the states.[7] Yet there were other contrasting policy patterns embodied in the Personal Responsibility Act of 1996. The lasting question for America's welfare future is which of these patterns represents the trend and which represents the exceptions. One finding from this study is that the decisions reflected in the 1996 act were based largely on short-run political expediency. There was little careful consideration of fundamental principles and little sense of an emerging policy consensus. Moreover, both the political balance that fostered compromise and the fiscal assumptions inherent to the bargain will most likely prove transitory. U.S. welfare policy continues simultaneously to signal restrained and unconstrained spending, promising lower burdens upon taxpayer resources yet full benefits to all deserving households. The tension between these conflicting objectives remains unresolved and potentially explosive.

Block Grants As A Form Of Budget Rule

John Engler, the Republican governor of Michigan, appeared before the Ways and Means Committee in mid-January 1995 and placed on the table before him a high stack of documents representing the rules and regulations for AFDC, food stamps, and Medicaid. The complexity of these programs, the inconsistencies among them, and the propensity for micromanagement from Washington,

[6] Ronald F. King, "Capping Entitlements: Budget Rules and the Food Stamp Program," *Journal of Public Policy* 18 (no. 2 1998): 133–161.

[7] For an early critical account found in this journal, see Demetrios Caraley, "Dismantling the Federal Safety Net: Fictions Versus Realities," *Political Science Quarterly* 111 (Summer 1996): 225–258.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

he said, comprised a barrier that limited flexibility and deterred efforts to lower the poverty rate. Speaking on behalf of Republican governors, Engler called for block grants to the states to replace these separate programs in order to foster innovation and permit more efficient operations. "Washington has had 60 years to tackle the welfare problem. It is time to give the States a chance. Certainly we can do better than the current Federal system that is represented by these rules and regulations."[8]

Part of Engler's justification was that a system of welfare block grants would save the government money. "How much money can we save with nationwide reform? Plenty."[9] Yet Engler was hesitant to estimate the value of increased state flexibility in terms of a percentage to be cut from current program costs. Instead, he indicated that the governors were willing to accept a fixed allocation from the federal government, possibly a five-year freeze using FY 1995 as the baseline. "I think the best solution," Engler told the House Agriculture Committee a few weeks later, "is to say, 'Here, States. Here's the money for the Food Stamp Program.' And then we'll write the rules to make sure that they work."[10] Not all commentators were so sanguine. The attractiveness of the block grant plan, argued some critics, lay in the promise of reduced federal responsibilities, both financial and substantive. It is a politician's dream to spend less money yet avoid blame for the consequences. "Block grants," said Senator John Breaux (D–LA), "are like taking all the problems that we have with the welfare program and putting them in a box, then wrapping it all up, tying a bow around it, and then mailing that box of problems to the States, saying: Here, it is yours. It is a block grant. It is a block grant of problems with less money to help solve those problems. That, I think, is not a solution."[11]

In a sense, a block grant can be seen as a form of budget rule that constrains the amount available for program spending, comprised of three different elements. First, there is the federal outlay to the states. If this dollar amount is specified by the authorizing legislation for some given number of years, then the block grant operates as a fixed allocation that cannot be altered without explicit congressional action. If the amount is not specified or if the authorizing legislation only establishes a maximum ceiling, then the block grant is subject to the annual appropriations process and must compete against other possible uses of government funds. Either way, a welfare block grant entails the abandonment of entitlement status, for the level of federal spending is no longer

[8] U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Ways and Means, Subcommittee on Human Resources, *Contract with America—Welfare Reform*, 104th Cong., 1st sess., 1995, 11.

[9] Ibid., 12.

[10] U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Agriculture, Subcommittee on Department Operations, Nutrition, and Foreign Agriculture, *Reforming the Present Welfare System*, 104th Cong., 1st sess., 1995, 351.

[11] *Congressional Record*, 104th Cong., 1st sess., 1995, 141, no. 137: S 12692.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

adjusted automatically given changing recipient demand and macroeconomic conditions.

Second, there is the distribution of federal block grant expenditures among the states. A distribution that copies the existing apportionment gives advantage to those states with abnormally generous program enforcement or abnormally high rates of current utilization. Yet a distribution that is tied to underlying population need (for example, the percentage of households living under the poverty threshold) promises a windfall to states that have made little effort to enroll and/or serve its poverty households. The choice of formula for state allocation thus invites political conflict, as the potential winners and losers will struggle over their slices from the fiscal pie.

Third, there are the funding decisions adopted by the separate states. The states desire to receive their block grants free from all restraints and conditions. This would insure maximum flexibility and reward states for lowering their welfare burdens. The federal government would prefer regulations to insure that the money it contributes actually is spent to assist recipient households. This would prevent states from arbitrarily reducing payments and using the funds for other purposes. Similarly, the states desire the liberty to pocket all administrative cost reductions as an incentive to more efficient operations. The federal government would prefer to share in any potential savings. At issue is the degree of permissible state autonomy within the new budgetary arrangement. Such autonomy, however, becomes risky during recession or natural disasters, when there are extraordinary and unanticipated claims for program benefits. One option is to establish an emergency federal fund or to require the states to establish their own, yet this violates the principle of local responsibility. The alternative is to leave the states alone to find supplemental dollars from higher taxes or competing programs if they wish to avoid denying welfare benefits despite rising need.

By implication, the tension between guaranteed assistance and budget discretion remains inescapable, although it is given a slightly novel articulation within the block grant format. The difficulties of adequate welfare provision absent entitlement protection are magnified under block grants, given the presence of multiple levels of government and the interactions between them. Yet the opportunities for spending constraint are also magnified from a combination of a limited federal outlay, a strict formula for apportionment, and the separate state appropriations responsive to local conditions. Each of these three elements, we shall see, were visible in the debate over the Personal Responsibility Act, in potential regarding the proposed food stamp block grant but with important consequences regarding the Temporary Assistance to Needy Families block grant enacted to replace AFDC.

The first element concerns the total amount of federal spending. When introducing the Personal Responsibility Act before the Senate, Robert Dole listed three fundamental justifications—state autonomy, a strong work requirement, and substantial cost reduction. "No program with an unlimited budget

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

will ever be made to work effectively and efficiently. Therefore, we must put a cap on welfare spending."[12] A strict limit upon federal obligations equally was a strong motivation for the advocates of a food stamp block grant. Those seeking to attach such a provision to the bill spoke of the "dramatic and rapid increase" in food stamp costs over time, faster than the growth in population and caused in part by insufficient oversight and faulty program management. They cited an opinion poll showing that 60 percent of Americans believed the budget deficit should be reduced by cutting food stamps.[13] The potential reduction in federal food stamp outlays threatened to be quite sizable. For example, a U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) analysis showed that a block grant as originally proposed in the "Contract with America" would lower total nutrition spending in FY 1996 by more than $5.1 billion, the equivalent of 12.7 percent. As the block grant would be adjusted only for changes in U.S. population and the inflation rate during the previous year, the gap predicted for spending under existing versus decentralized nutrition programs would widen over time. Moreover, the actual gap might be even larger as economic forecasts often err. The USDA simulated the five-year pattern of spending as if the proposed block grant rule had been implemented in FY 1989 and then compared the result to real program outlays. For FY 1994, the deficiency would have been more than $12.5 billion, producing more than a one-third cut in government nutrition outlays. This would have had a clear and adverse impact upon dietary intake and public health, especially among children of low-income families.[14]

Block grant defenders denied that lower federal spending would affect program benefits, citing the administrative efficiencies expected from greater state flexibility. Yet the claim was contradicted by evidence from a series of USDA demonstration projects conducted during the 1980s, which attempted to standardize and simplify food stamp benefit calculations for families already found eligible for AFDC. In all cases, the efficiency savings were modest. "This should not be that surprising," asserted Robert Greenstein, executive director of the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities. "In every state, the same agency already administers both the AFDC and food stamp programs, and the two programs use the same application forms."[15] Greenstein also argued that block grant reductions in federal nutrition spending would probably be much larger than anticipated because of its discretionary status within the budget process. The USDA calculations were based on the ceiling for possible expenditures. "The amount actually appropriated would likely be below the ceiling, as is true for most discretionary programs." Food assistance would have to struggle annually against other spending priorities. Programs with weak political constitu-

[12] *Congressional Record*, 104th Cong., 1st sess., 1995, 141, no. 130: S 11601–2.

[13] *Congressional Record*, 104th Cong., 1st sess., 1995, 141, no. 54: H 3615; no. 141: S 13334.

[14] U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food and Consumer Service, "The Nutrition, Health, and Economic Consequences of Block Grants for Federal Food Assistance Programs," printed in U.S. Congress, House, *Reforming the Present Welfare System,* 291–301.

[15] U.S. Congress, House, *Reforming the Present Welfare System,* 694–5.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

encies tend to fare poorly, especially during times of budget austerity with increasingly intense competition for a shrinking pool of available funds.[16] President Clinton made a similar point before the National Conference of State Legislatures, using the example of the Community Development Block Grant while he was governor of Arkansas. The dollar amount "was held constant for a decade. So in real terms, it got smaller and smaller and smaller."[17] To conservative delight and liberal dismay, the impact of a potential block grant on federal nutrition spending would most likely be substantial.

The estimated fiscal impact was purely hypothetical regarding the food stamp program, as Congress ultimately did not choose to transform it into a block grant to the states. The parallel controversy concerning AFDC, however, was quite real. Early in the debate, the Department of Health and Human Services reported simulation results for a five-year welfare block grant fixed at 103 percent of spending for FY 1987. By FY 1993, federal outlays would have been 26 percent lower than actually occurred, with forty-seven of fifty states receiving less funds.[18] The final version of the Personal Responsibility Act was incorporated within a reconciliation bill, in part to symbolize that the effort to slow the growth of welfare spending was an aspect of an overall strategy to reduce the federal deficit.[19] Nevertheless, the states were allowed to select a favorable baseline for the TANF block grant and they were guaranteed the full $16.4 billion appropriation through FY 2001 to protect against discretionary budgeting in Congress. In fact, according to Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projections, the TANF block grant would initially award more money to the states than they would have received under the prior law, which served as an incentive for enactment. Over time, however, economic and population changes would produce a shortfall, which by FY 2002 should exceed $1 billion.[20] Critics loudly complained that any fixed grant scheme would prove inadequate, with rising dollar deficiencies compared to current law that would not be matched by reduced caseloads or greater efficiencies.

The second aspect of block grants as a form of budget rule concerns the formula for fund allocation among the states. Each formula produces a differ-

[16] U.S. Congress, House, *Contract With America—Welfare Reform*, 106–7.

[17] William J. Clinton, "Teleconference Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session With the National Conference of State Legislatures," 20 July 1995, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, 1995,* 1126. A former congressional aide put the matter succinctly. "Block grants are one of the best ways to cut the budget. The cuts are so ethereal. You don't have to specify what will really happen to people and programs. You just give the states less money and let them decide." Quoted in Timothy Conlon, *From New Federalism to Devolution* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1998), 237.

[18] U.S. Congress, House, *Contract With America—Welfare Reform*, 27–28, 49.

[19] U.S. Congress, Conference Committee, *Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1996*, 104th Cong., 2nd sess., 1996, H. Rept. 725, 262.

[20] U.S. Congress, House, Committee on the Budget, *Welfare and Medicaid Reform Act of 1996*, 104th Cong., 2nd sess., 1996, H. Rept. 651, 1963; David A. Super, Sharon Parrott, Susan Steinmetz, and Cindy Mann, "The New Welfare Law," Center for Budget and Policy Priorities, Washington, DC, 13 August 1996.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ent pattern of relative winners and losers, thereby engendering controversy. Regarding the potential food stamp block grant, the USDA estimated the payment distribution for a system based on the number of eligible households per state, and it found wide cross-state disparities. Compared to FY 1996 actual spending, fourteen states would sacrifice as much as 20 percent of their food stamp funds. Texas would lose more than $1.1 billion, whereas California would gain $650 million.[21] The states that would suffer most were the ones with greater utilization rates, for they would have comparatively high current food stamp costs relative to the eligible population. In response, advocates for the food stamp block grant in Congress proposed a five-year plan based instead on the level of actual FY 1994 food stamp payments per state. The problem here, as President Clinton pointed out, is that states' demography and job opportunity structures change at different rates, and thus it will be very difficult to devise a fixed yet equitable "formula that keeps you from getting hurt . . . over a 5-year period." He expressed doubt, as assistance needs evolved over time, that any block grant formula could keep pace with the demands faced by many individual states, locking them "into a real bind."[22] Under entitlement, food stamps had acted somewhat as a stabilizer, automatically adjusting payments to help economically disadvantaged states facing increased nutritional demand. A long-term block grant formula grounded upon a single base year prevents that flexibility. Unless supplemented by a state's own resources, program rules would no longer guarantee funding adequate to insure that all qualified individuals—regardless of location within the United States—could escape going hungry.

Again, a distributional issue that merely threatened to affect food stamps was in fact a matter of serious contention with regard to the actual block grant that replaced AFDC. The House bill would apportion the TANF grant among the states based upon their previous share of federal family assistance spending. In addition, a small fund was made available to compensate states that had experienced population growth. The Senate Finance Committee deleted this supplemental fund, and thus it proposed to allocate grant money to each state equal exactly to the amount paid for AFDC and related programs in FY 1994. This incited a protest from southern and southwestern senators, led by Kay Hutchinson (R–TX), claiming that any formula defined by the old welfare regime merely replicated the status quo and discriminated against states with historically low benefit levels or experiencing rapid population growth. The response, especially from northeastern and midwestern senators, was that no state should be forced to cut its welfare effort because of a dramatic reduction from the funding level it currently receives. The month-and-a-half delay be-

[21] U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food and Consumer Service, *Reforming the Present Welfare System*, 303–15.

[22] William J. Clinton, "Remarks to the Iowa Legislature in Des Moines," 25 April 1995, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, 1995,* 603; "Teleconference Remarks," *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, 1995,* 1124.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tween the committee report and Senate floor consideration was in part caused by an intraparty Republican dispute over the funding formula. The eventual compromise was to maintain retrospective funding, giving states the option of the 1995 amount, the 1994 amount, or an average of 1992–1994 amounts. In addition, there would be a supplemental fund of $878 million (later reduced to $800 million by the conference committee) reserved for states with below national average benefit levels and above national average population growth rates; states with considerable variance from either threshold would also qualify. Nevertheless, this was not sufficient to satisfy all the critics. Amendments were attempted on the Senate floor to revise the supplemental fund based on the growth rate for poor families within a state and to revise the entire allocation formula based simply on the number of poor children. The effort was made again in 1996, when the welfare bill was revived and later enacted.

Finally, the effectiveness of a block grant system depends on the activities of the individual states. The degree of federal control over state appropriations constitutes the third aspect of such grants as a budgetary arrangement. Regarding food stamps, a federal block grant would entail the establishment of fifty different state programs, each with its own set of eligibility rules and benefit levels, thus abandoning any national commitment to insure a minimally nutritional diet for all Americans. Given complete autonomy, a state need not maintain its current level of financial commitment. "The Governors may decide," said Senator Richard Lugar (R–IN), "in fact, to use the money for something else. If you happen to be a citizen of one of those States, you are out of luck."[23] Lugar also feared a competitive "race to the bottom," because states that could keep their surplus federal dollars would have an incentive to set benefits low relative to their neighbors, so as not to serve as a magnet for needy populations.

A different concern about state-level financing was based on unintentional rather than intentional deficiencies, especially from unanticipated changes in economic conditions. During times of recession or natural disaster, program demand increases but state revenues decline. As Delaware Governor Thomas Carper warned, "The day will come when state economies are in a slump, and when that day comes families who never dreamed they would be dependent on food stamps will need them, and states won't have the resources to provide them."[24] This was the subject of a colloquy between Senators Kent Conrad (D–ND) and Rick Santorum (R–PA). Conrad used the example of Florida, which had stable food stamp utilization for a number of years before suffering

[23] *Congressional Record*, 104th Cong., 1st sess., 1995, 141, no. 141: S 13336. A comparative study of state AFDC programs operating during the early 1990s under waiver authority concluded that tightened fiscal circumstances plus unfavorable public opinion have meant that autonomous state welfare efforts are "even more likely to fall under the budgetary knife and that the cuts would be both popular and relatively easy to make." Donald F. Norris and Lyke Thompson, *The Politics of Welfare Reform* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1995), 220.

[24] Judith Havemann and Barbara Vobejda, "Food Stamp Block Grant Eyed as Way of Breaking Welfare Reform Stalemate," *Washington Post*, 13 July 1995.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in the early 1990s the combined effects of deep recession and Hurricane Andrew. "No block grant could have responded to the increase in families that needed food stamps in Florida during this time. No State would have been able to predict or prepare for this dramatic growth in demand for food assistance." Santorum replied that prudent state planners should have the wisdom to prepare for emergencies, saving a share of allocated dollars in a rainy day fund. Conrad doubted whether sufficient funds would ever be saved. Santorum responded that a state could always speed up the pace of appropriations or use its own resources. Conrad claimed that it was wrong to put children at risk because of possible planning mistakes. Santorum agreed that some risk always exists, but that governors are not fools and that the decisions should be theirs to make. "If their eyes were not open, they certainly are open now as a result of our discussion." Conrad answered, "The notion that Governors are put on notice because we in the Senate have a debate at 3 o'clock in the afternoon on Friday is probably not a very reliable thing for any of us to depend upon."[25]

Again, an issue that was hypothetical with regard to the food stamp program was instead quite significant as AFDC was replaced by a block grant system. Regarding intentional deficiencies, the initial bill gave the states virtually complete independence to use federal TANF funds as they found reasonable. Moreover, nothing in the act was "intended to limit in any way the manner in which a State may spend its own funds on aid for needy families."[26] Critics claimed that this was irresponsible, because it merely turned federal funds over to the states, and they demanded language requiring that the states maintain the level of their prior welfare effort. In the search for support from moderates in Congress, the provision was altered over several iterations. The final bill insisted that the states continue to spend at least 75 percent of the amount they previously had outlayed for AFDC, 80 percent if they had failed to place a required number of welfare recipients into the workforce. Significantly, the Senate explicitly rejected an amendment to mandate that the states actually guarantee fully funded benefits to all households that they defined as legitimately qualifying for aid, which would have re-established entitlement although at the state level. Regarding unintentional deficiencies, the initial bill contained little protection against economic downturn except for a rainy day loan fund of $1 billion ($1.7 in the Senate version) which the states could draw upon in emergencies but would have to repay with interest over three years. The final act added an encouragement to the states to establish their own rainy day funds, and it established a $2 billion contingency fund available to states experiencing high and rising unemployment rates or welfare caseloads. Such provisions helped to make the Personal Responsibility Act more palatable to legislators concerned about the limits of state financial capacity.

[25] *Congressional Record*, 104th Cong., 2nd sess., 1996, 142, no. 107: S 8350–7.

[26] U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Ways and Means, *Welfare Transformation Act of 1995*, 104th Cong., 1st sess., 1995, H. Rept. 81, pt. I, 13.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A block grant system entails more than the devolution of welfare rule-making and administration from the federal government to the states. It is also a budget arrangement useful for constraining expenditures, a fact that was apparent to proponents and opponents alike. As a budget arrangement, a block grant implies the rejection of entitlement protections. There no longer exists the legal promise that funds will be provided sufficient for all enrolled individuals to receive the benefits for which they are eligible under prevailing law.[27] Fiscal deficiencies could occur at three different levels—the national level because federal appropriations need not be maintained equal to the initial commitment; the distributional level because the apportionment formula need not reflect changing conditions among the states; and the state level because spending by each of the fifty separate welfare programs need not be adequate to meet recipient demand, especially in times of economic recession or natural disaster. Block grant proponents celebrated the opportunity to take welfare off automatic pilot, thereby increasing political control over the extent of public charity. They downplayed the attendant risk, believing that greater state innovation would reduce caseloads and program costs. Eliminating entitlement would provide extra incentives for individuals to end welfare dependency and for states to pursue efficiency. Block grant opponents were far less optimistic. The most striking aspect of the Personal Responsibility Act is the fact that AFDC ultimately was transformed into the TANF block grant, whereas food stamps were left unchanged as a federal entitlement. It is a surprising asymmetry, hardly predictable from the Republican "Contract."

Food Stamps and Welfare Reform

To conservative welfare reform advocates, there was no logical reason to treat cash and food assistance differently. The Republican governors regularly demanded that both programs be transformed into block grants to the states. More than fifty Republican members of Congress, mostly freshmen, signed a letter urging that policy remain loyal to the original "Contract with America." It was contradictory to redesign AFDC in a fundamental fashion but merely tinker with food stamps. Devolution of welfare to the states allegedly would improve flexibility and innovation, control costs, decrease fraud, and cut bureaucratic red tape. If true in general, it should also be true for food stamps. The new Republican majority had promised bold and consistent action, and it should seek nothing less than comprehensive welfare reform. The governors,

[27] This definition of entitlement is based directly on the language of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Act of 1974. According to the act, entitlement is defined by the necessity "to make payments (including loans and grants) the budget authority for which is not provided for in advance by appropriation Acts, to any person or government if, under the provisions of the law containing such authority, the United States is obligated to make such payments to persons or governments who meet the requirements established by such law." *United States Statutes At Large*, 93rd Cong., 2nd sess., 1974, vol. 88: 318.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

announced one legislator, deserve independence to help solve the welfare problems they understand best. "To only give them two-thirds of the tools they need is like playing golf without a putter. You can't finish."[28]

Yet Congress, despite Republican leadership, did not comply. The House Ways and Means Committee had quickly decided that it would favor the Republican governors over the "Contract with America" and thus it adopted a block grant system in place of AFDC. The House Agriculture Committee, however, rejected both the governors' appeal and the original "Contract," preferring a lesser reform. Chairman Pat Roberts (R–KS) expressed "real reservations" regarding block grants at the very first committee hearing of 1995. Instead, he declared his prime mission was to clean up fraud and make the food stamp program more cost-efficient.[29] Supported by Bill Emerson (R–MO), chairman of the Subcommittee on Nutrition, Roberts warmly praised the idea of "one-step shopping" for individuals receiving benefits under multiple welfare programs. To promote integration and compatibility, the House bill proposed that the states have the option to establish one uniform set of eligibility and benefit rules for those families applying simultaneously for TANF and food stamps. The goal was simplification in implementation and management. Nevertheless, it was a far step from eliminating food stamps as a federal entitlement. The House Agriculture Committee voted 5-37 against transforming food stamps into a block grant. A block grant amendment offered on the House floor failed 114-316, with Republicans divided almost evenly and Democrats opposed almost unanimously. The Senate Agriculture Committee similarly refused the block grant option, and a substitute motion on the Senate floor failed 36-64, with one-third of Republicans joining the Democrats by voting against it.

Given the challenge from the ideological right, the Republican Agriculture Committee leadership had to explain its preference, retaining food stamps as an entitlement program while rejecting devolution to the states. The main justification offered by Roberts in the House and by his equivalent, Richard Lugar, in the Senate was that food stamps were a necessary safety net for those who rely on public assistance. According to Lugar, "there must be a safety net, basically, for eating, for nutrition—a safety net against starvation in this country."[30] This was especially valuable given the transition to a new welfare system in the states. The freedom to experiment, it was argued, would be enhanced by the existence of a secure nutrition entitlement remaining at the federal level. Food stamps with a uniform national benefit structure linked to net income had always served an equalizing function given the wide disparities in AFDC payments by state. It could now provide a backstop against possible TANF program deficiencies. In addition, the Agriculture leadership expressed worry that a block grant establishing separate state food assistance programs would not

[28] *Congressional Record*, 104th Cong., 1st sess., 1995, 141, no. 54: H 3614.

[29] U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Agriculture, *Food Stamp Program*, 104th Cong., 1st sess., 1995, 2.

[30] *Congressional Record*, 104th Cong., 1st sess., 1995, 141, no. 141: S 13336.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sufficiently protect against fraud and abuse, and that it could not insure appropriate job training for able recipients. Chairman Roberts even asserted that there was nothing in the Republican "Contract" that actually called for "block grants of cash" to be given over to the states.[31]

The Republican governors protested and were placated with slightly greater discretion. After a two and one-half hour meeting and conference call, the House Agriculture Committee agreed to permit any state with a functioning electronic benefits transfer system (using debit cards in place of food coupons) to receive its food stamp funds as a block grant. This was largely symbolic in the short run; despite thirteen years of urging from Congress, only Maryland currently could qualify and most states were years away from operating such a system. In addition, the House committee agreed that welfare beneficiaries holding a job in private industry paying at least $350 per month could get their food aid in cash rather than stamps. Governor Engler conceded that these changes were in the right direction, although they were hardly satisfying to the states seeking more dollars and less federal control. Equally, however, the changes were frightening to food stamp proponents concerned about maintaining nationwide protections against hunger. "This could be the beginning of the end of the food stamp program," warned Robert Fersh of the Food Research and Action Center.[32]

The leadership's explanation was somewhat superficial and not necessarily convincing. If the states could be trusted to manage the TANF block grant, then why not food stamps? If welfare recipients deserved an adequate safety net, then why only in nutrition assistance and not cash? The inconsistency in treatment stripped part of the luster from the self-proclaimed Republican revolution and strained the unity among Republican ranks in Congress. Behind the articulated justification, however, are four other reasons why food stamps were retained as a federal entitlement despite a partisan declaration on behalf of devolution.

The first reason concerns the structural differences between food and cash assistance programs. For example, it is far more complicated to administer a welfare arrangement that prints, distributes, and redeems special coupons, as opposed to one that merely awards cash to eligible households. A number of states, with governors less attached to the new Republican agenda, were hesitant about the responsibility for managing an independent food stamp operation. In addition, food stamps had always functioned as a single, national-level program, although it used state welfare offices for implementation. By contrast, AFDC historically had been established as a joint partnership, with each state writing its own eligibility and benefit rules within broad federal guidelines and providing a share of the necessary funds. In a sense, cash assistance to needy

[31] *Congressional Record*, 104th Cong., 1st sess., 1995, 141, no. 54: H 3615.

[32] Robert Pear, "House Leaders and Republican Governors Agree on an Alternative to Food Stamps," *New York Times*, 2 March 1995; Judith Havemann and Barbara Vobejda, "Governors Offered Control of Food Stamps," *Washington Post*, 2 March 1995.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

families was already part-way toward state control. It was, therefore, easier to imagine block grants for family assistance and easier to implement the change. Finally, food stamps, as an in-kind program narrowly targeted for nutrition support, was more secure emotionally in the hearts of the American public than AFDC, which simply provided more discretionary dollars to households with substandard earnings. The belief that no one should go hungry in a land of abundance could be counterpoised against the popular demand to radically and swiftly fix the so-called welfare mess. The lesson is that political decisions made in the past have a distinct impact on the present, as the inherited structure of policy affects the perceived need for and plausibility of reform options.

The second underlying reason involved the institutionalization of decision making. The Agriculture committees in the House and Senate were at first hardly enthusiastic about food stamps. Practical necessity, however, gradually gave way to acceptance. The next generation of committee members was more willing to integrate a new set of issues—nutrition, environment, trade—within the broad domain of legitimate concerns. Moreover, an increasing percentage of agriculture dollars flowed toward these areas, as opposed to more traditional commodity support programs. There was political reward from greater attention to these new issues, for they had appeal in all congressional districts, giving the committee importance beyond the narrow constituency of farmers.[33] By contrast, AFDC was placed within the jurisdiction of Ways and Means in the House and Finance in the Senate, which are taxation committees primarily and which also have responsibility for Social Security and Medicare. The taxation committees found little political gain but lots of bother and blame from their policy-making obligation regarding family cash assistance. Therefore Agriculture would be far less willing to diminish its policy responsibility by means of a block grant to the states than would Ways and Means. Chairman Roberts had developed a reputation of fighting for his committee's interests and autonomy, which sometimes led to personal conflicts with other Republican leaders. As he declared, "I must caution those who say, just send us the money with no oversight, no strings attached, and let us run the programs. This committee is not prepared to abrogate our responsibility."[34] Ironically, the decentralization of Congress into standing committees helped deter the decentralization of the food stamp program to the states.

The third reason was the presence of organized interests. Nutrition groups predictably protested that a block grant for food stamps would signal a retreat from the nation's commitment to feed its hungry. Yet many agriculture interest groups also registered opposition, forming an unusual but powerful alliance that had no parallel in the case of AFDC. According to a USDA study, a nutrition block grant would significantly reduce agricultural purchases and farm in-

[33] William P. Browne, *Cultivating Congress: Constituents, Issues, and Interests in Agricultural Policymaking* (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1995), 31–34; John Mark Hansen, *Gaining Access: Congress and the Farm Lobby, 1919–1981* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 201–11.

[34] U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Agriculture, *Food Stamps Program*, 2.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

comes. Based on the initial draft of the Personal Responsibility Act, the USDA estimated a large fall in retail food sales, between $4.25 and $10.5 billion, affecting earnings in both food production and marketing industries while costing more than 100,000 jobs. The report detailed the projected losses in a series of food sectors and predicted from an economy-wide econometric model long-run and lasting changes "in the composition of output and in the distribution of employment," with effects that "would be felt most heavily in rural America."[35] Farm interests over time had become reliant upon the additional income received as a consequence of food stamp payments. A number of agricultural lobbies, including both producers and grocers, communicated their fears to Congress. By severing the direct link to a national nutritional standard, there was no guarantee that a block grant would maintain current payment levels. By allowing the states discretion to design their own programs, there was no guarantee that stamps would be issued that targeted benefits solely for food purchases. Thus, for example, Wayne Lord of the National Peanut Association wrote to Senator Lugar, "to urge you in the strongest possible terms to oppose proposals, such as those included in the Personal Responsibility Act (PRA), to replace current federal food assistance programs with block-grant funding."[36] Not surprisingly, it was farm state legislators who were most willing to defy the Republican "Contract" in order to protect the federal food stamp program.

The fourth reason for the differential treatment of food stamps and AFDC concerned the pending farm bill. Most agricultural support programs required reauthorization in order to permit spending for FY 1996 and beyond. Typically, commodity subsidies and food stamps were joined together to facilitate rural-urban logrolling.[37] The 1995 farm bill promised to be especially controversial, as Chairman Roberts and the House Republican leadership were advancing a major reform based on free-market principles. Replacing many government protections and regulations, farmers would be guaranteed fixed payments that would decline over time regardless of economic conditions or planting decisions. The announced goal was gradually to wean American agriculture from federal dependence. Roberts's "Freedom to Farm" proposal encountered strong opposition, especially from dairy and cotton commodity interests. In the quest for votes, food stamps were a means of attracting legislators with districts minimally affected by the battle of agricultural perspectives. Roberts and his allies were not about to sacrifice this valuable bargaining chip to the welfare bill while the farm bill remained pending. The House Agriculture Committee report an-

[35] U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food and Consumer Service, *Reforming the Present Welfare System*, 300–3.

[36] *Congressional Record*, 104th Cong., 1st sess., 1995, 141, no. 141: S 13339.

[37] For contrasting interpretations of legislative vote-trading and food stamps, see Randall B. Ripley, "Legislative Bargaining and the Food Stamp Act, 1964" in Frederic N. Cleaveland, ed., *Congress and Urban Problems* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1969), 279–310; John Ferejohn, "Logrolling in an Institutional Context: A Case Study of Food Stamp Legislation" in Gerald Wright, Leroy Rieselbach, and Lawrence Dodd, eds., *Congress and Policy Change* (New York: Agathon, 1986), 223–53.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

nounced this fact in the same paragraph that declared food stamps would retain its entitlement status, stating that further program amendments might be considered and "this section may be revisited . . . if deemed necessary" during the consideration of the farm bill later in the year.[38]

In sum, food stamps were protected from the ideological movement toward welfare block grants by old-fashioned political pressures. On the basis of institutions, symbols, interests, and strategy, food stamps were far better positioned than AFDC to ward off the challenge from the states. Those legislators wishing for a more sweeping reform, including Senator Robert Dole who espoused block grants in his campaign for president, ultimately had to concede that they just did not have the votes.[39] Despite the promise of the "Contract with America," the practical politics of food stamps dominated over policy consistency and conservative principles.

Caps On and Off

The argument thus far has been that block grants can be seen as a complex form of budget control, but that food stamps were not transformed into a block grant, mainly for pragmatic reasons. The Republican leadership certainly never abandoned the goal of restraining costs. According to the House Agriculture Committee, "it is time to limit the automatic increases built into the food stamp program."[40] Similarly, Agriculture Chairman Roberts told Congress that it must take "the food stamp program off of automatic pilot" and discontinue "the pattern of ever escalating, runaway costs."[41] The committee target was to reduce food stamp spending by $16.5 billion over five years. The political coalition that had protected program integrity against devolution would not save it from budget-cutting reforms, especially when the alternative was deeper incisions into commodity subsidies.[42] The savings in the House bill came from a combination of substantive and arithmetical changes. Substantively, consistent with the announced conservative agenda, benefits were denied to most legal aliens and were restricted to ninety days for nonworking but able-bodied individuals aged 18 to 50 with no dependents. Arithmetically, the inflation adjustment to the Thrifty Food Plan was limited to 2 percent per year; and the standard deduction from gross income, the excess shelter cost deduction, and the excludable asset value for automobiles were all frozen at 1995 levels.

[38] U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Agriculture, *Food Stamp Reform and Commodity Distribution Act*, 46.

[39] *Congressional Record*, 104th Cong., 1st sess., 1995, 141, no. 131: S 11739; "Panel Trims Nutrition Spending, But Keeps Food Stamp Benefits," *New York Times*, 15 June 1995.

[40] U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Agriculture, *Food Stamp Reform and Commodity Distribution Act*, 35.

[41] *Congressional Record*, 104th Cong., 1st sess., 1995, 141, no. 54: H 3683.

[42] Guy Guliotta and Barbara Vobejda, "Hill Action on Food Programs Reflects Disparity of Influence," *Washington Post*, 29 November 1995.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Finally, to insure that spending remained within expected levels, a cap was reimposed on total food stamp appropriations. Annual obligations could not exceed the current CBO estimate, adjusted for the impact of the Personal Responsibility Act. The committee report favorably cited the example of the Mathis amendment of 1977, which established the cap format applied to food stamps for the subsequent thirteen fiscal years, and it called for a return to strict restraints upon permissible program spending. If entailed outlays in any given year were forecast to breach the cap, the secretary of agriculture would be required to reduce allotments across-the-board unless Congress took explicit action either to override the ceiling or to modify program rules. Certain nutrition advocates, such as Robert Greenstein from the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, had indicated their willingness to accept restored food stamp spending caps. If Congress wanted to limit the total amount of program spending, it was a better option than block grants, especially given past history: Congress had effectively escaped cap strictures whenever they actually had endangered recipient benefits. Unlike the past, however, it would now be more difficult to override cap thresholds in emergency conditions, because under the provisions of the Budget Enforcement Act, every deliberate increase in mandatory spending had to be matched by a compensating rise in taxes or by cuts in other mandatory programs.

The Republican House food stamp provisions provoked immediate condemnation from partisan Democrats. Toward the end of a long and heated Agriculture Committee mark-up session, Representative Harold Volkmer (D–MO) proposed naming the bill the "Food Stamp and Commodity Reduction to Make Americans Hungry Act." The minority report complained that the proposed changes were inspired primarily by cost reduction. The report praised the bill for rejecting the block grant option, but found it hypocritical because the reasons used to defend food stamps as a federal program were contradicted when specific provisions were eroded. Food stamps could not truly be considered a safety net when certain needy individuals would be deprived of benefits if they failed quickly to find a job. It could not be called a protection against malnutrition if allotment indexing was limited to 2 percent, because USDA estimates predicted a 3.5 percent annual increase in the cost of food. It could not be defended as flexible given changing economic circumstances if yearly dollar expenditures were capped and there was no automatic correction for the growth in recipient demand that occurs during unforeseen recession. "We must conclude that the majority's bill is a cost savings bill, nothing more. . . . Merely cutting the Food Stamp Program at some arbitrary level is not reform and no one should mistake it as such."[43]

The Clinton administration was disturbed by the House bill yet pleased that it could be attacked as a narrowly Republican venture. In the Senate, however,

[43] U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Agriculture, *Food Stamp Reform and Commodity Distribution Act*, 169–70.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

administration spokespeople adopted a more cooperative tone. The new Agriculture Secretary Dan Glickman announced that the president would veto any welfare bill that turned food stamps into a block grant or jeopardized the nutritional safety net. He offered a set of relatively tame reform recommendations but also indicated "we will work with you" to find additional savings that minimized harm to "the basic feeding and nutrition mission" of the program.[44] Following Glickman's suggestions, the Senate Agriculture Committee draft bill generally adopted lower thresholds but permitted automatic adjustments for changing conditions. For example, it fixed allotments at 100 percent (rather than 103 percent) of the Thrifty Food Plan but fully accommodated annual increases based on the cost of food. It reduced the standard deduction from gross income (from $138 to $124 per month) but resumed indexing beginning in FY 2003. It deleted strict budget caps but authorized spending only through FY 2002. On the other hand, pressure from the Republican Right had to be appeased. Each state would be given the discretion to take its food stamp money as a block grant, provided that 80 percent would be spent on food assistance and no more than 6 percent would be used for administrative costs.

The object for moderates in Congress was somehow to balance fiscal savings and program integrity in a manner capable of attracting bipartisan support and hopefully acquiescence from President Clinton—despite the ideological threat from conservatives to the right demanding full devolution while hoping for a veto in order to pursue further partisan attacks against the president, and despite the ideological threat from liberals to the left protesting all benefit reductions that might increase hunger while hoping for political deadlock in order to further wage public battle against the Republican "Contract." Bipartisan balance, maintained precariously on the Senate floor, was even more forbidding in conference where the House and Senate versions had to be reconciled. For example, the conference deleted the Senate provision allowing states the choice to select a block grant with its food stamp funds, yet it expanded the House provision permitting the block grant option not only for states with electronic benefit transfer systems but also for those with especially low error rates or willing to pay from their own funds the cost of excess errors. With regard to an annual spending cap, the conference followed the House and reimposed the cap, although the ceilings were somewhat relaxed. Appropriations would be authorized for seven years, with the legislated maximum rising gradually from $25.4 billion in FY 1996 to $29.8 billion in FY 2002. Whereas in 1990 the Bush administration viewed such caps as an unnecessary complication to reasonable entitlement budgeting, in 1995, under a different political and fiscal configuration, the new Republican majority advanced them as a useful instrument for expenditure control. Ironically, only five years after their elimination, aggregate limits upon food stamp outlays were on the verge of policy reenactment.

[44] U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry, *Federal Nutrition Programs*, 104th Cong., 1st sess., 1995, 19.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Yet budget caps for the food stamp program were never in fact reinstituted. First, the Personal Responsibility Act was incorporated as part of the 1995 omnibus reconciliation bill. As such, it became embroiled in the furious partisan budget battle that resulted in the shutdown of nonessential government services from 14 to 19 November and again from 16 December to 6 January. Inclusion within the broader measure protected the welfare titles against a filibuster and allowed its savings to be scored as part of the Republican seven-year balanced budget plan. Inclusion also meant that the section re-establishing the food stamp budget caps had to be deleted, as the Byrd rule in the Senate prohibited extraneous matters in a reconciliation bill. The issue became moot, however, as President Clinton vetoed the huge reconciliation bill, claiming that it "would cut deeply into Medicare, Medicaid, student loans, and nutrition programs; hurt the environment; raise taxes on millions of working men and women and their families by slashing the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC); and provide a huge tax cut whose benefits would flow disproportionately to those who are already the most well-off."[45] Second, the Personal Responsibility Act was then sent to the president as a free-standing bill approved by Congress in mid-December 1995 with a few minor changes intended to attract additional support. This version contained the food stamp spending cap provision. Republicans hoped that President Clinton would be trapped by his own past rhetoric into accepting it. Instead, the president issued another veto. While announcing his willingness to bargain in good faith, he declared this particular bill unacceptable as the deep spending cuts fell "hardest on children" and the structural changes had "little connection to the central goal" of moving people from welfare to work.[46] Last, there was still another iteration of the Personal Responsibility Act that cleared Congress in mid-1996 and eventually was signed into law by the president. Yet this version did not contain any mention of cap limitations upon food stamp spending. At the end of the long ordeal, the program remained as it was at the outset—a federal entitlement in which the government was obligated to provide funds for all eligible households adequate to satisfy the full level of their legitimate benefit claims.

In early 1996, the welfare bill became part of the election year politics of appearance and position-taking. President Clinton, in his State of the Union address, called upon Congress to send him a bipartisan reform measure that he could sign. Robert Dole and the Republicans, fearing that any such compromise bill would not be sufficiently strict, preferred simply to criticize Clinton for blocking popular legislation. While the Personal Responsibility Act languished, the farm bill received immediate attention. Its titles had been included

[45] William J. Clinton, "Message Returning to the House of Representatives Without Approval Budget Reconciliation Legislation," 6 December 1995, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, 1995*, 1853.

[46] William J. Clinton, "Message to the House of Representatives Returning Without Approval Legislation on the Welfare System," 9 January 1996, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, 1996*, 22–3.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in the 1995 reconciliation package vetoed by the president. If not revived, the food stamp program would soon exhaust its authority to spend, and most other agriculture provisions would revert back to the wording adopted in 1949. The House approved a new version based on "Freedom to Farm" principles and the Senate Agriculture Committee did likewise. Yet the controversial character of the bill combined with the need to move quickly made the measure vulnerable to a filibuster on the Senate floor. Chairman Lugar thus also advanced an alternative version, written specifically to appease Patrick Leahy (D–VT), which added sections concerning conservation and rural development initiatives and reauthorizing the food stamp program for seven more years without any cap restrictions. According to Leahy, "a farm bill is no longer . . . just about growing crops or amber waves of grain. A farm bill is about feeding the American people. It is about the elimination of hunger in one of the wealthiest nations in the world."[47] Moderate Democrats were now given an option other than total opposition.

While Lugar's more conservative bill did not gain enough support for cloture to shut off debate, the Lugar-Leahy compromise fell just one vote shy. Given that it would probably garner sufficient support once all the senators had returned from spring break, it was granted floor consideration and was approved with minor amendments. Yet hurdles remained in conference. Many Republicans were loath to permit food stamp extension without accompanying reform, thereby abandoning the leverage needed to enact substantial savings. Counterpressure came from the Clinton administration. Agriculture Secretary Glickman, in an eleven-page letter to lawmakers, expressed the USDA's reservations regarding the "Freedom to Farm" system of guaranteed yet declining crop subsidies, but listed a number of provisions—including reauthorized nutrition programs—that could help avert a presidential veto.[48] The need for hasty resolution influenced the final outcome. The conference accepted most of the Lugar-Leahy amendments. Regarding food stamps, the program was reauthorized for two years, through FY 1997, rather than seven in order to facilitate reconsideration if welfare reform returned to the active agenda. To better satisfy both Leahy and Glickman, however, no specified ceiling was placed on permissible outlays. It was always possible that budget caps could have been reintroduced during some later examination of food stamp provisions. Yet this was unlikely in the short-run according to the norms of legislative behavior. The concession had already been made as part of the bargaining over the farm bill. Under ordinary conditions it is thought deceitful to renege on a deal already made, and as such the proposal for caps on food stamp spending was withdrawn—at least temporarily—from policy deliberations.

Therefore, when interest in welfare reform revived in early summer, a large number of issues were treated as already settled. Given Clinton's rising popu-

[47] *Congressional Record*, 104th Cong., 2nd sess., 1996, 142, no. 16: S 901.

[48] David Hosansky, "Snare of Competing Interests Entangles Dairy Debate," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 16 March 1996, 691.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

larity and the approach of elections, a number of members of Congress felt the need to claim credit for a major legislative accomplishment, even if it meant sharing praise with the president. The critical retreat occurred when the Republican leadership dropped its demand that Medicaid also be transformed into a block grant. The resulting draft bill was somewhat more moderate than the one prepared in 1995. Regarding food stamps, the most important difference was full program reauthorization without expenditure ceilings through FY 2002. In addition, the Senate floor voted 53-45 to drop the option for states to elect a food stamp block grant if they had implemented electronic benefits or showed low error rates, and the conference complied in order to appease the secretary of agriculture and the White House. The final bill thus contained neither budget caps nor block grants for the food stamp program. Nevertheless, it still transferred control over family cash assistance to the states, imposed time limits on welfare benefits, deprived most legal immigrants of aid, and cut spending by more than $54 billion over seven years, $23 billion from food stamps alone. As Chairman Roberts celebrated, "Congress is back in control of spending on food stamps."[49] President Clinton, after much wavering, announced despite reservations that he would sign the measure because of the "historic opportunity to finish the work of ending welfare as we know it."[50] He carefully consulted the public opinion polls before making his decision, which was motivated significantly by practical politics.[51]

In a sense, block grants and budget caps both freeze program spending while minimizing congressional responsibility for the effects. Block grants shift authority to the states, which then must manage on their own against potential deficiencies in available funding relative to demand. Budget caps formally constrain annual appropriations, such that potential funding deficiencies are deemed extraordinary and are remedied by Congress solely as a matter of policy discretion. Both block grants and caps have been justified as tools useful to constrain runaway federal welfare spending. Despite the apparent political and budgetary advantages of these tools and the ideological insistence from the new Republican majority that one of them be adopted, neither ultimately was applied to the food stamp program as part of the 1996 reform. The most striking conclusion from the preceding discussion is that institutionalization matters. On the one hand, the institutionalization of policy established stakeholders, either as beneficiaries protective of existing program functions or as decision makers protective of their jurisdictional power. The former was exemplified by the odd coalition of nutrition advocates and farm lobbies; the latter by the Agri-

[49] *Congressional Record*, 104th Cong., 2nd sess., 1996, 142, no. 105: H 7753.

[50] William J. Clinton, "Remarks on Welfare Reform Legislation and an Exchange With Reporters," 31 July 1996, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, 1996*, 1235.

[51] Dick Morris, *Behind the Oval Office* (New York: Random House, 1997), 297–304. Senator Moynihan (D-NY) commented, "The Cabinet is against the bill. The pollsters are for it. This is a defining event in his Presidency." Quoted in Robert Pear, "Clinton To Sign Welfare Bill That Ends U.S. Aid Guarantees and Gives States Broader Power," *New York Times*, 1 August 1996.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

culture committees refusing to cede sovereignty over the policies within their domain. On the other hand, the institutionalization of procedure constructed the policy arena and multiplied the number of actors with effective bargaining capacity. The autonomy of congressional committees enabled Roberts, Emerson, and Lugar to resist pressures from "Contract" loyalists. The threat of filibuster in the Senate allowed Leahy and other Democratic moderates to extract a price for their consent. The president's veto power helped Secretary Glickman to negotiate provisions more acceptable to the Clinton administration. The food stamp policy outcome—a momentous change that never occurred—was hardly the consequence of systematic deliberation and the careful formulation of preferences. Entitlement status was preserved, but not in a manner that suggests permanent resolution.

Bottom-Up or Top-Down Control

In the present era of welfare budget restraint, two alternative strategies have dominated the political agenda. The first emphasizes control from the bottom up, looking at the details of each program in order to enact reforms the sum of which are projected to bring overall costs down to the target level. The second emphasizes control from the top down, imposing a fixed limit on permissible spending backed by a procedure requiring program cuts if total outlays threaten to exceed some specified threshold.

From the standpoint of cost containment, each approach has its own entailed risks. The approach from the bottom is politically more difficult to enact, as it requires legislators to specify all program sacrifices and to construct a viable coalition capable of maintaining the cuts through the congressional labyrinth. After enactment, there will still be temptations toward leakage, as the groups deprived of desired benefits continue to pressure for redress and compensation. Moreover, there is no guarantee that any package of piecemeal reforms from the bottom will actually achieve the desired level of savings. Estimates of future program costs are rarely accurate. This is especially true of welfare entitlements, notoriously sensitive to fluctuations in utilization rates and macroeconomic indicators. The net result, therefore, is often substantial political pain for little budgetary gain.

The approach from the top, by contrast, is especially difficult to enforce. Legislators might be amenable to aggregate restraint as long as the cuts do not have to be identified in the present and the effects are felt only in the future. Mandatory spending ceilings protect against cost misestimation and automatic drift, but only to the extent that elected politicians are truly willing to sustain them when threatened—quite possibly deep into the fiscal year, quite possibly through cuts unpalatable to vulnerable or powerful interests. The net result, therefore, is that aggregate caps are often written to be more symbolic than real, and in emergency conditions they are overridden rather than imposed.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Food stamp reform, over the development of the Personal Responsibility Act, was increasingly focused upon cutting costs and saving federal dollars. The target figure was set by budget resolution, and the money would be used to help finance the zero-deficit plan advanced by the Republican leadership. At the start of the process, the proposed strategy for cost savings was almost entirely top down, initially by means of block appropriations to the states and then by ceilings on inflationary adjustments and by aggregate spending caps. At the end, the cost-cutting strategy was almost entirely bottom up, based upon a series of particular changes to program provisions. This was a remarkable movement, but it was not unique. A parallel shift, for instance, also occurred at the most aggregate level, concerning the control of welfare entitlements as a whole.

The "Contract with America" called for a Balanced Budget constitutional amendment as a form of top-down restraint upon the entire federal government. Defenders refused to specify exactly how zero deficits would be achieved, in part because an amendment should be focused on principles more than details and in part because the specification of details might frighten off potential supporters. Yet the wording of the amendment instructed Congress to enforce and implement the new article through appropriate legislation, which certain proponents assumed meant controls on mandatory spending written to match the Budget Enforcement Act's controls on discretionary spending. The Balanced Budget amendment easily passed the House, but it narrowly failed to secure a two-thirds majority on the Senate floor in 1995, 1996, and 1997.

In the meantime, Congress and the president were locked in a bitter struggle over deficit reduction. Clinton proposed only a token reduction in his budget submission of February 1995. In June, he sought to steal some of the Republican's thunder by proposing to eradicate the federal deficit over ten years, saving enough money from changes in mandatory and discretionary programs to afford a small tax cut for middle- and lower-class families. In December, at the climax of the battle, he matched the Republican offer with a revised, seven-year balanced budget plan, although it advanced somewhat different fiscal priorities and was grounded on friendly Office of Management and Budget (OMB) econometric estimates. In February 1996, Clinton accepted the principle of CBO scorekeeping as an element in the temporary truce that was kept until elections. The 1996 election maintained divided partisan control over government institutions, and the consequence was that both sides returned to Washington ready to negotiate. The celebrated budget deal of May 1997 would cut taxes and retard spending, especially health care.[52] Economic growth certainly made it easier to reach accord, as comparatively high revenues and low entailed spending had reduced the projected deficit gap. The agreement in itself indicated the degree to which the Republican agenda had become dominant. Yet the details of the agreement were entirely bottom-up, thus requiring appro-

[52] For a history of the 1997 Budget Agreement, see Daniel J. Palazzolo, *Done Deal?* (New York: Chatham House, 1999).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

priations and reconciliation bills to enact a range of reforms across many separate programs. Predictably, deficit hawks conscious of the original "Contract" were concerned by the disregard for top-down controls.

The anticipated rebellion occurred over the rule bringing to the House floor the reconciliation bill for government spending. Deficit hawks sought to add a title to the bill to insure strict enforcement of the specified revenue, expenditure, and deficit targets, and to obligate an automatic sequester if the actual figures varied from expectation. For mandatory spending, there would be a cap for the total sum and for a series of separate program categories, including food stamps. The annual target would be adjusted for changes in inflation and eligible population. If outlays during the previous fiscal year or anticipated during the current year breached the target, either in the aggregate or for any particular entitlement category, the Budget Committees had to report new legislation to generate the necessary savings and/or to accommodate the overage. If no explicit action were taken, across-the-board cuts would be imposed. The House Rules Committee, fearing disruption of the tenuous agreement negotiated with the Clinton administration, refused to allow the enforcement provision the privilege of a direct vote on the floor. However, the next day as the rule on the reconciliation bill appeared in jeopardy of defeat, the committee backtracked and decided to let the title emerge but only as a free-standing measure.

When the budget enforcement proposal finally reached the House floor one month later, the Republican leadership worked to prevent passage. It prohibited amendments to improve the draft, complained about interruptions to ordinary committee procedures, and warned that the measure would endanger tax reduction, Social Security, and veterans' benefits. The defenders of top-down controls complained loudly about hypocrisy, treachery, and duplicity. They argued that a balanced budget required firm discipline to insure responsible behavior. They pointed to the history of previous agreements—including Gramm-Rudman-Hollings and the compact of 1990—which had failed to achieve lower deficits because of the lack of sufficiently strong and encompassing entitlement constraints. The 1997 accord depended far too much on future projections, plausible as they were. Economic shocks were always a risk, but steps could be taken to guarantee that they do not undermine the fiscal promise made to the American people. Although it might sound hard-hearted, they asserted, no federal policy program should be insulated from budget accountability. The arguments were consistent, but the supporters were few, even among Republican loyalists. The enforcement bill lost impressively, 81-347. Top-down ceilings on the growth of entitlement spending had been a central element of dissenting budget resolution motions during previous Congresses. Now, surprisingly, early in the 105th Congress, with a Republican majority in both chambers and with public opinion favoring a balanced budget, this approach was rejected soundly.

The most recent period of welfare and budget reform thus produced, overall and for many individual policy arenas, a systematic tendency toward disag-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

gregated spending control. From the advance advertising, one could well have predicted the opposite. There was remarkably little debate regarding the merits of alternative strategies for restraint. Political contests were concerned more with partisan position-taking and deal-making than with the presentation and evaluation of fundamental principles of governance. Such is the common nature of American politics. Sometimes, even without careful deliberation, the resolution of thorny problems emerges. In the mid-1990s, AFDC was given to the states as a block grant, ending the direct federal commitment to support poor families with children. However, the vast majority of antipoverty programs remained in their fundamental structure unaltered. Despite repeated threats, food stamps was left as an uncapped entitlement. Medicaid similarly escaped reconstruction. A balanced budget was promised without procedural fetters on the growth of mandatory spending. The bottom-up strategy imposed a series of deep yet piecemeal spending cuts, but it did not establish new decision-making procedures or redefine entitlement rules. Given the inherent policy tension between responsive welfare provision and encompassing budget regulation, the outcome for the programs remaining within the federal dominion might appear to have been settled largely in favor of the former.

Nevertheless, there are grounds for skepticism. Entitlement protection and expenditure restraint still represent contradictory principles. In an era of pervasive budgetary concern, a bottom-up attempt to restrain welfare spending might not prove sufficiently strict. It establishes too little guarantee to politicians fixated upon securing a zero-deficit figure, and thus it threatens to reopen the problem of adequate antipoverty provision at the very moment when outlay controls seem to be eroding. The pressure from top-down entitlement limitations overall, and for food stamps in particular, was escaped but not because of a serious consideration of the complications entailed. Discipline over federal government expenditures remains popular on the national policy agenda. Welfare costs remain largely stigmatized despite the fact that full entitlement status for most programs has been preserved. The tension between entitlement and budgeting has been deferred by the adoption of a series of piecemeal, bottom-up cuts in eligibility and benefits. Conjoined to prosperous macroeconomic conditions, existing policy simply hopes that the tension will not again emerge in a vexatious form.

First, there is a problem with incremental leakages. Sympathetic constituencies and organized interests will pressure for relief from particular provisions imposed to reduce program costs. The erosions in food stamps, for example, started almost immediately. In late 1996, $2 billion of projected savings began to disappear as the states used a lenient administrative ruling to exempt nonworking able-bodied individuals with no dependents from the limitation of three months of benefits every three years. The law allowed waivers to communities with high unemployment rates or an insufficient number of available jobs. By December, thirteen states had requested waivers and more applications were expected. The 1997 supplemental appropriations bill gave permission for

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the states to award food stamp benefits to legal aliens, provided that they reimburse the USDA for the cost. The 1997 reconciliation bill allowed the states to exempt an extra 15 percent of able-bodied individuals from the work requirement. In 1998, the Agricultural Research, Extension, and Education Act restored full benefits to those aged, disabled, or child noncitizens who were legally in the United States when the welfare reform act was enacted. The provision was not in the original bill, but was added in conference partly in response to intense lobbying by Hispanic interests. The Clinton administration strongly supported the measure, and it was backed by a logrolling coalition of farm and nutrition groups, which agreed to split the $1.7 billion made available by a reduction in food stamp administrative costs.

Second and more important, welfare restraint through bottom-up adjustments in program benefit and eligibility rules is vulnerable to unexpected economic fluctuations. The effect of program cuts on total spending is merely predicted, and predictions often fall short of actual results. The thriving U.S. economy of the mid-1990s lowered assistance rolls, helping the Personal Responsibility Act to achieve its targets; it lowered the federal deficit, making the balanced budget accord easier to negotiate. The problem is that the prevailing fiscal optimism depends heavily on the assumption that market conditions will remain favorable. The bottom-up strategy alters substantive provisions but does not affect the requirement that the government finance all benefits granted under the terms of prevailing law. The deficit hawks had legitimate grounds for their suspicion of dollar savings claimed on the basis of forecast without procedural enforcement. A policy synthesis proclaiming simultaneously spending constraint and guaranteed payments is inconsistent upon the intrusion of renewed budget pressures.

One can imagine a situation where entitlement dominates, in which society agrees to accommodate all entailed obligations on behalf of the poor regardless of their effect on deficits, taxes, or other spending priorities. In the United States, however, recent pressures tilt the other way. The firm promise to balance the budget has diminished fiscal flexibility. Individual discontent has reduced voter willingness to sacrifice tax dollars or program rewards. The perceived imperatives of economic growth, especially in times of uncertain investor confidence, help deter movement toward progressive redistribution. The Clinton administration has been favored by prosperity, which has the capacity to drown away inconsistent imperatives. Yet upturns historically have not enjoyed infinite duration, and in the receding tide tensions often reemerge among competing policy principles. Unwilling to accept the full implications of welfare entitlement, it is not unlikely that the American federal government will soon rediscover the temptation toward mechanical caps and ceilings upon the assistance it awards to the hungry and impoverished.

This article has presented a perspective on the 1996 welfare reform somewhat different than those based primarily upon AFDC and the transfer of responsibility for family cash assistance to the states. It has emphasized the in-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

herent tension between entitlement status and spending restraint, and it has analyzed the welfare reform as an inconsistent conservative attempt to reconstitute the balance. Block grants are understood as a complex form of expenditure limitation. Yet, despite policy precedent and partisan promotions, neither the block grant option nor any other form of budget control was imposed on the food stamp program. Nor were budget control procedures introduced for federal welfare spending as a whole. Apart from AFDC, the reform was comprised mainly of bottom-up cuts to specific program provisions, which were forecast to achieve dollar savings in the amounts requested. Nevertheless, as the evidence shows, the outcome of 1996 should not be seen as a solution. American policy makers to date have not yet reconciled themselves to the full fiscal implications of preserved entitlement provision. One might hope for a society that makes explicit its commitments to those in the community declared needy and that refuses to waver from those commitments despite moderate sacrifices to self-interest and majority comforts. Short of this, however, we can wish that the next round of welfare reform confronts the underlying issues with greater consciousness. Budget control and entitlement protection are inconsistent objectives, yet both remain essential to the U.S. welfare agenda and have increasingly come into conflict in this era of deficit pressures yet persistent poverty. The consequence is a contradictory policy, reflecting a national unwillingness to decide.*

* This article is an excerpt from a much larger manuscript, entitled "Budgeting Entitlements: Costs and Caps in the Food Stamp Program." The author would like to thank the Century Foundation, the Murphy Institute of Political Economy, and the Tulane University Committee on Research for their generous support.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL & PUBLIC AFFAIRS

JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

The unique single-topic journal with multiple perspectives

Beyond the Headlines since 1947

Announcing the Fall 1999 Issue

FUELING THE 21ST CENTURY: THE NEW POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ENERGY

Diverse essays on the interplay between energy and politics, economics, security and the environment. Featuring **Edward L. Morse** on defining the "new" political economy of energy; **Terry L. Karl** reflecting on "the paradox of plenty"; **Amory Lovins** on the concept of natural capitalism; and **Christopher Flavin** on the clean-energy economy of the 21st century. Energy dilemmas from each region of the world are explored with **Luis Giusti** on privatization in Venezuela; **Bronwen Manby** and **John Imle** squaring off on the role of oil multinationals in Nigeria and Myanmar (Burma); **Martha Brill Olcott** on oil windfall expectations and society in the Caspian and Central Asia; **Dai Qing & Lawrence R. Sullivan** on China's controversial Three Gorges Dam; **David E. Nye** on the cultures of energy consumption; **Fereidun Fesharaki** on energy and security in East Asia; and **R. K. Pachauri** on cleaning up coal in India. Other contributors include **Lisa Anderson, Douglas Barnes** and **Marshall Goldman**.

SEEKING INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE: THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONS

Spring 1999 Issue

Featuring Jimmy Carter, Richard Falk, Ethan Kapstein, Benjamin B. Ferencz, Naomi Robt-Arriaza, M. Cherif Bassiouni, Alfred P. Rubin, Michael P. Scharf, Ed Vulliamy and Paul van Zyl, among others.

Within the United States, subscribe by check, money order or credit card
$18 (one year) $35 (two years) - postage included

Payable to: *Journal of International Affairs*, Columbia University
Box 4, International Affairs Building, New York, NY 10027 U.S.A.
Phone: (212) 854-4775 Fax: (212) 662-0398

http://www.columbia.edu/cu/sipa/PUBS/JOURNAL
Please contact us for institutional and international rates

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Policy toward Cuba in the Clinton Administration

WALT VANDERBUSH
PATRICK J. HANEY

The debates over U.S. policy toward Cuba take place within the parameters of the U.S. embargo and isolation policy toward Cuba that is a matter of law. The Helms-Burton legislation signed in 1996 after Cuban Migs shot down two planes piloted by members of the Cuban-American exile group, Brothers to the Rescue, killing four people, not only strengthened the embargo and lengthened its reach, it codified all such policies into law. The president cannot lift the economic embargo of Cuba unilaterally, as Clinton did with Vietnam; such a change must go through Congress. More interesting still, the Clinton administration surrendered this presidential prerogative largely without a fight and with little public or scholarly notice. No longer within the near-exclusive purview of the executive and a powerful interest group, in this period Cuba policy became enmeshed in electoral politics and a struggle for foreign policy power between the Congress and the president.

Here we examine the politics of Cuba policy in the first term of Clinton administration. We argue that the roots of Cuba policy rest in the complex dynamics of domestic politics that surround this issue. The initiative behind Cuba policy in the first Clinton administration largely moved out of the White House and onto Capitol Hill. While this trend began before the end of the cold war, it has accelerated in recent years. It is perhaps common to argue that policy makers are hostages to the Cuban American National Foundation (CANF),[1] a forceful supporter of the embargo, but the evidence suggests that the politics

[1] See "The Fading of Fidel," *The Economist*, 17 January 1998, 13; and Walter Russell Mead, "Mutual Assured Stupidity: Washington's Cuba Policy is Made in Miami," *The New Yorker*, 11 March 1996, 9–10.

WALT VANDERBUSH is assistant professor of political science, and PATRICK J. HANEY is associate professor of political science at Miami University. HANEY is the author of *Organizing for Foreign Policy Crises: Presidents, Advisers, and the Management of Decision Making.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of Cuba policy today are more complicated than that. Through the 1980s, Cuba policy was largely driven by presidential prerogative and interest group power. Now it is not so much driven as it is pushed by several actors, including interest groups and the president; but changing the core of Cuba policy—the embargo—must go through Capitol Hill. First, we discuss the relationship between Congress and the president in the area of foreign policy. Next, we quickly review U.S. policy toward Cuba in the Reagan and Bush administrations. Building on that conceptual and historical base, we then examine Cuba policy in the first Clinton administration. We conclude with an assessment of the new politics of Cuba policy that emerged in the 1990s—particularly the rise of Congress as a key actor in this area.

Congress, the President, and Foreign Policy

During at least the first two decades following World War II, a scholarly consensus existed that the "Imperial President" reigned supreme over U.S. foreign policy making. As Crabb and Holt described it, the situation in the mid-1960s was one "of virtually unchecked presidential authority in diplomacy."[2] Examples of presidential primacy in the making of U.S. policy toward Latin America during the quarter century following World War II abound. The exile invasion of Cuba, military intervention in the Dominican Republic, covert activities in Guatemala and Chile, and even sponsored assassination plots against Latin American leaders were products of the dominant executive branch.[3] Randall Ripley and James Lindsay suggest that the list of actors relevant to understanding U.S. foreign and defense policy as late as the mid-1970s included only the president and the national security bureaucracy.[4]

Many analysts point to the end of the Vietnam War as marking the beginning of a new period for congressional activism in the foreign policy arena.[5] In addition to the scholarly assessment, practitioners up to and including presidents have complained about the new constraints emanating from the legisla-

[2] Cecil V. Crabb Jr. and Pat M. Holt, *Invitation to Struggle: Congress, the President and Foreign Policy*, 4th ed. (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, 1992), 269.

[3] Stephen G. Rabe, "The Presidency" in David W. Dent, ed., *U.S.-Latin American Policymaking* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1995), 248–276.

[4] Randall B. Ripley and James M. Lindsay, "Foreign and Defense Policy in Congress: An Overview and Preview" in Ripley and Lindsay, eds., *Congress Resurgent: Foreign and Defense Policy on Capitol Hill* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1993), 3–14.

[5] For example, see Thomas W. Franck and Edward Weisband, *Foreign Policy by Congress* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979); Philip Brenner, *The Limits and Possibilities of Congress* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983); Cynthia J. Arnson, *Crossroads: Congress, the President, and Central America* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1993); John T. Tierney, "Congressional Activism in Foreign Policy: Its Varied Forms and Stimuli" in David A. Deese, ed., *The New Politics of American Foreign Policy* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), 102–129; Thomas E. Mann, ed., *A Question of Balance: The President, Congress and Foreign Policy* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1990).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ture. In referring to the ways that Congress had broadened its powers in foreign relations, President Gerald Ford argued that: "The pendulum has swung so far that you could almost say we have moved from an imperial Presidency to an imperiled Presidency."[6] More recently, scholars have suggested that the end of the cold war has marked a "new tug of war"[7] and more congressional assertiveness that has led to "a fundamental change in executive-legislative relations of foreign policy."[8]

Contributing to the change in the balance of power between Congress and the president was the loss of the executive's near-monopoly over information, which Cecil Crabb and Pat Holt argue has been among the branch's most important resources.[9] In the last two decades, more opportunities have developed for individual members of Congress to engage in what John Tierney refers to as "policy entrepreneurialism."[10] Representatives and senators may gain credibility on the basis of acquired expertise over a certain nation or region, and as a result they exert disproportionate influence on issues within their perceived domains.

The capacity of Congress to influence policy in a struggle with the president seems to vary by issue area. Ripley and Lindsay argue the Congress is likely to have the least influence in "crisis" policy making, somewhat more in "strategic" policy, and the most effect over "structural" issues, which largely mirror domestic spending issues.[11] And Jeremy Rosner agrees that congressional assertiveness varies from issue to issue: in traditional national security concerns or threats, including policies with likely domestic economic impact, the executive is likely to have the balance of power; with nontraditional issues, such as human rights, Congress is more likely to exert influence.[12]

This position has been challenged by scholars such as Barbara Hinckley, who argues that the increase in congressional activity is "less than meets the eye."[13] After all, "the fact remains that the president is still in charge of American foreign policy."[14] Or, as Roger Hilsman described it, the president is the "decision maker of last resort."[15] In general, the literature on the relative im-

[6] Crabb and Holt, *Invitation to Struggle*, 268.

[7] Jeremy D. Rosner, *The New Tug-of-War: Congress, the Executive Branch, and National Security* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1995), 11.

[8] James M. Lindsay, "End of an Era: Congress and Foreign Policy after the Cold War" in Eugene R. Wittkopf and James M. McCormick, eds., *The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy: Insights and Evidence*, 3rd ed. (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999), 177–178.

[9] Crabb and Holt, *Invitation to Struggle*, 19.

[10] Tierney, "Congressional Activism," 104.

[11] Lindsay and Ripley, "How Congress Influences Foreign and Defense Policy" in *Congress Resurgent*, 19–22.

[12] Rosner, *The New Tug-of-War*, 2–3.

[13] Barbara Hinckley, *Less than Meets the Eye: Foreign Policy Making and the Myth of the Assertive Congress* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994).

[14] Crabb and Holt, *Invitation to Struggle*, 1.

[15] Roger Hilsman, *The Politics of Policy Making in Defense and Foreign Affairs* (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), 18.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

portance of the president and Congress in making foreign policy still sides with the executive branch. While there has been a resurgence of congressional activism in foreign policy, the balance of power—especially in crisis and strategic policy making—favors the president.

U.S.–Cuba Policy during the Cold War

Over the course of the first two decades following the 1959 Cuban revolution, the executive controlled Cuba policy. Dwight Eisenhower and John F. Kennedy established and tightened the embargo, Ford opened secret talks with Cuba, and Jimmy Carter reached a number of agreements with Cuba, including the opening of "interest sections" in Washington and Havana.[16] U.S. policy toward Cuba would tighten again in the 1980s. Candidate Ronald Reagan saw Cuba as a key source for U.S. difficulties in Latin America. During a campaign radio broadcast, he argued, "The troubles in Nicaragua bear a Cuban label . . . there is no question but that most of the rebels are Cuban-trained, Cuban-armed, and dedicated to creating another Communist country in this hemisphere."[17] The Reagan team would focus on trying to tighten and globalize the embargo of Cuba, but there was little support in Congress or the public for the Reagan view of Latin America.[18] At this same time, Cuban-Americans—who had been attempting to challenge Fidel Castro's regime for years—decided to take their political activities to Washington, D.C. The Reagan team and some Cuban-Americans had a shared need to shift public perceptions on issues related to Cuba policy, and CANF was founded in 1980–1981. While the executive would continue to largely shape Cuba policy, it would now do so in a more complex way—with an interest group ally targeted at a reluctant Congress.

A number of different versions of the founding of CANF have appeared in the literature.[19] Jorge Mas Canosa has claimed that the impetus for CANF was the sole idea of a few Cuban-Americans, acting without help from Reagan supporters,[20] although Richard V. Allen, Reagan's first national security adviser,

[16] US Information Agency Chronology of US-Cuban Relations, 1958–1998 (http://www.usia.gov/regional/ar/us-cuba/cubach.htm). See Philip Brenner, *From Confrontation to Negotiation: US Relations with Cuba* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1988); Gillian Gunn, *Cuba in Transition* (Washington, DC: Twentieth Century Fund Press, 1993); Donna Rich Kaplowitz, *Anatomy of a Failed Embargo: US Sanctions Against Cuba* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998); and William M. LeoGrande, "From Havana to Miami: U.S. Cuba Policy as a Two-Level Game," *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 40 (Spring 1998): 67–86.

[17] Quoted in Holly Sklar, *Washington's War on Nicaragua* (Boston: South End Press, 1988), 57.

[18] Brenner, *From Confrontation to Negotiation*; Gunn, *Cuba in Transition*; Kaplowitz, *Anatomy of a Failed Embargo*, 117–143.

[19] For a full discussion of these different versions, see Patrick J. Haney and Walt Vanderbush, "The Role of Ethnic Interest Groups in US Foreign Policy: the Case of the Cuban American National Foundation," *International Studies Quarterly* 43 (June 1999): 341–361.

[20] Jorge Mas Canosa, Deposition from *Mas Canosa v. New Republic, Inc., and Ann Louise Bardach*, U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida (Testimony: 10 January, 20–21 February, 10–11 April, 1996), 110.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

is usually mentioned as being instrumental in CANF's founding.[21] Allen recalls suggesting to Mas during the 1980 election that Cuban-Americans form a lobby based on the model of the powerful American Israeli Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC); he notes that it was "not an official suggestion" but that he and others were clearly receptive to such a move. Needing help with a Democrat-controlled House of Representatives that would need to be persuaded to support Reagan's policies, the new administration welcomed any assistance from the Cuban community.[22]

Cuba policy and the political activities of CANF went largely hand-in-hand in the 1980s as a pattern of cooperation emerged between the executive and the interest group it sponsored. The two worked together to lobby Congress for a government-sponsored radio station aimed at Cuba. In October 1983, President Reagan signed into law the bill that led to the first broadcast by Radio Marti in May 1985. The political partnership appears to have continued through its operations, leading the first director of Radio Marti to resign in 1990 following a number of conflicts with Mas. The director argued, "USIA has practically abdicated control of the stations to an exile group. . . . A key foreign policy instrument is being subordinated to political considerations."[23]

CANF also developed a close relationship with the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), founded in the Reagan Administration as a vehicle for U.S. government financial support for democracy movements in other countries.[24] In addition, CANF was active in immigration policy in this period through Operation Exodus, whereby for the first time in U.S. history a refugee process was privatized. And CANF was a natural ally for the Reagan administration on the issue of aid to the contras in Nicaragua. Mas and CANF also focused on Angola, where Cuban troops had joined the battle, and lobbied Congress to repeal the Clark Amendment, which prohibited the U.S. government from funding the UNITA insurgency in Angola.[25] Congress repealed the

[21] See Ann Louise Bardach, "Our Man in Miami," *The New Republic*, 3 October 1994, 21; Gaeton Fonzi, "Who is Jorge Mas Canosa . . ." *Esquire*, January 1993, 86–9, 119–22; Lee Hockstader and William Booth, "Cuban Exiles Split on Life After Castro: Miami Groups in Bitter Conflict Over Who Might Be in Charge," *Washington Post*, 10 March 1992; Christopher Marquis, "Cuban Exile Leader Jorge Mas Canosa Dies," *Miami Herald*, 23 November 1997 (online); John Newhouse, "Reporter at Large: Socialism or Death," *The New Yorker*, 27 April 1992, 76; Mireya Navarro, "Cuban-Americans Vow to Carry on Leader's Efforts,"*New York Times*, 24 November 1997 (online); and Larry Rohter, "An Exile's Empire: A Special Report," *New York Times*, 8 May 1995.

[22] Richard V. Allen, telephone interview with author, 25 November 1997.

[23] Ernesto Betancourt, quoted in Patrick J. Kiger, *Squeeze Play: The United States, Cuba, and the Helms-Burton Act* (Washington, DC: Center for Public Integrity, 1997), 71; see also Kenneth N. Skoug, *The United States and Cuba under Reagan and Shultz: a Foreign Service Officer Reports* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1996), 201.

[24] On the founding of the NED, see Elizabeth Cohn, *Idealpolitik in US Foreign Policy: The Reagan Administration and the Promotion of Democracy* (unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, American University, 1995).

[25] Fonzi, "Who is Jorge Mas Canosa," 119.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

amendment, even though the administration never really pushed the issue.[26] Through the Reagan years, CANF was becoming increasingly powerful and more autonomous in making policy related to Cuba.

Cuba policy was largely on the backburner early in the Bush administration, but during his tenure international circumstances changed dramatically. Given these shifts, the focus of American policy toward Cuba changed to emphasize domestic political and human rights reform.[27] In order to press this agenda in Cuba, Mas proposed the idea of TV Marti, and he was able to secure a ninety day "trial" appropriation of $7.5 million without committee hearings in Congress.[28] By 1990, TV Marti was broadcasting regularly. Although Cuba mostly jammed the early morning broadcasts, President George Bush pronounced the trial period a success, and the jammed broadcasts continue to the present.

Cuba moved to the front burner for the Bush administration for two reasons. First, Haitian exiles were fleeing en masse but were largely being returned to Haiti, which raised the specter of a double standard relative to Cuban exiles who gained easy entry to the United States.[29] Second, the Congress became more engaged and formulated the Cuban Democracy Act (CDA) following a series of hearings before a House committee in 1991.[30] Both of these items would haunt Bush through the 1992 election. In 1989, Cuba-American Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R–FL) had taken her seat in the House of Representatives. Her arrival added a new dimension to the view of Cuba policy from Congress. Joined by fellow Cuban-Americans Lincoln Diaz-Balart (R–FL) and Robert Menendez (D–NJ) in 1993, she contributed to a new congressional activism in Cuba policy with which the president would have to deal. Heading into the 1992 presidential election, both international circumstances and domestic political realities had changed. The president and CANF were still important actors in making Cuba policy, but electoral politics and an increasingly active Congress were emerging as important forces as well.

Back to the Future: Cuba Policy in the 1990s

Cuban Democracy Act

Beginning in 1989, Connie Mack (R–FL) offered a bill for three consecutive years that would prohibit subsidiaries of U.S. firms from trading with Cuba.

[26] Peter Rodman, *More Precious than Peace: The Cold War and the Struggle for the Third World* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1994), 364.

[27] See Kaplowitz, *Anatomy of a Failed Embargo*, 145–69.

[28] Fonzi, "Who is Jorge Mas Canosa," 89.

[29] U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on International Law, Immigration, and Refugees, *Cuban and Haitian Immigration*, 102nd Cong., 1st sess., 20 November 1991 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office [GPO], 1992).

[30] U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittees on Europe and the Middle East, and on Western Hemisphere Affairs, *Cuba in a Changing World: The United States-Soviet-Cuba Triangle*, 101st Cong., 1st sess., 30 April, 11 and 31 July 1991 (Washington, DC: GPO,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Bush administration officials consistently opposed the Mack Amendment during that period. In July 1991, Bernard Aronson, assistant secretary of state for inter-American affairs testified before Congress that, "The ban on subsidiaries of U.S. multi-nationals would create a foreign policy problem with a lot of allies who rightly believe that that would be an assertion of U.S. law into their territory and who would be prepared to retaliate in direct ways. Our analysis is that the benefits that we would gain in terms of embargo enforcement are relatively minimal."[31] The Mack Amendment was defeated easily in 1991, as it was in previous years, showing that while Congress was becoming more active they were not yet able to countervail against the executive.

In early 1992, the impetus came from the other side of the aisle, as first Congressman Robert Torricelli (D–NJ) and then Senator Bob Graham (D–FL) introduced the CDA in their respective chambers. The CDA had two tracks, which were sometimes referred to as "carrots and sticks." One focus of the measure—similar to the Mack Amendment—was to increase the economic pressure on Cuba by shutting off trade with foreign subsidiaries of U.S. multinationals and making it more difficult for ships that had made Cuban stops to enter U.S. ports. This would close the de facto loosening of the embargo that followed as the Cuba economy opened to the rest of the world following the fall of the Soviet Union.[32] The other focus was to try to reach out to the Cuban people by making communication and family visits to Cuba easier. CANF played a prominent role throughout the legislative process of this bill. Torricelli had developed close ties to the interest group, although his own New Jersey district had almost no Cuban-Americans. In a future statewide race for the U.S. Senate, however, Cuban-American support would be quite helpful. Among the original twenty-two House sponsors of the CDA, fourteen had received total donations from the CANF PAC (political action committee) of more than $1,000.[33] From its partisan roots in the Reagan White House, CANF diversified its party links while making considerable inroads in the legislative branch, which was ascending in policy importance.

One analyst has suggested that Torricelli's proposal was part of a "Democratic Party campaign strategy," to force the hand of the Bush administration on a bill that had bipartisan support in Congress and CANF support in Florida and New Jersey.[34] A Democratic aide was quoted as suggesting that most of the Democrats backing the bill were hoping that President Bush would veto it.[35]

1991), 154. For the first statement of the Cuban Democracy Act, see Robert G. Torricelli, "Let Democracy Shine Through an Open Door," *Los Angeles Times*, 18 August 1991.

[31] U.S. Congress, *Cuba in a Changing World*, 128.

[32] Richard Nuccio telephone interview with author, 30 July 1998.

[33] Peter H. Stone, "Cuban Clout," *National Journal*, 20 February 1993, 451.

[34] Jorge Domínguez, "U.S. Policy toward Cuba in the 1980s and 1990s," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 533 (May 1994): 172.

[35] Carla Robbins, "Dateline Washington: Cuban-American Clout," *Foreign Policy* 88 (Fall 1992): 165–66.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

At first it looked like exactly that would happen. A month after the bill was introduced in Congress, Bush shared the dais with Mas at a $1,000-a-plate dinner for the re-election campaign and yet offered no endorsement of the pending legislation.[36] In April, Robert Gelbard, principal deputy assistant secretary of state for inter-American affairs, offered several objections to the CDA before Congress. Among the most important to the administration (foreshadowing future debates) was that the bill would cause the U.S. diplomatic costs and impinge "on the President's constitutionally mandated powers to conduct foreign affairs."[37]

The outcome of the CDA was not to be determined on the basis of a balance of national interests or constitutional questions about executive power but rather by the domestic politics of a presidential campaign. Within a few days of the fund-raiser referred to above, where Bush did not endorse the CDA, Mas had dinner with Stephen Solarz (D–NY) and evidently offered to provide help for Clinton's presidential campaign if he decided to endorse the CDA.[38] Clinton adviser George Stephanopoulos and Torricelli negotiated Clinton's acceptance of the CDA.[39] With a campaign short of funds, an interest in being competitive in Florida against President Bush in the general election, and even a Rodham family connection to the Cuban-American community in Florida, candidate Clinton signed on in Miami with the simple statement: "I have read the Torricelli-Graham bill and I like it."[40] That short statement capped a day in which the candidate raised $275,000 from Cuban Americans in Coral Gables and Miami.

Even though Clinton's acceptance of the CDA did not lead to an electoral victory in Florida, the Clinton campaign team saw the politics of it favorably. A former Clinton administration official familiar with the campaign explains, "the point was not to win a majority of the Cuban vote but to get a bunch of campaign money, to outflank Bush on the Right, and to make Bush spend time and money in Florida, which should be a gimme state for Republicans."[41] Furthermore, they were "not just thinking about one election, but also about building an electoral coalition for the future by breaking up the solid South and getting the Reagan Democrats back. Clinton got 20 percent of the Cuban vote in 1992, compared to 5 percent for 1988 Democrat candidate Michael Dukakis—all because of the endorsement, a good deal. And they made inroads to the [Cuban] community and CANF and Mas."[42] The Clinton team also liked the hard-soft policy side of the CDA: "get hard with the regime but open to

[36] Jane Franklin, *Cuba and the United States* (Melbourne: Ocean Press, 1997), 290.

[37] U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Consideration of the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992*, 102nd Cong., 2nd sess., 8 April 1992 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1993), 359.

[38] Franklin, *Cuba and the United States*, 290.

[39] Former Clinton administration official, telephone interview with author, 1 June 1998.

[40] Ann Bardach, "Our Man in Miami," *The New Republic*, 3 October, 1994, 20.

[41] Former Clinton administration official, telephone interview with author, 1 June 1998.

[42] Ibid; in fact, Clinton won Florida in 1996.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the people and allow for freedom to change the embargo with political change in Cuba. This would allow for responding to and working with a Castro-led regime that led the transition to democracy and human rights in Cuba, allowing the president to adjust the embargo accordingly."[43]

When word of Clinton's decision to sign on to the CDA reached the Bush camp, they tried to cut their political losses. Bush announced new restrictions on ships carrying Cuban goods at U.S. ports a few days before the Clinton announcement, and then began to work with Congress on fashioning the CDA that he would sign into law only a couple of weeks before the election. Advocates of increasing the economic pressure on Cuba—inside and outside of the Congress—got a bill that marked a significant step beyond anything that working with the Reagan administration had produced. The bill's advocates also believed that it offered a way to facilitate an opening directly to the Cuban people. As the Bush presidency came to an end, CANF had been able to use its money and votes to influence a sitting president to support a policy toward Cuba that he had previously argued was unnecessary, if not harmful to U.S. interests, and constitutionally problematic. CANF played a prominent role in the creation and adoption of the CDA as its political partnership with the Republican executive branch of the 1980s was shifting to an alliance that included Democrats on the Hill. Beyond CANF, the rising importance of Capitol Hill in U.S.–Cuba policy making can be seen. In this case Congress began to emerge as a more independent player than in the 1980s. Further, the dynamics of presidential electoral politics intervened in unexpected ways to improve the bill's fortunes as a presidential candidate loomed large in the policy-making process. Indeed, the CDA can be seen as the first of a pattern of moves whereby "Congress and Cuban groups [CANF] bring such bills in election years to back the administration into a corner."[44]

Mario Baeza and Clinton's First Year

President-elect Clinton did not appear immediately interested in rewarding the Cuban-America community in Miami with appointed positions as he began to put together his administration. Mario Baeza's placement at the top of the list for assistant secretary of state for inter-American affairs may have reflected an interest in a different constituency, African Americans, and perhaps even a more pressing issue in Latin America—trade. The black Cuban-American lawyer with a leading Wall Street firm was friendly with both Clinton transition team Co-Chair Vernon Jordan and Democratic National Committee Chair and Commerce Secretary-designate Ron Brown, and his specialty was Latin American privatization. The Clinton transition team apparently did not do all of its homework before reaching the decision on Baeza. There was no interview pro-

[43] Ibid; see also David Rieff, "Cuba Refrozen," *Foreign Affairs* 75 (July/August 1996): 62–75.
[44] Former Clinton administration official, telephone interview with author, 1 June 1998.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

cess for this position, making it likely that the White House was unaware of Baeza's recent visit to Cuba as part of a Mexican conference on investment prospects on the island.[45] In addition, key Democratic members of Congress, such as Torricelli, were not consulted about the choice. Torricelli, whose backyard was adjacent to Baeza's, did not know the Cuban-American lawyer and offered the initial opposition to his proposed nomination.[46] Nor was CANF consulted about Baeza, and it quickly mobilized against the presumed anti-embargo lawyer. In particular, the interest group encouraged its new allies in the Democratic party to register their opposition with the president and his transition team. The rapid response was successful, and Baeza's name was literally crossed out on the list of nominees that was faxed to the Hill.[47]

Clinton's last minute removal of Baeza was only one of several times that the president backed off in the face of vocal opposition to a proposed or actual nominee. Still, the ability of the CANF and perhaps its most supportive Democratic member of Congress to derail the nomination is noteworthy. The conflict over Baeza's nomination suggested to the foreign policy community that the Cuba policy "was being waged largely outside of government circles."[48] One writer has described the blocking of the proposed appointment as a "chit" called in by Clinton's "Miami benefactors."[49] The perceived influence of the CANF over presidential appointments by the first Democrat to hold that office in more than a decade gave some indication that Cuba was not a place where the Clinton administration intended immediately to challenge the policy status quo. In Alexander Watson, Clinton ultimately selected a compromise candidate for the position at State.[50] The choice of Richard Nuccio as his top assistant met with strong CANF approval. Nuccio, as Torricelli's aide, had been described as the "intellectual force" behind the CDA legislation.[51] The executive's appointment prerogative was here constrained by Congress and by the interest group that was sponsored by an earlier president.

Throughout the first year of the Clinton presidency, the occasional public statements by the administration were consistent on the need to stay the course on Cuba and on the utility of the CDA. In November 1993, for example, Clinton argued that his Cuba policy was working, stating that, "gestures of openness that have come out of the Castro regime in the last several months have been

[45] Domínguez, "US Policy toward Cuba in the 1980s and 1990s," 173–174.

[46] Former Clinton administration official, telephone interview with author, 1 June 1998.

[47] Ibid; see also Dick Kirschten, "Capitol Hill Watch," *National Journal*, 30 January 1993, 295; Mimi Whitefield and Christopher Marquis, "Cuban Concerns May Threaten Lawyer's Shot at Top Latin Post," *Journal of Commerce*, 21 January 1993, 12A; John M. Goshko, "Controversy Erupts on Latin America Post; Cuba Exiles, Black Caucus Are at Odds," *Washington Post*, 23 January 1993.

[48] Saul Landau, "Clinton's Cuba Policy: A Low-Priority Dilemma," *NACLA Report on the Americas* 26 (May 1993): 36.

[49] Dick Kirschten, "Guantanamo, Si; Otherwise, No," *National Journal*, 13 May 1995, 1198.

[50] Ibid.

[51] Kiger, *Squeeze Play*, 34.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the direct result of our policy of pressure and firmness."[52] He went on to note, "no Democrat in my life time, in the White House at least, has come close to taking the strong position I have on this, agreeing with the Cuban-American community."[53] Secretary Watson made his first major policy statement at an October 1993 CANF-hosted luncheon, where he voiced support for the CDA and went on to claim that Clinton had no plan "to soften" policy toward Cuba.[54] Following Jesse Jackson's Christmas Day call to end the "suffering" caused by the embargo, Watson countered, "We will continue our diplomatic, political, and economic isolation of the Cuban government and maintain our economic embargo as a form of leverage."[55]

Clinton kept up a good public front of support for the embargo. A number of officials within the administration, however, had previously made arguments about the need to reevaluate, if not change, U.S. policy toward Cuba. According to one critic of the Clinton administration: "On the entire Clinton foreign policy team—Bill (and Hillary); Anthony Lake and Richard Feinberg at the National Security Council; Warren Christopher, Strobe Talbott, and Peter Tarnoff at the State Department—there isn't one single person who favors a hard line against Castro."[56] Clinton's continued support for the embargo can be seen at least in part as a result of the ongoing influence of CANF and the growing importance of congressional and electoral calculations, especially in Florida, in making Cuba policy.

Immigration Crisis

A new series of attempts by Cubans to leave the island began in the summer of 1994. Initially the departures were largely by means of commandeering ships. Hijackings of tugboats, ferries, and even a navy passenger transport ship took place in the Bay of Havana between 13 July and 8 August. The hijackers were occasionally assisted by the U.S. Coast Guard and later given political asylum in Miami.[57] Frustrated by the government's actions and accusing the United States of encouraging the departures, President Fidel Castro announced that henceforth Cubans were free to leave the island, and thousands of *balseros* (rafters) proceeded to leave on whatever small rafts they could construct. Clinton, sensitized by his own problems as governor of Arkansas with rioting *Marielitos* (Cubans who had left from the Mariel Port) in 1980, was confronted with an

[52] William Jefferson Clinton, "Media Roundtable on NAFTA," *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents* 29 (12 November 1993): 2350.

[53] Ibid.

[54] Franklin, *Cuba and the United States*, 324.

[55] Ben Barber, "US Policy Toward Cuba Shows Signs of Change," *Christian Science Monitor*, 29 December 1993, 6.

[56] Elliott Abrams, "Castro's Latest Coup," *National Review*, 12 June 1995, 37.

[57] Jesus Arboleya, *Havana Miami: The U.S.–Cuba Migration Conflict* (Melbourne: Ocean Press, 1996), 56–57.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

immigration crisis during the first campaign season of his presidency. Not only were the midterm elections in play, but Democratic Governor Lawton Chiles of Florida was in a difficult race for reelection against Jeb Bush.

Immigration questions by 1994 were capable of generating pressure nearly as intense as that which came from hard-liners on Cuba policy, and there was a much larger domestic constituency likely to be engaged at some level by the issue. This was the year in which California voters, for example, overwhelmingly approved Proposition 187, which would deny education and nonemergency medical care to undocumented immigrants. The Cuban rafters arriving in Florida that summer were referred to by some as part of a "slow motion Mariel."[58] While some in the White House attempted to downplay the seriousness of the issue, Governor Chiles feared that the exodus would accelerate and firmly requested federal action. When the administration did not respond, Chiles claimed that the federal government was "in denial" and declared a state of emergency in Florida.[59]

At a press conference on the morning of 18 August, Attorney General Janet Reno denied that any thought was being given to reexamining Cuban refugee policy.[60] Some thirteen hours later, an announcement was made by Reno that the nearly three-decades-long policy of granting asylum automatically to all arriving Cubans was being ended and that any rafters would henceforth be detained by the U.S. government. The process that led to this decision was apparently rather haphazard. The new policy appears to have been crafted in an afternoon meeting of Clinton's top foreign policy advisers, although no experts on Cuba or Latin America in general were present. Clinton, who had not attended the meeting, endorsed the group's consensus to reverse the current policy. He had apparently still not discussed the change directly with any of his Cuba or Latin America specialists. One reporter notes, "There's little evidence . . . that Clinton was deeply involved in the unsystematic process by which the policy toward Cuba was dramatically reshaped. It doesn't appear that he ever heard his advisers debate the pros and cons of his choices in a structured setting."[61] The following day, Clinton ordered the Coast Guard to intercept the *balseros* and transport them to the U.S. Navy base at Guantanamo in Cuba. The 1966 Cuban Adjustment Act had been effectively repealed, and Cuban migrants would no longer automatically receive political refugee status. While the process might not seem particularly synoptic, it does show the president acting during a crisis with substantial prerogative like we might expect.

[58] Jonathan C. Smith, "Foreign Policy for Sale? Interest Group Influence on President Clinton's Cuba Policy, August 1994," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 28 (Winter 1998): 207.

[59] Ibid., 212.

[60] Burt Solomon, "Clinton's Fast Break on Cuba . . . or Foreign Policy on the Fly," *National Journal*, 3 September 1994, 2044.

[61] Ibid., 2045.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The reaction to the new policy by the majority of Cuban Americans was one of shock and outrage.[62] President Clinton met the following night with Mas and other Cuban Americans, as well as Governor Chiles and Miami officials, as part of what was referred to as "operation mollification."[63] At the meeting, Mas pushed for policy responses up to and including a naval blockade. After a second meeting on the morning of 20 August, Clinton announced a series of new sanctions that limited cash remittances and visits to the island, and authorized an increase in the broadcasting to the island by TV and Radio Marti. With these concessions in hand, Mas was able to return to Miami and offer support for the overall package of changes in policy. One analyst suggests that the measures instituted by Clinton marked the hard-liners' most important victory in years.[64] A more convincing interpretation was that administration officials had decided on the new restrictions prior to the meetings, and therefore, CANF did not "gain anything that the president was not willing to give."[65] Either way, the president acted aggressively and placated both a demanding Governor Chiles and CANF; and he had not apparently lessened his chances of winning the state of Florida in 1996.

Such a policy balanced competing domestic political pressure reasonably well, but it did not address the situation in Cuba itself. If anything, the new limits on remittances and visits may have increased the motivation for Cubans to leave. Castro made no attempt to halt the exodus, and Cubans continued to take to the seas, apparently undeterred by the prospect of spending some time at Guantanamo. As the number of Cubans held at the naval base and elsewhere grew, it became clear that negotiations with the Castro government were going to be necessary. On 1 September, those talks opened in New York City. A little over a week later, the United States and Cuba issued a joint communiqué that included reference to the interests both countries had in keeping rafters from undertaking dangerous trips to sea. The United States for its part agreed to provide at least 20,000 visas a year for legal immigrants, and the Cuban government committed itself to preventing citizens from leaving the island illegally for the United States.

The long-term status of Cubans being held at Guantanamo, or what to do with those who might flee the island in the future, was not resolved by the September 1994 accord. Additional secret discussions were held between U.S. and Cuban officials, which eventually produced the 2 May 1995 migration agreement. The joint statement by the two governments that day announced a U.S.

[62] David Rieff, "From Exiles to Immigrants," *Foreign Affairs* 74 (July/August 1995): 87; he describes Cuban Miami as "stupefied." See also Smith, "Foreign Policy for Sale," 215; he writes that the reaction of the Cuban American community "was first one of shock, then one of anger."

[63] Philip Brenner and Peter Kornbluh, "Clinton's Cuba Calculus," *NACLA Report on the Americas* 29 (Sept/Oct 1995): 35.

[64] Maria Cristina Garcia, *Havana USA: Cuban Exiles and Cuban Americans in South Florida, 1959–1994* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), 168.

[65] Smith, "Foreign Policy," 217.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

policy of returning Cubans found at sea or who enter the Guantanamo Naval Base illegally to Cuba. Clinton defended the decision as necessary to an audience of Cuban-Americans in June: "I know that many of you have questions about aspects of this policy. Yet, the simple truth is that there is no realistic alternative. We simply cannot admit all Cubans who seek to come here. We cannot let people risk their lives on open seas in unseaworthy rafts. And we cannot sentence thousands of young men to live in limbo at Guantanamo."[66]

That decision unambiguously ended the more than three decades of providing automatic political asylum and unrestricted access to the United States for Cubans fleeing postrevolution Cuba. With this change it became clear that CANF and Mas were not only no longer driving policy toward Cuba, but could be kept entirely out of the decision-making loop. There was no consultation with Mas before the day the announcement was made, and it appears that he and other members of CANF were unaware of the secret negotiations between Ricardo Alarcon, President of the Cuban National Assembly, and Tarnoff, Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, that led to the 2 May announcement.[67] Demonstrations by Cuban Americans were widespread in the aftermath of the announcement, and even within the administration the policy change led to the resignations of two top officials in the State Department's Office of Cuban Affairs. Cuba policy was clearly a function of a much more complex pattern of politics than it had been during the Reagan-Bush years. While Congress had become more engaged in making strategic policy toward Cuba, in this crisis it was not a key player, as we might expect. Still, Clinton faced new pressures from domestic constituencies in this crisis with regard to the immigration issue, state level elections, and even budget considerations about the mounting expense at Guantanamo. Finally, CANF's access to the executive branch was no longer guaranteed, and Clinton unilaterally changed a significant part of the U.S. policy toward Cuba.

Helms-Burton

The impetus for a new legislative initiative began to emerge even before the 1994 elections that would lead to Republican majorities in the House and Senate. Many on the Hill were frustrated that Castro had survived the wave of democratization that had swept Latin America; and some Republicans were concerned that Clinton was not engaged enough in trying to remove Castro. From the perspective of Dan Fisk, a key former Republican Senate committee staffer, Clinton had run to the right of Bush on the CDA only then to ignore Cuba policy or to send signals of rapprochement. The Haiti case frustrated many in Congress too. In the view from the Hill, Haiti and Cuba were both

[66] William Jefferson Clinton, "Remarks to the Cuban-American Community," *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents* 31 (30 June 1995): 1138.

[67] Peter Kornbluh, "Cuba No Mas," *The Nation*, 29 May 1995, 745.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

countries with dictatorships to be opposed, yet Clinton only seemed interested in dethroning Haiti's rulers. One of the keys to the Haiti case, though, was the activism of the congressional Black Caucus. Jesse Helms and others decided that similar congressional activism was needed on Cuba.[68] While they began planning in 1994, they really got their chance following the 1994 elections.

Republican success in 1994 changed the political dynamics of Cuba policy at the White House and on the Hill. On Pennsylvania Avenue, the elections likely weakened the position of those Clinton administration officials who were interested in at least softening the embargo in terms of travel and communication. As one analysis noted, the winners of the struggle within the administration were those who wanted to work with the Republican leadership in Congress and Mas Canosa's forces in Florida.[69] New pressure for a tightened and expanded embargo of Cuba came from the Congress in the form of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act (LIBERTAD for short or Helms-Burton for its sponsors) in early 1995, as well as from the front-runner for the Republican presidential nomination, Bob Dole, who told a joint session of the Florida legislature that it was time to "make the end of Fidel Castro's stay an explicit goal of American foreign policy."[70]

Though planning for new legislation had begun before the 1994 elections, LIBERTAD picked up steam following the elections at the direction of Senator Helms, the new chair of the Senate Foreign Relations committee. Dan Fisk was the point man on the legislation directed at driving Castro from Cuba. Fisk constructed the bill by bringing together all the pieces of Cuba legislation that had been floating around the Hill over the past few years. He also formed a coalition of staffers from the House and Senate to review these past initiatives and to plan this new bill.[71] Absent from the drafting coalition was CANF, which by the mid-1990s was behaving as a typical PAC that gave campaign money primarily to incumbent Democrats and thus deserved no special place in the drafting process. The "blessed" nature of CANF on the Hill left over from the 1980s was gone.[72] On the House side, not only had the view of CANF changed since the 1980s but so too had the demographics of the House itself, now including three Cuban-Americans. These members took on many of the roles that CANF had played previously, such as watching over the appropriations for Radio- and TV-Marti, drafting Cuba policy legislation, and lobbying other members of the House and Senate. While CANF was the biggest and most important lobby group in town on Cuba policy, and the drafting coalition wanted CANF's partnership in pushing the bill once drafted, the autonomous role in Cuba pol-

[68] Dan Fisk telephone interview with author, 16 June 1998.

[69] Philip Brenner and Peter Kornbluh, "The Internal Policy Debate," *NACLA Report on the Americas* 29 (Sept/Oct 1995): 37.

[70] In Franklin, *Cuba and the United States*, 367.

[71] See Kiger, *Squeeze Play*, chap. 5; see also Dick Kirschten, "Raising Cain," *National Journal*, 1 July 1995, 1714–17.

[72] Dan Fisk telephone interview with author, 16 June 1998.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

icy for Congress and some of its key members was growing. All three Cuban-Americans in Congress were playing roles like Tierney's "policy entrepreneurs."

The original idea was to use LIBERTAD as a rider on some other bill, but pressure and momentum were mounting in the House for a free-standing bill, and Dole's future electoral interests meant that the Senate would consider such a bill as well.[73] In February 1995, Senator Helms presented the bill. It included several controversial components that would tighten and expand the embargo of Cuba, perhaps most notably its Title III that would give U.S. citizens the right to sue in U.S. courts foreign companies that "traffic" in stolen property in Cuba. As Helms-Burton was moving through Congress in the spring and summer, others took more direct action to challenge Castro as flotillas of boats and small airplanes made periodic runs toward Cuba from Miami.

The early hearings in the House were marked by suspicion about the Clinton administration's intentions toward Cuba. Administration witnesses were grilled about an article in the *Washington Post* that claimed an internal National Security Council (NSC) paper suggested the embargo of Cuba be lifted.[74] This was compounded by leaks from the administration and from abroad that they were considering loosening or lifting the embargo.[75] The context of Clinton's unilateral moves on policy toward Vietnam—dropping economic restrictions and reopening diplomatic relations in 1994–1995—and his actions in the immigration crisis also suggested to proponents of an aggressive embargo policy in Congress that they might need to constrain the president in this area. Lincoln Diaz-Balart (R–FL), for example, was very concerned that the Clinton administration was going to normalize relations with Cuba before political reforms might be enacted there. He received a variety of signals of this intention, including one from a British diplomat who told him he had been assured by the Clinton people that they would normalize relations after the 1996 elections.[76]

The Clinton administration publicly opposed Helms-Burton. In an April 1995 interview on CNN, Clinton argued that it was unnecessary because of the existing CDA.[77] Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Peter Tarnoff testified against the bill in the Senate that it would limit the president's flexibility in conducting foreign affairs. He argues, as Clinton had on CNN, that the two

[73] Ibid.

[74] See U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, *The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIERTAD) Act of 1995*, 104th Cong., 1st sess., 16 March 1995 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1995), 31–34.

[75] Dan Fisk telephone interview with author, 16 June 1998. See also U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere and Peace Corps Affairs, *Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act*, 104th Cong., 1st sess., 22 May and 14 June 1995 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1995), 76.

[76] Lincoln Diaz-Balart (R–FL) telephone interview with author, 2 July 1998.

[77] William Jefferson Clinton, "Interview with Wolf Blitzer and Judy Woodruff on CNN," *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents* 31 (14 April 1995): 624–25.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tracks on the CDA were sufficient.[78] While CANF lobbied for the bill in the House, Secretary of State Warren Christopher sent a letter to House Speaker Newt Gingrich the day before the House vote that argued against the bill. Christopher wrote that if the bill were passed he would urge the president to veto it on the grounds that it was overly inflexible for dealing with a rapidly developing situation like that in Cuba. He also opposed Title III as counterproductive.[79] The administration was very concerned that LIBERTAD would cause problems with allies and put property issues, which should be the last concern, first in the relationship with Cuba.[80] Nevertheless, the House passed LIBERTAD by a count of 294–130 on 21 September 1995, and it moved to the Senate.

Passage of the bill in the Senate was more difficult than in the House. According to Fisk, Clinton never actually threatened to veto the bill, leaving it to the State Department to try to keep the bill from ever reaching his desk. Since there was no "heavy handed White House presence" against the bill, the Senate did not think LIBERTAD was necessarily a "killer" for Clinton.[81] A former administration official confirmed that the strategy was not to threaten a veto but rather to prevent the bill from ever getting to the president.[82] The administration also tried to cultivate corporate opposition to the bill. On 6 October, Chief of Staff Leon Panetta and other foreign policy advisers met with a group of about fifty U.S. corporate executives. These executives were then classified as "journalists" and went to Cuba to meet with Castro. The list included heads of Time Warner, Hyatt Hotels, General Motors, and Zenith.[83]

Attempts to close debate on the bill failed twice in mid-October, and as Clinton and corporate opposition grew more forceful, support for Helms-Burton faltered. In the meantime Clinton moved forward under the CDA. In October 1995 at Freedom House, he announced measures to expand contacts between people in the two countries, including the opening of news bureaus, relaxed travel restrictions, and more activities by U.S. nongovernmental organizations in Cuba.[84] Unable to move the bill as it was, the Senate removed Title III and Title IV (which would deny visas to executives of companies "trafficking" in confiscated properties in Cuba). Even though Helms-Burton had passed overwhelmingly in the House, the president seemed poised to carry the issue—as we would normally expect for presidents in foreign policy. Further in-

[78] U.S. Congress, Senate, *Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act*, 16–30.

[79] Quoted in Kiger, *Squeeze Play*, 54.

[80] Richard Nuccio telephone interview with author, 30 July 1998.

[81] Dan Fisk telephone interview with author, 16 June 1998.

[82] Former Clinton administration official, telephone interview with author, 1 June 1998.

[83] Kiger, *Squeeze Play*, 54; Christopher Marquis, "New Clinton Strategy Eases Rules on Travel, Cultural Ties to Cuba," *The Tampa Tribune*, 6 October 1995, 1; and Normal Pearlstine, "To Our Readers," *Time*, 25 October 1995, 4.

[84] William Jefferson Clinton, "Remarks at a Freedom House Breakfast," *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents* 31 (6 October 1995): 1780–81.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

dicating the president's strength were reports of the demise of CANF influence within the executive branch, which had been circulating for several months. A Cuban American representing an opposition viewpoint to the CANF had left a meeting at the White House at the end of May reporting that a State Department official said, "Jorge Mas Canosa is no longer a welcome guest at the White House. . . . The Cuban-American [National] Foundation is not going to drive US-Cuba policy."[85] Passed in its weakened form, LIBERTAD seemed dead as it went to conference and the embargo's future looked bleak to some—at least before two Brothers to the Rescue planes were shot down by the Cuban air force on 24 February 1996, killing four.[86]

The shootdown breathed new life into Helms-Burton. On 26 February, Clinton condemned the attack and ordered a number of actions directed against Cuba; he also announced his intention to reach an agreement with Congress on Helms-Burton.[87] In a situation that combined "crisis" and "strategic" elements, surprisingly the advantage now clearly shifted to the Hill.[88] At a strategy meeting the next day that was attended by Representative Dan Burton (R–IN), Diaz-Balart, Patrick Kennedy, Menendez, Ros-Lehtinen, Torricelli, and others, it was agreed to put Titles III and IV back in the bill. Diaz-Balart insisted that a new measure be added as well—codification of the embargo into law. He said that he would insist on codification and that he wanted their support; they all agreed.[89] From the perspective of those on the Hill, Clinton now had no choice but to accept LIBERTAD. Helm's point man, Dan Fisk, argues, "The shootdown left the Clinton administration politically naked: they were shown to have no Cuba policy, no contingencies for such things. LIBERTAD was now the only game in town."[90] A House staffer noted that the shootdown "changed everything," and left the administration in "no position to bargain."[91] Even the president's special adviser for Cuba policy, Richard Nuccio, admitted that, "President Castro created a veto-proof majority for the Helms-Burton bill."[92]

The next morning they presented their revised plan to Nuccio and the administration. At 8:00 A.M. on 28 February in Robert Menendez's office, the coalition from the Hill met with several members of the administration, including

[85] George Moffett, "Clinton Shuns Potent Anti-Castro Lobby," *Christian Science Monitor*, 9 June 1995, 4.

[86] See Carl Nagin, "Backfire," *The New Yorker*, 26 January 1998, 30–35.

[87] William Jefferson Clinton, "Remarks Announcing Sanctions Against Cuba Following the Downing of Brothers to the Rescue Airplanes," *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents* 32 (26 February 1996): 381–82.

[88] Nagin, "Backfire."

[89] Lincoln Diaz-Balart (R–FL) telephone interview with author, 2 July 1998.

[90] Dan Fisk telephone interview with author, 16 June 1998.

[91] Steve Vermillion, from the office of Lincoln Diaz-Balart, telephone interview with author, 19 June 1998.

[92] Quoted in Carroll J. Doherty, "Planes' Downing Forces Clinton to Compromise on Sanction," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 2 March 1996, 565.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Nuccio. Diaz-Balart recalls that the emphasis from the administration was still on wanting waivers for the enforcement of Title III. He says they negotiated most of the day on that issue. When the issue of codification was brought up, he says the Clinton team objected on the grounds that it was "new" to the bill. He recalls that he then asked, "Well, are you going to lift the embargo?" When the Clinton team said that they would not, Diaz-Balart's response was, "good, then we have no problem; next issue." This go-round happened a few times through the day, but Diaz-Balart argues that there was never any negotiation on this point, and the Clinton team seemed more concerned with Title III. When it came time to negotiate on Title IV, for which they also wanted waivers, Diaz-Balart recalls that Torricelli "played the bad guy and said there would be no waiver there." He further notes that the Clinton team had virtually no bargaining power and few options. "What were they going to do, veto a bill after a terrorist government's air force shot down American citizens? Not even Qadhafi has done exactly that."[93] Fisk agrees that the deal was, "you get waivers on Title III, and we get codification."[94]

A meeting of the Clinton team followed that included the attorney general, the secretaries of defense and state, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the director of Central Intelligence, and others. As they discussed the policy issues, none of them knew about the addition of codification; when they were told about it, they objected on the grounds that it took away too much prerogative from the president, and they wondered about its constitutionality. Political advisers George Stephanopoulos and Leon Panetta overruled the policy people because of political and reelection concerns, however, saying that Clinton had to sign the bill. When Anthony Lake agreed, the policy discussion was over and political calculations carried the day. Rather than argue against codification, the Clinton team focused on the waivers to Title III so they could explain their policy flip-flop and help in dealing with the allies. They then said they would sign the bill.[95]

After passing both houses, Clinton signed LIBERTAD on 12 March 1996, saying, "it will send a powerful, unified message to Havana." He noted it was a continuation of the bipartisan approach to an activist Cuba policy that began with the CDA.[96] In July 1996, he announced that he would waive enforcement of Title III. Still, the die of the embargo was cast. While Clinton could waive Title III, the ultimate question of Cuba policy—the embargo—had been codified into law. The initiative for this dramatic turn of events began on the Hill

[93] Lincoln Diaz-Balart (R–FL) telephone interview with author, 2 July 1998.

[94] Dan Fisk telephone interview with author, 16 June 1998.

[95] Former Clinton administration official, telephone interview with author, 1 June 1998; see also Nagin, "Backfire," 34.

[96] William Jefferson Clinton, "Remarks on Signing the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996," *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 32* (12 March 1996): 478–79.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and signaled an interesting and complex turn from the president-dominated foreign policies of the cold war. Helped along by the Cuban air force, Helms-Burton marked a key break in presidential power by transferring control over the embargo to Congress.

Conclusion: The Domestic Roots of U.S.–Cuba Policy

The cases discussed here show how broad domestic political calculations have pushed Cuba policy and decision making in the Clinton administration. When raised, Cuba policy often fell to the president's political advisers rather than the policy experts. During Clinton's campaign in 1992, electoral politics and the realities of fundraising led to support for the CDA, which the Clinton team saw as good politics and also good policy.[97] In the Baeza case, when Clinton miscalculated—whether due to poor information or an oversight—he quickly reversed himself, even if it meant crossing out Baeza's name on an imminent fax. In a single afternoon in 1994, the Cuban Adjustment Act—and thirty years of preferential treatment for Cuban migrants—was repealed when different domestic inputs entered the Clinton political calculus. In the case of Helms-Burton, the shootdown of the Brothers to the Rescue planes altered the political equation, and opposition to a weaker bill became support for an even stronger bill almost overnight.

One interpretation of these events is that they, with the exception of the immigration policy change that CANF opposed, mark the ultimate success of an ethnic interest group that had been driving U.S.–Cuba policy since its origins in the early Reagan years. While tempting, this explanation is clearly not sufficient. CANF supported the CDA, but Clinton's acceptance of the CDA made sense on many levels. While CANF opposed the Baeza appointment, so too did many on the Hill who acted to have his name removed. CANF opposed the immigration policy change and was in fact excluded from the policy process in that case. CANF was excluded from the drafting of Helms-Burton, though welcomed as a lobbyist on its behalf. The lobbying was largely unsuccessful until the Cuban Air Force changed everything. U.S.–Cuba policy in the first Clinton term was rooted in a complex pattern of politics in which the money, votes, and institutional links of CANF mattered, but the larger domestic political calculus of the president mattered even more. Further, entrepreneurial members of Congress usurped many of the functions once performed more exclusively by the executive and CANF. A small number of influential members of Congress appear to play a surprisingly important role in shaping U.S. policy toward Cuba. This is consistent with other foreign policy issues where various members

[97] Richard Nuccio telephone interview with author, 30 July 1998.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of Congress have stood out "by virtue of their persistence, expertise, or cleverness."[98]

Reflecting on the policy process evident in the cases, we reach a number of other conclusions as well. First, the executive decision-making process was noteworthy for the haphazard nature of meetings and consultation that preceded policy choices. This can be seen especially in the Baeza and immigration cases, but it is also apparent in the Helms-Burton case following the shootdown. Second, electoral calculations figured prominently in the decision by then-candidate Clinton to support the CDA and later in the immigration reversal by Clinton. Cuba as a "foreign" policy issue came to be infused with more "domestic" political content in this period, and the importance of elections, interest groups, and Congress increased. While the president could still act with great prerogative during the immigration crisis, even this had to be managed domestically.

Third, during the crisis that followed the 1996 shootdown, the balance of power shifted from the president to assertive policy entrepreneurs in Congress. This move may be particularly striking because it happened during a crisis—exactly the kind of situation in which one would expect the president's policy advantage over Congress to be greatest. The felt need of the president and his political advisers to respond to the pressures brought to bear by Congress (and the Cuban Air Force) can help show why Clinton signed on to LIBERTAD. It is still striking to note, however, that Clinton accepted codification of Cuba policy—which cuts into the heart of the foreign policy prerogative of the presidency—largely without a fight. The shifting of the locus of Cuba policy to Capitol Hill with the passage of Helms-Burton embargo is especially significant for students of U.S. foreign policy. The initiative behind Helms-Burton was in part a product of the 1994 elections and an interest by some in Congress to stop what was perceived as a drift in Cuba policy.[99] Clinton and his advisers consistently opposed LIBERTAD, because they saw it as unnecessary and as an encroachment on presidential authority in foreign policy. After the shootdown, Clinton negotiated waivers for Title III, but accepted codification and thus surrendered significant foreign policy prerogative to the legislature. Now any actor, including a president, who would try to change the core of U.S. policy toward Cuba—the embargo—must recognize that the path to do so runs through Capitol Hill. While the executive might still make lesser changes, and there is some debate in Congress about his right to do even that, Congress now retains the ultimate question of the embargo.

Thus far in Clinton's second term we have seen the president waive Title III, much to the chagrin of many in Congress. In fact, to date he has found a

[98] Tierney, "Congressional Activism," 111.

[99] Dan Fisk telephone interview with author, 16 June 1998.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

way to retain real and important power by acting almost as if he were still operating under the old CDA—thus ignoring codification. Such an approach has worked in the sense that Clinton has moved to allow direct flights, increased access for news organizations and people-to-people contact, and made changes in remittances. But the president cannot dodge Congress on the ultimate question of the embargo, which has been codified—an important and often overlooked point. Cuba policy is now largely an issue of domestic politics. Now and in the future, struggles between the president and Congress, and the extent of assertiveness by Cuban-Americans and other policy entrepreneurs in the legislature, are likely to matter as much as developments on the island of Cuba itself.*

* We thank the following for their assistance and suggestions: Phil Brenner, Dan Fisk, Bill Mandel, and Maureen Rada.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Israel's National Security and the Myth of Exceptionalism

GIL MEROM

Members of social groups tend to develop their sense of collective identity on the basis of two kinds of perceptions: perceptions of shared attributes within the group, and perceptions of the difference between these attributes and those of other social groups.[1] Images of identity and difference, irrespective of whether they are inherent, imagined, or acquired, serve as the glue that bonds individuals into an imagined social whole. They also serve as the foundations of a sense of exceptionalism, which is pivotal in the formation and molding of religious, ethnic, and national communities, and often serve the latter for years thereafter. The British people, for example, prided themselves in the seventeenth century for being exceptionally rational and scientific, and the Americans still believe today that they are inspired by an exceptional idealist creed.[2]

A sense of exceptionalism may also serve collectives, the modern nation-state included, in other instrumental ways. When married to power, a notion of exceptionalism may generate aggression and violence. National communities

[1] See John A. Armstrong, *Nations before Nationalism* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982), 5; and Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities* (New York: Verso, 1991), 6–7.

[2] On Britain, see Liah Greenfeld, *Nationalism* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992), 78–86. On American exceptionalism, see Samuel P. Huntington, *American Politics: The Promise of Disharmony* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1981); and Seymour M. Lipset's sociological work, *American Exceptionalism* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1996). For a concise statement about American foreign policy exceptionalism, see Huntington, "American Ideals Versus American Institutions," *Political Science Quarterly* 97 (Spring 1982): 1–37. For a critique of this idea, see Joseph Lepgold and Timothy McKeown, "Is American Foreign Policy Exceptional?" *Political Science Quarterly* 110 (Fall 1995): 369–84.

GIL MEROM is assistant professor in the Department of Political Science, Tel-Aviv University, and a U2000 Fellow in the Department of Government and Public Administration, Sydney University. His most recent articles include "Strong Powers in Small Wars: The Unnoticed Foundations of Success," and "A 'Grand Design'? Charles de Gaulle and the End of the Algerian War."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that became powerful often convinced themselves that their success was proof that they were culturally or otherwise exceptional, and thus entitled or even ordained to become agents of global acculturation. Moreover, in their sense of exceptionalism, they discovered a means to justify a gluttonous celebration of empire building and exploitation. Underdogs' sense of exceptionalism is somewhat different. Usually it combines inferiority and superiority complexes. In addition to an inherent sense of distinction, it includes a sense of exceptional vulnerability. This mixture can at times serve a nation well, but it can also become a burden.

In this article I assess the claim, which is prevalent in Israel and is often accepted elsewhere, that Israel's national security is exceptional. I first discuss the sources of the Israeli belief in exceptionalism. Second, I review various elements in the Israeli image of national security exceptionalism and their consequences. Third, I subject the realities of Israeli national security to a comparative scrutiny, discussing in particular the issues of threat and morality of conduct. Finally, I conclude with a discussion of the consequences and risks involved in perceiving Israeli national security in exceptional terms.

Before I proceed, however, a brief clarification is necessary. My argument about Israel may remind readers of Jack Snyder's discussion in *Myths of Empires*.[3] Snyder's argument is that empires overestimate the aggressive propensities of enemies and at the same time depict them as paper tigers. These myths of empires, which present expansion as both essential and inexpensively obtainable, are created and propagated by factions and institutions that seek to promote parochial interests. I argue that Israel displays a somewhat similar combination of excessive fears and self-confidence that Snyder describes. Whereas Snyder's thesis is primarily instrumental, mine is primarily cultural. I attribute the Israeli mythology of exceptionalism to deep-rooted beliefs that are widely shared and as such conceive of it as a by-product of cultural and historical processes.[4] In short, I consider the Israeli interpretation of reality as fundamentally spontaneous or organic, though I admit that on occasions it has been used instrumentally.

The Sources of the Israeli Image of Exceptionalism

A significant part of Israeli society and leaders is convinced that the Jewish and Israeli people, their historical experience, and the security problems they face are exceptional. These perceptions of exceptionalism rest on cultural, historical, and strategic foundations.

The origin of the cultural foundations of exceptionalism are in Biblical notions that depict the Jewish people as divinely "chosen" (*am nivchar*). Such

[3] Jack Snyder, *Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991).

[4] Indeed, Jack Snyder doubts the relevance of "cognitive" explanations that attribute imperialist behavior to ideology or formative experiences. See ibid., 28.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ideas are relatively widespread in Israel, because most Israelis were educated to think so and because most of them believe in the main tenets of Judaism.[5] The association between religious beliefs and the notion of exceptionalism takes many shapes and forms. For example, Gideon Ezra—a nonobservant parliament member from the Likud party and a former senior officer of the General Security Service (GSS)—believes in God, because "only God could have created a people so special as the Jewish people."[6] The cultural perception of Jewish exceptionalism is also expressed in secular terms. David Ben-Gurion, the founding father of modern Israel, was never tired of making the point of Jewish distinction. In one of his speeches in 1950 he explained: "We are perhaps the only 'non-conformist' people in the world. . . . We do not fit the general pattern of humanity: Others say because we are flawed. I think [it is] because the general pattern is flawed, and we neither accept it nor adapt to it. . . ."[7]

The sense of inherent exceptionalism, which emanates from concepts such as the chosen people, also includes the belief that the Jews would become a "light unto the nations" (*or la'goyim*) or a beacon to the world. Again, the words of Ben-Gurion illustrate how such deep-rooted religious concepts were incorporated into the modern secular-nationalist creed of Israelis. While Ben-Gurion emphasized that the Israelis wanted "to be like all gentiles," he hastened to add that they also aspired "to be different from the rest of the world in [their] spiritual superiority. . . ."[8] Similarly, in a speech he delivered to Israeli youths, he masterly meshed the theme of moral exceptionalism with the idea of inherent national security exceptionalism: "You . . . know that we were always a small people, always surrounded by big nations with whom we engaged in a struggle, political as well as spiritual; that we created things that they did not accept; that we were exceptional. . . . Our survival-secret during these thousands of years . . . has one source: *Our supreme quality, our intellectual and moral advantage, which singles us out even today, as it did throughout the generations.*"[9]

[5] See Shlomit Levy, Hanna Levinsohn, and Elihu Katz, *Belief, Observance and Social Interaction among Israeli Jews* (Jerusalem: The Louis Guttman Israel Institute of Applied Social Research, 1993), 12, 119. In this survey, 74 percent of Israelis thought it was "important" or "very important" to believe in God, and 79 percent described themselves as "strictly," "mostly," or "somewhat" observant. While 63 percent firmly believed in God, 24 percent doubted God's existence, and only 13 percent declared that they did not believe in God. Fifty percent believed that the Jews were the chosen people, while only 20 percent did not accept this view. See ibid., 108. The majority of believers seems to include the political elite. According to a survey of the *Ha'aretz* daily, 75 percent of the Knesset Members (MPs) believed in God. See *Ha'aretz,* 25 July 1996, weekend supplement.

[6] *Ha'aretz,* 25 July 1996, weekend supplement.

[7] Quoted in David Ben-Gurion, *Yihud Ve' Yiud* [henceforward *Distinction and Destiny*] (Tel-Aviv: Ma'arachot, 1980), 142.

[8] Quoted from a speech to Senior IDF officers, 5 March 1959. See Ben-Gurion, *Distinction and Destiny,* 322.

[9] From a speech of 10 November 1960. See Ben-Gurion, *Distinction and Destiny,* 354. (Emphasis added.) For similar contemporary views, see Benjamin Netanyahu, *Makom Tahat Ha'Shemesh* [the American edition titled *A Place Among the Nations*] (Tel-Aviv: Yediot Aharonot, 1995), 400, 401.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Now, while the image of inherent spiritual exceptionalism that we have reviewed this far is manifestly positive, it sometimes also acquires a negative dimension that depicts the Jewish people as wanting essential spiritual qualities as a result of a long life in a nationally-degenerating Diaspora environment. For example, Joseph Doriel finds that the Jewish strategic choice of "a method of survival rather than of expansion . . . left the Jews . . . with a biological programming that became obsolete—endangering their functioning in [their effort] to achieve collective national security under the new conditions . . ."[10] This perception of Diaspora-born weakness was part of the belief system of Zionist leaders, long before Doriel defined it so crudely. It was partly responsible for the idea that Israel, and particularly the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), must become a melting pot for the purpose of molding a new nation that will erase not only the differences between the various Jewish communities, but also the weaknesses the Jews have acquired in Diaspora life.[11]

The historical foundations of the Israeli perception of exceptionalism contain references to ancient national calamities and the presumably bitter experience of Diaspora life at the mercy of Gentiles and anti-Semitism. These foundations give rise to an acute sense of solitude and abandonment. Historical events both acquire meaning from and help to shape the cultural foundation of Israeli exceptionalism. Thus, the historical experience of isolation is bolstered by the belief that the Jewish people was preordained to "dwell in loneness" (*am levadad yishkon*), while historical events are perceived as corroborating the notion that isolation is part of the Jewish predicament. In recent times, the sense of loneness and abandonment was greatly increased by the general indifference of the world, and the apathy of Western powers in particular, in the face of the Nazi effort to annihilate the Jews. Such a sense was also buttressed by a string of other modern-day events, among which the most salient are the following:

- The British White Paper policy of fighting Jewish immigration to Palestine as of May 1939, which was not reversed during or after the Holocaust.
- The experience of the 1948 war in Israel.
- The French and British "defection" from the 1956 Sinai Campaign coalition because of American and Soviet pressure.
- The traumatic days preceding the 1967 Six Day War, including the evacuation of UN observers from the Egyptian-Israeli border and the American failure to break the Egyptian blockade of Israeli's southern sea lanes.
- The abrupt de Gaulle arms embargo on Israel and massive break-off of diplomatic relations by African and communist countries following the Six Day War.
- The compliance of states and firms with the Arab boycott.

[10] J. Doriel, *Terruf Maarachot* [Systems' Madness] (Tel-Aviv: Mabat, 1981), 145-46; see also Netanyahu, *Makom,* 365-69, 397-98, esp. 367.

[11] See, for example, Ben-Gurion, *Distinction and Destiny,* 362.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

- The frequent UN votes chastising and censuring Israel, including the 1975 UN resolution that declared Zionism to be a form of racism.

The strategic foundations of the Israeli perception of exceptionalism draw from both the cultural and historical sources of exceptionalism. For example, they draw on both cultural notions of isolation, cultural-historical experiences such as (the myth) of the Masada siege in the first century AD (which epitomizes the heroic struggle of the few against the many), or the historical experience of the Holocaust. Essentially, the strategic foundations of exceptionalism contain three elements: the perception of the basic imbalance of power between the Arab World and Israel, the perception of Arab declared hostile intentions, and the perception of Arab aggressive behavior.

The basic imbalance of power element refers to Israel's inherent quantitative inferiority in the face of the demographic, budgetary, and military resources that the whole Arab World possesses, and to Israel's geostrategic vulnerability—that is, lack of a measure of strategic depth. The intention element refers to voices in the Arab world that define the destruction of the Jewish State as the Arab strategic objective and occasionally discuss the extermination of the Jewish citizens of Israel. The behavior elements refers to the de jure state of war, occasional wars, continuous terror, and repeated efforts to deny Israel international recognition and legitimacy.[12]

The Image of National Security Exceptionalism and Its Consequences

The Israeli image of exceptionalism, and in particular the interactions between elements of its strategic, historical, and cultural foundations, are at the heart of the Israeli definition of the country's national security problem. These have helped to shape Israel's threat perceptions, her operational definition of the national interest, and her political and military strategies.[13] They also contributed to the shaping of a number of other attitudes, self-images, and beliefs.

Most significantly, the foundations of the Israeli image of exceptionalism created a persistent sense that Israel is entangled in a conflict of unparalleled dimensions: total ideological antagonism, an almost untenable strategic relationship, and unmitigated hostile conduct. In fact, notions of national security exceptionalism percolated so deeply into Israeli society that they became integrated even into the discourse of society's most critical minds. Indeed, excep-

[12] See, for example, the review in Aaron S. Klieman, *Israel and the World after 40 Years* (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1990), esp. 5–17.

[13] On the Israeli national security belief-system, see Asher Arian, Ilan Talmud, and Tamar Hermann, *National Security and Public Opinion in Israel,* JCSS study no. 9 (Jerusalem: The Jerusalem Post, 1988), 16–30; Michael I. Handel, *Israel's Political-Military Doctrine* (Cambridge, MA: Center for International Affairs, 1973); Dan Horowitz, "The Israeli Concept of National Security" in Avner Yaniv, ed., *National Security and Democracy in Israel* (Boulder, CO: Lynn Rienner, 1993), 11–53; and Avner Yaniv, *Politika Ve'estrategya* [Politics and Strategy] (Tel-Aviv: Sifriat Poalim, 1994), 14–34.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tionalist argumentation can be found in the writings of distinguished scholars and independent opinion makers that were deeply critical of Israel's foreign policy and rhetoric. Thus, for example, one scholar discusses "Israel's very special security predicament . . .," even though he argues that "Israel may not be as unique . . . as it sometimes presents itself."[14] While another scholar finds that "Israel's distinction in comparison to almost any of the states existing today . . . [is that it] faces a long term existential risk. . . ."[15] Similarly, in the wake of the March 1997 suicide-bomb attack in Tel-Aviv, a noted columnist of the liberal daily *Ha'aretz* depicted the terrorist act as one "the like of which is not to be found in the [whole] world."[16]

When Ben-Gurion and other Israelis raised the claims that "[Israel's national] security problem [was] rather different from that of every [other] nation," that it was "utterly unique and [without] parallel among the nations," or "one of a kind problem, much as [Jews] are a one of a kind people,"[17] they all had one issue in mind—the existential nature of the threat Israel faces.[18] In the Israeli mind, the national security exceptionalism boiled down to one issue: "little" Israel alone faced the risk of irreversible collapse, a "destruction of the Third Temple,"[19] and the threat of genocide. Such fears were expressed in the wake of the Holocaust, but they continue to reverberate in Israeli society today.[20] In 1988, for example, forty years after the establishment of Israel, Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir explained in reference to the idea that "the Arabs want to throw the Jews to the sea" that: "If we carefully examine our reality, it has not changed. The Arabs are the same Arabs, the sea is the same sea. The objective is the same objective—the extermination of the Israeli state. . . ."[21]

This acute perception of threat not only defines the Israeli-Arab conflict in total and irremediable terms, but also perceives the Arab world, as implied in Shamir's words, as a monolith. Moreover, such perceptions lead to a formula-

[14] Yaniv, *National Security and Democracy,* 230.

[15] Yehezkel Dror, *Estrategya Rabati Le'Israel* [*A Grand Strategy for Israel,* henceforward *Grand Strategy*] (Jerusalem: Academon, 1989), 26.

[16] Yoel Marcus, *Ha'aretz,* 23 March 1997.

[17] The first two quotes are from a 5 September 1949 speech, and the third quote is from an 18 August 1952 speech. See Ben-Gurion, *Distinction and Destiny,* 72–73, 179. See also a speech to senior officers, 12 December 1957, in ibid., 30; and Shimon Peres's opening statement in *Kela David* [David's Sling] (Jerusalem: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1970), 1.

[18] See Dan Horowitz, "The Israeli Concept of National Secrity," 11.

[19] This image was used by Moshe Dayan during the early stages of the 1973 war. See Chaim Herzog, *The War of Atonement* (Boston: Little Brown, 1975), 97, 116.

[20] See Ben-Gurion's speeches 26 August 1947, 2 January 1951, and 5 July 1955 (to IDF officers) in *Distinction and Destiny,* 16–17, 148, 205–206.

[21] Quoted in Daniel Bar-Tal and Dan Jacobson, *Security Beliefs among Israelis: A Psychological Analysis* (Tel Aviv: The Tami Steinmetz Center, 1996), 21 from *Ha'aretz,* 25 January 1988. Refael Eitan, former Israeli chief of the general staff (1978–1983) and a minister in several governments since then, is of similar opinion. See Eitan (with Dov Goldstein), *Sippur Shel Hayal* [A Soldier's Story] (Tel Aviv: Ma'ariv, 1985), 333; and an interview in *Ha'aretz,* 20 August 1996. See also Netanyahu, *Makom,* 185.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tion of the national security objective in negative and extreme terms, such as those embodied in the slogans, "never again" (which refers to the Holocaust) or "Masada shall not fall a second time." In short, the conflict is defined in game theory language as an unalterable, iterated, zero-sum game, which includes Arab terror and insurgency in Israel and abroad.[22] In this game, Israel has to be prepared to fight and win recurring rounds of war, since any loss inevitably would mean the termination of the whole sequence, or more specifically, the end of Israel. Finally, in such a scheme of thoughts there is also no place for compromise, as it will only weaken Israel.

Naturally, such a representation of Israel's security problems helps to preserve exaggerated perceptions of strategic threat and inferiority and a "siege mentality."[23] During the Lebanon war, for example, Lieut. General Rafael Eitan, the chief of general staff (CGS) chastised journalists who dared question the image of Israel as a "David" struggling against an Arab "Goliath." Ignoring the overwhelming Israeli military superiority, he argued that "the truth is that it is the other way round. . . . they [the Arabs] are Goliath: Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Iraq, Syria, the Palestinians, Libya, Algeria and all these states."[24] Chaim Hertzog, a retired general and later president of Israel, did not hesitate to depict the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Yasir Arafat as "the most cruel enemy the Jewish people have faced since Hitler."[25]

In any event, as Figure 1 suggests, the image of national security exceptionalism has several additional consequences. First, Israelis have been led to believe that the establishment of Israel, its survival, and its prosperity were exceptional. After all, if all three have been achieved in the face of exceptional problems and threats, then they must be exceptional too. Indeed, former Defense Minister Moshe Arens, explained in 1995 that: "The establishment of Israel was a *modern miracle; an exceptional event in human history. Her survival,* while constantly struggling against Arab aggression and terror in the hostile environment of the Middle East, seemed to me *no less miraculous.*"[26] Moreover, if that is the case, then one can also easily reach the conclusion that the capacity of Israeli society to meet its security challenges is no less exceptional. Indeed, Arens concluded that "surely, there is no parallel in history for such casualties, courage and energy of a small people that faces such overwhelming threats."[27]

[22] See Ben-Gurion's reference in a 2 January 1956 speech and on 15 October 1956 in *Distinction and Destiny,* 231, 258.

[23] On Israel's society security creed, see Bar-Tel and Jacobson, *Security Beliefs among Israelis;* and Arian, Talmud, and Hermann, *National Security and Public Opinion in Israel.* On the scope, origins, and cultural prevalence of the siege mentality, see Daniel Bar-Tal and Dikla Antebi, "Siege Mentality in Israel," *International Journal of Intercultural Relations* 16 (Summer 1992): 251–75.

[24] *Yediot Aharonot,* 17 September 1982.

[25] *Maariv,* 9 July 1982.

[26] Moshe Arens, *Milhama Ve'shalom Ba'mizrach Ha'tichon, 1988–1992* [War and Peace in the Middle-East] (Tel-Aviv: Yediot Aharonot, 1995), 35–36. (Emphasis added.)

[27] Ibid., 38.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FIGURE 1
The Sources, Structure, and Consequences of the Israeli Image of National Security Exceptionalism



The second important consequence of the image of national security exceptionalism is the conviction that Israel must devise strategic solutions that will match the level of the challenges Israel faces. Indeed, Ben Gurion had already concluded that: "We [Israelis] will not solve [our security problems] by means of simple answers, drawn from our past or adopted from other people. Whatever [solution] was adequate in the past, and for others—will not be adequate for us, since our security problem is one of a kind. . . . We will not withstand

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the [trying hour] unless we perceive our situation and needs in their geographic and historical singularity, and construct a security method adequate for that uniqueness."[28]

Similarly, four decades later, Ariel Sharon concluded that "Israel faces unconventional problems, and in order to continue to survive [it] must be able to devise unconventional solutions. . . ."[29] In fact, the idea that the Israeli strategic solutions, are, might, or perhaps should be exceptional was endorsed even in academia. Shai Feldman, for example, boldly suggested that Israel should establish an open nuclear deterrence against the conventional Arab threat, a choice that would be exceptional, as no other state by then dared to openly challenge the global nuclear regime of the Nonproliferation Treaty.[30]

Finally, the image of national security exceptionalism gave the Israeli leadership a powerful utilitarian tool for the purpose of extracting resources and mobilizing support from society for whatever collective tasks it wanted to achieve. In the wake of the Six Day War, Yitzhak Tabenkin, a prominent figure in the activist faction within the Labor camp, referred to the instrumental value embedded in the threat component of what we term the image of national security exceptionalism as he argued that: "This feeling of solitude which resulted from the threat of extermination was one of the 'secrets' of our victory, and we must imprint it in our memories as a consideration in our decisions in the future."[31]

Indeed, the Israeli state cashed in on the image of national security exceptionalism when it mobilized and motivated Israeli society in general, and attracted and extracted the most from her best and brightest. Israel recruited for the backbone and spearhead of the IDF—the junior officer corps, and the top-line combat units and special operations forces—personnel from classes that in other societies often regard military service as an onus.

Israel's National Security in a Comparative Perspective

In order to test the hypothesis that the Israeli national security problem is exceptional, I first specify an operational definition for national security. Using a deductive and relatively precise definition of the objectives of national security, which is also quite compatible with the thinking and behavior of Israel, helps

[28] 5 September 1949 to the Knesset. Ben-Gurion, *Distinction and Destiny,* 75.

[29] Ariel Sharon with David Chanoff, *Warrior* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989), 531.

[30] Shai Feldman, *Israeli Nuclear Deterrence: The Strategy for the 1980s* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982). Opposing Feldman's views are Avner Yaniv, *Deterrence Without the Bomb: The Politics of Israeli Strategy* (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1987); Yair Evron, *Ha'dilema Ha'Garinit Shel Israel* [Israel's Nuclear Dilemma] (Tel-Aviv: Ha'kibutz Ha'meuhad, 1987); and Yehezkel Dror, *Grand Strategy,* 139–150.

[31] Quoted in Arian, Talmud, and Hermann, *National Security and Public Opinion in Israel,* 26.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to overcome the inherent ambiguity plaguing the concept of national security.[32] My definition separates two broad categories of national security: primary objectives that refer to existential and collective security issues, and secondary objectives that refer to individual security and private and public property.[33] The primary objectives of national security are the following: ensuring the survival of the state; guarding the state's territorial integrity; maintaining the state's political autonomy.

I discuss here solely primary objectives, as only they concern the existential question at the national level. These objectives comprise the hard core of national security. Furthermore, they are ordered hierarchically. The attainment of the first goal, survival, is more important than achieving either the second or third goals. Though, it is not clear at all whether achieving the second goal of territorial integrity is more important than achieving the third goal of political autonomy, or vice versa.[34]

In any event, we can now compare the magnitude of Israel's security problem to that of other states in terms of the nature of the threat, its severity, and its intensity. We can check whether other states in the international system and the Middle East have encountered similar or more acute threats to their survival, territorial integrity, and political autonomy. Then we can check whether such threats involved similar or worse strategic relations. Finally, we can decide whether other conflicts were as comprehensive, enduring, or demanding in terms of investment and loss.

The most general comparative review of Israel's national security, as it appears in quantitative studies of enduring international rivalries (EIR), suggests that Israel experienced a high but not exceptional number of dyadic rivalry years (RY), militarized interstate dispute (MID) years, and war years (WY).[35]

[32] See Arnold Walfers, *Discord and Collaboration* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962), chap. 10; see also John A. Vasquez, *The Power of Power Politics* (London: Frances Pinter, 1983), 48–54.

[33] See the definitions of Frank N. Trager and Frank L. Simonie, "An Introduction to the Study of National Security" in Frank N. Trager and Philip S. Kronenberg, eds., *National Security and American Society* (Lawrence: The University Press of Kansas, 1973), 38; Barry Buzan, "People, States and Fear: The National Security Problem in the Third World" in Edward E. Azar and Chung-in Moon, eds., *National Security in the Third World* (Hants, UK: Edward Elgar, 1988), 16–17; and Harold Brown, *Thinking about National Security* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1983), 4. The idea of secondary national security interest has its roots in Brown's reference to "the control of borders" as a security goal, from Walfers's discussion of deviations from the "minimum national core values," in *Discord and Collaboration,* 154, and from Bernard Brodie's definition of vital interests as "those interests against the infringement of which we are prepared to take some serious military action." See Brodie, "Vital Interests: By Whom and How Determined?" in Tager and Kronenberg, *National Security and American Society,* 63.

[34] See also the discussion of territorial integrity and political independence in Trager and Simonie, "An Introduction to the Study of National Security," 36–43.

[35] Data from Table 1 in Zeev Maoz and Ben D. Mor, *Satisfaction, Capabilities, and the Evolution of Enduring Rivalries, 1816–1990: A Statistical Analysis of a Game-Theoretical Model* (paper presented at the 1995 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, 31 August–3 September 1995), 23–25.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE 1

Ratios of Basic Power-Indicators of Selected Conflict Dyads (rounded figures)

Dyad and Date	*National income (GNP)*	*Military Expenditures*	*Population*
Germany–Norway 1938 (1940)	19 to 1*	108 to 1*	23 to 1 (1939)
USSR–Finland 1938 (1939)	31 to 1*	374 to 1*	43 to 1 (1939)
Egypt–Yemen 1966 (1962–1966/67)	>16 to 1	>122 to 1	6.5 to 1
USA–North Vietnam 1966 (1964–1973)	502 to 1	193 to 1	9.7 to 1
China–Vietnam 1978 (1979)	27 to 1	N.A.	19 to 1
USSR–Afghanistan 1978 (1978–1989)	>464 to 1	>3237 to 1	18 to 1
Iraq-Kuwait 1989 (1990)	5.2 to 1 (GDP)	8.6 to 1 (estimated/planned)	9.1 to 1
China–Taiwan 1994	9.3 to 1	4.6 to 1	57 to 1
Arab**–Israel 1967 [ACDA] (1967)	1.8 to 1	1.1 to 1	14.3 to 1
Arab**–Israel 1973 [ACDA] (1973)	1.4 to 1	1.1 to 1	13.5 to 1
Arab**–Israel 1982 [ACDA] (1982–1985)	2.4 to 1	1.2 to 1	14.5 to 1
Arab**–Israel 1993 [JCSS]	1.4 to 1 (GDP)	0.8 to 1	1.40 to 1

* Based on $ figures of German and Russian national income of the year 1937.

> The *greater than* sign was added to indicate that existing data about the underdog's power referred to the whole nation state, whereas the conflict involved only part of the underdog's nation, as the latter was split.

** The Arab side of the dyad is considered as a coalition consisting of Israel's immediate significant neighbors: Egypt, Syria, and Jordan.

Source: B.R. Mitchel, *European Historical Statistics, 1750–1970* (London: Macmillan, 1975); Peter Flora et al., *State, Economy, and Society in Western Europe, 1815–1975*, vols. i and ii (London: Macmillan, 1983); Henrik S. Nissen, "The Nordic Societies" in Nissen, ed., trans. Thomas Munch-Petersen, *Scandinavia during the Second World War* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983), 3–52; Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, *The Middle East Military Balance*, various years (Jerusalem: JCSS-The Jerusalem Post); U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1967–76, 1970–1979, 1985, 1995; Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* (New York: Random House, 1987), 332.

Yet the analysis of the EIR data suggests that Israel stands out as far as hostility, defined as MID to RY, is concerned. With two of its neighbors, Syria and Egypt, Israel's MID/RY ratio is the highest among all the conflict dyads (90 percent and 94 percent respectively). The two next highest ratios of MID/RY, are those of India-Pakistan (82 percent) and of South Korea-North Korea (74 percent).

Still, the EIR data cannot indicate a real measure of Israeli national security exceptionalism, for it does not include dimensions of conflict—such as the power ratios, level of threat, or the cost and consequences of rivalry and war—which are necessary for a reliable comparative assessment of Israel's security situation. Indeed, as Table 1 indicates, a most elementary review of dyadic

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

power relations of actors engaged in tense and/or violent conflict clearly indicates that the security predicament of other states was or is more severe than that which Israel faces.

In order to answer the question of exceptionalism, let us consider strategic relationships in a qualitative manner, starting with a deductive argument about which strategic relationships potentially involve an equal or even worse national security threat than that which Israel has experienced. Then, let us briefly recall a few empirical cases that seem to corroborate my deductive argument.

At least three types of conflict situations—all involving actors that fall within the definition of small state[36]—involve inherently worse strategic situations and consequently potentially greater threats, risks, and costs than the Israel experience: cases involving seceding nations (usually not quite full states); cases involving states sandwiched between two powerful rivals; cases of small states living on the frontier of empires or ambitious regional powers.

States in the first and third categories (seceding and frontier) are in a worse situation, since they face mighty political units that are far more cohesive and powerful than the Arab community. States in the second category (sandwiched) are in a worse situation, because they face a dual threat over which they have no control whatsoever, since it arises from their geopolitical position.

Biafra, Bosnia, and Chechnya, are good examples of seceding nations that became involved in manifestly more threatening and demanding struggles than Israel. Examples of sandwiched states that experienced a worse strategic predicament than Israel are Poland during much of its interrupted national life, Belgium and the Netherlands during the first half of the twentieth century, and Central European states during the cold war. Examples of frontier states whose powerful and ambitious neighbors threatened, robbed, or violated their autonomy, territory, or sovereignty are Albania from birth and until the end of World War II; the Baltic states, Czechoslovakia, and Finland since shortly before World War II and up to the end of the cold war; Latin and particularly Central American and Caribbean states since the mid-nineteenth century, and Chad in the 1970s and early 1980s.[37]

[36] The concept of "small" state, as Yohanan Cohen argues, is inherently relative. Demographic and geographical dimensions are not sufficient in order to define states as small. We correctly consider Finland (as it faced the USSR), Czechoslovakia (as it faced Nazi Germany), and Poland (as it faced both) as small states, though Finland controlled vast territory, Czechoslovakia had 14,000,000 citizens, and Poland almost 30,000,000. According to absolute definition, which is based on population or territory, about 20–25 percent of the world's states are small (Israel is not included in any such list!). Many of these small states are utterly indefensible, and a few of them are situated in hazardous locations such as the Middle East or Southeast Asia. See Yohanan Cohen, *Small Nations in Times of Crisis and Confrontation* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 2; the UNITAR Study, *Small States & Territories* (New York: Arno Press, 1971), 32–33, 36–38; and Gordon W. East and J. R. V. Prescott, *Our Fragmented World* (London: Macmillan, 1975), 53–55.

[37] Data from Alan J. Day, ed., *Border and Territorial Disputes* (Detroit: Gale Research, 1982); Cohen, *Small Nations in Times of Crisis and Confrontation*; Robert Schaeffer, *Warpaths: The Politics of Partition* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1990).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Some of these and other international actors—Poland, Albania, Serbia, Montenegro, the Baltic states, Biafra, and Tibet—simply ceased to exist, temporarily or permanently, as a result of other states' aggression. For similar reasons, other potential states have never quite made it to independence. East Timor, for example, escaped Portuguese rule only to discover shortly thereafter that Indonesia "accepted" a merger with it on 17 August 1976, declaring its territory as Indonesia's twenty-seventh province.[38] Some of the above states and provinces also experienced alien colonization designed to thwart their future secession. Even today, a few states, most notably Taiwan, have good reasons to fear dismantling.

Moreover, dire existential threats await not only small actors. In June 1950, South Korea was the victim of an offensive by its rough northern equal that would have put an end to its existence had the United States decided not to intervene. Of course, shortly thereafter, North Korea faced a similar threat that would have ended in its destruction had it not been for China's decision to intervene. South Vietnam perished after two decades of independence, and Kampuchea was conquered by Vietnam. The superpowers have faced since shortly after the dawn of the nuclear age thermonuclear armageddon. Indeed, the citizens of Europe, the United States, and the USSR, have lived under the threat of nuclear annihilation, a threat Israelis have yet to face.

Now, though many of the states mentioned managed to retain their sovereignty, they nevertheless suffered from a significant reduction in their political autonomy and control over their territory and other affairs. For example, most East European members of the Soviet bloc (except Yugoslavia, Romania, and Albania) hardly enjoyed any measure of sovereignty as far as their foreign relations and internal political order were concerned. They had to follow the dictates of the USSR, and when they failed to obey Moscow, their sovereignty was violated and their leadership was swiftly removed (Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Afghanistan). Even less tightly controlled small neighbors of the USSR could not afford to practice full autonomy. Post-1945 Finland remained out of the Soviet institutional grip but was still deprived of much of its autonomy in foreign policy and even domestic matters (all that, after Finland had already lost vast territories in the 1939 Winter War). One must also remember that life on the frontier or under the proclaimed sphere of influence of democratic powers was not necessarily safer, at least as far as political autonomy was concerned. Communist Cuba lived under continuous American threats and economic pressure, occasionally suffering from American aggression. Other Latin American states—including Mexico, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Chile, Nicaragua, Panama, and Grenada—were also victims of American covert or overt aggression.

Finally, even within the Middle East, the national security situation of Israel seems to be relatively bearable. Some Arab states are locked in a significantly

[38] See Day, *Border and Territorial Disputes,* 296–302.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

more problematic situation than Israel. They are either sandwiched between or on the frontier of states that are far stronger than them and that have occasionally become ambitious, threatening, and aggressive. Jordan is neighboring three such states—Iraq, Syria, and Israel. These neighbors have all at one time or another threatened the Jordanian regime, territorial integrity, and even existence; and they still might make Jordan the site of military collision between any two of them. Another Arab state, Lebanon, has already been a victim of such predicament. In 1982, it became the site of an Israeli-Syrian collision, and today it is virtually run by the Syrians and is de facto divided between Syria, local militias, and Israel. Bahrain is another small Middle Eastern state that should be concerned over its existence. It was claimed by both pre- and post-revolutionary Iran, whose spokesmen occasionally depicted it as their country's fourteenth province.[39] Finally, Kuwait, as of its independence on 25 June 1961, has been claimed by Iraq, which tried and almost succeeded in annexing it in 1990.[40]

In short, Israel's security situation is better than that of other regional actors. Moreover, its depiction as a small state became inappropriate, as it is not locked anymore in acutely inferior strategic relationships with its immediate neighbors—a condition which is the very hallmark of a small state. A power-related time analysis of the dynamics of the Arab-Israeli conflict shows that Israel's relative position vis-à-vis its Arab enemies has improved considerably and consistently over the years.

Now this dynamic of the balance of power in favor of Israel is not recent nor even a post-1967 phenomenon. Studies by Yair Evron and others reveal that the relative improvement in Israel's position vis-à-vis its immediate Arab foes started as early as the 1950s.[41] For example, Israel's rate of defense outlays growth in the period 1950-1970 exceeded on average that of its Arab neighbors.[42]

After 1967, the relative improvement in Israel's security only accelerated, though initially the rate of defense outlays may not have indicated that. First, Israel's geostrategic position improved as a result of conquest. Second, its military capabilities, and in particular superiority in terms of kinetic military power, increased as a result of the transition from French to American military technology and aid. Third, as Dan Segre and Daniel Ben-Yaakov further note, Israel's position improved in terms of the quality of its human capital (as measured by scientific production) and economic growth that followed the "science and

[39] Ibid., 209–11.

[40] Ibid., 222–225.

[41] Yair Evron, "Arms Races in the Middle East and Some Arms Control Measures Related to Them" in Gabriel Sheffer, ed., *Dynamics of a Conflict* (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1975), 95–135; and J. C. Hurewitz, *Middle East Politics: The Military Dimension* (New York: Praeger, 1969), 438–88.

[42] See Evron, "Arms Races in the Middle East," 114–15, tables 7–9. See also Hurewitz, *Middle East Politics*, 448, 450, tables 18, 19.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

technology based industrial revolution" it experienced.[43] Finally, as Zeev Maoz recently demonstrated, the economic gap between Israel and its "strategic reference group" grew further in Israel's favor in the 1980s and 1990s, and its defense outlays grew while those of its rivals declined in the later part of the study period (1986-1994).[44]

Still, in order to fully appreciate the importance of the change in Israel's national security, our discussion needs to go beyond material dimensions and to seek to understand the actual conventional threat Israel faces as well as its political dimensions. A good starting point would be the premise that the conventional strategic threat Israel faces is a function of three related factors: geostrategy, power relations, and the probability and potential damage of a strategic surprise attack. For example, of all possible threats (excluding a massive nonconventional attack), a strategic surprise by a grand coalition (Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Iraq) on two fronts is the worst in terms of magnitude and severity. In such a scenario, the Egyptians tie down a considerable part of Israeli forces in the southern front, while the eastern members of the coalition strike on a broad front, right into the heart of Israel, before Israel fully mobilizes or adequately deploys its forces. The second worst threat comes from a strategic surprise by the above coalition minus its Egyptian component—by a broad eastern coalition (Syria, Jordan, and Iraq). The third worst threat could be that posed by a strategic surprise by a limited two-fronts coalition (Egypt and Syria), etc.[45]

What these scenarios make clear, by implication, is that the threat level that Israel faces is not simply a function of the balance-of-power and Israel's geostrategic vulnerabilities. Rather, the threat level is also a function of regional and international politics.[46] These decide the structure of hostile coalitions, and consequently the magnitude of the threat of strategic surprise, and the potential damage carried in its wake. In short, a reliable account of the dynamics of Israel's national security situation cannot ignore diplomatic and strategic developments in the world in general, among Arab states, and between the Arabs and Israel in particular (including possible Arab interests in Israel's survival).[47]

[43] See Segre and Ben-Yaakov, "Powers and Power in Middle East Politics" in Sheffer, *Dynamics of a Conflict,* 27–36, esp. 30–32.

[44] Zeev Maoz, "The Evolution of the Middle East Military Balance, 1980–1994" in Ephraim Kam, ed., *The Middle East Military Balance* (Jerusalem: JCSS-The Jerusalem Post, 1996), 66–92, esp. 69, 72, 80. The study includes both Iraq and Iran in Israel's "reference group."

[45] See, for example, the discussion in Avraham Tamir, *Hayal Shoher Shalom* [A Soldier in Search of Peace] (Tel-Aviv: Edanim, 1988), 227–28, 234.

[46] For a similar approach see Cohen, *Small Nations in Times of Crisis and Confrontation,* 2.

[47] Colin S. Gray, for example, notes that for the Arabs to keep Israel as an enemy has the advantages of promoting inter-Arab unity, diverting domestic pressures elsewhere, and avoiding the threat of leaving the scene for full blown inter-Arab rivalry. See "Arms Races and their Influence on International Stability, with a Special Reference to the Middle East" in Sheffer, *Dynamics of a Conflict,* 68–69. For a study of inter-Arab discord (and collaboration) see Alan R. Taylor, *The Arab Balance of Power* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1982). For an analysis of the Arab-Israeli balance of power that includes consideration of different Arab coalitions, see Alouph Hareven, *War and Peace* (Hebrew) (Jerusalem: Dvir, 1989), 439–48.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Adjusting the assessment of the Arab threats to Israel to regional and global politics soon reveals that Israel's security position has improved beyond what material analysis suggests. Israel's enemies' patron, the Soviet Union, ceased to exist; and its two neighbors who share its longest borders, Egypt and Jordan, decided to sign peace agreements that contain important strategic arrangements that Israel sought. In short, the number of states that threaten Israel with any kind of territorial surprise attack has shrunk over time to one—Syria. Of course, Israel's immediate neighbors can still change heart and threaten Israel. But the current and near-future threat level still remains lower than that created before the peace agreements. The change back to hostility will involve serious cost and will give Israel time to prepare for its consequences.

The improvement in Israel's national security situation was noted by several scholars, including Jerome Slater and Zeev Maoz.[48] Maoz, for example, demonstrates that in comparison to the period 1945–1970, the Arab-Israeli conflict of the last three decades occupies a declining share of the region's security problems, as measured by the problems' severity.[49] Moreover, the improvement in Israeli security was indicated clearly by regional and global development. First, Israel was spared much of the pain and horror certain Arab powers inflicted on Middle Eastern nations. For example, Israelis avoided the fate of the Yemeni and the Kurds, who were subjected to gas attacks by the Egyptians and the Iraqis respectively. Similarly, Israel avoided the kind of civil and military bloodshed that Iran and Iraq inflicted on each other, and the kind of destruction Kuwait suffered at the hands of Iraq. Second, the improvement in Israel's national security situation was reflected in the transformation of the strategic calculus of Arab states, and their readiness to establish open commercial ties, conduct peace negotiations, and conclude diplomatic relations with Israel.[50] Third, the consistent improvement in Israel's national security was indicated by the consolidation of its international status after long years in which Israel was subject to an effective Arab delegitimation campaign.

Israel's National Security and Moral Exceptionalism

Thus far we have not discussed a major consequence of the Israeli image of exceptionalism, which springs from the notion that the Jews were ordained to

[48] Jerome Slater "A Palestinian State and Israeli Security," *Political Science Quarterly* 106 (Fall 1991): 411–429, esp. 419–20; and Zeev Maoz, "Regional Security in the Middle East: Past Trends, Present Realities and Future Challenges," *The Journal of Strategic Studies* 20 (March 1997): 11–15. Slater notes that Israel faces a reduced threat and lower probability of an Arab attack due to political and military factors that only intensified after 1990 as a result of the Soviet decline and the defeat of Iraq in the Gulf War. These factors include a decreased Arab hostility, the strong Israeli nuclear deterrence, and the American commitment to Israel.

[49] Maoz uses as an indicator for severity the rate of military and civilian fatalities that resulted from interstate violence. See "Regional Security in the Middle East," in particular table 1, 11.

[50] Avner Yaniv, "Hartaa Ve'hagana Ba'estrategia Ha'Israelit" [Deterrence and Defense in the Israeli Strategy] in *Medina, Mimshal Ve'Yehasim Ben-Leumiyim* 24 (1985), 56; and Tamir, *Hayal Shoher Shalom,* 362–3.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

be a light unto the nations—the conviction that Israel can be a moral beacon while using its military might, and can somehow untangle the Gordian knot created by the conflict between the necessities of security and the ethics of human conduct. The Israelis believe that their presumed moral exceptionalism is a vital component of national power and of their strategy to deal with the country's "exceptional" security situation. IDF officers and soldiers are instructed to abide by ethical rules of conduct in war, which are embodied in the Israeli concept of the "purity of firearms" (*tohar ha'neshek*) and the permission/instruction to refuse to obey "blatantly illegal orders" (*pkudot bilti hukiot be'alil*).

This central moral tenet of the Israeli image of national security exceptionalism must be approached, much as were other tenets of that image, as a proposition to be evaluated rather than a given assumption. The evaluation itself can be accomplished on the basis of a review of the Israeli conduct in two realms: international military trade (and aid), and military conduct in war and occupation.

The review of Israeli's military trade policy suggests that Israel does not break with the prevailing patterns of the international arms and military market, which are characterized by the preponderance of utilitarian calculations over ethical considerations. In short, Israel's military-trade and aid policy is formulated on the basis of ordinary economic, strategic, and diplomatic calculations. It has done military business with some of the most corrupt, cruel, and unjust regimes in the world including the pariah regimes of apartheid South Africa, Mobutu's Zaire, Communist China, and Argentina's junta (a country whose government and army were also plagued by anti-Semitism).[51]

The review of Israel's military conduct, the realm with which Israelis and a few scholars associate the country's presumed moral exceptionalism, does not support the moral claim.[52] Let us first inform ourselves of the basic concepts of moral philosophy and international law regarding conduct in war.[53] Our departure point is that "war [remains] . . . a rule-governed activity, a world of permissions and prohibitions,"[54] a tenet that is at the root of the Western body of principles, which presumably guide warring sides that consider themselves civilized. Some of these principles have already been incorporated as binding obligations in international conventions that deal with restraints on the conduct of war.

[51] On Israel's arms exports, see Aaron Klieman, *Israel's Global Reach* (Washington, DC: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1985), esp. 29–69 and 149–166.

[52] The case in favor of Israel has been made by William V. O'Brien, *Law and Morality in Israel's War with the PLO* (New York: Routledge, 1991), 148–271; Esther R. Cohen, *Human Rights in the Israeli-Occupied Territories, 1967–1982* (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 1985).

[53] See Michael Waltzer, *Just and Unjust Wars* (New York: Basic Books, 1977); James T. Johnson, *Just War Tradition and the Restraint of War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981); Thomas Nagel, "War and Massacre" in Charles R Beitz, Marshall Cohen, Thomas Scanlon, and A. John Simmons, eds., *International Ethics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), 53–74; George Mavrodes, "Conventions and Morality of War" in ibid., 75–89; and O'Brien, *Law and Morality in Israel's War with the PLO.*

[54] Waltzer, *Just and Unjust Wars*, 36.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Among these principles, two types concern restraints on combat behavior: absolutist and utilitarian.[55] Absolutist principles deal with what one is doing. They forbid "doing certain things to people, rather than bringing about certain results."[56] Murder and torture, for example, are "the most serious of [such] prohibited acts."[57] Utilitarian principles are concerned with consequences. They revolve round the idea that in the pursuit of legitimate military goals, one should try to minimize evil. In short, the distinction between absolutist and utilitarian principles is between what one is allowed to do to people and what merely happens to them as a result of what one does.

Absolutist restrictions are organized in two clusters of prohibitions: those concerning whom soldiers can kill; and those concerning when and how soldiers can kill.[58] Thus, certain people may not be subject to hostile treatment, while others, though legitimate targets, can be considered as such only under certain circumstances.[59] For example, noncombatants are granted immunity at all times from an attack directed at them.[60]

Among utilitarian principles, the double effect principle, which concerns the fate of civilians placed in harm's way, is central.[61] In essence, this principle defines a military act as illegitimate if its consequences include deliberate damages to civilians. According to the double effect principle, a military act might be legitimate according to utilitarian principles even if it involves the foreseen but unintended death of noncombatants. The act must still meet the somewhat vague requirements of proportionality—that is, the military benefit should surpass the evil of the unintended damage the act brings upon noncombatants.

A slightly different way to assess the morality of state acts is to measure the morality of the behavior of states according to the relations between the principle of necessity, and the principles of humanity and chivalry.[62] Necessity is defined in terms of the value of the desired military goal. However, the goal must be of immediate indispensability, limited by the principle of proportionality, directed toward legitimate military ends and achieved by legitimate military measures (that is, measures that are not prohibited by the law of war or natural law). Humanity requires that the actions should not cause unnecessary or disproportionate damage or suffering and should not violate the principles of discrimination (noncombatant immunity). Chivalry demands that the behavior be honorable, even toward the enemy.

[55] See Thomas Nagel, "War and Massacre" in Charles R. Beitz et al., *International Ethics,* 54–56.

[56] Ibid., 60.

[57] Ibid., 72.

[58] Waltzer, *Just and Unjust Wars,* 41.

[59] Nagel, "War and Massacre," 63.

[60] See the discussion in Waltzer, *Just and Unjust Wars,* 151; and George Mavrodes, "Conventions and Morality of War" in Beitz et al., *International Ethics,* 76.

[61] See the discussion of legitimacy within the "double effect" in George Mavrodes, "Conventions and Morality of War," 77; and Waltzer, *Just and Unjust Wars,* 151–54.

[62] See O'Brien, *Law and Morality in Israel's War with the PLO,* 91.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

My evaluation of the moral standing of a state can be based on the concepts discussed, but it cannot be comprehensive unless we also consider the degree of responsibility of the state for moral transgression. This responsibility is easy to define and a function of the position of the perpetrators in the state's hierarchy. Explained inductively, I submit that a state's culpability in the case of the murder of enemy civilians by lower ranks, on their own initiative, is smaller than when the very same act is initiated by higher authorities.

With these premises in mind we can now divide the realm of military conduct into four important issue-areas—enemy-civilians during war, POWs, occupation, and counter-insurgency and antiterrorism campaigns—and discuss ethics in terms of the severity of moral transgressions and the responsibility of the state. The severity will be measured according to the type of prohibition transgressed and the scope of transgression. The responsibility will be measured in relation to the position of the perpetrator in the state hierarchy.

The evaluation of Israel's behavior according to these standards reveals that not all acts depicted as Israeli violations of military and combat ethics are of the same class. A few Israeli actions that ended in horrible consequences should not be considered as indicative of immorality, as they were inadvertent. For example, the bombing of an Egyptian school during the war of attrition or the 1996 Kafr Canna artillery massacre in Southern Lebanon should not a priori be considered as refuting the claim of moral exceptionalism, though the acts do bear moral responsibility. Other episodes, such as the Dir-Yasin massacre and the Sabra and Shattila massacre, which could have been easily averted or stopped early, resulted in clear transgression of moral standards and thus cast doubts on the claim of moral exceptionalism. Still, they do not clearly disprove the claim, as the immoral outcomes seem not to have been the result of premeditation or intention. A significant number of other episodes, however, seem to contradict the claim of moral exceptionalism. These episodes involved war crimes that were perpetrated by lower- and middle-level Israeli ranks who interpreted ambiguous orders in a criminal manner, or took advantage of a permissive atmosphere. In short, they involved severe transgressions of absolute or utilitarian principles of war ethics, and the responsibility involved intentional default or even design at various levels of authority. Such transgressions include the dispersed yet massive eviction—at times forced or encouraged, and all too often accepted with indifference—of Palestinian Arabs during the 1948 War of Independence (and to a lesser degree, after the 1967 Six Day War).[63] They also include a string of other cases—the 1953 Qibya reprisal; the 1955 private vengeful raid of Meir Har-Zion and friends, which ended in the arbitrary murder of five Bedouin shepherds; the 1956 Kafr Kassem summary execution of forty-seven Israeli Arabs who returned from work after curfew; the murder of Egyptian POWs during the 1956 Sinai Campaign; and several documented and undocumented instances of murder of PLO captives and other people during the

[63] See Ben-Eliezer, *Derech Ha'Kavenet* [Through the Gun-Sights], 252–68.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1978 Litani operation.[64] Finally, there is a class of cases that defeats the claim of moral exceptionalism most prominently, as they involved actions that were ordered by the highest authorities and that ended in the abuse of the utilitarian principle of proportionality and/or the absolute principle of discrimination. The following cases fall within this class: the June 1972 shooting down of a Libyan civilian airliner over the occupied Sinai peninsula, the artillery assault on the cities of the Suez Canal during the War of Attrition, the bombardment of Beirut during the Lebanon war, and the relentless bombardment of villages in Southern Lebanon during the 1993 Din-Ve'heshbon Operation.[65]

Additional refutation of the Israeli claim of moral exceptionalism can be found in the general attitude of the Israeli society toward the Arabs and in the chronicles of Israeli behavior during the occupation of Gaza and the West Bank.[66] Most Israelis either ignored or were indifferent to the prolific documentation of collective and individual abuse of Arab human rights in the occupied territories, while many of them are even supportive of abuses of power such as beating, excessive use of deadly force, collective punishment, demolition of private residences, administrative detention without indictments or trial, torture, and deportation. If anything, only a minority within Israel seems to have realized that Israel could not overcome the inherently exploitative, unjust, and corrupting nature of occupation. Israeli society at large, it seems, mostly views the Palestinians as ungrateful for the "enlightened" Israeli occupation that presumably bestowed on them development and prosperity.

Yet the most reliable means of assessing the claim of moral exceptionalism is to check the Israeli conduct in the issue-areas of counter-insurgency and antiterrorism (issues that are also often part of the reality of occupation). These issue areas provide a particularly good opportunity to evaluate moral exceptionalism, because they both involve a high dose of frustration and are less clearly regulated than other forms of conventional warfare.[67] If Israeli moral exceptionalism exists, it should be clearly evident in Israel's capacity to act morally in spite of the strong temptation to abuse its powers and emphasize above all else efficacy and effectiveness, and in spite of the fact that the fields of counter-insurgency and antiterrorism are relatively poorly regulated.

[64] See Morris, *Israel's Border Wars, 1949–1956*, esp. 227–62; Yigal Elam, *Memalei Ha'pkudot* [The Executors] (Jerusalem: Keter, 1990), 53–70; Eitan, *A Soldier's Story,* 163–64; and *Yediot Araronot,* weekend supplement, 11 April 1997.

[65] See Ze'ev Schiff and Ehud Ya'ari, *Israel's Lebanon War* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984), 132–50, 195–229, esp. 211–12.

[66] See the continuing reporting of journalist Gideon Levi in *Ha'aretz,* successive issues of *Amnesty International Report* (London: Amnesty International Publications); current reports, case studies, annual reports, and other publications of *B'tselem,* The Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories (Jerusalem); and Ilan Peleg, *Human Rights in the West-Bank and Gaza* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1995).

[67] On the state of regulation of whatever is not included firmly within the Jus in Bello, as it applies to nonnational armies, see James Turner Johnson, *Just War Tradition and the Restraint of War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), 59–69, esp. 64.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

During the long years of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Arabs and the Palestinians perpetrated horrible terrorist attacks against Israelis. Many of these attacks can be defined only as war crimes or other crimes. However, Israel did not adhere to what her presumed moral superiority should have dictated. Indeed, Israel has all too often adopted methods that were banned by international law, such as when its forces twice intercepted Arab civilian jets, in order to capture the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) leader George Habash. Moreover, while such failed efforts involved no morally repulsive consequences, other Israeli acts and methods of antiterrorism and counter-insurgency—including the use of torture and hit-teams—involved breaches of international ethics that did result in travesties. For example, following the Munich massacre of eleven members of the Israeli 1972 Olympic Team, Israel launched an assassination campaign against those who it suspected were responsible for the crime. In July 1973, this campaign ended in the assassination of a man who was mistakenly identified as a key Black September operative. The innocent man, an Arab waiter named Ahmed Bouchiki, was gunned down in front of his bewildered pregnant wife.

Of all "exceptions" to the presumed Israeli moral exceptionalism in the issue area of counter-terrorism, the most telling is perhaps the Bus 300 affair. This affair started on 12 April 1984, when four juvenile (17–18 years old) Palestinian terrorists highjacked an Israeli commuter bus. The bus was raided by an Israeli assault team and two of the terrorists were captured in good health. After a short brutal interrogation on the scene, the terrorists were taken by GSS officers to an interrogation center. However, while on the road, the head of the GSS Department of Operation, Ehud Yatom, received instructions from his chief, Avraham Shalom, to kill the two captives. Yatom followed the order,[68] and the official version was that all four terrorists were killed during the army assault. Shortly thereafter, the press provided proof that two of the terrorists were captured alive. The government was embarrassed by the moral side of the disclosure and by the fact that it was caught lying, and decided to limit the damage by establishing an investigation committee. For a while, senior army officer, Brigadier General Yitzhak Mordechay, later the defense minister (1996–1999), who participated in the initial brutal investigation, was suspected of the killing. However, at the end, the committee failed to reach any conclusions.

Some two years after the event, it became clear that the committee fell prey to a GSS conspiracy. Three senior GSS officers, all familiar with the details of the killing (one of them allegedly instrumental in the cover-up), disclosed the truth to the government and to the attorney general. It then became clear that the leadership and ranks of the GSS had committed perjury, conspiring to mislead the civil authorities. Eventually, GSS Chief Shalom resigned. Yet in a bizarre twist of the law and ethics, President Chaim Herzog pardoned the GSS

[68] *Yediot Aharonot,* weekend supplement, 26 July 1996.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

officers who were involved in the crime, although none was found guilty or even put on trial.

In the tumult, the key moral issues were almost lost completely. The major issue became the perjury of the GSS command and ranks. The role of the officers who participated in the initial brutal beating (presumably on the basis of the ticking bomb principle) was hardly debated. The fact that presumably morally exceptional people could murder wounded captives or obey a blatantly illegal order (by Israeli conventions) and ignore an absolute prohibition (by international conventions) bothered only a few. Even of greater significance, it became clear that at least in some circumstances this sort of criminal conduct was not all that unusual, and still very few people seemed concerned. Finally, Yatom, the confessed killer, continued a successful career in the GSS for another eleven years after the murder, and no GSS officer ever protested publicly against the conduct of his fellow officers.

In short, the Bus 300 Affair, as well as other incidents, indicate that Israel does not display moral exceptionalism. Israelis have violated absolute and utilitarian ethical rules of military conduct more often and extensively than they and others have claimed. Moreover, these violations also suggest that state agents and the public at large rarely value Arab life. Israel's morality, as opposed to the country's moral image, concerns at best only a limited professional and intellectual elite in the Justice Department, academia, and the media.

Still, critical discussion of Israel's proclaimed moral exceptionalism does not lead to the conclusion that Israel stands at the opposite moral pole. Israel does not display exceptional morality, but neither does it display exceptional immorality. There is nothing unprecedented or exceptional in Israeli conduct in the international arms and military market, during war and occupation, or while fighting insurgency and terrorism.

The Israeli utilitarian export of arms and know-how is no more outrageous than that of self-proclaimed moral beacons such as France, Germany, Britain, or the United States. If anything, Israel is probably in a slightly better moral position as its arm-sales are motivated by more than profit and employment consideration: to keep alive vital defense industries that serve it in an ongoing struggle. Nor has Israel violated absolute and utilitarian standards of *jus in bello* more often or more severely than other nations. Excessive collateral damage and attacks on civilians, forced evacuation and resettlements, killing of POWs, and other war crimes have all been integral parts of the history of war almost everywhere. Similarly, institutionalized murder, torture, deportation, and cover-up have been part and parcel of almost any counter-insurgency campaign.

Consider the following events: the Russian conduct in the war in Chechnya; the American PGM attack of a civil air-raid shelter in Baghdad during the 1991 Gulf war; the Spanish secret war against the Basque movement, ETA; the Soviet shooting down of a Korean Air Lines passenger-flight; the general British treatment of Irish Republican Army (IRA) suspects in Ireland and the 1988 summary execution of three unarmed IRA members in Gibraltar in particular;

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the massive American bombing campaigns in South and North Vietnam, their Phoenix anti-insurgency campaign, and the My Lai massacre; or the French conduct during the Algerian war in general and during the battle of Algiers in particular.[69]

To sum up, Israel's conduct towards its Arab enemies, be they soldiers, terrorists, or civilians, did not display an outstanding commitment to ethical or moral values. Israelis have gone down the slippery slope of brutalization in war, much as did members of other "civilized" societies before them. Still, Israel as well as other democracies are set apart from brutal regimes that perpetrate war crimes as part of their war strategy or as a means of occupation—as we have seen in ethnic conflicts such as in Bosnia or Rwanda. In short, its conduct, while not exceptionally moral, is still more ethical than that observed and expected from certain nondemocratic states, including those in the Middle East.

Conclusion

The most conspicuous conclusion one can draw from this article is that Israel is not exceptionally vulnerable nor involved in exceptionally difficult strategic relations with its neighbors. The security situation of other small states, which are or were trapped in asymmetric relationships with their neighbors, is or was worse than that of Israel. That in itself should not be all that surprising. As international relations theorists have noted, life at the mercy of international environment leaves little room for exceptionalism. States and societies face similar problems and go through a process of socialization that makes them and their conduct converge.[70] While Israel and its problems surely contain idiosyncrasies, Israel's strategic choices and conduct are not unprecedented or exceptional. Considering Israel's relative economic growth, the fragmentation of the Arab world, the end of bipolarity, and Israel's improved strategic situation, it seems hardly justified to continue analyzing Israel as a small state.

All that, however, does not suggest that Israel's national security problems are trivial or insignificant. The trajectory of middle-eastern and world developments is not necessarily monotonically positive, and thus Israel's gains could be constrained within a temporal window of opportunity. This window may currently be starting to close, and Israel's strategic gains may be eroding, as effective weapons of mass destruction and reliable long-range delivery systems are introduced into the Middle East.[71]

[69] On French conduct, see Pierre Vidal-Naquet, *Face à la raison d'état* (Paris: Éditions La Découverte, 1989); Rita Maran, *Torture: The Role of Ideology in the French-Algerian War* (New York: Praeger, 1989).

[70] Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing, 1979).

[71] See Ze'ev Schiff, "Israel After the War," *Foreign Affairs* 70 (Spring 1991): 19–33; Mark Heller, "Coping with Missile Proliferation in the Middle East," *Orbis* 35 (Winter 1991): 15–28; and Reuven Pedhatzur, "Theater Missile Defense: The Israeli Predicament," *Security Studies* 3 (Spring 1994): 521–70.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

If Israel's national security problems are not all that exceptional, the derivatives of the image of exceptionalism are as worthy of endorsement as the image itself. Israel was not called upon for an unprecedented level of mobilization, nor did it pay an exceptionally high price for the purpose of achieving its objectives. Rather, an honest analysis suggests that other nations faced far greater difficulties, have sacrificed much more, and have often gained far less in the course of their struggles and sacrifices. For example, one may want to consider the levels of heroism, sacrifice, and pain in the Finnish Winter War against the USSR, the Algerians' war for independence against France, the communist struggle in Vietnam against the United States, the Kurds' struggle against three regional powers—Iran, Turkey, and Iraq—and the recent struggles of the Bosnians and Kosovars.

There remains the utilitarian question: Is it beneficial or harmful for Israel to believe in exceptionalism? On the positive side, a self-sense of national security exceptionalism can at times serve a nation well. Combined with a sense of urgency and necessity, it can increase a community's capacity to achieve collective goals. In ordinary times the Israeli image of national security exceptionalism served as a means of decreasing social tensions and centrifugal tendencies within Israel. In times of peril, it provided Israelis with extra necessary strength. Society preserved its cohesion, was more ready to mobilize, its threshold of tolerance to sacrifices was raised, and it was goaded to achievements as the balance between the public and private interest was shifted in the collective's direction.

However, since the Israeli image of national security exceptionalism distorts reality, it is also potentially harmful. Being a source for delusions, it may undercut rational analysis, for the capacity to form an accurate assessment of a means-ends relationship may be lost. It has already been argued that one dimension of the Israeli image of national security exceptionalism—the inflated perception of threat—contributed to the preponderance of military over political considerations.[72] It has also been argued that this and other derivatives of that image were partially responsible for inadequate responses in times of conflict and crisis and for unnecessarily costly operational decisions. For example, in the early 1970s the inherent belief in Israeli-Jewish exceptionalism led to a general contempt towards the Arabs and their capacity to fight, and to an overconfidence in the Israeli power to deter its neighbors. In October 1973, as the Yom-Kippur War erupted, the exaggerated perception of Israel's vulnerability and of Arab objectives led to panic and overreaction.[73]

More significantly, a false sense of exceptionalism can create among leaders and their followers a psychological climate that leads to the disregard of international constraints and the experience of other communities. How can a na-

[72] See Arian, Talmud, and Hermann, *National Security and Public Opinion,* 24–26.

[73] See Tamir, *A Soldier in Search of Peace,* 104–105, 334; and Ariel Levite, *Ha'doctrina Ha'tzvait shel Israel: Hagana Ve'hatkafa* [The Israeli Strategic Doctrine: Defense and Offense] (Tel-Aviv: Ha'kibutz Ha'meuhad, 1988), 109.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tion or its leaders, who perceive themselves and/or the situation as exceptional, draw lessons or establish a rational process of learning from the experience of others? In short, a belief in exceptionalism can lead to a primitive interpretation of international reality and to the following arguments: no existing solution can be adopted since the problems are unprecedented; only an exceptional solution is adequate; such a solution is feasible and can overcome the circumstances or historical quasi-laws, since it is devised and executed by exceptional people.

When the most important dimensions of national security and state strategy are involved, notions of exceptionalism can lead to risky and badly calculated adventures. Thus, the renouncing of notions of exceptionalism, though difficult and costly, might at some point become essential. It could help to avoid setting over-ambitious goals and to develop irrational perceptions of ends-means relationships. It could prevent an ethical regression that can stem from the idea that "morally superior" people are entitled to follow their own standards of behavior.

In this respect, several segments in Israeli society and among the elites have already started to distance themselves from the image of national security exceptionalism. This process of sobering up and the consequent changes in the Israeli strategy, doctrine, and self-perception have already become noticeable.[74] As a result, Israel has entered a delicate process of negotiations on conflict resolution with its neighbors, a process which has replaced the strict reliance on power politics. Still, Israeli society at large is not yet ready to abandon the rhetoric of exceptionalism. Significant segments of society adhere, perhaps even more firmly than before, to various dimensions of exceptionalism. These segments include, the hard ideological core of the Herut movement, members of the Labor activist faction, a large proportion of the national-religious community, and recently a growing portion of the religious-orthodox masses. The religious sectors may find it particularly hard to give up their image of exceptionalism, as it is part of their belief system and communal identity. These sectors are convinced that they are the spearhead of Jewish and Israeli exceptionalism, and that they are living in an exceptional historical moment, the time of redemption (*geula*)—a time when the alleged secular laws of history can be circumvented and a Utopian dream can be achieved against all odds.

The vision generated by this brand of exceptionalism contradicts some key tenets of universal ethics and thus reduces the Israeli national capacity to mobi-

[74] On past changes, see Dan Horowitz, *Ha'kavua Ve'hamishtane Be'tfisat Ha'bitachon Ha'Israelit* [The Constant and the Changing in Israel National Security Perception] (The Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1982); and "Israel's War in Lebanon: New Patterns of Strategic Thinking and Civilian Military Relations" in Moshe Lissak, ed., *Israeli Society and Its Defense Establishment* (London: Frank Cass, 1984), 83–102. On recent changes, see Efraim Inbar, "Contours of Israel's New Strategic Thinking," *Political Science Quarterly* 111 (Spring 1996): 41–64. On long-term changes in public opinion, see Asher Arian, *Israeli Security Opinion,* February 1996, JCSS Memorandum no. 16 (Tel-Aviv: Tel-Aviv University, 1996), 10.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

lize the secular and liberal constituent of society. If led by such a vision, Israel may find itself aspiring to achieve extreme objectives with a severely reduced capacity to mobilize national resources. The goals will be exceptional and so perhaps would be the spirit of some Israelis. But, the ends-mean relations will become fundamentally irrational.

If in order to succeed, as Dror suggests, Israel has, to "progress on a narrow bridge between inferiority and superiority complex,"[75] unless the Israeli society and leaders abandon the belief in, and vision derived from, the notion of exceptionalism, they are likely to reap the worst of the two complexes rather than pass unharmed between them.*

[75] Dror, *Grand Strategy,* 97.

* The author wishes to thank Daniel Bar-Tal, Gad Barzilai, Avi Ben-Zvi, Azar Gar, Peter J. Katzenstein, Aharon Klieman, and Yossi Shain for reading, commenting, and suggesting how to improve this article. An early version of this essay was presented at the conference on *Israel in a Comparative Perspective: The Dynamics of Change*, University of California, Berkeley, 2–4 September 1996.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Missing Boundaries of Comparison: The Political Community

PETER JUVILER
SHERRILL STROSCHEIN

How and where should the balance lie between lofty principles of human solidarity and the self-interest which drives the indispensable market? This remains the puzzler today that it was for Alexis de Tocqueville. Writing on *Democracy in America* in the 1840s, he saw in Americans' "habits of the heart" (their customs and values) a tension between community solidarity and self-centered individualism that might endanger democracy.[1] In the United States, foundations and centers across a wide ideological spectrum have appeared, dedicated to save the purportedly failing political community.[2] The political community and its relation to individual autonomy pose a "central issue" of political theory.[3]

In contrast to political thought and to public discourse, the field of comparative politics almost ignores the political community as either a normative issue

[1] Robert N. Bellah, et al., *Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American Life*, 2d ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), xlii, 36–41, 147–8.

[2] Kevin Merida and Barbara Vobejda, "In Search of a Civil Society: A Diverse Group of Crusaders Looks for Solutions To Myriad Social Problems," *Washington Post National Weekly Edition*, 29 December 1996–5 January 1997, 6; Michael J. Sandel, "Making Nice Is Not the Same as Doing Good," *New York Times*, 29 December 1996.

[3] C. F. Delaney, ed., *The Liberal-Communitarian Debate: Liberty and Community Values* (Boston: Rowman & Littlefield, 1994), quote from viii. See also Amitai Etzioni, *The New Golden Rule: Community and Morality in a Democratic Society* (New York: Basic Books, 1996); Michael J. Sandel, *Democracy's Discontent: America in Search of a Public Philosophy* (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1996); Shlomo Avineri and Avner de-Shalit, eds., *Communitarianism and Liberalism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992).

PETER JUVILER is professor of political science, Barnard College, and co-director of the Columbia University Human Rights Center. His recent books include *Freedom's Ordeal: The Struggle for Human Rights and Democracy in Post-Soviet States*. SHERRILL STROSCHEIN is a Ph.D. candidate at Columbia University.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

or a working concept for framing research. Comparatists turned only briefly to the political community during the 1950s and 1960s as a clue to processes of political integration and decay. Our research and teaching recently have convinced us that rediscovery of the political community concept is long overdue.[4] It provides, if you will, a holistic comparative perspective. It integrates aspects of political development, stability, democratic state-building, public participation, and their relation to the inclusion and exclusion of various groups regarding the equality of rights and obligations.

The political community is a particular form of active community. Members of active communities transcend mere labels like "business," "Hispanic," "blue collar," or certain "neighborhood" names. They join in commitments to cooperate toward the attainment of common purposes. Their communities may relate to their religion, profession, cultural and recreational interests, or to the advocacy of various causes such as peace, civil rights, Christian values, women's rights, the rights of labor, etc.[5] All active communities have some form of legitimate decision-making authority. The political community differs from other active communities in that its legitimate authority, hereafter referred to as the government, makes the most binding and inclusive decisions for a given territory.

We begin with a review of the origins and recent neglect of the political community concept, a definition of political community, and suggestions about the consensus on which it appears to rest. Civil society enters in as an important part of that consensus. We reflect on debates over cultural and economic causes of diminishing political participation, along with signs of its revitalization, taking the United States as one example. The experience of the United States and other countries exemplifies the centrality of inclusive and exclusionary purposes for community building and breakdown and for the health and preservation of the community. This holds both for countries that have admitted many immigrants, and where the breakup of empires has left newly independent states with borders that divide ethnic communities, leading to a consideration of nationalism's origins and impact. In closing, we suggest other possible directions of research that utilize the political community concept.

Conceptions of Political Community

The political community is an ancient concept. It had an authoritarian model of membership in *The Republic* of Plato (427–347 BCE) and a relatively democratic

[4] Peter Juviler, *Freedom's Ordeal: The Struggle for Human Rights and Democracy in Post-Soviet States* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1998), on community at 1, 2–7, 81, 105, 113, 118, 122, 161, 181.

[5] Howell S. Baum, *The Organization of Hope: Communities Planning Themselves* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997). Members of the strongest active communities share sentiments of "mutual sympathy and loyalties; of 'we-feeling,' trust, and consideration. . . ." Karl W. Deutsch and S. A. Burrell, *The Political Community and the North Atlantic Area* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), 129.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

model (for the few thousand male citizens) in *The Politics* of Aristotle (384–322 BCE). Aristotle applied his normative concepts of the idealized participatory, democratic, Athenian city-state community to the empirical study of constitutional arrangements, stability, and social power in hundreds of other Greek city-states. Aristotle's concern for stability and distributive justice shaped his preference for the rule of law over that of men, for the rule of many men under law over that of a single ruler, and for a relatively numerous middle class, to avoid the extremes of unequal power and wealth that Aristotle found to be a cause of community breakdown and revolution.[6] The ideal of a united political community—more or less collectivist, more or less secular, more or less egalitarian, but always united under legitimate rule for the common good—has infused political thought, East and West, into modern times.[7]

Membership in the community implies a commitment to its purposes and its rules. Plato relates that Socrates refused a chance to escape from his death cell, because he had undertaken to accept the authority of Athens' laws by residing in Athens, even though he considered his sentence of death for alleged disrespect for the gods to be unjust.[8] Socrates's implicit sense of social contract (implicit only because the idea of sovereignty and a contract legitimizing it had not yet emerged) became explicit in modern political thought.

The social contract had a medieval precedent in the Magna Carta agreement of 1215 between King John and his aggrieved barons. The barons conditioned loyalty to the King on his respect for their rights. Johannes Althusias wrote between 1603 and 1610 a modern formulation of mutual obligations between rulers and ruled.[9] During the tumult of civil war in seventeenth-century England, the Puritan radicals advocated a community of equal rights for all. Thomas Hobbes, more skeptical than were the radical Puritan Diggers and Levellers about freedom and human rationality, envisaged government by consent. But Hobbes had in mind the consent of the ruled to surrender all individual rights save those of life and death to the sovereign ruler as the only means to order, rather than consent by contract among equals.

A half-century later, John Locke presented the social contract as a means to liberty under a government whose sovereignty rested on its fulfillment of a mandate to protect the life, liberty, and property of its subjects. John Locke's

[6] Aristotle saw the Athenian *polis*, the city state, as a community of equals embracing all the other communities and aiming at the highest good. Richard McKeon, *The Basic Works of Aristotle* (New York: Random House, 1941), 1127. The equals actually formed a minority of fewer than 5000 male citizens. Karl W. Deutsch, *Political Community at the International Level* (New York: Doubleday, 1954, reprinted by Archon Books, 1970), 3–9.

[7] George H. Sabine, *A History of Political Theory*, 4th ed. (New York: Harcourt Brace College Publishers Holt, 1973); Irene Bloom, J. Paul Martin, and Wayne L. Proudfoot, eds., *Religious Diversity and Human Rights* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).

[8] Plato, "Crito" in *The Trial and Death of Socrates*, trans. by G. M. A. Grube (Indianapolis: Hackett Publ. Co., 1975), 43–58.

[9] Walter Laqueur and Barry Rubin, *The Human Rights Reader*, rev. ed., (New York: Meridian Books, 1990); on Althusias, see Sabine, *A History of Political Theory*, 387–90.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

classic liberal vision of the political community, the "commonwealth," consisted of a "civil society" of propertied rights holders and its agent, the government. The legitimacy of government depended on its fulfillment of the purpose of the political community (commonwealth): the protection of individual rights to life, liberty, and property.[10]

The political sociologist, Robert MacIver, published an essay in 1930 that singled out the political community to be at the core of stable democratic political life. MacIver discerned the presence of a political community in democratic societies as a territorially-rooted collective whose members hold the government accountable to them in pursuit of common purposes. They come to share a common identity—"common characteristics—manners, traditions, modes of speech, and so on," despite the plurality of interests pursued by the individuals and associations located on that territory. MacIver's political community excludes government. It is the civil society of our discussion below.[11]

In the 1950s, Karl Deutsch and Ernst Haas turned to the integrative processes of the national political community for clues to factors that might promote the formation of transnational communities such as the European Community. The political community in their thinking, as in ours, is distinguished from other active communities by its decision-making authority, that is, the government, as the legitimate maker of accepted and binding decisions for the country or region as a whole.[12]

From this perspective, and in our conception of it, the political community of a given territory (country or region) is the collection of persons in and out of government who recognize the government as the legitimate decision maker for that territory, generally comply with its decisions, and cooperate toward shared purposes. Embedded within the community is the political system: the interacting set of private associations and governmental institutions involved in the decision-making process for the society that forms the political community.[13]

[10] A. S. P. Woodhouse, ed., *Puritanism and Liberty: Being the Army Debates (1647–49),* 3rd ed. (London and Melbourne: Dent Everyman's Library, 1986); Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan* (1640) (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996); John Locke, *Second Treatise on Government* (1690) (Indianapolis: Hackett Publ. Co., 1980).

[11] Robert M. MacIver, "The Primacy of Community," reprinted from *Community: A Sociological Study*, 3rd ed. (London: Macmillan & Co., 1936), 22–36, in Leon Bramson, ed., *Robert M. MacIver on Community, Society and Power: Selected Writing* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1970), 30–31. MacIver's community excluded government, included only civil society to which the state is accountable, 39.

[12] Karl W. Deutsch, *Political Community at the International Level: Problems of Definition and Measurement* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1954, reprinted 1970 by Archon Books), 33. Political communities were conceived by Deutsch and Burrell as "social groups with a process of political communication, some machinery for enforcement, and some popular habits of compliance." Deutsch and Burrell, *The Political Community and the North Atlantic Area*, 5–8, quote on 5.

[13] "The boundary of the political system," wrote David Easton, "is defined by all those actions more or less directly related to the making of binding decision for a society. . . ." The "units of a political system" are "political actions as they structure themselves in political roles and political groups," according to "at least some minimal division of labor." David Easton, "An Approach to the Analysis of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The boundaries of political community include both persons in government and persons outside of government, as they provide demands (lobbying, advocacy, etc.) and supports (loyalty, compliance) that energize and sustain the political system. System and community are interdependent. But it is the political community, rather than merely the political system or governing institutions within the system, that is the ultimate conditioner of political stability and peace. Because governmental legitimacy can be maintained only within a political community, the political community is, according to David Easton, "a premise upon which the continuity of any political system depends."[14]

Clues to stability and inclusiveness of the political community and, therefore, of the political system are to be found in its consensus on identity, purpose, rights and obligations, and peaceful conflict resolution. This consensus legitimizes government and binds the political community together.[15] To the extent that the elements of consensus exist, so does a political community. And to the extent that the political community exists, so does stability and social peace.

Despite its importance, the political community almost disappeared from comparative political analysis after the 1960s. David Easton contrasted the importance of the political community for political stability and order with the neglect of the political community in comparative research.[16] But Easton and most other comparatists have not followed up on their earlier reflections about the political community.[17] Leading handbooks and comparative texts ignore it.[18] Nor have others picked up on their work. A survey of books in print and se-

---

Political Systems," *World Politics* 9 (April 1957): 386. See also David Easton, *A Systems Analysis of Political Life* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1965; reissued in 2nd ed. with new preface, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979), 177, 184–5.

[14] Easton, "An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems," 391.

[15] On conflict resolution and identity, see, Deutsch and Burrell, *The Political Community and the North Atlantic Area*, 6, 35; on identity, see also Ernst B. Haas, *The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social, and Economic Forces, 1950–1957* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1958), 6; on rights-protection, see Jack Donnelly, *International Human Rights*, 2nd ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997), 153–59.

[16] Easton, "An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems," 391; Easton, *A Systems Analysis of Political Life*, 172–3.

[17] David Easton, *A Framework for Political Analysis* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965 and reprint with new preface, 1979); passing mention of political community on 85, 116–17; no mention in David Easton, *The Political System: An Inquiry into the State of Political Science*, 2nd ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1979); David Easton, John G. Gunnell, and Luigi Graziano, eds., *The Development of Political Science* (New York: Routledge, 1991).

[18] Nelson Polsby and Fred Greenstein, eds., *Handbook of Political Science* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1975), 9 vols., has one line citing Easton's reference to the political community in vol 2, 114; see also, Robert E. Goodin and Hans-Dieter Kingerman, eds., *A New Handbook of Political Science* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1996); Mary Hawkesworth and Maurice Kogan, eds., *Encyclopedia of Government and Politics* (London: Routledge, 1992). Only one comparative text out of many perused refers to community at all in a passing reference to community as "an aggregation of interacting individuals defined by a set of shared values." Lawrence C. Mayer, John H. Burnett, and Suzanne Ogden, *Comparative Politics: Nations and Theories in a Changing World*, 2nd ed. (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1996), 16, 42, quote from 42.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

lected periodical indices yields over thirteen times as many entries on the political system as on the political community of which it forms a part. Most of the writings on political community relate to political theory, the European Community, or urban community activism.[19] Our research is aimed in part at rediscovering the political community as a comparative concept. Central to that concept is the relationship of the democratic political community to civil society.

Civil Society and Political Community

Not all community consensus is democratically expressed. Nondemocratic political communities have formed under numerous authoritarian regimes and out of the subject societies of the totalitarian Nazi and Soviet dictatorships. But democratic political communities have been the most stable of all. Could this be because they are anchored in civil society, a potential source of correctives to erring governments?[20] The founders of the Czechoslovak human rights movement, Charter 77, reminded their subjugated compatriots more than a decade before the collapse of communism that maintaining the human rights enumerated in the international covenants is not the responsibility of government alone: "Everyone bears their share of responsibility for public matters, and hence also for the observance of pacts valid in law, which are, in any case, binding not only on governments but on all citizens."[21]

Responsible citizens such as those envisaged by Charter 77 form the autonomous, empowered part of the population that is often called "civil society."[22] Civil society, as conceived here, is the nongovernmental part of the democratic political community—in Larry Diamond's words: "*the realm of organized social life that is voluntary, self-generating, (largely) self-supporting, autonomous from the state, and bound by the legal order or set of shared rules.*" Diamond includes in civil society only citizens active in the public political process.[23] The boundaries of civil society thus conceived by Diamond and like-minded theorists of democracy exclude persons participating in the private spheres of cultural, recreational, and religious activity.[24]

[19] A search *in Social Sciences Citation Index, ABC Poli Sci* since 1990 and *Books in Print* since 1991 until September 1997 yielded 614 titles pertaining to political system and 46 to political community. A search in other indexes such as the Public Affairs Information Service (PAIS) yielded similar results. Thanks to Peter Howard, Katharine Gratwick, and Tamar Tamler for their assistance.

[20] Juan J. Linz, "Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes" in Greenstein and Polsby, *Handbook of Political Science*, vol. 3, 175–411.

[21] "Czechoslovakian Charter 77 Declaration (1976)," Laqueur and Rubin, *Human Rights Reader*, 338.

[22] Bronislaw Geremek, "Civil Society Then and Now," reprinted in Diamond and Plattner, *The Global Resurgence of Democracy* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 241–250.

[23] Larry Diamond, "Toward Democratic Consolidation," *Journal of Democracy* 5 (July 1994): 4–17, quote from 5. (Emphasis in original.)

[24] Ibid., 6; Foley and Edwards question inclusion of private activities of "social capital." However, they concede that "even nuns and bishops! may become subversive" in the face of repression, as in Latin America. Michael W. Foley and Bob Edwards, "The Paradox of Civil Society," *Journal of Democracy* 7 (July 1996): 38–52, quote at 48, 49.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The dividing line between the political and purely private social activism seems largely artificial to us, since many civic organizations, such as church groups and various voluntary associations, not only foster the networking that binds civil society together but also get involved in the political process. They too form part of the "social capital" of civic activism and trust that Robert Putnam associates with effective democratic governance.[25]

Inequality and Community

Benjamin Barber associates "strong democracy" with strong community. Strong democracy "rests on the idea of a self-governing community of citizens who are united less by homogeneous interests than by civic education and who are made capable of common purpose and mutual action by virtue of their civic attitudes and participatory institutions rather than their altruism or good nature."[26] Several indicators suggest that democracy in the United States may have become less "strong" in Barber's sense. One indicator is the declining voter turnout in national and local elections. The 49 percent turnout of eligible voters in the 1996 presidential election marked the lowest participation since 1924. Robert Putnam cites reports that indicate a considerable decline since the 1960s in the "social capital" of civic activism and public trust. Participation in activities ranging from bowling leagues to Boy Scouts, voting, and political campaigning fell by more than a third in 1973–1993. Participation among otherwise similar people has diminished even more, the later they were born after 1930.

Putnam attributes the falling participation to an increase in home-bound television watching.[27] Pippa Norris questions whether the community impact of television may not depend on the type of programs one watches and whether television watching is not an effect rather than a cause of social changes "in a deeply divided American society."[28] The growing inequality between rich and poor may have contributed to political apathy.[29] A contented wealthy minority

[25] Robert D. Putnam, "Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital," *Journal of Democracy* 6 (January 1995): 65–78; Robert D. Putnam, "The Prosperous Community: Social Capital and Public Life," *The American Prospect* 13 (Spring 1993): 35–42; Robert D. Putnam, *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993).

[26] Benjamin Barber, *Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 117.

[27] Putnam, "Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital," 65–78; Robert D. Putnam, "The Ithiel de Sola Pool Lecture, 'Tuning in, Tuning Out: The Strange Disappearance of Social Capital in America,'" *PS: Political Science and Politics* 28 (December 1995): 664–683; Robert D. Putnam, "The Strange Disappearance of Civic America," *The American Prospect* (Winter 1996): 34–48; Robert D. Putnam, *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993).

[28] Pippa Norris, "Does Television Erode Social Capital? A Reply to Putnam," *PS: Political Science and Politics* 29 (September 1996): 474–80, quote at 479.

[29] The income share of the top fifth rose by 13 percent in 1979–1996. (Michael Walzer, "The Big Shrug," *The New Republic*, 2 February 1998, 9) and to the top 5 percent by 50 percent ("Rich Get Richer, Poor Get Poorer," *Public Employee Press*, 26 December 1997, 15), while the share of the bottom fifth fell by 22 percent. Walzer, "The Big Shrug," 9. Children below the poverty line rose from

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

has political influence out of all proportion to its numbers, owing both to its wealth and to its relatively high voting turnout.[30]

The rich-poor gap is physical as well. Witness the spread of "gated" and suburban communities of the affluent, and the continued virtual segregation of the poor, especially of African Americans.[31] Desegregation permitted a flight of more affluent African Americans to the suburbs, but they remained considerably segregated because of residual racism.[32] The deindustrialization and the middle class abandonment of the ghettos left the inner cities in desperate plight. New immigrant families tend to settle in neighborhoods with co-ethnics. As an anonymous colleague puts it, "that the U.S. has moved from favoring a melting pot society to favoring a quilted society also deserves mention." But some minorities have tended to remain in countercommunities, separated from job opportunities and too often mired in a drug and gang counterculture,[33] outside of civil society and the political community.[34] Governmentally mismanaged urban and exurban sprawl has increased the concentration of poverty. It has helped to separate inner cities from jobs, educational, and other essential opportunities.[35] Small wonder that such growing inequality and isolation of the poor contributes to their sense of powerlessness, of isolation from the mainstream of opportunity. Rightly or wrongly, it may convince them of the futility of voting.[36]

From the ranks of business and academia as well as labor come suggestions, such as those of George Soros, that "market values"[37] tend to crowd out purposes of the democratic community, such as promoting "human growth and

12.6 million, 19.6 percent in 1989 to 14.5 million or 20.5 percent by 1998. Robert B. Reich, "When Naptime Is Over: The Placid Public Mood Is An Illusion," *New York Times Magazine*, 25 January 1998, 32–4.

[30] John Kenneth Galbraith, *The Culture of Contentment* (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1992); on voting disparity, see also Robert Kuttner, *Everything for Sale: The Virtues and Limits of Markets* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1997), 350.

[31] Andrew Stark, "America the Gated?" *The Wilson Quarterly* 22 (Winter 1998): 58–79; Robert B. Reich, "Secession of the Successful: How the New U.S. Emphasis on 'Community' Legitimizes Inequality," *The Other Side* 31 (1995): 21–7; Jonathan Kozol, *Amazing Grace: The Lives of Children and the Conscience of a Nation* (New York: Crown Publishers, 1995).

[32] Andrew Hacker, "Grand Illusion," *The New York Review of Books*, 11 June 1998, 26–29.

[33] Janet Mancini Billson, *Pathways to Manhood: Young Black Males Struggle for Identity*, 2nd ed. (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1996); William Julius Wilson, *When Work Disappears: The World of the New Urban Poor* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1996).

[34] William A. Galston and Peter Levine, "America's Civic Condition," *The Brookings Review* 15 (Fall 1997): 24.

[35] Bruce Katz, "Give Community Institutions a Fighting Chance," *The Brookings Review* 15 (Fall 1997): 32–35.

[36] David Callahan, "Ballot Blocks: What Gets the Poor to the Polls?" *The American Prospect* (July–August 1998): 68–75.

[37] George Soros, "Why the Market Is Not Enough: Every Society Needs Some Shared Values," *Giving*, 30 October 1997; George Soros, "The Capitalist Threat," *The Atlantic Monthly*, February 1997, 45–58.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

development,"[38] or fulfilling "the American dream" of equal opportunity for all.[39] "Rather than fostering the kind of democratic citizen who can be trusted to govern," Jacob Weisberg laments, ". . . the market ideal of citizenship is about developing the means to withdraw from unsatisfactory common institutions—public schools, the social security system, even the need to work. . . ."[40] As a result of all this exclusion, says Michael Walzer, the poorest Americans "have withdrawn from political life; they are defeated, resigned, apathetic, and, in any case, inarticulate and unheard."[41]

Communities Revitalized?

In their concern for the survival of a democratic open society, Walzer and other analysts of political decline may underestimate the resilience and recuperative powers of democratic political communities. True, professional and business people have been shifting from local, cross-class, and single-gender voluntary associations such as women's auxiliaries and fraternal orders, toward mixed-gender professional organizations, the workplace, cyberspace, and more sporadic forms of participation. But Alan Wolfe argues that civil society survives such shifts.[42] Even a critic of civic commitment in the United States, Jean Bethke Elshtain, affirms that nostalgia for a long lost civil society is misplaced. The "overlapping plural associations of civic life," Elshtain insists, have become essential partners of government in the solution of social problems.[43]

African-American activists, impatient with black and white liberal politicians, are shifting from civil rights issues "to quality-of-life issues in local communities."[44] J. Phillip Thompson points to African-American voluntary grassroots associations of a revitalized civil society as the essential means to self-respect among African Americans, to public dialogue within and among black communities, and to their political empowerment.[45]

Manning Marable, another proponent of political inclusion through revitalized communities, urges activists to follow the example of coalitions of churches,

[38] Willis W. Harman, "Reassessing the Economic Assumption," *The Futurist*, July–August 1996, 13–15, quote at 15.

[39] "By the American dream I mean not merely the right to get rich, but rather the promise that all Americans have a reasonable chance to achieve success as they define it—material or otherwise—through their own efforts, and to attain virtue and fulfillment through success." Jennifer L. Hochschild, *Facing Up to the American Dream: Race, Class and the Soul of the Nation* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), xvii. See also "Rich Get Richer," 15.

[40] Jacob Weisberg, "United Shareholders of America," *New York Times Magazine*, 25 January 1998, 32.

[41] Walzer, "The Big Shrug," 9.

[42] Alan Wolfe, "Is Civil Society Obsolete?" *Brookings Review* 15 (Fall 1997): 9–12; William A. Galston and Peter Levine, "America's Civic Condition," ibid., 25.

[43] Jean Bethke Elshtein, "Not a Cure-All," ibid., 15.

[44] Galston and Levine, "America's Civic Condition," 24.

[45] J. Phillip Thompson, III, "Universalism and Deconcentration: Why Race Still Matters in Economic Development" (manuscript draft, February 1998).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

civic associations, and volunteer community organizations that join in community-building and improvement and act jointly with unions in defense of minority workers' rights. The coalitions are "struggling for affordable public transportation, health care, decent schools, and an end to police brutality," as part of "community-based black and multiracial movements for democratic change." They work with black and Latino young people in their neighborhoods and in the criminal justice and prison systems, which processes about a third of black males in their 20s.[46] Church leaders and congregations play a prominent part in this renaissance of minority communities,[47] despite underfunding and lingering suspicions of church-based voluntarism.[48]

This is not the first time that politics in America has appeared to enter the doldrums, then revived and faced up to the issues preempted periodically by the market. For Robert Reich, the choice lies between slowing the pace of globalization in a mood of economic nationalism and turning today's relative losers into winners as well. That would be the way toward a renewed common purpose of fulfilling the American dream in a more inclusive and stable political community.[49]

The United States experience exemplifies the centrality of inclusive community purposes for the preservation of the system of politics that it sustains. The importance of inclusive community purposes, politics, and policies seems to be confirmed in countries that have admitted many immigrants in the recent past, such as Germany during the labor-short golden years of the "economic miracle" (though not recently!), Canada, or the United States. The political community's inclusiveness—and state's stability—is severely tested where the breakup of empire leaves a newly independent state with borders that cut across boundaries of ethnic settlement and community, such as occurred in Africa and Eastern Europe.

Sustaining Multicultural Communities

Political communities comprising multiple identity groups may form and hold together because of a "thin" understanding of political community. Members simply tolerate individuals with different backgrounds for the sole purpose of avoiding societal breakdown or violence. Any democratic political system present cannot be said to have consolidated in a firm community. In Macedonia, for example, Macedonians and a substantial ethnic Albanian minority tend to

[46] Manning Marable, "Black (Community) Power!" *The Nation*, 22 December 1997, 21–24, quote at 23.

[47] Galston and Levine, "America's Civic Condition," 23–26, quote at 25.

[48] John J. DiIulio, Jr., "The Lord's Work: The Church and the 'Civil Society Sector,'" *The Brookings Review* 15 (Fall 1997): 27–31. The United States is untypical of industrialized democracy, where religious participation averages just 13 percent. Yet active congregations everywhere are likely to be found in thriving and emerging civil societies. E. J. Dionne, Jr., "Why Civil Society? Why Now?" ibid., 5.

[49] Reich, "Naptime Is Over."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

interact very little in daily life. The tensions stirred by assertions of ethnic group identity, such as flying the Albanian flag over a local city hall, are more in evidence than are the rare Albanian-Macedonian intermarriages. The Macedonian government has accepted a small UN peacekeeping force to help maintain the precarious peace.[50] Leaders of both groups have endorsed institutions of toleration in an attempt to prevent Macedonia from experiencing the violence of ethnic war so graphically depicted in neighboring Bosnia and the Kosovo region of Serbia.

Stable political communities tend to manifest a relatively robust sense of shared purpose. A poignant example of inclusivity comes from the Bosnian city of Tuzla. Its Serb, Croat, and Muslim residents together successfully withstood a siege that could have brought the city into war. Tuzla's mayor noted: "There were only two political forces in the Tuzla area: those of us who defended our city and those who attacked us."[51] Even when the shared purpose of tolerance takes more of the thin version found in Macedonia, the fact that this purpose comprises part of the community's formal self-definition tends to stabilize and confirm inclusive boundaries. Built up out of a civic consensus, those boundaries may even be able to resist the spillover of tumult from troubled neighbors.

A primary shared purpose of stable multiethnic political communities is to include members of all groups in a shared identity and shared sets of rights and obligations.[52] The diversity of the citizenry of Canada and the United States receives endorsement as part of their community's understanding of itself, despite some deviations in the form of ethnic exclusivism and racism.[53] Dialogue and debate continue over how to fully realize their multicultural purposes. Contrast this relatively inclusive purpose with the deliberately discriminatory and divisive purpose of curtailing the rights of members of minority groups (as in Northern Ireland after the 1922 partition) or of excluding them from a particular territory (as in Nazi Germany and in ethnically cleansed areas of former Yugoslavia).[54]

[50] Thomas G. Weiss, David P. Forsythe, Roger A. Coate, *The United Nations and Changing World Politics* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), 74, 77, 86.

[51] Mayor Selim Beslagic, quoted in Robert Donia, "Peace Endangers the Unity that Survived War," *Transition*, 17 May 1996, 54. Tuzla's strong multicultural ethnicity is only now weakening because of a massive influx of war-hardened refugees who resist acceptance of other groups. See also Julia Glyn-Pickett, "A Last Bastion of Ethnic Tolerance," *Transition*, 6 June 1995, 18–19, 56; William Finnegan, "Letter from Tuzla: Salt City," *The New Yorker*, 12 February 1996, 46–57.

[52] For a discussion of this strong form of multiculturalism, see Susan Wolf, "Comment," on Charles Taylor's "The Politics of Recognition" in Amy Gutmann, ed., *Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 75–85.

[53] These inclusive boundaries are not entirely secure, as revealed by unequal social rights of legal immigrants, repeated efforts to pass "English language only" legislation in the United States, and Quebec's limits on the commercial and educational use of English.

[54] One of the clearest examples of the enactment of this policy was the murder of several thousand individuals, primarily Muslim, in the Bosnian town of Srebrenica in July 1995.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The criteria for membership in the community, Michael Walzer notes, are determined by those who are already its members, and thus are set "in accordance with our own understanding of what membership means in our community and what sort of community we want to have."[55] Citizenship is a necessary, though not sufficient, condition for full membership in a political community. It is a legal bond of mutual rights (such as voting and travel) and obligations (such as military service) between an individual and a state or union of states. Citizens are full members of the political community to the extent that they accept the political order, share a common identity with other citizens, and have—and exercise—full equality of rights and obligations.[56]

Two principles that have historically formed the basis for the determination of citizenship belong in research on political community building and breakdown. The principle of *jus sanguinis* raises the most barriers to ethnic outsiders: it ascribes citizenship by right only to the descendants of citizens. Thus it tends to prioritize ethnic criteria or bloodline. The principle of *jus soli* is more inclusive of outsiders: it ascribes citizenship by right to individuals born within a given territory, even of foreign parents.

While citizenship in Britain and the United States is ascribed according to the principle of *jus soli*, citizenship in continental Europe has tended to follow the principle of *jus sanguinis*. But individual states within Europe combine these principles in different ways. German citizenship was ascribed only by the principle of *jus sanguinis*; citizenship in France may be ascribed both by *jus sanguinis* and by *jus soli*.[57] Naturalization in Germany before the year 2000 was more ethnically restrictive and discriminatory than naturalization has been in France. Because of the ethnic component of German citizenship, individuals who have never resided in Germany but who are found to hold German ethnic ancestry may become automatic citizens, while the children of generations of Turkish guest workers within Germany might remain foreigners indefinitely.[58]

Multicultural communities, those relatively accepting of ethnic and linguistic diversity, seem more likely to specify a *jus soli* foundation for citizenship and to accept more ethnic diversity as part of their shared purpose. But this wider passage to citizenship does not prevent backlash against immigration among persons who believe that immigration's costs outweigh its benefits or who worry about the dilution of shared community identity.[59]

Various requirements for citizenship reveal differing levels of political and ethnic assimilation within the boundaries of multicultural community. Jürgen

[55] Walzer, "Membership," 66.

[56] Andrei Liebich and Daniel Warner with Jasna Dragovic, eds., *Citizenship East and West* (London and New York: Kegan Paul International, 1995).

[57] Rogers Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany*, 2d ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992), 81. Effective January 1, 2000, children of foreigners born in Germany hold dual citizenship. Between ages 18 and 23 they must choose one.

[58] Ibid., 77–81.

[59] George L. Borjas and Richard H. Freeman, "Findings We Never Found: How a Report on Immigration was Distorted," *New York Times*, 10 December 1997.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Habermas notes that the political assimilation signaled by an agreement to abide by the institutions and procedures of conflict resolution in a community is a level of assimilation more accepting of diversity than is the process of cultural integration.[60] Some communities condition full membership on specific forms of cultural integration. They may require the public use of a particular language as in Quebec, and additionally make knowledge of the indigenous language a requirement for naturalization, as in Estonia and Latvia. They may favor adherence to a particular religion, as in Croatia. Such communities cease to be multicultural to the extent that cultural uniformity replaces diversity as a primary shared purpose. Distinctions between political and cultural assimilation are often ignored in the literature on citizenship and nationalism. The political community framework, however, remains sensitive to inclusion and exclusion in a country's purposes, as well as in its definitions of rights and obligations.

Breakdowns of Multicultural Communities

The political community concept also highlights the relationships among key aspects of political development such as nation-building, state-building, and public policy making. Claus Offe uses the political community approach in all but name in describing the "triple transitions" of identity, institutions, and rights in Eastern Europe after 1989. He writes:

> At the most fundamental level a "decision" must be made as to who "we" are, i.e., a decision on identity, citizenship, and the territorial as well as social and cultural boundaries of the nation-state. At the second level, rules, procedures, and rights must be established which together make up the constitution or the institutional framework of the "regime." It is only at the highest level that those processes and decisions go on which are sometimes mistaken for the essence of politics, namely, decisions on who gets what, when and how—in terms of both political power and economic resources."[61]

The consensus that sustains a country's political community may vanish when decisions at Offe's "most fundamental level . . . as to who 'we' are reject the multicultural 'we.'" Borders of shared identity shrink to encompass nothing wider than the ethnic groups of a nation state. Once the purpose of maintaining a multiethnic Yugoslav identity was no longer shared by the Slovenian and Croatian republics, they declared independence in 1991. The multiethnic Yugoslav political community built by Tito—and to a large extent, around Tito—ceased to exist.[62]

[60] Jürgen Habermas, "Struggles for Recognition in the Democratic Constitutional State" in Gutmann, *Multiculturalism*, 138–39. Acculturation might be understood as the "melting pot" model, while multiculturalism and political integration might be understood as the "salad bowl" model.

[61] Claus Offe, "Capitalism by Democratic Design? Democratic Theory Facing the Triple Transition in East Central Europe," *Social Research* 58 (Winter 1991): 869.

[62] This previous community is not to be confused with what is now legally recognized as "Yugoslavia," a rump entity consisting of Serbia, Kosovo, Montenegro, and Vojvodina.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Unresolvable disagreement at the second level—of the institutions and rules of governance—also threatens community maintenance by undercutting the legitimacy of rules for the peaceful resolution of conflicts. The regime and its constitutional framework lack legitimacy for those rejecting that consensus, as they lacked legitimacy for much of the Catholic majority in Ireland under British rule. The design of legitimate institutions in ethnically divided communities becomes a particularly complex affair, involving minority rights protection such as proportional representation in elections and government offices plus forms of autonomy where a country forms into ethnically distinct regions.

At the third level, that of day-to-day policy, decisions that violate the human rights of a minority group or that apply rules which violate those rights aggravate tensions between the dominant decision makers and aggrieved outgroups. Forty-six years after the partition of Ireland, the militant Protestant Unionists' brutal suppression of the Northern Irish Civil Rights Movement in 1969, coupled with a lack of protection and support for the movement by the British government, provided the stimulus to disaffection and Irish nationalist separatism across nearly thirty more years of violent confrontation.

Similarly, governmental policies that require integration in the form of the acceptance of a particular language or religion in the name of a single national community ironically can destroy that community. Those policies negate the shared purpose of unity in diversity. It is for this reason that Quebec's French-only laws affecting schooling and commerce might be viewed as a danger to the multicultural foundations of Quebec and of Canada as political communities. The Quebecois language laws remind us that regional majorities in distinctive identity groups within a presently nondiscriminatory multiethnic community (Canada) may still reject its shared identity and multicultural goals, fall back on a distinctive identity, and form a community apart or even aspire to a separate nation.[63]

Groups that perceive themselves to be placed outside the "we" category by being denied equal rights during the "triple transitions" are the ones most likely to separate into de facto nation-states, to form political communities of their own, and to seek full independence. The official government brands such rebellious communities as criminally deviant. But their leadership may maintain considerable legitimacy and support among their followers.[64]

The province of Kosovo in Serbia is a prime example of such a situation of ethnic and social alienation. Kosovo, the southernmost part of former Yugoslavia, borders on Albania and Macedonia. It contained a 90 percent Albanian majority and a mainly Serbian minority of about 200,000 in a total population of some two million. Kosovo held the status of an autonomous region within

[63] Charles Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition" in Gutmann, *Multiculturalism* 25–74; Anthony De Palma, "To Some Canadians, The Maple Leaf Is a Red Flag," *New York Times*, 26 November 1997.

[64] Ted Robert Gurr, "Minorities, Nationalists, and Ethnopolitical Conflict" in Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson with Pamela Aall, eds., *Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Responses To International Conflict* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996), 53–77.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Serbia from 1974 until 1989. Albanians and Serbs shared employers, government, schools, and universities.

The Belgrade government, led by Slobodan Milošević and backed by his supporters and police forces in Kosovo, shattered Kosovo's fragile biethnic community by ending Kosovo's autonomous status, as reflected in a new constitution passed by the Serbian parliament on 28 September 1990. The government dissolved local legislative institutions, dismissed 100,000 Albanian employees, gave ethnic Serbs a monopoly of governing positions, forbade public education in the Albanian language at all levels, and relied on the Serbian police forces to impose this subjugation of the local majority.[65] The authorities subjected Albanians to brutal violations of their human rights, driving some 380,000 into exile.[66] The Albanians remaining formed an underground community, a "parallel Albanian society" complete with their own "political institutions, educational and health-care systems, cultural scene, and sports leagues," and a tax-collection mechanism. An agreement in September 1996 to reintegrate schools, mediated by the Italian religious peacemaking society of Saint' Egidio, remained stillborn as Kosovo drifted into civil war.[67] The nature and path of conflict have proved to be dependent on the solidarity and inclusiveness of purpose in the estranged and the international communities, and on their leaders' perceptions of their interests and obligations.

Nationalism and Political Community

Ethnicity involves a sense of common ancestry,[68] language, religion, and culture.[69] These may forge a sufficiently close "psychological bond" of shared ethnic identity to form a nation.[70] Nations are for Benedict Anderson "imagined communities." They are "imagined because the members of even the smallest

[65] Tihomir Loza, "Kosovo Albanians: Closing the Ranks," *Transitions* 5 (May 1998): 16–26; Denisa Kostova, "The Trap of the Parallel Society," ibid., 20.

[66] Loza, "Kosovo Albanians," 19–20.

[67] By 1995, reportedly, 837 lecturers taught 11,000 Albanian university students, 4,000 teachers taught 56,000 secondary school students, and 14,500 more taught 273,000 elementary school pupils—mainly in private homes and cellars. Kostovic, "The Trap of the Parallel Society," 20–21, quote at 20; see also Chris Hedges, "Serb's Iron Rule: Belgrade Power Play May Light Fuse," *New York Times*, 6 October 1997; Chris Hedges, "Albanians Inside Serbia Set to Fight for Autonomy," ibid., 19 October 1997; Fabian Schmidt, "Kosovo: The Time Bomb That Has Not Gone Off," *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Reports* 2 (1 October 1993): 22–29.

[68] Walker Connor, "A Nation Is a Nation, Is a State, Is an Ethnic Group, Is a. . . ," reprinted in Walker Connor, *Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 100–103.

[69] Individuals may change these practices in order to "pass" as a member of another group. For a discussion of passing, see Joseph Rothschild, *Ethnopolitics: A Conceptual Framework* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981), 141–2.

[70] Connor, "A Nation Is A Nation," 2.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

nation will never meet most of their fellow-members, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each member lives the image of their own communication."[71]

Nationalism is the extension of this psychological bond into the political goal of forming a separate, autonomous, or independent political community.[72] Ethnic nationalism provides the cultural foundation for the identity and legitimate authority at the core of an ethnically homogeneous political community. Claims of national self-determination pose obvious threats to the integrity and peace of many contemporary, internationally-recognized multinational states, especially those whose borders divide close-knit ethnic groups. Because of such threats, international law upholds states' territorial integrity; it omits any recognition of separatist claims by right, other than those of overseas colonies.[73]

Group self-determination may be achieved through peaceful partition,[74] as in the breakup of Czechoslovakia into Slovakia and the Czech Republic on 1 January 1993. But the assertion of claims to self-determination may bring on considerable violence as in the Caucasus region and Central Asia of the former Soviet Union, the breakup of Yugoslavia in 1991–1995, and the Kurdish rebellion in Iraq (1988) as well as in Turkey.[75] For these reasons, peace keepers and analysts of nationalism might well focus on the maintenance of inclusive, multicultural political communities as crucial to promoting peace and stability, even in their weak form of adopting a shared purpose of tolerance. Moreover, ethnic nationalism cannot always keep an ethnically homogeneous political community from its own conflict and breakdown. Reflecting on Algeria's bitter experience during and after its war of independence with France (1957–1961), Lahouari Addi writes: "A political community that is held together solely by nationalist ideology will never enjoy lasting civil peace. There will always be

[71] Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (New York: Verso, 1991 ed.), 6, citing Hugh Seton-Watson, *Nations and States* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1977).

[72] Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, 2d ed. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993), 1.

[73] Walker Connor noted in 1972 that "of a total of 132 contemporary states, only 12 (9.1 percent) can be described as essentially homogenous from an ethnic viewpoint." Walker Connor, "Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying?" reprinted in *Ethnonationalism*, 29.

[74] Partition arguments for the resolution of ethnic conflicts are gaining credence, particularly in the literature of International Relations, for the stated purpose of "resolving security dilemmas." Chaim Kaufmann, "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars," *International Security* 20 (Spring 1996): 136–75; John Mearsheimer and Stephen Van Evera, "Hateful Neighbors," Op-ed piece, *New York Times*, 24 September 1996.

[75] The colonially-engineered geographic sprawl across state boundaries of ethnic groups like Bengalis, Kurds, Mexicans, Uzbeks, and Mongolians, as well as scores of African tribes, means that achieving ethnically homogenous nation-states would require massive population exchanges as well as violent social upheaval, as in India, Rwanda, Sudan, and former Yugoslavia. For arguments against partition, see Radha Kumar, "The Troubled History of Partition," *Foreign Affairs* 76 (January–February 1997): 22–34; Senad Pecanin, "Before It's Too Late," Adil Kulenovic interview, "Ethnic Division is a Crime," and Mihajlo Mihajlov, "It Is Senseless to Divide Bosnia," *Uncaptive Minds* (Spring 1995): 51–65.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

. . . a 'purer than thou' dynamic that . . . claims a monopoly over 'pure' nationalism."[76]

Frameworks such as the "security dilemma" in international relations explain failures of peaceful conflict resolution among states.[77] The political community framework serves better to analyze and compare conflicts within states. The parts played by politics and history in the breakdown of communities remain to be clarified.[78] But it appears that communities may break down for a combination of reasons: an unchanging exclusive, ethnic identity and its baggage of historic grievances;[79] discrimination in defining the rights of nondominant groups;[80] and, often enough, the interests of political elites.[81]

Conclusions

Working concepts of political community and its boundaries go back millennia in Western and non-Western thought. In comparative politics it reappeared in the 1950s through the work of Deutsch, Haas, and Easton. But the concept of the political community and its boundaries are rarely encountered in contemporary comparative politics. We felt the lack of it in our own research and began to teach about it. Now we suggest that the political community concept serves well both in the empirical analysis of political change and stability as well as in the normative framing of questions for empirical research that has now become acceptable, even desirable, in place of the attempts at pure empiricism in the 1950s. The adoption of the theme of "community" for its 1998 Annual Meeting by the American Political Science Association seems to support our contention.

[76] Lahouari Addi, "The Failure of Third World Nationalism," *Journal of Democracy* 8 (October 1997): 110–24, quote on 113.

[77] For an application of the security dilemma to ethnic conflict, see David Lake and Donald Rothschild, "Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict," *International Security* 21 (Fall 1996): 41–75. For a more persuasive approach that applies such models to individuals, see James Fearon, "Ethnic War as a Commitment Problem," manuscript, New York City, 1993.

[78] See Anthony Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations* (Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishers, 1986); Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*; Liah Greenfeld, *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992); Eric Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism Since 1780* (New York: Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge, 1990); and Alexander Motyl, "Inventing Invention: The Limits of National Identity Formation," manuscript, Columbia University, June 1995. For rational–choice approaches, see Michael Hechter, "Nationalism as Group Solidarity," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 10 (October 1987): 415–26; Russell Hardin, *One For All: The Logic of Group Conflict* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995).

[79] Franke Wilmer, "Identity, Culture, and Historicity: The Social Construction of Ethnicity in the Balkans," *World Affairs* 160 (Summer 1997): 3–15; "Theories of Ethnicity" in John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith, eds., *Ethnicity* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 35–104.

[80] Gurr, "Minorities, Nationalists, and Ethnopolitical Conflict;" Ted Robert Gurr and Barbara Harff, *Ethnic Conflict in World Politics* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994).

[81] Vladimir Goati, "The Disintegration of Yugoslavia: The Role of Political Elites," *Nationalities Papers* 25 (September 1997): 455–67; Jean-Germain Gross, "Haiti's Flagging Transition," *Journal of Democracy* 8 (October 1997): 101–03.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The boundaries of the political community for a given country or other territory encompass all those persons who recognize a common legitimate political authority for that territory and who cooperate toward a common purpose or purposes. The stability of a political community and, therefore, of the political system that it sustains depends on an underlying consensus—perhaps especially among political elites—on shared purposes, identity, rules on rights, obligations, and ways of peacefully resolving conflicts. Civil society provides an essential source of consensus as the vital, nongovernmental part of the democratic political community. Community boundaries never include a territory's total population. One may hypothesize that the less completely the boundaries of community coincide with those of society, the less stable is the political community and political system within it.

The comprehensiveness of the political community concept may challenge research methodology, and tempt researchers to broad generalizations, such as we have made in this article. But the concept provides a revealing gauge of inclusion and exclusion as measured by the reach and limits of consensus over identity and degree of multicultural dialogue, respect, and tolerance; the equality of rights and obligations; the reach of commitment, apathy and alienation, interdependence, and atomization.

Exclusion from equal rights and opportunities, whether by default of purpose or intentionally, causes a range of reactions from apathy to protest and separatism. The United States experience reminds us that the political communities of a given country function at various territorial levels. They may manifest varying degrees of class and ethnic integration and exclusion at various local levels and the national level. Political communities and the political systems they support retain their inclusiveness and vitality to the extent that civil society generates correctives to divisive trends such as growing inequality and segregation.

The commitment of a political community to fostering multiculturalism means that its shared identity, purposes, rules, and policies foster the equality of and respect for various cultural groups. It means a shared recognition of diversity within unity around common political authority and consensus supportive of that authority. Fissures and breakdowns of community involve a loss of regime legitimacy stemming from a loss of consensus on shared purposes, identity, rights, and obligations, including the lack or loss of a commitment to multiculturalism. In such cases, a gap opens up between the legally recognized nation state and the reality of a state lacking a unified nation.

The proposition that the members of a political community hold shared purposes helps to distinguish between situations in which multiculturalism or tolerance remain a primary shared purpose for the community, and situations in which one faction (minority or majority) or its leaders may begin to prioritize its purposes over those of the multicultural community. The resulting discrimination may lead a community to break down into two or more smaller political communities with opposing purposes.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Looking ahead, one of the topics left uncovered here is the difference between the political community and the political system which it includes and sustains. Another possible direction of research concerns the distinguishing features and interactions of political communities at different levels, from local to national and international. For example, this article barely touches on interactions between national political communities and the international community, made up of intergovernmental organizations such as the United Nations, NATO, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, along with member states and nongovernmental organizations. A third topic for exploration concerns the nature of cross-border transnational communities spawned by various processes of globalization and their impact on national communities and on state sovereignty. Whether the questions about political community be normative ones concerning what its politics should be or empirical ones concerning the nature of its inclusiveness and consensus, the political community concept presents promising but missing boundaries of comparison.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A SHORT HISTORY OF THE U.S. WORKING CLASS
From Colonial Times to the Twenty-First Century
Paul Le Blanc

Le Blanc blends economic, social, intellectual, cultural, and political history into a compelling, coherent, colorful, and gripping narrative that includes the views of key figures of U.S. labor such as Cesar Chavez, Eugene V. Debs, Elizabeth Gurley Flynn, Samuel Gompers, Woody Guthrie, "Big Bill" Haywood, Dolores Huerta, Langston Hughes, "Mother" Mary Jones, Martin Luther King Jr., George Meany, A. Philip Randolph, Carl Sandburg, and John Steuben. Le Blanc's broad analytical framework highlights issues of class, gender, race, and ethnicity.

160 Pages (Index)
ISBN 1-57392-665-5 • Cloth $45.95
ISBN 1-57392-664-7 • Paper $17.95

RETHINKING FANON
The Continuing Dialogue
Edited by Nigel C. Gibson

Psychoanalyst and social philosopher Frantz Fanon (1925–1961) rejected his French citizenship and became a strong advocate of the Algerian liberation movement in the 1950s. Fanon's revolutionary writings founded an African intellectual awakening.

The rebirth of Fanonism today in universities and the English speaking world is a testament to his relevance.

400 Pages • ISBN 1-57392-708-2 • Cloth $59.95
ISBN 1-57392-709-0 • Paper $18.95

THE POLITICS OF WESTERN SCIENCE
1640–1990
Edited by Margaret C. Jacob

244 Pages (Index)
ISBN 1-405-9 • Paper $16.95

THE SUBVERSION OF POLITICS
AWARD WINNER!
European Autonomous Social Movements and the Decolonization of Everyday Life
George Katsiaficas

"At a time when the dominant trends in politics and culture are toward the right, it is important to be aware that there are also counter-trends. With the knowledge and understanding of an insider, George Katsiaficas describes the autonomen, the loose network of European young people who live collectively on the margins of society, and who combine the pursuit of a communal life with social action against racism and repressive policies of the right. This book is an important corrective to the all-too-common view that global capitalism is triumphant, that there is no basis for opposing the values that it promotes."

—Professor Barbara Epstein, University of California, Santa Cruz

301 Pages (Index)
ISBN 1-57392-328-1 • Cloth $59.95
ISBN 1-57392-441-5 • Paper $19.95

CIVILIZATION AND BARBARITY IN 20TH-CENTURY EUROPE
Gabriel Jackson

Jackson deals with the political and cultural history of Europe in the twentieth century. This work is not, however, a chronological survey concentrating on political and economic developments. Rather, the major aspects of those developments, and of international relations—both peaceful and warlike—are seen as the necessary background for the consideration of European culture, values, practical expectations, and the lifestyles available to, or imposed upon, the population as a whole.

320 Pages (Index)
ISBN 1-57392-668-X • Cloth $59.95
ISBN 1-57392-645-0 • Paper $21.95

At better bookstores, or order directly from

HB Humanity Books

an imprint of Prometheus Books

Call toll free (800) 421-0351 (24 hours) • Fax (716) 691-0137
59 John Glenn Drive • Amherst, NY 14228-2197

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Citizenship Issues in China's Internal Migration: Comparisons with Germany and Japan

DOROTHY J. SOLINGER

Migrant labor the world around unfailingly provides a fertile field for human rights abuses, as the following quotation encapsulates cogently: "To get their chance, migrants typically mortgage their human rights. . . . Many countries can't live without foreign workers—but don't want to live with them. The message to unskilled migrants is almost always: get the job done and get lost; *citizenship is out of the question.*"[1]

Though this problem of migrant labor is pervasive globally, in China it takes on a peculiar form: the more economically developed areas of the country have since the economic liberalization beginning in the 1980s drawn upon the country's own domestic peasants to serve as drudges. In the process, peasants are denied the rights that international norms of justice and globally accepted standards of citizenship decree should belong to all human beings and to nationals.

This article explores the Chinese situation, highlighting this idiosyncracy by comparing it to two other polities—Japan and Germany—with which its migration regime shares two critical features. First, in all three, "outsiders" have played a comparable role in economic growth; and second, in each of them (effective) *ius sanguinis* (the right of blood or race) determination of citizenship (in China's case, what amounts to urban citizenship) has sharply separated newcomers at work from the natives.[2] Moreover, I demonstrate the surprising finding that in

[1] Gary Silverman, "Vital and Vulnerable," *Far Eastern Economic Review* [hereafter *FEER*], 23 May 1996, 60–61. (Emphasis added.)

[2] In fact, Chinese nationality is defined quite liberally. See Legislative Affairs Commission of the Standing Committee of National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China, *Laws of the People's Republic of China,* vol. 3 (Beijing: Science Press, 1990), 182–83. But that is not relevant to the discussion here.

DOROTHY J. SOLINGER is professor of political science at the University of California, Irvine, and Adjunct Senior Research Scholar in the East Asian Institute, Columbia University. She has just published *Contesting Citizenship in Urban China: Peasant Migrants, the State and the Logic of the Market*, and a co-edited volume (with David A. Smith and Steven Topil), *States and Sovereignty in the Global Economy.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

several ways foreigners in Japan and Germany, which by no means welcome outsiders, receive significantly better treatment and stand in possession of more rights than do the transient nationals of the "People's Republic" of China.

The article uncovers crucial distinctions in developmental and political trajectories among the three countries—the place of labor in politics, the timing of immigration in relation to economic development in a country, and a nation's integration into certain international networks. I then suggest that these factors may work to diminish the negative impact that ethnocentrism and developmental pushes have placed on granting rights. By extension, these factors could help account for China's current harshness to those it has made into aliens, as well as point to a possibility that time and political change could alter these aliens' situations.

SIMILARITIES

The most fundamental similarity between the three countries is what one might term an ethnocentric underpinning for belonging and membership. If we extend Emily Honig's conception that—based on linguistic, lifestyle, custom, and self-perceptional grounds—the ethnic Chinese native to the various regions of China are in effect members of separate ethnicities,[3] we might say that at least as a social construction, urban Chinese generally view rural Chinese as ethnically distinct.

If we consider the package of benefits, privileges, and entitlements enjoyed by city-born Chinese, at least through the early 1990s, to be the equivalent of the rights of urban citizenship, from which the country-born have been excluded, we can say that the Chinese government uses an ethnocultural foundation for granting this urban citizenship. It denies it to rural residents, just as Japan and Germany do in the case of their own citizens and against foreign nationals.[4] As Japan and Germany ground citizenship on the principle of *ius sanguinis* (that is, the notion that one can be a citizen only on the basis of descent[5] or "blood"[6]) in China urban household registration is passed down hereditarily, and until the summer of 1998, just via the maternal line.[7]

[3] Emily Honig, *Creating Chinese Ethnicity: Subei People in Shanghai, 1850–1980* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992).

[4] Rogers Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992), 51, 123.

[5] In Germany, only "ethnic Germans," those whose German parents or grandparents lived in the German Reich on 31 December 1937 can immediately become German citizens upon entering the country for residence. See Philip L. Martin, "Germany: Reluctant Land of Immigration" in Wayne A. Cornelius, Philip L. Martin, and James F. Hollifield, *Controlling Immigration: A Global Perspective* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994), 216; and Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany,* 82–84, 176. In Japan, under the nationality law in effect up to 1985, Japanese nationality was handed down only through one's paternal lineage. But in that year, the government amended the law to permit nationality to be passed down through either parent. See Wayne A. Cornelius, "Japan: The Illusion of Immigration Control" in Cornelius, Martin, and Hollifield, *Controlling Immigration,* 396.

[6] This is in contradistinction to *ius soli,* or the right of soil, meaning birth within the national territory. See Hollifield, *Immigration,* 16; Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood,* 32 and 122–23; and Ya-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Until late 1998, Germany along with Switzerland stood at an extreme pole among West European nations in this regard. It did not count even third-generation immigrants as citizens until they had themselves lived in the country for at least ten or sometimes even as many as fifteen years.[8] In Japan, a strong, historically-derived ideology emphasized racial homogeneity, which shores up the national bias against outsiders. This ideology, which boasts of the virtues of Japan's "single-race nation" or its "sage" society,[9] bolsters the nation's disinclination to open its labor market. The source of the opposition lies in fears of polluting the cultural integrity of Japanese society.[10] Official documents prepared as recently as the late 1980s go so far as to attribute the country's economic miracle to its "one ethnic group, one language" society.[11]

In China historically, even in the very cosmopolitan port of Hankow, according to William Rowe, domestic migrants in the form of squatters, whether laborers or beggars, were denigrated as rootless people who summoned up distaste and even alarm among the town's permanent residents.[12] In contemporary China, in the wake of economic reforms after 1980 that permitted peasants to move out from the rural areas for the first time in several decades, the traditional discrimination against the outsider persists. Here it is probably at an even higher peak than in the past, given that some large cities have had to adjust to as many as several million rustics suddenly residing within their midst. These quotations illustrate urbanites' scorn and also indicate their certainty that these country people do not deserve the same rights that they themselves enjoy:

> Their [migrants'] thinking, morality, language, and customs are all different, their quality is inferior. The places they inhabit are very likely dirty places. . . . They lack a concept of public morality . . . so that behavior that harms prevailing social cus-

semin Nuhoglu Soysal, *Limits of Citizenship: Migrants and Postnational Membership in Europe* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 25–6.

[7] Sulamith Heins Potter and Jack M. Potter, *China's Peasants: The Anthropology of a Revolution* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 296.

[8] Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood,* 34, 81, 176; and Martin, "Germany," 196. Soysal, *Limits of Citizenship,* 25, shows that the rate of naturalization in Germany was just 6 percent of total foreigners in the country, almost half the rate in Switzerland, another *ius sanguinis* state. See also Hollifield, *Immigrants,* 173; and Ursula Mehrlander, "Federal Republic of Germany: Sociological Aspects of Migration Policy" in Daniel Kubat, ed., *The Politics of Migration Policies: Settlement and Integration—The First World into the 1990s* (New York: Center for Migration Studies, 1993), 196. In autumn 1998 the new Social Democratic-Green governing alliance opened up citizenship rights to those born in Germany at least one of whose parents had been resident in the country since age 14.

[9] Saskia Sassen, *The Global City: New York, London, Tokyo* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), 33; Chalmers Johnson, "Studies of Japanese Political Economy: A Crisis in Theory" in the Japan Foundation, ed., *Japanese Studies in the United States, Part I: History and Present Condition. Japanese Studies Series XVII.* (New York: The Japan Foundation, 1988), 109.

[10] Haruo Shimada, *Japan's "Guest Workers": Issues and Public Policies,* trans. Roger Northridge (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1994), 47.

[11] Cornelius, "Japan," 396, 385.

[12] William T. Rowe, *Hankow: Conflict and Community in a Chinese City 1796–1895* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1989), 231.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

toms occurs time and time again. City residents are dissatisfied because they disturb normal life and livelihood.[13]

Similarly, a public security officer in Beijing is actually said to have pronounced that, "These out-of-towners are no better than animals."[14]

A second key similarity between the three countries is that all have also been the site for economic miracles—the Japanese and the Germans in the postwar period, the Chinese just since economic reforms began in 1979. In Germany from the 1950s to the early 1970s and in the Chinese special economic zones during the 1980s, rapid growth has been openly acknowledged to be the result of the cheaply-recompensed drudgery of outsiders. In Germany at the height of immigration in 1972, only 12 percent of the workforce has been said to have "made possible the remarkable economic recovery and expansion."[15] In China's Guangdong, the province made most prosperous by special governmental regulations meant to attract foreign capital, according to two traveling journalists who journeyed there in 1989: "At all levels of the Guangdong party and government, right down to the heads of the town and village enterprises, everyone highly praised the contribution of the peasant workers. Provincial Party Secretary [as of 1989] Lin Ruo said, 'Without the peasant workers, Guangdong's prosperity wouldn't exist.'"[16]

Even in Japan, once the new boom of the mid- to late-1980s brought in outside laborers and built up a definite dependence upon them, there emerged within the country a growing recognition that foreign workers were supporting vital sectors of the Japanese economy and that their removal would have adverse economic impacts on businesses and communities.[17]

In all three countries the response to outsiders—ethnically different foreigners in the case of Germany and Japan and those from the countryside in Chinese cities—starts from highly exclusionary, culturally-superior, ethnocentrically-informed stances. The heavy reliance of these places upon the brawn and the backbone of these outsiders, while somewhat pushing aside native dis-

[13] Wang Jianmin and Hu Qi, "Pay Attention to Policy Research on Adjusting the Structure of the Outsider Floating Population," *Zhongguo renkou kexue* [Chinese population science] [hereafter *ZRK*] 6 (1988), 72.

[14] *South China Morning Post,* [hereafter *SCMP*] (Hong Kong), 9 October 1991, 10, reprinted in U.S. *Foreign Broadcast Information Service, China Daily Report* [hereafter *FBIS*], 10 October 1991, 22.

[15] Wayne A. Cornelius, Philip L. Martin, and James F. Hollifield, "Introduction: The Ambivalent Quest for Immigration Control" in Cornelius, Martin, and Hollifield, *Controlling Immigration,* 18; Martin, "Germany," 198; Hollifield, *Immigrants,* 50, 58; and Ruth Mandel, "Ethnicity and Identity among Migrant Guestworkers in West Berlin" in Nancie L. Gonzalez and Carolyn S. McCommon, *Conflict, Migration, and the Expression of Ethnicity* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989), 61.

[16] Ge Xiangxian and Qu Weiying, *Zhongguo Mingongchao: "Mangliu" Zhenxianglu* [China's Tide of Labor: A Record of the True Facts about the "Blind Floaters"] (Beijing: Chinese International Broadcasting Publishing Co., 1990), 175.

[17] Cornelius, "Japan," 378, 394.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

taste for their presence, still only marginally tempers a persisting and fundamental disdain for their persons.

I review what I label the migration regime in each country, examining one by one three types of rights that are typically assaulted in the treatment of migrant labor: rules about entry (movement rights); extension of civic and social privileges (citizenship rights); and the treatment of migrant workers (labor rights). Following that, I explore differences among the three societies and speculate about the potential effect of this variation on the citizen rights of migrants.

Migration Regimes

Germany

Rules about entry. "We are not a country of immigration," a slogan that is more a normative maxim than a descriptive statement, has been a repetitive theme in official German postwar policy toward foreigners.[18] The very term used to refer to nonnative workers, "guestworker"—despite the long-term residence by now of many of them—exposes an underlying belief in a fiction that these people will be with the Germans only temporarily, and a view that they never can be truly native. Even a more recent incarnation, the label "foreign fellow citizens," continues to communicate a sign of otherness.[19] Yet, of the three migration regimes to be considered in this article, Germany's is the most hospitable.

Rogers Brubaker traces the descent-based approach to citizenship and migrants to a 1913 law of citizenship—if not to an 1842 Prussian law—which made domicile contingent on "membership" in the community, a status that was itself based on descent, marriage, or naturalization.[20] In the postwar period, reflecting this exclusivist posture, a minimum of ten years' residence has been the usual span needed for naturalization; one must also give up one's prior citizenship, as well as fulfill a lengthy list of other requisites.[21] Even after fulfilling all of these conditions, an applicant is still subject to the discretion of local authorities, who frequently reject the request without explanation.[22]

The first postwar outsiders admitted into the country were mainly German refugees and displaced persons, many from Eastern Germany, encouraged to come for the purpose of working. With the erection of the Berlin Wall after

[18] Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood,* 174.

[19] Zig Layton-Henry, "The Challenge of Political Rights" in Zig Layton-Henry, ed., *The Political Rights of Migrant Workers in Western Europe* (London: Sage Publications, 1990), 7–8.

[20] Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood,* 52, 70–71; and 53, 64, 136.

[21] Ibid., 77; Soysal, *Limits of Citizenship,* 26. Yet Martin, *Citizenship and Nationhood,* 196, claims that fifteen years are required. The right of dual citizenship was granted by the new government in autumn 1998.

[22] Gerard de Rham, "Naturalisation: The Politics of Citizenship Acquisition" in Layton-Henry, "The Challenge, 162–63; and Martin, "Germany," 209–10.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1961, foreigners from further away (Turkey, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Yugoslavia) were admitted during the 1960s and 1970s. But the recession and accompanying unemployment brought on by the oil crisis of 1973, along with wildcat strikes and threatening signs of permanent settlement, led the government to call a halt to recruitment.[23]

Since that time, the state has been pursuing a three-pronged policy: strict limits on further immigration, encouraging the voluntary repatriation of migrants, and integrating second-generation immigrants.[24] Tightening up showed up in a new Aliens Law in 1990, a decree in 1993,[25] and in administrative measures taken since 1989 to bring in foreign workers but geared specifically to prevent their settlement.[26] At the popular level in recent years, with the rise in Muslim inflow, a rash of refugees and asylum seekers after 1989, and renewed recession and its attendant steady and ominous unemployment, a threateningly xenophobic strain appeared in the reactions to outsiders, marked by ugly incidents involving attacks on foreigners.[27] Yet as of the early 1990s, there were just seven million foreigners living in Germany, equal to a mere 8 percent of the total population.[28]

Civic and social privileges. The Basic Law of West Germany,[29] its constitution, reserved a few rights that would apply for citizens alone, such as the right to hold public meetings and form associations. But legislation later granted most of these to resident foreigners as well. Fundamental legal rights, such as equality before the law, due process and appeal, however, were universally granted from the outset in the Basic Law.[30] Although the Aliens Law of 1965 promised no freedom of occupation, place of work, or place of education, gradually foreigners did receive these rights.[31]

By the 1960s, pressure from the trade unions brought foreign children into the schools, obtained social services for them, and pressed for an end to discrimination.[32] While the Federal Constitutional Court affirmed that giving local

[23] Martin, "Germany," 198, 202; Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood,* 75, 172; and Catherine Wihtol de Wenden, "The Absence of Rights: The Position of Illegal Immigrants" in Layton-Henry, *Political Rights,* 31; and Hollifield, *Immigrants,* 82.

[24] Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood,* 76.

[25] Ibid., 78; Soysal, *Limits of Citizenship,* 26; and Cornelius, Martin, and Hollifield, *Controlling Immigration,* 18.

[26] Martin, "Germany," 194, 218–20.

[27] Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood,* 72; Martin, "Germany," 189.

[28] Martin, "Germany," 202, 190.

[29] After Germany unified in 1990, the migration regime of West Germany became the common regime of the whole of Germany.

[30] See Tomas Hammar, "The Civil Rights of Aliens" in Layton-Henry, *Political Rights,* 79 and 83; Soysal, *Limits of Citizenship,* 129.

[31] Soysal, *Limits of Citizenship,* 122, 130; Hammar, "Civil Rights," 84–85.

[32] Uwe Andersen, "Consultative Institutions for Migrant Workers" in Layton-Henry, *Political Rights,* 116–17.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

voting rights to noncitizens was unconstitutional, foreigners may at least join local advisory committees that local authorities can consult, are members of unions and work councils in the factories, and can serve as shop stewards.[33] Foreigners are also in principle eligible for welfare money. As of the early 1990s, they were forming political associations and organizing protests; the lack of formal channels for interest representation because of not having the franchise would appear to be the only significant barrier to their effective, if not actual, citizenship.[34]

Treatment of migrant workers. The lot of the foreign worker in Germany is reasonably favorable; the government's effort to help his/her situation has far surpassed that of China and Japan.[35] Non-German laborers' degree of unionization (about one-third of them were members as of 1989) was more or less on a par with that of native workers;[36] they have also been included in the apprenticeship system, which provides training for youths of 16 to 19 years of age.[37] Foreign workers amounted to about 5 percent of the workforce as of the early 1990s.[38] In general, the stigma of not belonging does hang somewhat heavily on the noncitizen in Germany, but at least she/he might hope eventually to become a member. While she/he waits and works—provided she/he escapes the frustrated wrath of the new violence-prone xenophobes—life is more than tolerable.

Japan

Rules about entry. Like Germany's, Japan's official policy toward outsiders is explicitly exclusivist. Its three key provisions, though observed more in the breach than in reality, bear this out: to admit foreigners solely as a last resort, to prohibit the entry of the unskilled, and to keep all immigration purely temporary.[39] For decades foreigners were almost entirely Koreans and Taiwanese dragged in as forced labor under the reign of the empire, and later their descendants. Numbers remained low and stable until the 1980s, in part because immigration was actively resisted. In the years between 1950 and 1988, foreigners only represented 0.6 percent of the population.[40]

[33] Soysal, *Limits of Citizenship,* 128–29; Layton-Henry, *Political Rights,* 24; Jan Vranken, "Industrial Rights" in Layton-Henry, *Political Rights,* 57.

[34] Soysal, *Limits of Citizenship,* 124, and 166, 88, 107–08.

[35] Vranken, "Industrial Rights," 57; Hollifield, *Immigrants,* 205.

[36] Vranken, "Industrial Rights," 61; and Hollifield, *Immigration,* 205.

[37] Hollifield, *Immigration,* 208.

[38] Martin, "Germany," 190.

[39] Cornelius, Martin, and Hollifield, *Controlling Immigration,* 26–27.

[40] Susumu Watanabe, "The Lewisian Turning Point and International Migration: The Case of Japan," *Asian and Pacific Migration Journal* 3 (no 1, 1994): 134–35; Sassen, *The Global City,* 300; and Matsatoshi Muto, "Japan: The Issue of Migrant Workers" in Kubat, *Politics of Migration Policies,* 348; Cornelius, "Japan," 375.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Starting in the late 1980s, however, there was a surge of movement into the country, mainly composed of migrants from Japan's South, East, and Southeast Asian neighbors. The numbers of foreigners overstaying their tourist visas to take up employment shot up to about 280,000 at the same time that the ranks of legal immigrant workers doubled between 1986 and 1991.[41] The demand was fed by domestic labor shortages resulting from demographic trends that were unable to match a sudden economic boom, as well as by a revaluation of the yen, which only served to increase the already sizable gap in income-earning potential between Japan and other Asian nations. As of the early 1990s, however, both legal and illegal foreign workers accounted for a mere one percent of the total workforce—500,000 to 700,000 of 65 million.[42]

The official response was an Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Law in 1990 whose aim was clearly to limit the inflow of the unskilled and semiskilled.[43] Matching the mood of this legislation, the numbers of apprehensions of illegal residents and forced deportations rose at this time, and a rotation system was used to cut down on the number settling down.[44]

Civic and social privileges. Foreigners resident in Japan are far less fortunate than those in Germany. In the first place, the constitution does not even address the issue of the status of foreign workers. There appears, however, to be a general sense that foreigners have, among other rights, the rights to petition, to exercise religious belief and assembly, and to reside where they wish, as well as freedom of thought and conscience, and they are considered equal before the law. But the social consensus is that voting rights and the rights to subsistence, education, and work apply to citizens alone. Though in many localities, schools have in fact opened their doors to foreigners, this is not done by law; and housing discrimination is still serious.[45]

Treatment of migrant workers. The crux of the problem of treatment of migrant workers is that most of them are in Japan against the law. This means that unfair treatment and abuses are commonplace by employers, the labor brokers (the *yakusa,* who dominate the underworld) who often manage them, immigration officers, and the police. There is neither any protective law to which the workers could appeal nor any guarantee that they will receive decent working conditions.[46]

[41] Sassen, *The Global City,* 308; Watanabe, "Lewisian Turning Point," 135; and Kiriro Morita and Saskia Sassen, "The New Illegal Immigration in Japan, 1980–1992," *International Migration Review* 28 (Spring 1994): 154. Shimada, *Japan's "Guest Workers,"* states that in 1990 there were only 80,000 foreigners officially employed, less than one-third the number estimated to be there illegally.

[42] Cornelius, "Japan," 377–78, 382; Muto, "Japan," 348.

[43] Morita and Sassen, *"The New Illegal,"* 160–61; Shimada, *Japan's "Guest Workers,"* 164; and Cornelius, "Japan," 390–400.

[44] Sassen, The Global City, 309; Cornelius, "Japan," 387.

[45] Shimada, *Japan's "Guest Workers,"* 161–62, 167–8.

[46] *Japan's "Guest Workers,"* 40, 42, 48.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The discrimination that fuels the situation is revealed in the following statistics: in a 1989 survey of 266 Tokyo firms, a mere 3 percent of employers expressed a belief that foreign workers should be treated like Japanese ones.[47] Though specific programs have been designed to entice foreign workers into the country, these are generally unfavorable to the workers.[48] An April 1993 Ministry of Justice initiative, entitled the "skills work-training system," for the first time permitted foreigners to do real work and to have their rights as workers guaranteed, but only within definite limits.[49] Nonetheless, this system is clearly an improvement for the recipients.

Japan did ratify the UN Agreement on Social Rights and claims to guarantee to all workers rights of social insurance, social security, and accident compensation. While illegal workers are theoretically also allowed these benefits, they would surely risk deportation if they tried to demand enforcement. Unemployment benefits are officially available to legal foreign workers, but even for them they are rarely granted; the illegals are not even eligible.

A range of welfare benefits are supposedly open to illegal workers, such as child welfare, disability, and mental infirmity, but their application is spotty. Also, illegals cringe from even applying for medical insurance, again because of their fear of exposing their presence. And though in principle even those in the country illegally are entitled to enroll in pension plans, and even as most foreign workers are forced to pay into the schemes, there are severe practical difficulties in receiving any pensions.[50] As with education, some local governments have taken it upon themselves to offer basic social services, including assistance with medical bills, though this is by no means national policy.[51]

In sum, Japan's migration regime, while less humane than that of Germany, is at least informed by a sense of—if not yet a fulfillment of—internationally recognized rights and benefits. There has also been a development of potentially more humane work programs.

China

Rules about entry. Soon after the post-Mao regime, Deng Xiaoping launched the Chinese nation on a heady course of what was to become steadily intensifying marketization in 1979, the commune structure in the countryside was permitted to crumble, trading in the cities was legitimized, urban construction exploded, and as a function of all these shifts, a floating population was born. This

[47] Sassen, *The Global City,* 311–12.
[48] Cornelius, "Japan," 399; Morita and Sassen, "The New Illegal," 161.
[49] Shimada, *Japan's "Guest Workers,"* 73–77.
[50] Ibid., 158–59, 164–65, 168–69.
[51] Cornelius, "Japan," 406.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

term refers to some 60-80 million peasants lured away from the rural communities, to which they had been confined for over twenty years, into towns and cities by the promise of work and higher earnings.[52]

Under the reign of the socialist system in China, from the 1950s through the early 1990s, urbanites, especially urban workers in state-owned and large collectively owned factories,[53] were the recipients of a wealth of state-bestowed benefits, including full labor insurance, generous retirement and medical packages, housing and life-time job tenure.[54] In addition, all proper, permanent urban residents received dwellings at exceedingly low rents; almost gratis public transportation, home heating, and water; guaranteed jobs; and heavily subsidized grain, oil, and other daily necessities. With the deepening of economic reform in the mid-1990s, these entitlements are slipping away; still, the urban-born always benefit from whatever privileges remain.

The cumbersome and uncertain procedure for attaining even temporary residence in the city, which cannot confer urban citizenship, lends the large numbers of internal migrants who fail to register their presence in the city a status in legal limbo. Their consequent vulnerability in the face of local police and both domestic and foreign employers often renders their existence precarious.[55]

While the residents of Chinese cities may historically have been hostile to sojourners—at least to those of the lower, working classes—governments prior to the Communist one did nothing by and large to restrict internal migration. Privately organized geographical mobility tended to predominate in both the late imperial and Republican (1911–1949) periods, though most imperial rulers had the power to relocate their peoples.[56] In both eras, movement was common, widespread, and frequent.[57]

By contrast, under the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) until the reform era, statist choices about population location prevailed in all but a very few years. No one at all moved freely, at least not legally. The state struggled to

[52] The first State Council directive liberalizing peasants' right to be in towns is "State Council Notification on the Question of Peasants Entering Towns and Settling," published in *Zhonghua renmin gongheguo Guowuyuan gongbao* [State Council Bulletin], No. 26 (447), 10 November 1984, 919–920.

[53] On collectively-owned factories, see Andrew G. Walder, *Communist Neo-Traditionalism: Work and Authority in Chinese Industry* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986).

[54] See Walder, *Communist Neo-Traditionalism,* 40–3, 56–68.

[55] Dorothy J. Solinger, "The Chinese Work Unit and Transient Labor in the Transition from Socialism," *Modern China* 21 (April 1995): 155–83.

[56] James Lee, "Migration and Expansion in Chinese History" in William H. McNeill and Ruth S. Adams, *Human Migration: Patterns and Policies* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1978), 20–47; F. W. Mote, "The Transformation of Nanking, 1350–1400" in G. William Skinner, *The City in Late Imperial China* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1977), 101–153; and Gilbert Rozman, *Urban Networks in Ch'ing China and Tokugawa Japan* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973).

[57] R. J. R. Kirkby, *Urbanisation in China: Town and Country in a Developing Economy, 1949–2000 A.D.* (London: Croom Helm, 1985), 34.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

check population movement beginning in the early 1950s, even if it did not succeed fully until 1960. By that point everyone in the countryside was harnessed tightly into a commune, and the wherewithal for subsistence in the cities was locked securely in the grasp of the regime. The purpose of the state was to make of the peasantry a potential underclass, ready to be exploited to fulfill the new state's project of industrialization. After coming into possession of all of China's land and commercial and industrial assets in the mid-1950s, the state was prepared to industrialize the cities ruthlessly. Consequently, industrialization and its fiscal demands dictated the pace of migration and served to justify any abuses inflicted in its service.[58]

By barricading the cities against the peasants, the state rendered rural people available for the big spurts of industrial growth and disposable in tighter times. Though earlier constitutions permitted movement, that right has not appeared in any version since 1975.[59] The larger economic aspirations of the authorities initially overrode not only any concern for the rights of the rural people to move about, but also their rights as citizens and workers should they be summoned into town.

The legal basis for this division was first laid by a June 1955 State Council directive on establishing a system of household registration rules,[60] which were further elaborated in a set of January 1958 regulations on household registration.[61] With the order on household registration of mid-1955, each individual was required to register his/her place of residence officially with the local public security offices in their home places.

With the onset of the reform era after 1980, successively more and more permissive state policies on movement into urban areas were accompanied by a gradual relaxation of the state's control over the resources essential to daily life—grain, housing, and employment. These developments made it possible for peasants to relocate into cities in search of a more comfortable standard of

[58] Zhang Qingwu, "A Sketch of Our National Migration Policy," *ZRK*, 2 (1988), 36; Chaoze Cheng, "Internal Migration in Mainland China: The Impact of Government Policies," *Issues & Studies* (Taipei) 27, 8 (1991): 56; and Kirkby, *Urbanisation*, 14–21, 154. See esp. Kam Wing Chan, *Cities with Invisible Walls: Reinterpreting Urbanization in Post-1949 China* (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1994).

[59] Ding Shuimu, "The Present Household Registration System and the Direction of its Reform," *Shehuixue yanjiu* [Sociological research] (Beijing) 6 (1992): 103.

[60] This is the "Directive on Establishing a System for Registration of Permanent Households," published in Guowuyuan fazhiju, Zhonghua renmin gongheguo fagui huibian bianji weiyuanhui, bian [State Council Legal System Bureau, Editorial Committee of the Compendium of Legal Documents of the People's Republic of China, eds.], *Zhongguo renmin gongheguo fagui huibian* [Compendium of Legal Documents of the People's Republic of China] (hereafter, *Compendium*), vol. 1 (Beijing: Falu chubanshe, 1956), 197–200, and translated in Zhang Qingwu, "Basic Facts on the Household Registration System," *Chinese Economic Studies* 22, 1 (1988): 103–06.

[61] "Regulations on Household Registration in the People's Republic of China," published in Compendium, vol. 7 (Beijing: Falu chubanshe, 1958), 204–216, and translated in Zhang, "Basic Facts," 87–92.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

living. And yet a closer look reveals that migrants remain confined within the rubric of the state's persisting imperative: to marry urban growth and productivity with cost-saving and to provide for the city dweller, while reserving the ruralite as docile, disposable trespasser and drudge.[62]

Beyond requiring rural transients to make known their presence in the city, local authorities also demand that they obtain labor permits, as if they were foreign workers.[63] As economic "reform" increasingly enshrined market values and profit considerations began to throw even native urban workers' jobs into question, the legitimation for infringing rural migrants' labor rights shifted. The rationale became the need to protect the posts of city laborers. Expressly for this purpose in early 1995 the Ministry of Labor even considered establishing "a system similar to international passport and visa requirements, in order to curb 'transprovincial migration.'"[64]

Despite much discussion and debate, and even talk of fundamental reform,[65] the foundational features of the *hukou* policy hang on. A few notable alterations have been the availability of a new, "temporary" household registration in the cities since the mid-1980s, the *zhanzhuzheng*;[66] a widespread resort to the sale of the urban *hukou,* both on black markets by the late 1980s,[67] and by the early 1990s, openly by the city administrations themselves in the form of a "blue *hukou*";[68] and permission for 450 hand-picked, highly developed county-level towns having a financial surplus to allow "law-abiding, stably employed" peasants to receive an urban *hukou,* complete with the right to send their children to school at subsidized rates and with eligibity for basic health and welfare benefits.[69] In summer 1998, the State Council allowed permanent

[62] Chan, *Cities with Invisible Walls,* chap. 4, makes the same argument.

[63] Stephen Castles and Godula Kosack, *Immigrant Workers and Class Structure in Western Europe* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 2nd ed., 100.

[64] Robert J. Saiget, "Beijing Exiles Floating Population," Kyodo, 25 March 1995, in *FBIS,* 27 March 1995, 33.

[65] For instance, *FBIS,* 31 January 1994, 41, from Xinhua [New China News Agency] (hereafter, XH) of the same date, "Ministries to Reform the System of Household Registration."

[66] See Michael R. Dutton, *Policing and Punishment in China: From Patriarchy to "The People"* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 336.

[67] Anthony Kuhn and Lincoln Kaye, "Bursting at the Seams," *FEER,* 10 March 1994, 27–8; and Ding Shuimu, "A Preliminary View of the Present Household Registration Management System" *Shehui* [Society] (Shanghai) 1 (1987): 19.

[68] For instance, Cao Jingchun, "Some Deliberations on Household Registration as Temporary Residence Permit," *Renkou yu jingii* [Population and economy] 5 (1993): 38–42; and Ma Chenguang, "Cities Set Looser Rules on Residency," *FBIS,* 4 March 1994, 22, from *China Daily* [hereafter, *CD*] of the same date, 3.

[69] "Gradually Reform Small Towns' Household Management System," *Baokan wenzhai* [Periodicals Digest] (Beijing), 24 July 1997, 1; Summary of World Broadcasts FE/2986 G/8 (1 August 1997), from XH, 30 July 1997 and FE/2989 G3–4 (5 August 1997), from XH, 30 July 1997; and Agence France Presse (AFP), 16 August 1997.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

residence rights to be accorded "qualified investors" and to a citizen's spouse, parents, and children.[70]

The blue *hukou* became available in most larger cities for up to 10,000 yuan as of early 1993.[71] Just as the most recent reform, this one was clearly a measure to milk both the wealthier peasantry and the countryside as well to benefit the cities. Its possession offered most of the rights that urbanites enjoyed at the time. But the ongoing snobbish xenophobia that characterizes urbanites' attitudes toward the peasantry is illustrated by this: Even advocates of household registration reform were proposing in 1993 that the holder of the blue *hukou,* beyond disbursing the hefty fee, should yet have to wait a full ten years before becoming the city's permanent resident![72]

For the most part, though national leaders welcome the peasant workers for their contribution to economic growth and their provision of services for the cities, the official aim remains to protect the cities. Most politicans' opinion is that additional farmers in search of work should seek their livelihood in the vast countryside by setting up township enterprises, by creating new small towns, by engaging in more intensive agricultural development, or by performing works of capital construction.

As for the managers and bosses who handle the migrants, this comment, casting aside a notion of rights, illustrates their justifications for doing so: "Construction team leaders aren't concerned about the regulations in the [1994] Labor Law, since they think what their own workers are most concerned about is [simply] making more money."[73]

Yet there are signs of something else as time goes on: beginnings of mentions of rights, law, and protection for the migrants. For instance, the Beijing City Regulations on the Management of Transient People Seeking Jobs in Beijing of 1995 listed protections that migrant workers should enjoy, the fees they would be expected to pay, and the legal responsibilities to which they would be held accountable in the event of violating regulations.[74] And in mid-1995, Ren Jianxin, director of the Central Commission for Comprehensive Management of Public Security, announced that: "More should be done to intensify controls over residence and public order concerning the population who work in places other than their long-term residences. In addition, such work should be linked to government efforts in educating and providing services for

[70] *China Daily Business Weekly,* 6 September 1998, 1.

[71] Cao, "Some Deliberations," 38.

[72] Qin Qiuhong, "Reform the Present Household Registration System to Fit the Needs of the Market Economy," *Jingji gaige* [Economic reform] (Xi'an) 5 (1993): 46.

[73] Yuan Yue et al., *Luoren-Beijing liumin di zuzhihua zhuangkuang yanjiu baogao* [The exposed—a research report on the condition of the organization of migrants in Beijing] (Beijing: Beijing Horizon Market Research and Analysis Company, 1995), 35.

[74] *FBIS*, 19 April 1995, 15, from XH, 19 April 1995.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

these people, which should be included in rules, regulations, or laws that relate to this population."[75]

Civic and social privileges. Like illegal foreign workers in Japan, many countryfolk who come to town in China are forced to cobble together a coarse existence among the cracks and crevices of proper, permanent urban life. If they fail to register, they are on the lam just by virtue of their presence. Politically they are worse off. For given China's authoritarian polity, they suffer as do all workers in the country, only more so.

Trade unions in the PRC are heavily dominated by party officials and so are far more responsive to party directives and policies than to the workers themselves. In the case of the migrants, despite a national Trade Union Law of 1992 demanding that all firms set up branches of the trade union,[76] the factories where migrants tend to concentrate—the foreign-funded firms—have been notoriously flagrant in not installing unions.[77] Perhaps in response to this lack of unions as well as to the unrepresentative nature of the official unions, perhaps as many as 800 unauthorized unions, set up outside the party's aegis, had emerged in Guangdong province by early 1994. But defenseless peasant workers feared openly joining them because of the likelihood of being laid off as a result.[78]

True, the most recent version of the PRC constitution grants freedoms of speech, press, assembly, association, procession, and demonstration to all citizens of the country, urban and rural alike, in its Article 35. The right to strike present in the 1978 version as Article 45,[79] was struck from this latest edition.[80] Many, if not most, attempts at staging processions and demonstrations, even by regular workers and proper urban residents—not even to mention the precariously situated urban peasants—do not receive the requisite advance approval from the authorities and if carried out nonetheless are decreed illicit. Ever since the Tiananmen Square shootdown of June 1989 and the demonstrations that preceded it, all efforts at organization outside the party have been declared illegal.

Given this official posture toward even the mildest forms of assembly and protest by the permanent residents of cities, it should be obvious that participation in such activities by temporary inhabitants would be all the more prohibited. As for voting (a practice that until the past few years has been without practical content or consequences even for those who have the right to engage

[75] *FBIS*, 8 June 1995, 17, from XH, 7 June 1995.

[76] XH, 12 September 1994, 51, and translated in *FBIS*, 12 September 1994.

[77] As of the end of June 1994, only one third of the 52,000-plus foreign firms in the country had established trade unions. See *CD*, 27 October 1994, 3, reprinted in *FBIS*, 28 October 1994, 31.

[78] Reported in *Tangtai* [Contemporary Times] (Hong Kong), 36 (15 March 1994), 38–9, translated in *FBIS*, 5 April 1994, 43–44.

[79] *Beijing Review* [hereafter, *BR*,], 17 March 1978, 13.

[80] Ibid., 27 December 1982, 16.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in it), just as foreigners are denied the franchise in Japan and those from outside the European Union (EU) do not have it in Germany, anyone residing in a Chinese city for however long without official household registration in that city may not take part in elections. Civic/social rights and prerogatives, such as the right to subsistence, education, dwelling, employment, and medical care are denied to migrants in the cities.[81]

Certainly these various deprivations and denials were experienced far more keenly before the late 1980s than thereafter. For by that time, bustling open markets in grain and produce were available to all, and the low-quality rationed grain was rarely the choice of anyone. Urban schools began admitting outsiders, if for increasingly steep fees as the size and prestige of the city rose, and peasants in town found shelter in rentals let by permanent residents in newly-opened guesthouses and hostels and in the dormitories of the firms that hired them.

A wider and wider nonstate labor market opened up as the 1980s progressed, with private entrepreneurs, self-employment, and foreign firms providing opportunities on a scale that had never before existed in the PRC. State-owned firms began employing peasants as temporary labor in far larger numbers and with more regular procedures than had been the case in the past. Private doctors also set up practices. Yet their ability to buy these goods by no means meant the civic or social incorporation of the outsiders.

As compared to foreigners in Germany and Japan, peasants in Chinese cities have a double disadvantage: First, like all Chinese nationals, they are subject to the authoritarian regime of the still-party-governed polity; and second, they can only acquire at markets, often at elevated prices, the basic necessities of daily urban living. These goods are still often available much more cheaply to locals.

Treatment of migrant workers. It is more or less accurate to state that peasant workers in Chinese cities are slotted into the same tier of the labor market as migrant labor is anywhere—a secondary niche where work is dirty, dangerous, debilitating, and insecure. In many cases, it is also less well paid.[82] But there are at least two twists to the story. In the first place, migrant labor in many state-owned factories in Chinese cities appears to have received fairer treatment, better pay, shorter hours, and more welfare benefits than those in foreign-funded firms, at least well into the 1990s.

The foreign firms (a fixture not present in Germany or Japan, but much courted in China for their famous boost to the economy) are often invested at the behest of local governments anxious for the extra taxes they will yield, and state regulations are usually ignored altogether. There have been numerous re-

[81] Zhang Qingwu, "Basic Facts," 8.

[82] Michael J. Piore, *Birds of Passage: Migrant Labor and Industrial Societies* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1979).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ports of the litany of abuses suffered by migrants in these overseas-financed enterprises, especially those financed by capital from East Asia. These range from sixteen-hour days to an absence of toilet breaks, kicking, lock-ins, and even being penned up in a dog cage and being made to stand in the rain as penalties.[83]

The second aberration from the stereotypical secondary sector of the labor market is that it is not uniformally wretched in China. For those with skills, capital, and connections to regular urbanites (especially to government or party officials via blood or common place of origin), it is possible to become a well-to-do private entrepreneur in the retail, service, or garment manufacturing sectors. This chance for forming connections that bridge the barrier between local and outsider may actually provide privilege to some Chinese migrant laborers in comparison with his/her fellow marginal workers in Germany or Japan. This is possible since Chinese migrants are, after all, nationals, unlike those in Japan and Germany.

To summarize, it would appear that Chinese farmers who come to town in their own country have been subject to at least as rigorous rules of entry and have lesser formal civic and social privileges than their counterpart foreign migrant laborers in Germany and Japan. As migrant laborers, the Chinese probably fare about the same as foreign migrant workers in Japan, and not as well as those in Germany. With their nation beginning at a lower level of development than the other two, and as rulers of a staunchly authoritarian regime, China's leaders rely on a stringent developmental imperative that causes them to put peasant outsiders into a generally rightless realm.

Explaining Differences

Three variables that distinguish the political economies of these three countries can each be shown to contribute to an explanation of the differences in the respective migration regimes of the countries, with potential implications for the rights that migrant laborers receive in each. The first of these is a set of issues connected with developmental patterns and the associated timing of demand for labor. Second is the place of regular/native labor in the political system.[84] The third has to do with the geopolitics of location.

Development and Timing

An important distinction between Japan and Germany is that when the massive postwar recovery took off, almost half of the Japanese labor force was in the

[83] Liu Jinghuai and Zeng Mingzi, "Rights, Interests, and Dignity Brook No Infringement—Worries About Protection in Foreign-Invested Enterprises (Part 1)," *Liaowang* [Outlook] (Beijing) 5 (31 January 1994), 26–29, translated in *FBIS,* 3 March 1994, 32–36; and Part 2, *Liaowang,* 7 February 1994, 15–17, translated in *FBIS,* 3 March 1994, 37–41.

[84] Patrick R. Ireland, *The Policy Challenge of Ethnic Diversity: Immigrant Politics in France and Switzerland* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

agricultural sector; by 1970, this figure had dropped to just 19 percent. In the single decade between 1960 and 1970, the three major metropolises of Tokyo, Osaka, and Nagoya had raised their combined populations by a total of 10 million.[85] This meant that in addition to Japan's reliance on automation, the pool of rural people migrating to the towns relieved the country from having to turn to foreigners for several decades.[86] Germany, which had already begun to empty out its countryside much earlier, saw only about 3.5 million workers abandon the fields for the factories in the two decades between 1950 and 1970.[87] So, it was compelled to call in outsiders, albeit ethnic German resettlers at first, as early as the 1950s.

But neither of these countries devised a developmental agenda that locked the peasants onto the land in the interest of modernizing cities, as China did; both of them had admitted their farmers as full-fledged workers as soon as the need arose. In the case of China, it was not until the early 1980s, just before Japan's surge of inmigration also took off, that Deng Xiaoping's new market reforms ushered in an era of rural movement. As a result, policy makers and their municipally-based publics in both China and Japan are only lately coming to terms with outsiders mixing into their fold—genuine foreigners in Japan, native farmer-foreigners in China.

Another difference in this category of developmentally-governed timing has to do with unemployment figures in the 1980s. Unemployment in Germany—which had lingered in the range of 2 to 3 percent into the early 1970s—was up to 8 to 10 percent by the 1980s.[88] Beginning as early as the mid-1970s, following the oil price shock of 1973, high unemployment became the excuse for restricting immigration.[89] With the unification of the country and its attendant costs, Germany in the 1990s began cutting back some of its more generous policies and its more open stance, not just for outsiders but for natives as well.[90] But its relatively liberal migration regime had been born decades before, when the economy craved migrant workers and long before these problems came to the fore. That regime has by no means been fully dismantled.

In Japan, to the contrary, unemployment rates remained around 2 to 3 percent into the 1980s.[91] The mid-1980s saw a virtual economic boom that lasted into the first years of the 1990s, one that cried out for the entry of foreigners

[85] Sassen, *The Global City,* 308.

[86] Muto, "Japan," 350.

[87] Jost Halfmann, "Social Change and Political Mobilization in West Germany" in Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., *Industry and Politics in West Germany: Toward the Third Republic* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989), 55.

[88] Peter J. Katzenstein, "Stability and Change in the Emerging Third Republic" in Katzenstein, *Industry and Politics,* 308.

[89] Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood,* 176.

[90] Katzenstein, *"Stability and Change,"* 309.

[91] Watanabe, "Lewisian Turning Point," 122; Ronald Dore, *Flexible Rigidities; Industrial Policy and Structural Adjustment in the Japanese Economy 1970–80* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1986), 87.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ready to work. This sequence meant that even though the issue of competition in the labor market between outsiders and insiders had not emerged by the mid-1990s, neither had modes of integrating foreigners into this market evolved.

In China the pre-reform period socialist system's pledge to grant a job to every urban worker held good in the main through the 1980s, in large part because the labor market was kept manageable in size by excluding peasants. Moreover, post-1980 economic liberalization stimulated growth and legitimated the birth of brand new components of this market, especially marketing and private and foreign business, all of which begged and bid for hands, both "native" and peasant. Only in the years since the late 1980s did city laborers begin losing their positions. This occurred first because of a regime-engineered economic recession from 1988 to 1991, and then because of an acceleration of market-style reforms after 1992. These developments have led state firms to shed their permanent workforces.

A regime of incorporation for transient labor failed to take root in China in the few short years between 1984 (when peasants first began populating the cities in sizable numbers) and 1988 (when recession and reform first joined in dispelling labor). Just on the heels of the entry of countryfolk in significant numbers into the urban industrial workforce, urbanites under threat of loss of their jobs began to perceive a sense of competition with them. At the same time, the encouragement of market principles has seen increasing numbers of foreign investors and peri-urban communities open firms. But these are the enterprises that operate outside the regimen of state-decreed benefits and fair treatment for migrant workers.

This phenomenon is comparable in effect to the case in Japan, where it is principally the small and medium construction and manufacturing firms, which derive their work from subcontracts with large corporations, that engage foreign labor.[92] These smaller firms handle their casual workforces, also in the secondary labor market, according to frameworks totally at odds with the regime of life-tenured, enterprise-trained employees that obtains in the major companies for which Japan is famous. In Germany, on the contrary, though foreign workers may stir antagonistic feelings among resident labor, the outsiders, who as a collectivity have been on the scene now for some decades, enter the same factories with native labor and so are subject to identical rules of treatment.

In sum, unlike in Germany, the presence of substantial rural reserves in China and Japan, along with extremely low urban unemployment rates in the cities (both of which conditions were regime-manufactured outcomes in the Chinese case) delayed importing outside labor for decades. Neither did any regime of incorporation develop, nor did issues of competition come to the fore. When migrant labor did appear, it was often shunted into firms that functioned

[92] Sassen, *The Global City,* 315; Morita and Sassen, "The New Illegal," 157.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in a realm set apart from and immune to the comparative beneficence of the mainstream, primary labor market regulatory regime.

The Political Place of Labor

The cases here uncover a surprising relationship: the place of native labor in the larger political economy appears to have definite implications for the reception accorded migrant labor. Where labor is coordinated at the national level by a powerful federation of unions and where it is bonded to a political party that is truly a player in national politics, migrant labor stands a better chance of receiving good treatment.

In Germany, workers lay claim to two distinct channels for the representation of their interests. The first is via codetermination in works councils at the enterprise level, which are compulsory in private companies employing at least five workers. These councils, in which foreign labor is also permitted to participate, deal on an equal basis with management on a range of important matters related to their own employment. Second are the unions, also open to foreigners, where workers can engage in collective bargaining.[93]

It is not just that regular workers are recognized. They have sometimes utilized their clout, paradoxically, for the benefit of the migrants. Unionists laid the foundation for the institution of migrant workers' rights and benefits in the 1960s. Native workers fought migrants' early fights for them out of fear that the outsiders could potentially organize themselves into a competing and presumably less demanding union of their own.[94] Beginning in 1986, the DGB (Federation of German Trade Unions) campaigned—so far fruitlessly—for voting rights for migrants at the local level.[95]

The power of labor is probably enhanced by its concentration in one mammoth federation at the federal level.[96] This manifest strength is combined with the federation's close tie to a political party that has always been a major contender for power—the SPD, the socialist party.[97] Moreover, a "relative equality in the distribution of power among [the] different actors" in the enterprise lies at the root of the "German model" of labor relations. All these factors mean that workers' interests are genuinely represented in the policy process at the central level.[98]

In Japan, labor within the mainstream, large-scale corporations[99] has been the beneficiary of the renowned life-time employment system. It has typically

[93] Peter J. Katzenstein, "Industry in a Changing West Germany" in Katzenstein, *Industry and Politics,* 11; and Vranken, "Industrial Rights," 68.

[94] Hammar, "Civil Rights," 88; Vranken, "Industrial Rights," 57–8.

[95] Jan Rath, "Voting Rights" in Layton-Henry, *Political Rights,* 133.

[96] Katzenstein, "Industry," 11.

[97] Vranken, "Industrial Rights," 51–2.

[98] Katzenstein, "Stability and Change," 348.

[99] Keiko Yamanaka, "Commentary: Theory Versus Reality in Japanese Immigration Policy" in Cornelius, Martin, and Hollifield, *Controlling Immigration,* 413.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

been treated as valuable "human capital," trained and educated on the job within the firm,[100] and has been protected against the downsizing that might otherwise attend recessions, at least into the late 1990s.[101] While incorporated at the level of the plant, drawn into consultations with its own management there, and sheltered and promoted over time within long nourished internal labor markets, this participation has essentially been one based just in the firm.

Workers as members of enterprise unions limited to the bounds of their own companies have had a role in the Japanese industrial relations system. From the late 1940s until at least the late 1980s, when a national-level Japanese Trade Union Confederation (Rengo) was formed,[102] labor as a whole was decentralized, fragmented, and scattered.[103] Even after the formation of Rengo, one scholar writing in the early 1990s still concluded: "In short, although labor unions can and do participate in the policy process, their participation still falls short of being formalized in a neocorporatist structure involving the summit organs of functional interests."[104]

The other significant weakness of Japanese labor has been its historical marginalization, which can be traced to the nature of its linkage with the party system. Unlike in Germany, Japanese labor has been split in its allegiance to not one, but two parties of the Left: the Japanese Socialist party (JSP) for public-sector labor and after 1960 the Democratic Socialist party (DSP) for the private sector.[105]

After a burst of energetic involvement at the core of power just following the war, Socialist party mismanagement, combined with the U.S. reverse course, quickly shut off a space for the Left at the top until 1994, when the Socialist party was arguably no longer leftist at all. Following that early taste of political centrality, the JSP's militancy and DSP's accommodating irrelevance over the years excluded both parties and their labor group members from the inner circles of power and policy.[106] This was a fragmentation already lent labor by the enterprise-centeredness of activism.

[100] Vocational training is nationally-based in Germany. See Katzenstein, "Industry," 12.

[101] Johnson, "Studies," 96, 100, 110; Dore, *Flexible Rigidities.* This changed in the late 1990s.

[102] Yutaka Tsujinaka, "Rengo and its Osmotic Networks" in Gary Allinson and Yasunori Sone, eds., *Political Dynamics in Contemporary Japan* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993), 211; and Lonny E. Carlile, "Party Politics and the Japanese Labor Movement: Rengo's 'New Political Force,'" *Asian Survey* 34 (July 1994): 617–19.

[103] Carlile, "Party Politics," 620; Ikuo Kume, "A Tale of Twin Industries: Labor Accommodation in the Private Sector" in Allinson and Sone, *Political Dynamics,* 166.

[104] Mike Mochizuki, "Public Sector Labor and the Privatization Challenge: The Railway and the Telecommunications Unions" in Allinson and Sone, *Political Dynamics,* 196; see also Dore, *Flexible Rigidities,* 88, 105, 123; Eisuke Sakakibara, *Beyond Capitalism: The Japanese Model of Market Economics* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1993), 16, 19; and Carlile, "Party Politics," 610, 619.

[105] Carlile, "Party Politics," 609, 611.

[106] Gary Allinson and Yasunori Sone, "Negotiating Labor's Role" in Allinson and Sone, *Political Dynamics,* 156, 157; Carlile, "Party Politics," 607.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The upshot of these deficiencies from a political point of view was that until the advent of Rengo, labor was relatively isolated at the top, its interests taken at best as secondary,[107] certainly by no means equal as they were in Germany once the postwar era began. When foreign labor finally arrived in Japan in large numbers around 1986, it entered a labor movement very different from the one that greeted the early guest workers of West Germany.

The Japanese movement was too incoherent to accommodate this outside labor; with the foreigners entering only the subcontracting firms in the secondary labor market, it was also one whose own members were not really threatened. Thus, this movement was without a need to shackle foreign workers within some larger, home-grown union structure, which in 1986 was not even to exist for another three years. In the mid-1990s, some smaller labor unions put forth a minimal call for legalizing unauthorized foreign workers. But Rengo did not endorse this request.[108]

In the highly authoritarian Chinese case, the dominance of the Communist party (CCP) over both individual laborers[109] and over the whole labor movement meant that there was hardly a question of any genuine representation of labor's interests either within the individual firm or via the national-scale All China Federation of Trade Unions. The corporate federation at the top has no independent power of its own. Because of the monopoly of power exercised by the CCP, it is meaningless to speak of a linkage between labor and one or another party, for there is no other power-wielding entity. Even the efforts of underground labor organizers to mobilize independent unions among the peasant workers are devoid of influence within the present system, and their efforts have only led to arrests of the activists.[110]

We can conclude that where the power of permanent, resident labor is strong and its place more or less secure, both within the plant and at the apex of the political system, the fate of migrant labor is more promising. Both China's repressive political system and its continuing strategy of effectively sacrificing farmers' interests for untrammeled urban modernization have undercut any influence for outsider underdogs.

Geopolitical Location

One last variable is the influence of several facets of a nation's geographical location upon its migration regime. Here I refer to the impact a country's connections with its immediate neighbors might have on its policies; there may also be a relationship between the regime in place and the source of the migrants reaching its labor markets.

[107] Carlile, "Party Politics," 620; Tsujinaka, "Rengo," 211.

[108] Cornelius, "Japan," 394.

[109] Walder, *Communist Neo-Traditionalism.*

[110] *FBIS,* 17 May 1994, 19, from *SCMP,* 17 May 1994, 1, 8; and *FBIS,* 24 May 1994, 52–3, from *Eastern Express* (Hong Kong), 23 May 1994.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Several scholars have pointed to what they see as the effect of a progressively pervasive cultural and global spread of conventions surrounding human rights internationally.[111] According to them, the advance of values attached to human rights has begun to render the concept of citizenship nearly irrelevant in the granting of rights and privileges. Instead, they claim, citizenship is being replaced with a borderless "personhood," whereby entitlements are granted without regard to territory.[112]

Notably, however, among our three countries, such a movement appears to have taken root only in Germany, which, of course, is the only one to have become incorporated into the increasingly encompassing liberal, rights-based regime germinating in the European Union. As far back as 1957, in establishing the Union's predecessor, the European Economic Community (EEC), the Treaty of Rome guaranteed the citizens of all the member states the right to work in any EEC nation beginning in 1968.

In the early years, since Europe was unifying in other ways, receptivity in West Germany to foreign labor—virtually all from Europe itself, if not always from EEC countries—was undoubtedly eased.[113] As time went on, a growing harmonization of the judicial systems of the member states emerged, to which Germany falls subject.[114] This entails among other matters the laws governing both foreign as well as intra-EU labor.[115]

But in Japan's case, the migration flows came from South, East, and Southeast Asian countries; more recently, migration has come from China,[116] a result in part of the focus of the Japanese economy's own internationalization.[117] No liberal human rights regime impinges on this interchange; if anything, the societies from which the migrants hail—the Philippines, South Korea, Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Thailand[118]—have all been known to entertain human rights abuses of their own. Neither Japan's location nor the homes of its sojourners exert a beneficial influence on Japanese treatment of migrant workers.

In China, the incoming masses are peasants from China's own countryside, not foreign workers. So there is, of course, no effect of a value system of some foreign country or grouping upon the migration regime. Since inhabitants of the countryside have been downgraded for decades, there is no larger force

[111] See Soysal, *Limits of Citizenship;* Hollifield, *Immigrants;* and Cornelius, Martin, and Hollifield, *Controlling Immigration.*

[112] See, for instance, Soysal, *Limits of Citizenship,* 3.

[113] Martin, "Germany," 199.

[114] Miriam Feldman, "New Citizenship Strategies in Postwar Europe: Nationalist and Post-National" (paper prepared for presentation at the American Political Science Association Meeting, 2–5 September 1993, Washington, DC), 3–5.

[115] Discussion with Alec Stone, Irvine, CA, 15 February 1996.

[116] According to Jonathan Friedland, "Immigration: Traffic Problem," *FEER,* 4 August 1994, 20, around 36,300 Chinese nationals were then living illegally in Japan, brought in by the *yakusa* in collaboration with organized criminal syndicates in Taiwan, Hong Kong, and China.

[117] Sassen, *The Global City,* 32–33.

[118] Morita and Sassen, "The New Illegal," 151.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

involved that could impose any more humane values than those held by China's own urban rulers and managers. No legitimating framework issues from the country's immediate surroundings or from the homelands of its transients that would counter the dominant paradigm within which most urban politicians are operating.

James Hollifield and Yasemin Soysal have both perceived an international spread of human rights for migrants. But so far only countries such as Germany—situated in and involved with Western European liberal and largely law-abiding regimes and with the EU itself—are susceptible to the power of the international human rights regime that is pervasive on that continent.

Conclusion

Insofar as its enjoyment of human and citizenship rights is concerned, migrant labor around the globe is in a sorry plight. Its problems are likely to be even worse in places such as Germany and Japan where an ethnocultural bias (*ius sanguinis* basis for citizenship) is joined with a relentless push to grow economically. China shares with Germany and Japan a discriminatory, even xenophobic basis toward its "foreign workers" (in China's case, its own peasants) along with a drive to develop at almost any cost. I have found disparities among these countries in three categories: the timing of their absorption of migrant laborers and the connection of this with the health of the economy (because of the negative impact high rates of native unemployment have upon receptivity toward migrant workers); the role played by resident labor in the larger political arena; and their geopolitical situations. I went on to point to ways in which these dissimilarities might be linked to differential outcomes in migration regimes.

This analysis yields the following relationships: First, given relatively healthy economic conditions, the longer a society has had to cope with outsiders, the more likely it is that it will come to assimilate them. This conclusion is consistent with one enunciated for the United States by Rita J. Simon and Susan H. Alexander: "The responses [in public opinion surveys] show that immigrant groups who have been in the United States longer tend to receive more positive evaluations than do recent immigrant communities. . . ."[119]

Second, the stronger, better organized, and more involved in governmental policy making domestic labor is, the more prone it may be to assist outsiders to gain a foothold, and the more capable of doing so; and third, given the first two conditions and other things being equal, the more entwined in exchanges with other liberal regimes, the more legalistic and rights-conscious states should become, with beneficial consequences for sojourners as well as for other minorities.

[119] Rita J. Simon and Susan H. Alexander, *The Ambivalent Welcome: Print Media, Public Opinion and Immigration* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1993), 46.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

These conclusions imply the following: First, over time, the Chinese floating population will likely be treated more benignly than it has been heretofore; there are already signs that this is underway. Second, if the regular, permanent workforce could gain new rights, it would have positive side-effects for the migrants as well. The 1994 Labor Law is a start, but it is currently honored more often in the breach.[120] Third, the more that Western, law-based states engage China in their economic activities, the more the people of China, including the peasants in the cities, are apt to gain good treatment in the long run.*

[120] This law was adopted on 5 July 1994 at the 8th Session of the Standing Committee of the 8th National People's Congress (translated in *FBIS,* 19 July 1994).

* This article draws on a chapter in Joanne R. Bauer and Daniel A. Bell, eds., *The East Asian Challenge for Human Rights* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Neocolonialism and Neoliberalism in South Africa and Zambia

MARGARET HANSON
JAMES J. HENTZ

The 1980s and early 1990s witnessed a wave of neoliberalism breaking across the developing world. Nationalized strategies of growth painted a broad consensus for targeting low inflation, balanced budgets, currency convertibility, export-oriented production, and privatization. In sub-Saharan Africa, at least twenty-nine countries have undergone almost a decade of structural adjustment, some longer.

Through their conditionality, international financial institutions (IFIs) have been described as the main policy conduit for the spread of these neoliberal strategies of economic growth.[1] The ability to withhold or advance much needed liquidity to governments is the reputed source of IFI influence on domestic policy. However, financial power as the central explanatory variable for stimulating the latest wave of economic reform in sub-Saharan Africa has failed to tell the full story of why governments have adopted neoliberal strategies of growth and how effectively or ineffectively they have been able to sustain such strategies in volatile political climates. We argue that an equally important part of the story is how governments develop ownership of those ideas.[2]

IFI conditionality has been depicted as neocolonialism in the popular press and in policy debates within borrowing countries, and this rhetoric implies an

[1] See for example, David Gordon, "Debt Conditionality and Reform" in Thomas Callaghy and John Ravenhill, eds., *Hemmed In: Responses to Africa's Economic Decline* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993).

[2] By "ownership," we mean the political identification that a government or political party develops toward a set of policy ideas.

MARGARET HANSON and JAMES J. HENTZ both received their Ph.D. in political science from the University of Pennsylvania. HANSON is currently a research fellow at INSEAD (European Institute of Business Administration) in Fontainebleau, France. HENTZ is assistant professor of political science at the Virginia Military Institute. He was a visiting scholar at Rand Afrikaans University in 1993–1994.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

imposition of Western ideas on government officials, who in turn shape domestic policy. However, when we look at the process whereby governments commit to those ideas, the evidence of neocolonialism backed by financial coercion is mixed. The role of IFIs in sub-Saharan Africa might explain in part why some policy documents are drafted. But the presence of IFIs fails to explain conclusively why governments do or do not develop ownership of those policies. We find that the intervening variable between international financial pressure and domestic policy change is the electoral cycles of domestic politics. Building a domestic consensus in favor of neoliberal strategies of growth is a far more complex process of consolidating political support for those policies than the one-way imposition of ideas implied by those who label neoliberal conditionality "neocolonialism." Our aim in this article is to trace the emergence of political ownership of these ideas by tracing the policy dialogues. We focus on the interaction of international and domestic sources for reform that stem from financial pressures from external imbalances as well as political pressure from the assertion of control over the organization of domestic state/society relations by both international and domestic actors. Considering the problem in this light, we find that rhetorical attacks on IFIs are less indicative of ideological shifts than simply the machinations of political parties reckoning with both international financial pressures and the necessities of domestic political survival. Thus, we do not dismiss the relevance of international financial pressures. We simply offer a more nuanced explanation of the emergence of neoliberalism in Africa by looking to the battle over ownership of economic policy ideas.

Using two case studies, Zambia from 1987–1996 and South Africa from 1993–1996, we examine more closely the process through which governments commit to neoliberal strategies of growth. In each case the government adopted neoliberal policies after a period of policy dialogue over neoliberal strategies of growth that occurred at both the international and domestic levels. Neoliberal ideas travel via an array of policy-related activities including technical advice, negotiations over specific conditions of lending, and debates that provide the background to policy making.

During policy dialogues between IFIs and governments and between political parties, the ownership of policy ideas is negotiated. Policy commitment is the product of both the dialogue between IFIs and their African counterparts as well as the policy dialogue within the country's political fora. The dialogue is the process by which partnerships may develop between external and domestic actors. However, we acknowledge that that relationship may be poorly characterized by the positive connotation of "partnership" and that in many instances the capacity to design and implement such policies effectively depended on foreign advisers, particularly in countries such as Zambia where the capacity of the bureaucracy remains limited.[3]

[3] This point has been made repeatedly. See for example, Thomas Callaghy, "Lost Between State and Market" in Joan Nelson, ed., *Economic Crisis and Policy Choice* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Thus, to trace the formation of domestic commitments to neoliberalism or lack thereof, we look at the content of policy debates as well as the political framing of those policy ideas.[4] Policy ideas are important but so are the perceptions concerning the ownership of these ideas—that is, whether foreign or national.[5] In these two cases, we find that neoliberal ideas associated with IFIs have taken on new political significance as they have been mobilized by political parties vying for power. The political framing of technocratic policy debates leaves traces on the neoliberal policy ideas themselves. The contested political framing, which we highlight in this article, is the perception in domestic dialogue of IFI-government policy relations as either a partnership or as a form of neocolonialism. We find that this coloring of ideas affects the consolidation of domestic political support behind those policies, which presents an indicator of the political sustainability of such policies over time.

By focusing on the policy dialogues between IFIs and governments, and between rival political parties vying for electoral support, we do not dismiss the impact of African countries' financial dependence on foreign creditors and investors. We do not respond to the question of whether a liberal economy is a de facto exploitative economic system that can be described as neocolonial. We argue simply that we can learn from the occasional resurgence of an anticolonial polemic, because it reflects the changing domestic political landscape. This is true whether the polemic is aimed at international advisers on domestic policy, at political parties who cooperate with IFIs, or at political groups associated with IFIs simply by virtue of their policy orientation.

Our argument speaks to more than one branch of political science. From a political economy perspective concerned with the role of ideas shaping international financial relations, we see that there is justification for giving greater attention to the process through which governments decide to pursue neoliberal growth strategies and to consolidate support for politically sensitive economic reforms. From an international organizations perspective, we see there is justification for considering the influence of IFIs on the formation of a government's commitment to neoliberal strategies of growth, given the changing role of IFIs in sub-Saharan Africa over the last decade. African economies, increasingly marginalized in global financial markets, have drawn rather more advice than increased aid from public lenders. The number of policy conditions required

[4] This framework of analysis takes off from Miles Kahler's proposition that political conflict can erupt along at least three dimensions: content of programs, nationalist resentment at the intervention that is implied by conditionality, and the differential effects of conditionality on groups inside and outside the government. This article focuses largely on the first two dimensions of content and political framing of the reform programs, arguing that conflict along these two dimensions gives insight as to how political support aligns with respect to economic reforms. Miles Kahler, "External Influence, Conditionality and the Politics of Adjustment" in Stephan Haggard and Robert Kaufman, eds., *The Politics of Economic Adjustment* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 89–136.

[5] By referring to the "ownership of ideas" we want to highlight the importance of looking at policy ideas within their domestic support base, not solely as a function of external debates.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

through International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank lending has increased and so has the technical advice offered to support the execution of specified policies and projects.[6] The overall effect has been a qualitative shift toward increased IFI involvement in the formulation of economic reforms. This shift in turn implies an increased capacity for monitoring through deeper and tighter conditionality. However, it is not clear that more advice and the increased capacity of IFIs to monitor a developing country's economic programs have served to establish greater control. But it does suggest that we need to examine more closely the interaction between international advice and aid and the politics of domestic policy making.

The two cases reflect different financial profiles: South Africa was not debt distressed, whereas Zambia was "severely indebted."[7] As late as October 1995, it was reported: "South Africa can afford to snub the Bank [World Bank] because, unlike most in Africa it does not need Bank money."[8] However, in both cases the specter of colonialism is present. Both the Zambian and the South African dialogues with the IFIs over strategies for economic growth were at one point characterized in the popular press and in policy debates as "neo-colonial" and later as "partnerships."

But the audience of the "neocolonial" polemic was clearly made up of both international and domestic members. In the period immediately before the April 1994 elections, in South Africa's economic policy debate between the departing National party government and their heir apparent, the African National Congress (ANC), the ANC characterized the National party's neoliberalism as "neocolonial." The ANC, however, was playing to at least one important constituency—labor. The ANC had in fact begun to moderate its position even in the early transition period. But this moderation remained cloaked in political rhetoric. For example, in November 1993, the assistant general manager for exchange control of the South African Foreign Reserve could state that Trevor Manuel, the ANC's economic policy czar, was becoming more moderate: "He is beginning to understand."[9] Three months later *Newsweek* would print an interview with Manuel under the title, "No Adam Smith Fans Here."[10] The ANC then moved to neoliberalism without obvious financial leverage from the IMF and World Bank.

In Zambia, former President Kenneth Kaunda and members of his supporting party, the United National Independence party (UNIP), called the IFIs

[6] For a discussion of IFI conditionality, see Matthew Martin, "Neither Phoenix or Icarus" in Callaghy and Ravenhill, eds., *Hemmed In*, 143–45.

[7] According to World Bank sources, Zambia is categorized as "severely indebted low income," whereas South Africa is categorized as "less-indebted middle-income." See *World Debt Tables, 1994–95* (Washington, DC: IBRD, 1994, 49–50). In 1992, Zambia's debt was estimated at $7.2 billion in 1991 and 6.3 billion in 1995 according to the Ministry of Finance (1995).

[8] *Economist*, 28 October 1995, 48.

[9] Authors' interview in Pretoria with P. J. Gloster, assistant general manager, Exchange Control, South African Reserve Bank, 23 November 1993.

[10] "No Adam Smith Fans Here," *Newsweek*, 7 February 1994, 48.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

neocolonial as the government abruptly broke with IMF program on 1 May 1987. As with the South African case, the move had both international and domestic audiences. Kaunda's move was aimed at IFIs but also gestured toward the growing opposition forces within Zambia. Four years later, the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) was elected on a platform built on neoliberal policies, which were described as "too aggressive for even the IMF's tastes."[11] In 1991, both the donors and the Government of the Republic of Zambia (GRZ) described their relations as a "partnership."[12] However, this partnership has splintered since 1991, as the MMD employed traditional strategies of political support during the elections of fall 1996. After concluding a three year IMF Rights Accumulation Program (RAP) in December 1995, Minister of Finance Ronald Penza returned from Paris and reveled in the political capital earned by having secured crucial debt reductions and renewed commitments of aid. The response of UNIP and MMD splinter groups was to label Penza a puppet of the donors and the IMF.[13]

The cases present different trajectories for the adoption of neoliberalism by the governments; but the variation suggests that hurried conclusions that neoliberal policies are adopted because of financial coercion must reckon with the variation at the domestic level, such as South African politicians' appeal to the neocolonial argument despite a relatively sanguine financial position vis à vis IFIs and the apparent powerlessness of IFIs to impose liberalization in Zambia through successive reforms during the 1980s. This variation in the response of both Zambia and South Africa to external financial pressure suggests the need to consider more closely the policy-based interaction between IFIs and domestic politics in order to explain how a government develops a commitment to neoliberalism. In tracing this development, we highlight the negotiation of policy ideas associated with IFIs as they are brought into domestic politics. This process of negotiation is captured in policy dialogue and fills the bulk of our case-study research.

Zambia: 1987–1996

This case study considers the period of economic and political reform in Zambia and brackets this episode with two events: first, the breakdown of talks between the Kaunda government and the IMF in May 1987; and second, the normalization of relations with multilateral lenders and enthusiastic renewal of talks with bilateral donors following the MMD's electoral victory in November 1991. In 1987, Kaunda had abruptly announced his rejection of IMF strategies of growth, framing it as a protest against neocolonial IFIs. Headlines in the UNIP-controlled *Times of Zambia* repeated the outcry against the imperial

[11] Authors' interview, Bank of Zambia, 6 December 1995, Lusaka, Zambia.

[12] Authors' interviews with representatives of the donor community and the government of the Republic of Zambia, November–December 1995, Lusaka, Zambia.

[13] See selections from *Times of Zambia* during January 1996.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

power of the IMF. However, the process of normalizing relations with IFIs and bilateral donors began shortly thereafter. This process of normalization was not complete until the electoral victory of the opposition MMD party atop a platform of neoliberal economic reform and Western-style democracy. It became clear in the 1991 elections that despite the cries of neocolonialism, the blame for economic problems had not been shifted entirely to external forces, "the foreign devils," but remained with the departing government. Indeed, neoliberal ideas served as an organizing principle of the MMD opposition against President Kaunda. Domestic political debate embraced the key issues of political and economic liberalization, and the political life of the UNIP and the MMD came to depend on the positions which they would take toward such issues.

Identifying Partners in the Dialogue

The policy dialogue over the appropriate economic policies for Zambia had two groups of participants: the Government of the Republic of Zambia (GRZ) and the donor community. The GRZ's principal representatives included successive presidents and their respective advisers, ministers of finance and governors of the Bank of Zambia. The donor community comprised multilateral organizations such as the World Bank and the IMF, and bilateral donors such as the United States, Great Britain, Germany, and the Scandinavian countries. Bilateral donors set their own aid agenda and negotiated this agenda with multilateral IFIs as well as directly with the government. The IMF took the lead from the donors' side, although bilaterals played an important role both financially and in terms of coordinating the dialogue. The IMF's programs had increasingly become the keystone for most other aid and lending agreements; and its seal of approval was an indicator of Zambia's commitment to spend donor money wisely, that is, in support of credible strategies of economic growth.

Policy Dialogues

The international level. In 1987, talks between the donors and the GRZ broke down in what the press called a "divorce" between the IMF and the government, as Kaunda went off the IMF Standby program, reinflating the currency from as high as 20 kwacha to the dollar to eight. A ceiling on debt servicing was announced at 10 percent of foreign exchange earnings; subsidies on maize meal were reintroduced, and the GRZ fell into arrears to the World Bank and the IMF, restricting any further lending.[14] The impetus for this move by Zambia was surely rooted in the severity of Zambia's debt burden, compounded by declining foreign exchange receipts from copper production, once a lucrative source of foreign income for the country. However, the political framing of the debate had implications for Kaunda's relations with both IFIs and his domestic

[14] "Zambia: Bargaining with the IMF," *Africa Confidential*, 28(23), 6–7.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

constituency. With reduced debt servicing and a bumper crop in the agricultural sector, the economy actually experienced positive growth in 1987–1988; however, this growth was short-lived.

Kaunda presented this as a unilateral move by Zambia in response to IFI pressure. Residents of the donor and diplomatic community stayed in Lusaka after the divorce, maintaining ties with the GRZ. But President Kaunda soon discovered that the fallout from breaking with the IMF was that no one else would lend.[15] Disbursements of multilateral credits were suspended, and bilateral aid dried up as allocated projects were brought to a close and no new funding emerged.

Bilateral donors quoted in the press gave a chilly response to the New Economic Recovery Plan (NERP), which Kaunda introduced in place of the IMF-backed program.[16] Some of the East European, Chinese, and Scandinavian aid programs continued but complained of the difficult working environment, given the cool political relations and the breakdown of complementary aid supported programs previously supported by other bilaterals and multilaterals.[17] The net effect of this divorce was that bilateral aid slowed to a trickle.[18]

Prior to the 1987 divorce, neocolonial rhetoric had surfaced in the newspapers. Sampling headlines in the *Times of Zambia* read, "Third World Problems Arise from Colonialism," "Western 'Experts' behind Third World Decline," and "IMF Conditions Impoverish Poor Nations."[19] Talks with the IMF, ending immediately prior to the divorce in spring 1987, were described by Western analysts: "We understand that recently ended talks in Lusaka, although centering on the revival of the [foreign exchange] auction system, were used by the government to complain about the political instability caused by the IMF programme."[20] President Kaunda's NERP was described as mimicking previous IMF agreements, while removing the IMF label and dropping key policy components such as exchange liberalization and the elimination of subsidies on maize meal. Some argued that the specter of neocolonialism had surfaced at the level of face-to-face negotiations during the 1980s between government-level representatives and foreign advisers, embedded in the negotiation proce-

[15] "Zambia: Kaunda Tightens His Grip," *Africa Confidential*, 23 September 1988, 3.

[16] Donors repeatedly cited problems with exchange rate and price liberalization. The Swedish development organization, SIDA, argued, "the Zambian government plan has flaws," citing price controls and exchange rates as especially problematic. (*Times of Zambia*, 21 October 1987). The British and the Americans explicitly linked their disapproval with the GRZ to their going off the IMF program. (*Times of Zambia*, 22 October 1987).

[17] Authors' interviews with members of the donor community, government officials, and former government officials in Lusaka, Zambia, November–December 1995.

[18] "Zambia: Kaunda Tightens His Grip" and "Back to the IMF," *Africa Confidential*, 23 September 1988, 2–3.

[19] Headlines taken from the *Times of Zambia*, 6 October 1986, 29 November 1986, and 5 January 1987.

[20] "Zambia: Borrowing," *Africa Confidential*, 15 April 1987, 1.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

dures themselves. The IMF was perceived as "dictating" domestic economic policy onto GRZ letterhead.[21]

During that spring, Kaunda repeatedly invoked the foreign threat to explain the strikes and political unrest that had erupted in Zambia's Copperbelt since December 1986. Meanwhile Western analysts observed: "...most Zambians are convinced that the strikes have more to do with economic decline than with outside destabilisation. The government too seems to recognize this implicitly, since it is now proceeding with fundamental economic reforms."[22] Such analysis was thrown into question briefly after Kaunda unilaterally departed from the agreed IMF strategies and once again invoked the foreign threat. However, with the benefit of hindsight, the jury was apparently still out, for in the next elections voters would pin blame for economic problems squarely on the government, not the IFIs.[23]

The NERP differed in content from IMF supported programs in policy areas that had acute political significance to both the Zambian government and the IFIs.[24] For example, subsidies and foreign exchange liberalization had become central debating points of economic reform programs throughout the 1980s. For the GRZ, the removal of subsidies had become closely associated with widespread popular unrest, although some in the civil service had begun to disagree with continued subsidies.[25] The IFIs increasingly saw subsidies as intolerable, viewing balance of payments support used toward maize subsidies as perpetuating a patrimonial government. For the GRZ, inflating the kwacha and decreasing debt service meant that foreign goods would be available, albeit to a privileged few. The IFIs saw that inflating the kwacha, combined with reducing debt service to less than 10 percent of foreign exchange, was a clear signal that the GRZ was not planning to repay debts.[26]

Shortly after Kaunda's announcement, the *Times of Zambia* reported: "Lender Smearing Zambia," "IMF Break Is Good Riddance," and "IMF Is Imperialist."[27] In a speech in Addis Ababa that September, Kaunda argued that "colonialists are responsible for Africa's growing debt."[28] While Kaunda went off the IMF program in 1987, at his first press conference on 2 November after

[21] Matthew Martin, *The Crumbling Facade of Debt* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), 53.

[22] "Zambia: Actions and Auctions," *Africa Confidential*, 22 April 1987, 3–5.

[23] For elaboration on the political reaction to economic crises, see Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle, *Popular Protests and Political Reform in Africa* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1991); Carol Lancaster, "Democracy in Africa," *Foreign Policy* 85 (Winter 1991–92); and Nicolas van de Walle, "Democratization and Economic Reform in Zambia," *MSU Working Papers on Political Reform in Africa*, 15 November 1994.

[24] "Zambia: Kaunda Still Going Strong," *Africa Confidential*, 18 November 1987, 7.

[25] There is evidence of some policy learning having gone on in the civil service during the successive attempts at economic reform during the 1980s. For a brief discussion, see van de Walle, "Democratization."

[26] Authors' interview, Bank of Zambia, 6 December 1995, Lusaka, Zambia.

[27] Headlines from the *Times of Zambia*, 6 May 1987, 21 May 1987, and 3 July 1987.

[28] *Times of Zambia*, 13 September 1987.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the 1987 elections, Kaunda stressed that Zambia remained a member of the Bretton Woods Institutions, although he made no mention of renegotiating a lending agreement with the IMF or the World Bank at that time.[29] By January 1988, Kaunda reported, "Zambia is now making proposals to the IMF and not the other way around."[30] From a distance, Western analysts described Zambia: "After being a model pupil for almost two years, the government broke with the IMF last May, amid much nationalist rhetoric by President Kenneth Kaunda. . . . Now Zambia is seeking to re-start its relationship with the IMF on terms of its own choosing."[31]

Informally, Kaunda had maintained contact with resident IFI representatives. Bilateral donor representatives as well as his own advisers urged rapprochement with the IMF.[32] Meanwhile the IMF's management of relations with governments became more flexible with respect to the agreements used as the bases of negotiations. A Policy Framework Paper (PFP), required for any severely indebted country wanting to use the Extended Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF), was signed in 1990. Negotiations over a RAP began in 1990–1991, which established performance "benchmarks" that would have to be met in order for the government to accumulate rights to draw on ESAF funds.[33] The broader targets established in the PFP and RAP agreements contrasted with the strict quarterly targets characteristic of the three standby agreements that Zambia signed in the 1980s. Despite looser conditionality and wider targets, Kaunda still strayed from the policy targets in an obvious effort to regain votes prior to the 1991 elections.

Under a new constitutional provision passed in 1990, which allowed multiparty elections, the MMD challenged UNIP in the November 1991 elections and won an overwhelming victory. The plan for economic reform was outlined in the RAP that the new MMD government negotiated and signed with the IMF. The economic reform program outlined in the RAP did not differ significantly from the agreements that the IMF negotiated with Kaunda in 1989–1991. What was decidedly different was the commitment of the government to pursue such reforms, signified by the government's swift implementation of key policies that the previous government had backed away from, specifically the removal of price subsidies on maize meal and petroleum imports and the nearly complete liberalization of foreign exchange.

[29] "Zambia: Tightening up for New Term," *Africa Confidential*, 18 November 1988, 6–7.

[30] *Times of Zambia*, 22 January 1988. Clearly, the story of normalizing relations between the Bretton Woods Institutions and the GRZ was much more complicated than making a proposal. It entailed building support in the donor community to assist in climbing out of the mounting arrears to the Bretton Woods Institutions, not to mention the technical capacity to do so.

[31] "Zambia: Bargaining with the IMF," *Africa Confidential*, 18 November 1987, 6.

[32] For example, Chigaga, Kaunda's political adviser and later minister of finance, was instrumental in urging Kaunda's rapprochement with the IMF. Authors' interview, former government official, 22 November 1995, Lusaka, Zambia.

[33] The RAP was successfully completed in December 1995, and an ESAF agreement signed, which cleared GRZ arrears to the IMF.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The government's political commitment to such economic and political liberalization was represented by the MMD campaign document, the MMD Manifesto. This document was outlined at the famous Cathedral Meeting in fall 1991, convened without the participation of any foreign advisers. Frederick Chiluba's government-in-waiting drafted the manifesto, written largely by Minister of Finance Emmanuel Kasonde, who consolidated input from the MMD government-in-waiting. The manifesto was presented to and approved by all cabinet members. Quoting briefly from the introduction: "MMD believes that economic prosperity for all can best be created by free men and women through free enterprise; by economic and social justice involving all the productive resources—human, material and financial, and by liberalizing industry, trade and commerce, with the Government only creating an enabling environment whereby economic growth must follow as it has done all the world's successful countries."[34] While the language employed in the document reflected a variety of sources, it was proclaimed as a document produced by the MMD, used as a campaign document, and taken to represent the MMD's plan for reform.

When Chiluba was elected, the document was distributed by the minister of finance to all members of the donor community as a statement of the new government's economic and political program, outlining sweeping economic and constitutional reforms. The donors took this agreement as evidence of the Chiluba government's commitment to political and economic liberalization, which added credibility to the MMD government's agreement to follow the IMF RAP. Bilateral donors in particular read the manifesto literally and perceived it as the foundation of a partnership for reform between the donors and the GRZ. With this partnership, almost $1 billion in aid flowed into Zambia annually over the period 1991–1996.

Chiluba appeared to share a common understanding with IFIs. He described in an open forum with donors and diplomats shortly after being elected, the "Zambian paradox as a country which is the most debt distressed in the world with little to show for it in terms of development."[35] The bilateral donors, in particular, perceived a man who at last seemed to empathize with their own frustrations with repeatedly failed reforms.

By 1993, however, warning signs of Chiluba's wavering commitment to liberalism came first with the 1993 removal of key pro-reform technocrats in the government, including Minister of Finance Kasonde, a well-liked bargaining partner of the donor community.[36] Such dismissals and reshuffling accompanied a "state of emergency" declared by the MMD government, citing conspiracies to overthrow the government.[37] The state of emergency signaled to the bilateral donors that political liberalization reforms were slowly losing ground to old-

[34] *MMD Manifesto*, published by the Campaign Committee, MMD, Lusaka, Zambia, 1995, 1.

[35] "Zambia: Government Presents Economic Plans to Donors," Inter Press News Service, 6 December 1991.

[36] Authors' interview, Emmanuel Kasonde, minister of finance (1991–1993), November 1995.

[37] "Zambia: The Model Democracy Loses its Shine," *Africa Confidential*, 14 May 1993, 1–3.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

style, one-party politics. The IMF and the World Bank, however, identified a weakened commitment to economic liberalism, but this was not perceived as significant enough to throw Zambia off track of the IMF program, as aid and lending largely continued, albeit with occasional delays and threats to withhold aid.

The domestic level. President Kaunda's break with the IMF in 1987 was viewed as a unilateral decision vis à vis the donor community, but also vis à vis the growing opposition forces within the country. This two-faced refusal to adjust the economy was symbolized by Kaunda's protest against external forces, represented by IMF conditionality, and against internal opposition emerging from labor unions. With an eye on fall elections, Kaunda made the announcement to abandon these neoliberal reforms on 1 May 1987, in the context of Zambia's Labor Day. 1 May had been traditionally a day of processions in the streets of Lusaka, leading up to speeches by political leaders. The president had shared the platform with labor leaders. But by 1987, Kaunda no longer shared the dias with union leaders, now viewed as a challenge to Kaunda's leadership. Thus, Kaunda's response to liberalization, as perceived by the domestic political opposition, was aimed at them as well.[38]

At the March 1990 Convention, Kaunda collected a wide range of political forces, many of whom were discontent, and asked for modest economic liberalization as well as constitutional reforms.[39] But rather than bring in the opposition under one umbrella, Kaunda's recalcitrant position in response to demands for economic and political liberalization had the effect of galvanizing the opposition. As described by one of the MMD founders: "As many as possible were supposed to be included and the conventions were supposed to focus on economic issues. But the [sentiment] increasingly developed that you can't address the economic without addressing the political. . . . We presented proposals for reform, and Kaunda rejected them. It was then that the opposition galvanized and really took form."[40] This polarization of political forces, centered on policies of economic and political liberalization, foreshadowed the constitutional reform in 1990, which allowed for multiparty elections in 1991 and the radical macroeconomic liberalization which took form during 1991–1993.

From the outset, Chiluba had campaigned for economic renewal and embraced the language and the imagery of Western style democracy and democratic reform.[41] His manifesto claimed, "Like the American President Truman says, 'The Buck Stops Here,'"[42] associating Zambia's liberalization with suc-

[38] Economic adviser to President Kaunda and to President Chiluba, 5 December 1995, Lusaka, Zambia.

[39] Authors' interview, founding member of the MMD, 6 December 1995, Lusaka, Zambia.

[40] Economic adviser to President Kaunda and to President Chiluba, 5 December 1995, Lusaka, Zambia.

[41] "Zambia: All Change but No Change," *Africa Confidential*, 3 July 1992, 5–6.

[42] *MMD Manifesto*, 1995.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

cessful capitalist economies in the West. From the view of one of the founders of the MMD, the party itself threw out a wide net, bringing together everyone from intellectuals to businessmen to drug-dealers. Thus expectations of liberalization were very simplistically sketched and the only solid basis of consensus was the vote against Kaunda and against shortages and queues characteristic of the closed Zambian economy.[43]

The frail foundation of Zambia's commitment to neoliberalism has revealed itself in the changing pattern of partisan politics within domestic politics. The "state of emergency" imposed in 1993 in response to an alleged coup plot against the MMD government signaled to the donors that the government's commitment to liberalism was wavering. But this state of emergency and the reshuffling of cabinet members which followed, signaled to pro-reform members of the MMD that the pendulum was swinging backward toward the politics of the one-party state, characteristic of the Kaunda regime. Removing Finance Minister Kasonde from his cabinet post in spring 1993 was viewed as a defensive reaction by Chiluba to Kasonde's "receiving too much applause in the Parliament," and therefore posing a political threat.[44] By 1995, almost all outspoken pro-reform members of the MMD had left or been removed from the government.

The domestic audience for debate over the substance of economic liberalization narrowed and then focused on a few key issues, such as maintaining food security, privatization, and civil service reform. Looking forward to the upcoming elections, members of the MMD called for the government's subsidy of maize supplies in light of continued drought. Drought in 1992–1993 and to a lesser extent in 1994 brought international support in the form of food relief, and the effect was to maintain the social safety net, but also to suggest to producers and distributors that the government was not entirely "removed" from the maize market. While maize prices had been liberalized, production and distribution had been slowly liberalized, and the last bit of control that the government gave up was over lines of distribution. Privatization of the Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines also became a central issue. However, the debate over which method of privatization involved only a small number of influential business and government participants, including representatives from bilaterals and IFIs. Rationalizing the civil service toward a meritocracy rather than a kleptocracy failed to stir much domestic debate, and reform was characterized by repeated delays in the implementation of reforms.

As the 1990s progressed, the domestic debate largely followed the political issues of winning elections. Rivalry between the MMD and the UNIP had increased over the early 1990s, as each party competed for political survival. The ruling MMD party treated its rivalry with the former ruling UNIP party as a

[43] Authors' interviews, former member of GRZ candidate and MP, 20 November 1995, Lusaka, Zambia.

[44] Authors' interview, Zambian adviser, 21 November 1995, Lusaka, Zambia.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

fight to the death, rather than a competition with the loyal opposition. This struggle took a strange turn in the 1996 campaign as political strategies turned from debates over economic liberalization, which had filled the rhetoric of the 1991 campaign, to debates over the authenticity of citizenship of the leading candidates. This battle ensued over the content of a constitutional amendment that required that the president be born in Zambia and be a Zambian citizen. Kaunda was accused of being born in Malawi, which would invalidate his claim to national citizenship and his candidacy. Shortly after this accusation, Chiluba was accused of being born in Tanzania, which cast a shadow on the validity of his citizenship. He nonetheless won the 1996 elections.

Proof of Zambia's Commitment to Neoliberalism

President Chiluba's tilt towards the IFI-style liberalization in 1991 was a reaction to international financial pressure from bilateral donors and IFIs; but it was also grounded in election politics. As Zambia neared elections, domestic politics had once again captured the process of liberalization. While significant progress has been made on difficult macroeconomic liberalization, including foreign exchange and trade liberalization, inflation remained high and there was foot-dragging on privatization of the vast parastatal sector. At this point we can conclude that there is no turning back on significant macroeconomic reforms of monetary and trade liberalization. But as one member of the donor community described, the partnership between the donors and the government is shaky. "Zambia is walking a tight rope between what it can get away with and what will anger the donors enough to leave.[45]

Political liberalization is now described with the catch-all term "governance," which is used to refer to a variety of issues from constitutional reform, drug-trafficking, and voters registration to widespread corruption. Governance has become the focus of policy dialogues between the government and the bilateral donors, in particular. These governance reforms have been progressively delinked from economic reforms, insofar as most formal benchmarks of the IMF and World Bank programs are defined through macroeconomics. Zambia continues to be on track with economic liberalism in the international view, while the topic of governance masks a wide-ranging domestic debate over the proper role of the state in the market and worrying implications for the sustainability of economic growth of the Zambian market.

South Africa: 1993–1996

This case study focuses on the transition period in South Africa. The period brackets the April 1994 election, marking the formal end of apartheid. This was a particularly fluid time in South Africa's sociopolitical history characterized

[45] Authors' interview, U.S. government official, Washington, DC, 26 October 1995.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

by open debate on the belief systems and institutions underlying South Africa's political economy.

Identifying Partners in the Dialogue

The dialogue over the appropriate economic policies for postapartheid South Africa had three major participants—the National party (NP, ex-government), the ANC, and the IFIs, specifically the World Bank and the IMF. Prior to the April 1994 election, each produced blueprints for South Africa's postapartheid economic development, and the debate underlying South Africa's economic policy choices was evident in the discourse those documents informed.

In March 1993, the Central Economic Advisory Service (CEAS), in consultation with the South African Reserve Bank and government departments, coordinated by the special economic adviser to the minister of finance, published the comprehensive study, *The Restructuring of the South African Economy: A Normative Model Approach* (NEM). Although the authors did not intend it to be an NP platform, the NP in fact acted as if it were.[46] Finance Minister Derek Keys at one time claimed that South Africa has only one model for economic growth on the table—NEM.[47] The ANC-aligned Macroeconomic Research Group frequently referred to the document as "government policy," which carried a negative connotation. This report was the first economic blueprint for postapartheid South Africa.

The ANC's economic policy platform, released just prior to the April 1994 election, was revealed in two documents: *Reconstruction and Development Programme* (RDP) and *Making Democracy Work: A Framework for Macroeconomic Policy in South Africa*.[48] The former document had gone through several drafts and was stated as official ANC policy. The latter was drafted by officials who were aligned with the ANC and while left-leaning, included many key ANC officials who would obtain high-level government positions in the first ANC government.[49] As one South African commentator stated: When the Macroeconomic Research Group releases its policy framework on Friday, Finance Minister Derek Keys will no longer be able to say that the NEM is the only model on the table. "The MERG framework, for all its faults, presents a serious challenge to the government's approach."[50]

[46] Authors' interview, T. Malan, economist, Central Economic Advisory Service, 18 March 1994. Malan pointed out that in fact the document was accompanied with a disclaimer stating that it was not an NP policy document.

[47] Greta Steyn, "MERG Poses Serious Challenge to Govt's Economic Model," *Business Day* (Johannesburg), 1 December 1993.

[48] We refer to the former as the RDP, and the latter as the MERG Report.

[49] The ANC had a more conservative and more liberal faction engaged in what one South Africa newspaper called, "A Battle Royal for the Economic Soul of the ANC." Greyta Steyn, "A Battle Royal for the Economic Soul of the ANC," *Business Day*, 17 November 1993.

[50] Steyn, "MERG Poses Serious Challenge to Govt's Economic Model."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Policy Dialogues

The international level. The three-way dialogue between the NP, the ANC, and the IFIs in transitional South Africa became a center of political conflict in terms of the disagreement over policy content and in terms of each party's association with IFI-style reform. Both the IMF and the World Bank were active in the debate over how to structure the postapartheid economy.[51] For example, the preface to an IMF study stated: "Within this context [democratic South Africa], a debate has begun on the appropriate economic policies to be pursued in a new South Africa to address the country's acute socioeconomic backlogs. This study aims at making a contribution to that debate."[52] A World Bank study related: "This paper is a synthesis of some informal studies on different aspects of the South African economy prepared by the World Bank. The studies have been discussed with a wide range of South Africans, and have benefited from South African ideas and inputs."[53]

However, the participation of the IFIs in transitional South Africa's policy debate was itself a political soccer ball. The ANC aligned Macroeconomic Research Group (MERG) coordinator, Vella Pillay, argued that if IMF conditions attached to the Contingence and Compensatory Financing Facility were implemented in South Africa, unemployment would rise to "catastrophic" levels.[54] One ANC official stated: "The World Bank and IMF are promoters of what can certainly be called a hegemonic ideology in economic policy in the current times. . . . What facilitates their task is their access to and ability to influence the flow of much needed capital, their expansive research capacity and their massive human resource base which often means that they can put a more powerful team of economists into a country than the country itself can mobilize."[55]

The RDP reflected a more subtle, but nonetheless evident aversion to IFI prescriptions and a concern that the "domestic policy formation process" not become dependent on IFIs: "Relationships with international financial institutions such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund must be conducted in such a way as to protect the integrity of domestic policy formation and promote the interests of the South African population and economy. Above all

[51] For a general review of the early debate in South Africa over the appropriate role of the IFIs in postapartheid-South Africa, see Leslie Lipschitz, "Review of the Debate on the Prospective Role of the IMF and World Bank" in Pauline Baker, Alex Boraine, Warren Krafchik, eds., *South Africa and the World Economy in the 1990s* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institute, 1993), 212–217.

[52] Desmond Lachman and Kenneth Bercuson, *Economic Policies for a New South Africa: Occasional Paper 91* (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, January 1992), vii.

[53] World Bank, *An Economic Perspective on South Africa* (Washington, DC: Southern Africa Department, The World Bank, May 1993), foreword.

[54] Kelvin Brown, "Govt. Should Spur Demand," *Business Day* (Johannesburg), 17 November 1994, 3.

[55] Ketso Gordhan, "Should South Africa Get Involved with the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank" in *What Has the IMF in Store for South Africa*, Proceedings of a Symposium on 27th and 28th July 1981 at the Soweto College of Education, 8.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

we must pursue policies that enhance national self-sufficiency and enable us to reduce dependence on international financial institutions."[56]

Whereas the ANC rejected IFI policy prescriptions, the NP built its platform on those same prescriptions. Alan Hirsch, who became a top trade official in the first ANC government, acknowledged that discussions with the World Bank had strongly influenced the writing of the NEM.[57] For example, the NEM stated: "This model is compatible, not only with a postapartheid dispensation, but also with virtually all macro-economic stabilization and structural adjustment programmes in developing countries during the 1980s."[58]

The nature of the World Bank's influence was, however, debated. Because of the World Bank's support for infrastructural development, it was asserted by some in the ANC camp that it therefore supported a demand-led growth strategy. However, the World Bank had argued for a reduced role for the state. For instance, the World Bank opposed reinvestment in South Africa's parastatals because: "[T]he productivity of capital (that is, the output-to-capital ratio) is higher in the private sector than in parastatals."[59] Higher investment in sectors with lower productivity would depress the level and the rate of growth in the gross domestic product (GDP). The NEM followed lock step with this conclusion.[60]

The NEM and the IFIs' strong commitment to budgetary restraint was tied to their commitment to maintain low levels of inflation. Both the IMF and the World Bank cautioned against high inflation. For the IMF, commitment to low inflation was a working assumption: ". . . it is assumed that monetary policy will continue to be used to bring inflation under control. . . ."[61] The World Bank stated: "Any significant increase in inflation, however, would be destabilizing and foster greater social discontent."[62] The NEM had a strong anti-inflation stance[63] and directly linked the rate of inflation to domestic savings.[64] In order to keep inflation down, both the NEM and the IFIs argued for wage con-

[56] ANC, "Reconstruction and Development Programme," *Draft: for Discussion Purposes Only, For ANC Regions and Departments Only*, 17 February 1994, 74.

[57] Alan Hirsch, *Trading Up: Towards a Trade Policy for Industrial Growth in South Africa, Industrial Strategy Project Draft Final Report* (Cape Town: Development Policy Research Unit, University of Cape Town, August 1993), 54–55.

[58] Central Economic Advisory Service, *The Restructuring of the South African Economy: A Normative Model Approach* (NEM) (Pretoria, March 1993), 4. In stark contrast, the RDP states, that "The pressure of the world economy and the operations of international organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank and GATT, affect our neighbors and South Africa in differing ways."

[59] World Bank, "An Economic Perspective," 10.

[60] NEM, 29.

[61] Lachman and Bercuson, "Economic Policies," 14.

[62] World Bank, "An Economic Perspective," 6.

[63] NEM, 6.

[64] Ibid., 123.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

straint.[65] As the MERG Report stated, the conclusions of the IMF were virtually identical to those outlined in the NEM, establishing a consensus between the National party and the IFIs on the content of economic policy in postapartheid South Africa.[66]

The domestic level. A domestic dialogue concerning IFI policy prescriptions for postapartheid South Africa paralleled the dialogue at the international level. This domestic dialogue pitted the ANC and aligned groups against the NP and its supporters during the 1993–1994 election campaigns. The general economic policies revealed by each participant in the domestic debate had distinct support bases. The ANC's was labor, represented by the powerful Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU); and the ex-government's was big business, represented in particular by the South African Chamber of Business (SACOB). However, the rhetoric of the election period belies subtle shifts in the ANC's platform, which in places was reminiscent of its 1955 socialist manifesto, *The Freedom Charter*. It also foreshadowed the new politics of postapartheid South Africa, where business appeared to replace labor as the ANC's implicit partner. The ANC empathized with the rest of Africa, and in fact many of its leaders had lived in neighboring countries that had experienced stringent structural adjustment programs. Both the RDP and the MERG Report took explicit stands against the IFI's policies. The MERG Report ran various scenarios through its model to determine the best fiscal policy and concluded that the worst-case scenario would be succumbing to IMF ideology.[67] "[T]he MERG analysis of the causes of this failure, and its policies to address the crisis differ radically from those promoted by the government and the Washington based international financial agencies. The differences start at the theoretical level. The MERG view is that government, IMF, and IBRD [International Bank for Reconstruction and Development] conclusions are analytically incoherent, colored by an ideological anti-worker bias, and unsupported by the available empirical evidence."[68]

This quote is significant in terms of what it says and how it says it. IFI policies were deemed pragmatically inappropriate for postapartheid South Africa. But the tone of the ANC's rejection was also significant. The National party not only accepted IFI policy prescriptions, but adopted them as its own. In the run-up to the April 1994 election, the ANC attempted to discredit its opponents by associating them with IFI policies, which were painted as a foreign idea.

The ANC's *Freedom Charter* stood as the anti-apartheid struggle's manifesto for close to four decades. Marina Ottaway described the Charter thus: "The Freedom Charter, the 1955 manifesto to which all ANC members sub-

[65] Sven Lunsche, "Paycut Will Boost Jobs Claims IMF," *Sunday Times/Business Times* (Johannesburg), 27 March 1994; World Bank, "Economic Perspective," 13.

[66] MERG Report, 152–153.

[67] Ibid., 40.

[68] Ibid., 152.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

scribed, carried the strong imprint of ideas prevalent in the early period of Africa's anticolonial struggle, later formalized in some countries as doctrines of African socialism—an ideal of justice, equality, and economic development brought about through the intervention of a benevolent state in the best interest of the entire population."[69] As Jeffrey Herbst argued, ". . . the extremely vague Freedom Charter adopted in 1955—which seemed to demand the nationalization of the mines, banks, and monopolies—was still considered the last word on the ANC's economic doctrine when it was legalized in 1990."[70] Although the ANC had moved away from the strict socialist dogma of the *Freedom Charter*, its economic ideology remained anathema to the economic liberalism of the IFIs. The divide between ANC and NP policy is revealed by their conflicting positions over three issue areas central to IFI-encouraged economic strategies: privatization, budget deficits, and inflation.

The National Party had promoted privatization of South Africa's huge parastatals even prior to the elections. However, in anticipation of relinquishing the reigns of state power to the ANC, privatization became a priority. The notion that the large parastatals should be privatized was argued to be consistent with the policy of "unbundling," which was being used to break up the overcentralized conglomerates that dominated the South African economy. However, the counter-argument was that parastatals could be used for black empowerment. This line of argument was present in earlier drafts of the MERG Report written in part by Tito Mboweni (labour minister in the new government), who cautioned against rapid antitrust moves by the government and who did not argue for forced unbundling.[71] The RDP even stated that: "The democratic government will reverse privatisation programmes that are contrary to the public interest."[72]

The NP and ANC blueprints for the postapartheid economy had distinct implications for South Africa's budget. The NEM was based on supply-side logic, which naturally found succor in IFI's prescriptions. The World Bank, for instance, was described in the South African press as attempting to "nudge" the ANC to a recognition of the importance of private investment.[73] In contrast, the RDP and MERG Report were essentially Keynesian models of economic management. The MERG Report stated: "The starting point for the calculations is the principle that in order to overcome a major failure of policy in the

[69] Marina Ottaway, *South Africa: The Struggle for a New Order* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1993), 48.

[70] Jeffrey Herbst, "South Africa: Economic Crisis and Distributional Imperative" in Stephen John Stedman, ed., *South Africa: The Political Economy of Transformation* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994), 33.

[71] "Policy Plan Omits Forced Unbundling: Merg Proposes Antitrust Caution," *Business Day* (Johannesburg), 6 December 1993.

[72] RDP, 46.

[73] Simon Barber, "World Bank Takes a Delicate Approach to South Africa," *Business Day* (Johannesburg), 7 December 1993.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

recent past, the relative size of public sector investment needs to be increased."[74] The long list of government-funded projects found in both the RDP and the MERG Report reflected their demand-led growth philosophy. South Africa's fifteen years of economic decline was blamed on too little government spending.[75] The MERG program fit nicely into the IMF "Scenario 2: Higher Fiscal Deficit," which predicted lower economic growth and employment growth.[76]

During the election period, there was a clear delineation of support for the respective NP and ANC plans. One of the ANC's most important constituencies was labor which directly attacked IMF policy. The Council of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) General Secretary Sam Shilowa stated, "SA's [South Africa's] militant and organized workers will not accept a formula for economic growth based on their exploitation."[77] He furthermore stressed that the "much-vaunted Asian tiger scenario would lead to widespread social and industrial conflict,"[78] an implicit slap at the IFIs. It was reported, furthermore, that COSATU reacted "swiftly and angrily" to bankers' criticism of the RDP.[79] Shilowa opposed an IMF loan for $850 million, because the IMF was on record as favoring wage constraints in South Africa.[80] Tony Ruiters, COSATU national economics task force member, also argued against "IMF adjustment plans" stating that there was "scope for government intervention in business beyond an enabling role," another quiet jab at the IMF's economic liberalism.[81] In February 1994, Nelson Mandela argued that job creation was the ANC's highest priority. He also argued: "We are convinced, left to its own devices, the South African business community will not rise to the challenges that face us."[82] In the same month he told workers at a National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) conference that the ANC-led government would wrest mineral rights from mining houses and place them in the hands of the state.[83]

South African business, on the other hand, criticized the RDP and MERG plans. For instance, a book edited by Ben Vosloo, managing director of the Small Business Development Corporation, painted the ANC policy as "a grim picture of the growth of the public sector in SA to the detriment of the private

[74] MERG Report, 25.

[75] The MERG Report, 71, for instance, argues that the government in the past has focused much too much on inflation.

[76] Lachman and Bercuson, "Economic Policies," 16.

[77] Eric Jankowitz, "Cheap Labour is no Panacea Says Shilowa," *Business Day* (Johannesburg), 2 December 1993.

[78] Ibid. The Asian Tiger scenario has in the mainstream been associated with the neoliberalism of the IFIs and thus acts as a code-word for IFI policy.

[79] Claire Gebhardt, "Bankers under the Whip," *The Star* (Johannesburg), 4 February 1994.

[80] "COSATU Bites the IMF Hand," *Business Times* (Johannesburg), 31 October 1993.

[81] Patti Waldmeis, "A New Nation Takes Shape," *Business Day* (Johannesburg), 22 November 1993.

[82] "State Intervention to Help Business," *Business Day* (Johannesburg), 15 February 1994.

[83] Sven Lunsche, "An Underground Struggle," *The Star* (Johannesburg), 12 February 1994.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sector," and pointed to the Asian newly industrialized countries as a model for future South African policy.[84]

Proof of South Africa's Commitment to Neoliberalism

Although in the months leading up to the April 1994 election IFI policies were rejected by the ANC, those policies were later embraced. This turnabout points to three factors. First, the neocolonial rhetoric was used to paint the NP's economic policy as foreign and exploitative, and was targeted more at the NP than at the actual policy. After the election, the rhetoric was no longer necessary. Second, Mandela and the top echelon of the ANC adopted IFI policy prescriptions and thereby rejected to some extent their demand-driven model. Third, in transitional South Africa, new domestic alignments had evolved beneath the veneer of ANC-labor solidarity. Furthermore, the shift in the domestic alignment was at once reinforced by and a response to the importance of foreign capital. Ironically, the demand-driven model proposed by both the RDP and the MERG Report accentuated the importance of foreign capital. The World Bank argued that only by reviving private investment will postapartheid South Africa be able to meet the demands of the RDP. It stated that even if the new administration did everything right, it would need to match the investment level of the 1970s or it would lose 2 percent growth a year.[85]

Although the RDP reflected the issues, such as housing, training, services, and jobs that are important to the ANC's base constituency, the ANC's macroeconomic policies after the April 1994 elections were characterized as both moderate and business friendly. Characterizations of the ANC leadership in the popular press reflect South Africa's acceptance of neoliberal economic policies. Jay Naidoo, the ex-head of COSATU and the new government's minister in charge of implementing the RDP, was once described as, "looking like Satan, sounding like Marx, and acting like Mephistopheles." As minister he was described as "a figure of flawless economic orthodoxy."[86] Alec Erwin, the new government's deputy minister of finance, an ex-unionist, was labeled a convert to economic orthodoxy.[87] In Mandela's first State of the Union address in front of parliament, he was as intent on "soothing" the fears of foreign investors and domestic business, as in pleasing his traditional supporters.[88] In the opening session of the World Economic Forum in Cape Town on 9 June 1994, Mandela

[84] Kevin Davie, "Economic Freedom Paves Way to Success," *Sunday Times, Business Times* (Johannesburg), 6 March 1994.

[85] Simon Barber, "World Bank Takes a Delicate Approach to SA," *Business Day*, 7 December 1993.

[86] "Profile: The Economic Team," *Financial Times* (London), 18 July 1994.

[87] Ibid. Alec Erwin, who represented COSATU on the National Economic Forum (NEF), and became deputy finance minister in the new government, had earlier stated: "We do not accept a simple macro-economic formula, such as the IMF's labour elasticity model, in assessing job growth in SA." *Sunday Times/Business Times*, 27 March 1994, 3.

[88] Associated Press, 24 May 1994.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

stressed that his government would adhere to Western economic policies rather than the socialist policies the ANC advocated as a banned liberation movement.[89]

The ANC's apparent deference to big business did not go unnoticed among its traditional constituency. In late June 1994, the new government announced its first budget, which was described by Trevor Manuel, minister of trade and industry in the new government (once a labor leader) as an "investors' budget."[90] One ANC MP, and a member of the ANC executive committee responded: "It's going to be hard to sell this budget in the townships."[91]

The ANC had also backed away from its strong position against privatization. Jay Naidoo, minister without portfolio responsible for the 37.5 billion rand ($10.5 billion) five-year RDP, said that "under-utilized properties" might be sold.[92] The *Economist* reported: "Though too coy yet to use the word 'privatisation' openly, the government is putting the finishing touches to a plan that amounts to nothing less: the sale of stakes in state-owned corporations that together are worth at least 64 billion rand ($18 billion)."[93]

The ANC's acceptance of neoliberalism was an instrument in a gradual political alignment that would become evident in the postapartheid South Africa. A month before the national election *The Star* stated: "The underlying message from the ANC delegation was that they were looking for a partnership with business."[94] However, in its nascent stage this partnership was more pragmatic than political. First, business had long recognized the relationship between stability and economic growth, while the ANC in the past benefited from that instability. Second, and barely distinguishable from the first, both business and the ANC wanted the democratization process to go forward.

The relationship between business and the ANC is captured in the denouement to the first elections. In a final and successful attempt to get the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) to participate in the first election, an Anglo-American Lear jet shuttled negotiators among South African cities. The eleventh hour accord between the ANC and the IFP that facilitated the latter's participation in the 1994 election was crucial, not only because it meant essentially full participation in the first elections but because, as *The Star* reported, "The key to foreign investment is whether the settlement with Inkatha ends violence."[95]

The culmination of the government's move to neoliberal orthodoxy was signaled by the apparent demise of the RDP on 28 March 1996 and its replacement with a new economic blueprint, the *GEAR* (Growth, Employment, and Redistribution) in June 1996. The RDP was not dismantled, but the RDP portfolio

[89] Ibid., 9 June 1994.
[90] Reuters, 23 June 1994.
[91] Ibid.
[92] Ibid., 27 August 1995.
[93] *Economist*, 6 May 1995, 67.
[94] Claire Gebhardt, "ANC Allays Fears," *The Star*, 31 March 1994.
[95] Neil Behrmann, "Inkatha Accord Cheers Investors," *The Star*, 21 April 1994.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

was closed, and the RDP fund reallocated to the Department of Finance and the office of Deputy President Thabo Mbeki. There is, of course, more than one interpretation of this move.[96] Nonetheless, Mandela's spring 1996 cabinet reshuffle scrapping Jay Naidoo's Reconstruction and Development Portfolio while raising Mbeki to the position of South Africa's "growth czar," symbolized the ANC's shift in policy emphasis from development to growth.[97] Mbeki was reported to have been "deeply skeptical at the outset about the RDP; he knew the government's delivery promises would lead it up a dead-end."[98] Further evidence of the ANC's shift was Pallo Jordan's replacement as minister of posts, telecommunications, and broadcasting by Jay Naidoo. Jordan was possibly the most powerful proponent of the ANC's Keynesian wing and reportedly clashed often with Mbeki.

The *GEAR* was the ANC's first comprehensive economic plan since its election in 1994. Nico Czypionka, chief economist at Standard Bank, stated that the "debate appeared to have shifted in favor of a free market approach despite accusations from labor and some in the ANC of such an approach as "Thatcherite."[99]

The *GEAR* was announced despite strong labor opposition. This move could threaten the ANC's most important traditional constituency, labor. With 3.5 million members or approximately 26 percent of the economically active population, organized labor in South Africa is a political force.[100] The COSATU 1996 Mission Statement argued that unemployment was still too high due to bad or nonexistent policies from the ministers of trade and industry and finance. COSATU organized a general strike for 16 January, protesting the "piecemeal privatization" supported by the government. And, in June 1996, COSATU repeatedly lobbied against tight monetary policy calling for lower interest rates.

While South Africa labor expert Duncan Innes contended that COSATU's influence would grow because its leaders would capture a large number of parliamentary seats and figure prominently in an ANC government,[101] in fact the labor elite were coopted. The ANC strengthened its ties with business. Furthermore, not only had labor's most effective leaders joined the government, but

[96] Willie Esterhuyse of the University of Stellenbosch argued, for instance, that it was just a necessary administrative move for greater efficiency. "What Happened to the Reconstruction and Development Programme," 28 June 1996, mimeo.

[97] The ANC had always argued for development with growth. The connotation, however, was that development was the focus and would be promoted through state-initiated demand-led growth.

[98] *Issues: A View of South African Political Trends* (Johannesburg: Communications Services, June 1996), 5. This policy shift was evident as early as mid-1995, when Mbeki and others had concluded that economic growth was more important than growth and redistribution. See Esterhuyse, "What Happened," 2.

[99] Reuters, 11 June 1996.

[100] Patti Waldmeir, "Trade Unions Are Changing," *Financial Times* (London).

[101] Jovial Rantao, "COSATU's Influence to Grow- Expert," *The Star*, 3 February 1994.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the ANC had a large base constituency outside of labor which it could in theory draw on for support.

Conclusion

Our main argument has been that Zambia and South Africa adopted neoliberal policies for reasons that are explained insufficiently by the financial coercion (neocolonialism) of IFIs or foreign investors, and that such an explanation must be supplemented by a study of the politics of emerging domestic support for neoliberal policies. To this end, we have analyzed policy dialogues over neoliberal economic reforms between IFIs and the government and within domestic fora of electoral politics, in terms of both the content of economic reforms and the political framing of those reforms.

Adopting neoliberal policy prescriptions for structural adjustment has been linked to severe economic distress in both Zambia and South Africa.[102] In both cases, political parties attacked the neoliberal policies only to adopt them after taking power. During the policy dialogues, these policies had been first attacked using the rhetoric of neocolonialism, only to be later embraced using the rhetoric of neoliberalism.

In Zambia, President Kaunda couched his critique of neoliberalism in neocolonial rhetoric when be broke with the IFIs in 1987. As financial distress increased, Kaunda began to normalize relations with IFIs and tone down the neocolonial rhetoric, but again went off the IMF program in 1991, blaming the IMF once more. Thereafter, any appeal to neocolonialism was presumably buried with the sound electoral defeat of the Kaunda government by a president who based his campaign on neoliberal-based economic renewal. While there is no turning back from macroeconomic reforms, the process of discovering free markets and democracy in Zambia has been difficult; and the specter of neocolonialism appears to have been buried in a shallow grave as the UNIP and splinter groups from the MMD occasionally use the "colonial" argument to discredit their opposition's economic policies.[103] However, as the case study illustrates, in moving closer to the next elections, the firm ownership of neoliberal ideas has not developed within the MMD and remains largely as a subject of dialogue between government and IFI representatives.

In South Africa, one might speculate that the Mandela government's shift from rejecting neoliberalism as IFI neocolonialism to embracing its basic policy

[102] Thomas Callaghy, "Lost Between State and Market: The Politics of Economic Adjustment in Ghana, Zambia, and Nigeria" in Joan Nelson, ed., *Economic Policy and Policy Choice* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990).

[103] In wake of the recent successful Consultative Group Meeting and conclusion of the RAP with the IMF, the incumbent minister of finance has been trying to gather political capital out of the successful agreement, unleashing large amounts of aid and new loans from the IMF. However, emerging opposition parties have also been trying to build political capital by portraying the current government as puppets of the donors. *Times of Zambia*, January, 1996; *The Weekly Post*, January 1996.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ideas is explained by his acute awareness of the importance of foreign investment and the importance of the IFIs "good housekeeping seal of approval" in luring foreign investment. However, South Africa's economic liberalization threatens the ANC's alliance with labor and therefore the party's commitment to neoliberalism.

Nonetheless, the ANC has been able to use its ownership of neoliberalism to strengthen its relationship with business. This process was facilitated, not dictated, by South Africa's ties to the IFIs. The World Bank's approach to transitional South Africa was described: "It does not want to be seen calling the shots, and has, in any event, concluded from hard experience that calling the shots seldom delivers the desired results. Its clients must be made to feel they are in charge and doing, of their volition, what is best for them."[104]

In South Africa, ownership of the new ideas (economic liberalism) is more strongly anchored by the government's relationship with powerful business interests. But, we would expect the rhetoric of neocolonialism, now often called globalization, to reappear during elections cycles where an important constituency, such as labor in South Africa, can press its electoral advantage. IFIs may be attacked again in the future, but future attacks should be seen as part of the political cycle on the domestic level rather than as immediate indications of true ideological shifts.

[104] Simon Barber, "World Bank Takes a Delicate Approach to SA," *Business Day*, 7 December 1993.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Book Reviews

Molding Japanese Minds: The State in Everyday Life *by Sheldon Garon. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1998. 313 pp. Paper, $15.95.*

Historians of modern Japan have been paying increasing attention to the theme of civil society. This theme, made popular by social scientists writing about Eastern European societies under communist regimes, has been utilized by specialists in other areas of the world in order to determine the degree to which democratic forces have emerged to shape people's lives.

The concept of civil society, of course, is rooted in the Western European and North American experience. Most students of Western civil society go back to G. W. F. Hegel and to Alexis de Tocqueville to locate the origins of theoretical formulations concerning the relationship between the state, the individual, and the public space in between. Whether there has been comparable public space or civil society in East Asia has been a hotly contested issue among historians of China, Korea, Japan, and other countries.

In this book, Sheldon Garon, the Princeton historian, comes close to providing a definitive (if indeterminate) answer to that question as far as modern Japan is concerned. He traces how the state and society interacted in pre-war and postwar Japan through an examination of three issues: welfare, sexuality and gender relations, and religious movements. All three lend themselves to excellent analysis, because such questions as relief to the sick and the indigent, control of prostitution, and incorporation of religious sects into social order are among the most fundamental facing any society.

Japanese society, Garon shows, developed various mechanisms to cope with these problems, including the establishment of private associations created for specific ends. Organizations devoted to women's wellbeing, for instance, sprang up after the turn of the twentieth century and actively campaigned against brothels and for the eradication of sexually transmitted diseases. These organizations and the men and women who led their movements, however, acted not so much against the state as, in most instances, in cooperation with it. The state, Garon argues, was always interested in "social management" (the term frequently used in the book) in order to preserve order and was increasingly eager to coopt middle-class Japanese in solving various social issues. The latter were usually willing to cooperate with governmental officials to have state endorsement of their programs. (One notable exception was the success of women's organizations during the 1950s to have the Diet enact an antiprostitution law despite governmental opposition.) There was thus, the author maintains, a greater measure of state-society collaboration in Japan than in most Western countries. And such collaboration has persisted to this day.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The overall argument of the book is to confirm the widely held view that Japanese society, unlike Western democratic societies, is far more extensively controlled by the state. The author's thesis that middle-class Japanese have tended to turn to the state for guidance and support, that they have been willing accomplices of the government, would not surprise anyone familiar with the literature. Nevertheless, the book is valuable because it shows the steady growth of civic organizations in Japan that have played key roles as "managing intermediaries" between the state and the people. While the persistence of such organizations leads the author to stress that in Japan there has been a marriage of "democratization and social management" (p. 236), these organizations may yet develop with their own momentum. The passage of an NPO (nonprofit organizations) law in 1998 was evidence that nongovernmental organizations had come of age. Although many of them may still fall within the category of managing intermediaries, recent evidence suggests that an increasing number are oriented more toward democratization than toward social management. Should the trend continue, there may indeed develop a sharp discontinuity with the past. In any event, Garon's book with its stress on continuities between pre-war and postwar Japan in terms of a "close association between the moral reformers and the state" (p. 312) provides a good point of reference to measure changes in contemporary Japan.

AKIRA IRIYE
Harvard University

The Pity of War *by Niall Ferguson. New York, Basic Books, 1999. 520 pp. $30.00.*

Niall Ferguson's set of essays on the origins, course, and aftermath of World War I has received a great deal of publicity, in large part because of its important claims. Unfortunately, some of these are familiar, others are not well supported by evidence, and still others are underanalyzed. Readers who persevere, however, will be rewarded by a wealth of interesting reports and analyses of economic data.

Overclaiming and insufficient evidence come up at many points. Ferguson denies that World War I was inevitable but never seriously considers exactly what this means. His related claim that militarism did not dominate European decision making is more interesting and is supported by evidence others have slighted, but his treatment is not balanced and he pays little attention to the excellent analysis in David Herrmann's *The Arming of Europe and the Making of the First World War* and David Stevenson's *Armaments and the Coming War: Europe 1904–1914*. His argument that Germany sought war in 1914 largely out of fear and a sense of weakness is not new and does not preclude the possibility that Germany also sought European dominance. Ferguson denies the latter claim and here is on more controversial ground. The dispute on German aims and intentions, although beyond definitive settlement, is central to any general analysis of pre-war diplomacy, especially one that focuses on Britain's role. Ferguson's discussion is framed by the interesting if familiar argument that Britain appeased the powers that most menaced her, France and, especially, Russia. But on whether Germany would have gained a position from which it could readily menace British vital interests had the UK remained nonaligned, he adds little to what others have said either analytically or in terms of close study of the historical record.

Turning to the conduct of the war itself, there is similarly less than meets the eye to two of Ferguson's major claims. He argues that Germany came to terms in 1918 not because it

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

was suffering more casualties than it inflicted on the enemy, but because German soldiers started surrendering in large numbers. Since he explains this fact by the damage to German morale inflicted by defeats on the battlefield, he merely reasserts the conventional view without deeply exploring the reasons why German resolve collapsed at all levels. More startling is his claim that to a significant extent soldiers fought because they enjoyed the comradeship, excitement, and even pleasure in killing. The problem here is one that parallels his treatment of militarism: he moves from finding that his characterization fits at least a few people to asking the reader to believe that the attitudes were widespread.

Even weaker is the counterfactual claim that has earned *The Pity of War* much of its publicity: if World War I had not been fought, or if Britain had not joined in the fray, many of the ills of the twentieth century could have been avoided. If Germany had won the war, Ferguson claims, "the victorious Germans might have created a version of the European Union, eight decades ahead of schedule" (p. 458; also see pp. 172, 460). This is a benign reading of German aims and neglects the fact that today's Germany is very different from the earlier regime. Furthermore, Ferguson argues, without a prolonged war ending in German defeat, the world would have been spared both Lenin and Hitler. But using counterfactuals in this way is like playing tennis without a net—there are so few constraints that almost any claim has as much or as little plausibility as any other.

The most dramatic arguments in the book are clever in the British sense, with more dazzle than depth. Fortunately, other parts of the book are clever in the American sense. Drawing on his strength in economic history, Ferguson shows how changes in the bond market and differences between interest rates of bonds of various countries can be used to shed light on contemporary expectations about the major powers' prospects. With the aid of comparisons with the Allies' experience, he also rebuts the view that Germany was less efficient than its adversaries in utilizing its economic resources during the war. Examining basic economic statistics indicates that the Entente powers had such great material advantage that only German efficiency can explain why the Central Powers were not defeated much sooner. Ferguson's analysis of German postwar economic policies is also thorough and insightful. Although his conclusion that Germany could have paid reparations is not new, his picture is full of important details and his analysis of the effect of the inflationary policy and the possible alternatives is well-balanced and thoughtful. Furthermore, his central critique of Britain's pre-war policy—that it was foolish to seek great influence over European politics without a large army—is valid, underappreciated, and relevant to today's world.

Although Ferguson's most striking claims are not substantiated, the chapters dealing with the less glamorous topics of political economy are excellent. Readers who are not distracted by the verbal fireworks and who believe that economic strength, organization, and policies are crucial to world politics can learn much from this book.

ROBERT JERVIS
Columbia University

Destroying the Village: Eisenhower and Thermonuclear War *by Campbell Craig. New York, Columbia University Press, 1998. 216 pp. Cloth, $54.40; paper, $22.50.*

There was a method to his madness. Campbell Craig offers a fascinating and persuasive analysis of Dwight D. Eisenhower's seemingly senseless nuclear policy. In opting for mas-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sive retaliation and cutting back on conventional forces, the president appeared to be risking a nuclear holocaust to counter any aggression by the Soviet Union in the 1950s. Advocates of flexible response, including even Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, argued for greater reliance on the Army and the Navy as well as the option of waging a limited nuclear war. Eisenhower disagreed, arguing that a limited war between nations possessing unlimited weapons was suicidal; it was bound to escalate into all-out nuclear war, since neither side would surrender while it still had the power to destroy its opponent.

Eisenhower's solution to this dilemma, Craig argues, was a strategy of nuclear evasion. Realizing the dire consequences of nuclear war, Ike insisted on an all-or-nothing policy, combined with a determination to avoid direct confrontations with the Soviet Union. Publicly, he continued affirming a policy of nuclear deterrence, but privately he sought to defuse potentially dangerous issues with the Soviet Union and to be as evasive as possible in his diplomacy. The best example Craig offers is the second Berlin crisis, where the president skillfully avoided giving in to Nikita Khrushchev's ultimatums by pursuing a policy of postponement and evasion.

Craig's book has many virtues. He succeeds in showing that Eisenhower understood the perils of the thermonuclear age and that the avoidance of World War III in the 1950s was due to design, not accident. He also illuminates the complex relationship between Eisenhower and Dulles. Eisenhower revisionists have tended to reverse the old stereotype of Dulles determining policy under a passive president to suggest that the secretary of state was merely an errand boy. Craig shows how Dulles stood up to Eisenhower and compelled the president to moderate his position in order to achieve consensus within his administration. It was only after Dulles's death in 1959 that Eisenhower was free to carry out his strategy of nuclear evasion unchecked.

Strong as the chapters on Eisenhower are, however, the final section on the Kennedy administration is less convincing. Craig shows John F. Kennedy and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara being forced to accept the strategy of evasion over Berlin in 1961 and then, after a brief attempt at flexible response, returning to it after the Cuban missile crisis. Craig's argument fails to account for the great risk of nuclear war that Kennedy's hawkish stand on the Cuban missiles entailed, even in light of the new evidence of his willingness to trade away American missiles in Turkey. The lack of conventional forces compelled Kennedy to evade a confrontation over Berlin; in Cuba a year later, superior American nuclear power emboldened him to force a showdown he knew he could win. Instead of pursuing a strategy of evasion, Kennedy went to the brink of nuclear war, securing a Soviet withdrawal but also intensifying the nuclear arms race for the next decade.

ROBERT A. DIVINE
University of Texas at Austin

The Roosevelt Presence: The Life and Legacy of FDR *by Patrick J. Maney. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1998. 269 pp. Paper, $17.95.*

Patrick J. Maney's one-volume biography is a useful addition to the extensive Roosevelt scholarly corpus. Although Maney breaks no new ground (his research relies primarily on secondary sources), he provides a literate synopsis (including an excellent bibliographical essay) of the thirty-second president's life, particularly his presidential years. Some will take

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

issue, as I do, with Maney's conclusion that although FDR's leadership style was uniquely suited for the times, it likely would have failed in a different context. Others will appreciate the lack of hagiolatry that frequently infuses writing about Roosevelt. On balance, however, Maney hews to the intellectual center when discussing the major controversies of FDR's life and presidency.

Maney argues that FDR achieved his reputation as one of the three "greatest" American presidents because he possessed the requisite leadership skills and temperament for the times in which he served. "[A]las," Maney concludes, "Franklin Roosevelt was not a man for all seasons" (p. 203). This is a curious observation, and Maney does not make a persuasive argument in its favor. The reputations of all our "great" presidents are in part derived from the context in which they served; what would Lincoln's legacy be without the Civil War? Washington's without the Founding? But to conclude from this that their leadership would have been less effective in another time or context seems a speculative and ultimately fruitless argument. Roosevelt's greatness derives from what he did when confronted with probably the two greatest crises of the twentieth century: the Great Depression and World War II. In his handling of these events, most scholars would argue that Roosevelt earned his historical dues—a conclusion Maney's own narrative supports.

Maney's overall tone is set in the introduction, in which he argues that observers frequently mistook Roosevelt's personal reserve and desire for privacy as a manifestation of a deep thinking and inner complexity. Instead, Maney insists, FDR was in many respects a simple man, albeit one of great courage and optimism. From this starting point, Maney races through Roosevelt's early years, devoting only three chapters to his childhood and adolescence, his political apprenticeship, his bout with polio, his political reemergence in New York state politics, and his victorious 1932 presidential campaign. A full six chapters are then devoted to Roosevelt's presidency, with four covering the pre-war New Deal years and two dealing with World War II. Some might quibble with Maney's historical focus—for example, after skimming through FDR's pre-presidential political years, he then spends 11 pages recounting Roosevelt's effort to pack the Supreme Court. But any one-volume biography of Roosevelt is subject to this type of criticism, and for the most this book strikes a nice balance between parsimony and historical detail. A final chapter, which now appears somewhat dated because of the comparison between Roosevelt and Ronald Reagan's temperament and leadership style, assesses FDR's reputation and legacy.

Maney enlivens the narrative with insights that encourage the reader to rethink received wisdom. For instance, historians have long noted FDR's penchant for disorderly administrative practices. But Maney, citing FDR's support of government reorganization and his interest in architectural planning, argues that in fact "... FDR had displayed an intellectual affinity for order, efficiency, and planning" (p. 99).

Maney also revisits the enduring controversies associated with FDR's presidency. Like many scholars, Maney struggles to discern FDR's intentions on the eve of World War II. Did he foresee American involvement, and if so, did he do enough to prepare the nation for that eventuality? Maney concludes that as late as the summer of 1941 FDR still hoped the United States could avoid military entanglement, and he faults him for not educating the public for the necessity of U.S. involvement. Indeed, Maney asserts that as a war leader, FDR's boundless optimism helped buoy the national psyche, but it was not always conducive to sound strategic thinking. Moreover, Maney argues, Roosevelt "never developed a particularly clear or coherent plan for the postwar world" (pp. 182–83).

Interestingly, he defends Roosevelt on the one issue for which he is perhaps most criticized: the failure to extract greater concessions from Stalin at the Yalta conference. Maney

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sides with those who argue that Soviet troop placements, and not Roosevelt's failings at Yalta, dictated the postwar configuration of Eastern Europe.

Maney speculates that FDR's death from a cerebral hemorrhage in April 1945 was a blessing for his historical legacy. With his health failing, Roosevelt would have served out his term with rapidly diminishing mental vigor. Even a healthy FDR, Maney suggests, would not have been so lionized after having to deal with the atomic bomb and Soviet intransigence in the cold war era. On all these points there is room for argument, of course, but Maney is to be commended for raising them in a balanced, succinct, and highly readable manner.

MATTHEW J. DICKINSON
Harvard University

Pivotal Politics: A Theory of U.S. Lawmaking *by Keith Krehbiel. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1998. 258 pp. Cloth, $50.00; paper, $17.00.*

Keith Krehbiel's theoretical treatment of the conflict and interactions of the legislative and executive branches of the U.S. government as they contribute to the making of laws stands as an important contribution to understanding both the process and the outcome of the legislating at the federal level.

As Krehbiel himself notes, when he first presented his theory about five years ago, professional peers were unconvinced. He was undeterred. Events, especially the health care stalemate of 1993–1994, reinforced the necessity of understanding gridlock, even in the case of unified government. In this more developed statement of his theory, Krehbiel not only develops the formal theoretical argument with admirable clarity but also tests it empirically and explores ways to apply it.

Krehbiel begins by laying out two facts that must be explained by any theory of lawmaking. The first fact relates to gridlock. He demonstrates that gridlock is a complex term because although linked to partisan strife, the concept itself says nothing about parties; although a relatively new term, the phenomenon has recurred throughout the nation's history; and although often used pejoratively, gridlock is at times favored by those who oppose change. The second fact that requires explanation is that much legislation is passed by large, bipartisan coalitions. Krehbiel lays out ten different "theories or schools of thought" and discusses how each of these deals with these two basic facts.

Krehbiel then lays out his own theory. Summarized briefly, he argues that each policy space is unidimensional, which he characterizes for convenience on a liberal-conservative dimension; that the status quo falls somewhere on that line; that each legislator and the president have an ideal point on that dimension for that policy; and that the lawmakers prefer a proposal over the status quo if that proposal is closer to their ideal point than is the status quo. He then argues that policies to be adopted will move according to the preferences of those individuals who are at crucial pivot points on the policy spectrum. Rather than being those legislators who reflect the median position, the pivot-point legislators are those who can overturn or uphold a veto when the president disagrees with the position of the legislature (that is, when the president is liberal and the legislature is conservative), or who can break a filibuster if the president and a majority of the Senate concur but a significant number of senators (near the 41 needed to sustain a filibuster) favor the status quo.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Krehbiel uses the family-leave bills in the Bush administration (on which the representatives at the veto point were pivotal) and in the Clinton administration (which passed with a large bipartisan coalition) and of the Clinton economic stimulus package in the 103rd Congress (on which the senator at the filibuster point was pivotal) to illustrate his theory. He concludes that his theory works to explain the two basic facts—including the seemingly anomalous existence of nonpartisan gridlock—by relating policy positions to the status quo, the position of the president, and the positions of the veto and filibuster pivots.

What is missing in this discussion is recognition that the theory implies a unicameral legislature and thus does not incorporate a key feature of the Congress, bicameralism. In addition, Krehbiel seems to imply, but does not state, that threats of filibusters or vetoes are strategies in the lawmaking process that might well mask actual pivot points.

In the remainder of the book, Krehbiel lays out empirical tests of each of the component parts of the theory; then he goes on to demonstrate applications for the theory. The strength of this book is the careful and systematic way in which Krehbiel takes the reader through his theory. In that, *Pivotal Politics* is a model for how formal theorists can present their views to a wider audience. The contribution of the theory means that all future analysts of the lawmaking process will have important factors to consider as they attempt to explain outcomes. Krehbiel focuses attention on the implications of the supermajoritarian requirements of the lawmaking process and the implications of those, as well as the positions of the president and lawmakers, for moving from the status quo. For these reasons, it seems clear that *Pivotal Politics* will find its place among the most influential books in the American field.

L. SANDY MAISEL
Colby College

A World Transformed: The Collapse of the Soviet Empire, The Unification of Germany, Tiananmen Square, The Gulf War *by George Bush and Brent Scowcroft. New York, Knopf, 1998. 590 pp. $30.00.*

A wise senior colleague of mine, commenting on an essay I had written about American diplomacy in Europe after World War II, wrote, "Be careful with success stories. We academics generally don't care for them." I would guess that many academics will not care for this volume by President George Bush and his National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft. The book depicts an extraordinarily successful period in American diplomacy, during which the United States achieved such cold war objectives as the end of Soviet control over Eastern Europe and the unification of Germany within the NATO alliance. These goals seemed unrealistic dreams when Bush became President in January 1989. Bush and his team accomplished these long-sought objectives without humiliating Mikhail Gorbachev and the Soviet leadership, or as Bush disdainfully puts it, "dancing" on the Berlin Wall. In the end Bush and Scowcroft even engineered the diplomacy that would help prevent the final collapse of the Soviet Union in August 1991 from leading to widespread conflict. Although known for his modesty, President Bush allows himself a moment of justified pride when he and Scowcroft write in their prologue that because of their efforts, "We eluded the shadow of another Versailles" (p. xiv).

The book is not a comprehensive look at the Bush foreign policy. Noteworthy by its absence is any discussion of the administration's lack of response to the initial break-up of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Yugoslavia, a time when some believe that Slobodan Milosevic's trouble making might have been nipped in the bud. On the other hand, Bush and Scowcroft are forthright in dealing with one of the most controversial aspects of the Bush foreign policy, their reaction to the Chinese government's massacre of students in Tiananmen Square. Both men condemn the action, and both were appalled by the behavior of the Chinese leaders. Yet it is also clear that each had quite a stake in China. Both were involved in opening up the country to America in the 1970s, and neither wanted to see the relationship endangered by the violent suppression of the Chinese democracy movement. Within days of the event, Bush sent a private letter to Deng Xiaoping, with the offer to send a special emissary — ultimately Scowcroft — and pleaded that "We must not let this important relationship suffer further" (p. 102). The authors make the case that their efforts helped elicit Chinese cooperation with the administration, especially during the Gulf War. But the unseemly haste with which they courted Beijing, especially in contrast to their strong warnings to Gorbachev against violence in Eastern Europe and the Baltic states, does leave one wondering about a double standard in American foreign policy. What is it about China that has entranced Americans and distorted their judgment since the Open Door notes of a hundred years ago? We seem to find it difficult to develop a policy toward China consistent with both our values and interests. With the recent revelations about Chinese nuclear espionage, this debate is unlikely to end soon.

But give credit where credit is due. The George Bush in these pages is an incredibly knowledgeable and skilled leader, with a remarkable gift for personal diplomacy and coalition building. Bush and Scowcroft recapture the tension and suspense before and during the Gulf War, and remind us how difficult it was to convince Congress and the American people of the importance of that conflict. Many of their critics now look somewhat foolish, and although the authors do not seem particularly intent on settling scores, they provide a compelling defense of the administration's policy, including leaving Saddam Hussein in Baghdad. Curiously enough, this book about American successes ends with a dire warning against isolationism, and an insistence that we in America "live up to our responsibilities" (p. 566). Will we be hearing such a theme in a campaign speech from another Bush in the very near future?

THOMAS A. SCHWARTZ
Vanderbilt University

The Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation: Lessons from South Asia *by Devin T. Hagerty. Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1998. 205 pp. Paper, $17.50.*

Recent nuclear tests in South Asia refocused attention on a simmering debate: Can new nuclear states, many of which may lack the resources of the established nuclear powers, manage their nuclear weapons effectively and establish stable relationships of nuclear deterrence?

In *The Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation,* Devin Hagerty examines the debate with respect to two emerging nuclear states, India and Pakistan, and their recent security crises: the 1986–1987 Brasstacks crisis and the 1990 Kashmir crisis. Advocates of what Hagerty calls the "logic of nuclear deterrence" have argued that new nuclear states are likely to settle into stable deterrent relationships like the superpowers had during the cold war. But proponents of the logic of nonproliferation contend that nuclear proliferators will lack the geopo-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

litical conditions, advanced technologies, and level-headed leadership the superpowers enjoy and that stable deterrence relationships are unlikely. Hagerty's volume is a supporting case study for optimistic deterrence logic. His conclusions are all the more powerful given that the South Asian deterrence he examines is of the ostensibly problematic opaque variety.

During the two crises, India and Pakistan existed in nuclear opacity—a condition in which countries are strongly suspected of having nuclear weapons even though they have not officially declared they do. Opaque proliferators do not fully reveal their nuclear arsenals because they fear the ire of the global nonproliferation regime; but they may well hint about their weapons in order to deter enemies, much the same as a robber with a concealed gun might point to the bulge in his coat in order to frighten a victim. Opaque deterrence can be effective, but it is fuzzy. Consequently, Hagerty's difficult historical task is to clarify exactly what Pakistani and Indian decision makers perceived the nuclear situation to be in South Asia during 1986-1987 and 1990, and then to deduce what the deterrent effects of the opaque nuclear capabilities were.

Hagerty does this superbly. By weaving together official statements, semiofficial leaks, indigenous journalistic accounts, and a small number of interviews with informed decision makers, he sketches the opaque deterrence dialogue that existed between India and Pakistan. He concludes that during the Brasstacks crisis, Pakistan had not quite achieved nuclear capability, and therefore nuclear deterrence did not figure in the episode's ultimate resolution. However, as he rightly underscores, nonproliferation logic to the contrary, crisis fears did not drive India to launch preventive strikes to forestall what it accurately perceived to be Pakistan's imminent nuclear weapon development. Hagerty contends that deterrence logic did play a large role in 1990, because Pakistan had sufficiently established its nuclear weapons credentials by then.

Hagerty focuses his theoretical firepower on opacity itself. It is true, Hagerty says, that efforts to obscure nuclear weapons make it difficult to establish believable nuclear threats. But he adds that global nonproliferation leaders such as the United States inadvertently contribute to proliferators' deterrence credibility when they publicize proliferators' suspected nuclear developments. Here, Hagerty makes a bit too much of too little. Opaque proliferators have always found it easy to establish their weapons capability, using such simple methods as announcing scientific achievements or, as in India's 1974 example, exploding "peaceful nuclear devices." The more interesting question is how opacity persists despite increasingly transparent situations. Everyone knows Israel has nuclear bombs, and the May 1998 detonations reaffirm that India and Pakistan have them, too. Yet concerned parties continue to find utility in preserving some degree of ambiguity about the extent of arsenal development and deployment in both situations. If anything, Hagerty's fine historical work should help put to rest the overdone distinction between opaque and overt deterrence, and help focus attention on the unique advantages of opacity and other distinctive elements of nuclear proliferation among "minor" states.

JORDAN SENG
Harvard University

Pursuing Majorities: Congressional Campaign Committees in American Politics *by Robin Kolodny. Norman, University of Oklahoma Press, 1998. 320 pp. Paper, $18.95.*

Two themes organize *Pursuing Majorities*. The first is that the campaign committees have long been a preeminent part of the national party apparatus. They are not, Robin Kolodny's

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

analysis argues, organizational innovations from a recent cycle of party building. Their activity rates have increased, and they are involved in more aspects of campaigning, but they have been a feature of congressional elections for more than a century. The second theme argues that the conventional conception of the American parties as a tripartite structure with a facet in government, in the electorate, and existing as a separate organizational structure produces a poor understanding of them. Kolodny insists that a clearer perspective on the dynamics of the party system emerges when we acknowledge that the party organization is not separate from the party in government, but exists as an extension of the officeholders' efforts to be reelected and become the majority. The national committee serves the electoral needs of the presidential candidate. The campaign committees seek to elect and send members to their respective houses with an eye to achieving and retaining a majority.

Kolodny's argument and evidence are laid out in seven chapters. This first proposes the thesis that it is "separate elections in a separated system" that motivated the development of the campaign committees. This is also the point at which she makes a case that the campaign committees have more than an electoral role, insisting that the officeholders who have directed external electioneering activities of each party's committee have used the campaign committee to demonstrate the talents their colleagues seek in a party's leader. The next three chapters offer a detailed history of the evolution of the campaign committees, their establishment by the GOP in 1866 and the Democrats in 1870, the creation of campaign committees for the Senate with the direct election of senators, the activities of the committees, and the practices and conventions of the committees between 1920 and the emergence of the modern campaign regime after 1972. Despite limited primary and secondary historical materials, these chapters have a reasonably extensive description of the activities of the committees during their first hundred years and the identities of the individuals who directed them. The narrative may be too detailed for some, but the detail persuasively advances Kolodny's argument that the campaign committees have been active institutions from the time they were established. The innovations and twists and turns of campaign committee chairs provide a rich historical bonus. Chapter 6 analyzes the relationship between leadership roles in Congress and service as a chair of the campaign committee. Kolodny's conclusion that the campaign committees provide a try-out for ambitious members of Congress who look for a leadership position in their party may not persuade everybody, but the narrative makes the case with a wealth of interesting detail. The involvement of the National Republican Congressional Committee in the development of the "Contract with America" (Chapter 7) is an interesting case study of the involvement of the campaign committees in governing and elections.

The most interesting chapter (5) examines how the burst of campaign finance reform in the 1970s energized and reshaped the campaign committees. It explains how and why the committees were transformed from serving as conduits for campaign money to become sources of money; it documents each committee's involvement in the development and dissemination of new campaign technology and how the GOP did it differently than the Democrats; it also elegantly describes how the committees became energetic users of soft money and how the Republicans have prospered more than the Democrats. Some of the specific evidence is new, some is familiar, but the weaving into an explanation of how campaign finance changes made the committees prominent players in the party caucuses is distinctive and original.

All students of political parties ought to have this book. Its historical material alone makes it a useful reference. The chapter on the committees and campaign finance is close to being a must-read.

JOHN R. PETROCIK
University of Missouri

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Sound of Money: How Political Interests Get What They Want *by Darrell M. West and Burdett A. Loomis. New York, W.W. Norton & Co., 1998. 291 pp. Paper, $16.70.*

This thoughtful and provocative book weaves together two important themes in contemporary American politics and political science. The first is the profound change that has occurred in interest-group politics in the last several decades. The increase in the number of organized interests, the transformation of iron triangles into issue networks, the rise of soft money and other innovations in the evasion of the spirit of campaign finance laws, the technology-induced shift from inside lobbying to grassroots lobbying—these and other developments define a new era of organized political activity. The second theme, which has become a growth industry in political science, is the importance of narrative in politics and policy. The crucial stage in the policy-making process is often the definition of problems, and politics can be fruitfully studied as the battle to control that definition through compelling causal stories.

The Sound of Money is chock full of facts about the new American politics, and it places these facts in a useful theoretical context. West and Loomis argue that variation in the scope and impact of group conflict creates distinct types of politics and political narratives. The presentation of these narratives, the authors show, has been transformed by changes in political structure and in communications technology. From sophisticated grassroots organization to elite issue advocacy to large-scale efforts to shape public opinion, organized interests now have a much broader array of lobbying options.

The problem, as West and Loomis see it, is that well-financed interests are best able to exploit these new options. "Moneyed interests," they suggest, "can tell their tales, through anecdotes, scientific studies, or symbolic appeals, again and again. Schattschneider's heavenly chorus has become more vocal, operates in more venues, and sings with more sophisticated harmony" (p. 45). As the authors interpret their case studies of the Clinton health care reform, the "Contract with America," the 1996 Telecommunications Act, and Medicare reform, the sound of money threatens the foundations of representative democracy in the United States. In "the age of big interests" (p. 223), the power of well-heeled groups that can create and sustain political narratives is checked only by other such interests and not by traditional sources of democratic control, including voters, political parties, social movements, politicians, and journalists.

Some readers may believe that in this gloomy assessment of contemporary political discourse West and Loomis go beyond the warrant of their evidence. After all, money and access to communications technology do not guarantee successful manipulation of political narratives. Perhaps the most notorious effort to shape a debate about policy was the "Harry and Louise" advertising campaign against the Clinton health care plan produced by the Health Insurance Association of America (HIAA). Yet although the campaign was extensively covered by the news media, the authors' own analysis of survey data shows that these television spots were not persuasive with the American public. West and Loomis may be correct that HIAA's ad campaign did influence the perceptions of decision makers, but so too did many other forces. The authors may understate the complexity of the process by which political narratives develop and influence the policy-making process. Moneyed interests are certainly part of the story. However, the rise, fall, and definition of issues on the agenda is also affected by events and the interpretations put on them by academic scribblers, journalists, think tanks, public interest groups, and entrepreneurial politicians. As the tobacco industry and the National Rifle Association have recently learned, the twists and turns of political discourse are difficult to predict, let alone control.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

From the Progressives to Common Cause, the impulse of reformers has been to solve all problems of American politics by tinkering with campaign finance laws. West and Loomis place the issue of political money in the much broader and important context of democratic discourse and control. Well-written, well-grounded in theory and data, and highly relevant to public concerns about American democracy, *The Sound of Money* is political science at its best.

THEODORE J. EISMEIER
Hamilton College

Checked and Balanced: How Ticket-Splitters are Shaping the New Balance of Power in American Politics *by V. Lance Tarrance, Jr. and Walter De Vries. Grand Rapids, MI, Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1998. 132 pp. Paper, $12.00.*

Since the 1980 election, there has been only one brief period (1993–1995) when the same party controlled the presidency and both chambers of Congress. Casual observers might conclude that most voters are deliberately choosing divided government in order to balance one party against the other. It is easy to attack that notion, simply because the great majority of voters in any presidential election do not split their tickets. Political scientists tend to prefer other explanations for divided government, such as the quality of candidates that each party runs for Congress and the presidency.

V. Lance Tarrance and Walter De Vries, however, contend that there might be something to the "balancing" notion after all. Drawing on Gallup surveys, they say that perhaps 2 percent of the voters strategically split their tickets in support of divided government. While this figure may seem minuscule, the authors point out that it might have been pivotal in 1996, since it exceeded the House GOP's nationwide popular vote margin. The 1998 election, which took place after publication of this book, supplies a bit more evidence for the potential significance of balance voting. In a poll for the Pew Research Center, about 4 percent of respondents said that they were voting Republican specifically to control President Bill Clinton. In the total House vote, Republicans outpolled Democrats by only 1.3 percent.

Obviously, such small numbers can scarcely yield firm conclusions, so Tarrance and De Vries take care not to place undue emphasis on them. They also look to the broader set of ticket-splitters, who account for about 20–30 percent of the vote in any given presidential election. Through his work with the Gallup Organization in 1996, Tarrance arranged for in-depth follow-up interviews with survey respondents who voted for the presidential candidate of one party and the House candidate of another. This qualitative material suggests that while the desire for partisan balance is not the main cause of divided government, it is nevertheless on many voters' minds. Ticket-splitters tend to believe that divided control of the government forces politicians to debate and compromise, thereby leading to more accountability, information, and competition. Tarrance and De Vries also present survey data showing that even many straight-ticket voters think it is better for Congress and the White House to belong to different parties. The "blank check" argument, which Republicans used in 1996 to defend their House majority in the face of a likely Clinton victory, seems to have considerable appeal.

In their final chapter, Tarrance and De Vries argue that the growing popularity of divided government reflects support for smaller government. Here they oversimplify. Large majori-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ties tell pollsters that they want less government involvement, just as the authors say; but surveys also show that Americans would increase spending on such things as public education, Social Security, and Medicare. Additional attention to these mixed messages would have been enlightening, especially in light of the controversy over what to do with the federal budget surplus.

Checked and Balanced has a straightforward, nontechnical prose style that makes it quite suitable as a supplemental reading in undergraduate courses on parties and elections. It would have been stronger, however, with more discussion of the academic literature, as well as a bibliography and index.

JOHN J. PITNEY, JR.
Claremont McKenna College

Black Corona: Race and the Politics of Place in an Urban Community *by Steven Gregory, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1998. 282 pp. $29.95.*

The social conditions of blacks in northern cities have undergone substantial change since the 1950s—the last decade of racially integrated communities. Now the majority of black northerners live in predominantly black neighborhoods. Corona, located in the borough of Queens in New York City, is one such neighborhood. Steven Gregory's ethnographic study of the internal dynamics and political activism of Corona is an attempt to challenge what he calls the powerful and negative "tropes" of inner city life and an explanation of the identity politics that animate this community. He defines politics as "a diverse range of social practices through which people negotiate power relations" (p. 13). The social construction of black identity and political activism is a continuing process as people relate to each other and their external community. For this reason, he concludes that most of what happens in Corona's complex set of social relations is about the collective construction of identity.

To understand how these residents arrived at where they are politically, Gregory provides a social history of black Corona and its residents. He discusses the impact of the civil rights movement and the War on Poverty on the neighborhood. Although black Corona underwent a profound social transformation, it does not fit the prevailing images of inner-city black communities. Black Corona residents are optimistic, organized, and community oriented. Despite these supportive social relations and structures, black Corona still has to fight to remain a community. The primary vehicles for this struggle are the Concerned Community Adults (CCA), East Elmhurst–Corona Civic, and the Association and Social Action Volunteers for Empowerment (SAVE). Corona residents use these organizations to fight the alienation of their youths, blight, and City Hall. Gregory describes how the community organized itself to provide more services for the youths of Lefrak City, a black high-rise apartment complex. He also outlines how the community resisted the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey's proposal to build a people mover that would have transported airline passengers from Manhattan to airports in Queens. The Port Authority framed the proposal as an economic development project, whereas the community reframed it as an environmental issue and was able to build an antipeople mover coalition in the region. The Port Authority's response was to divide the coalition along parochial interests. Although the Port Authority finally decided to abandon the project as too costly, the neighborhood coalition had forced the mighty Port Authority to address the environmental issues. Grego-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ry's description of the Port Authority's "tactic of divide and conquer" is an excellent case study of how a large public agency responds to citizen resistance. Gregory's penchant for detail and his careful fieldwork provide us with valuable information about the motivations of Black Corona leaders such as Ellen Baskin, Arthur Hayes, John Bell, Joyce Cumberbatch, Selma Heraldo, Calvin Wynter, John Booker, and Jacob Govan. These leaders make life in black Corona sane, safe, and meaningful. The city of New York owes a debt to them.

In summary, Gregory provides us with an excellent case study and microanalysis of a single community. It is a well written and documented confutation of black stereotypes and their communities. This study of black Corona is more than a book about "the everyday politics of black identity" (p. 12); it is a classic piece of urban anthropology. Although some portions of the analysis are underdeveloped, students of the social construction of black neighborhoods should find the book absolutely fascinating.

WILBUR C. RICH
Wellesley College

The Continuing Storm: Iraq, Poisonous Weapons, and Deterrence *by Avigdor Haselkorn. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1999. 398 pp. $30.00.*

In an intriguing 1997 *Security Studies* article, Barry Posen explored how the Gulf War might have played out if Iraq had possessed nuclear weapons. His answer was that events could well have followed a similar course and led to a similar outcome, with Saddam Hussein's nuclear capability deterring the coalition from trying to overthrow the Iraqi regime. In *The Continuing Storm: Iraq, Poisonous Weapons, and Deterrence* Avigdor Haselkorn tells a similar story, substituting chemical and biological weapons for nuclear ones. Where Posen was engaging in explicitly counterfactual analysis, however, Haselkorn claims to be writing the true, if hidden, history of the Gulf War.

His argument can be stated simply: Previous analysts have misread the war, because they failed to appreciate the dominant role played throughout by Iraq's unconventional weapons. These gave Saddam the confidence to invade Kuwait in the first place, were cleverly held in reserve until the tide of the war turned against Iraq, and were then brandished discreetly, stopping the Bush administration in its tracks short of victory. The key moment in the war, according to Haselkorn, was the landing in the Israeli desert on 25 February 1991, of an Iraqi Scud missile fitted with a concrete warhead—a signal that Saddam was about to switch to chemical and/or biological weapons. "His message was as follows: 'Because Iraq is pulling out of Kuwait, there are no more grounds to continue the war. But if you reject this deal and continue the offensive, I shall conclude that your aim is not only the liberation of Kuwait but the destruction of my regime. In that case, I am prepared to use mass destruction weapons against Israel'" (p. 155). The results were panic among Israeli leaders, a hasty decision by the Bush administration to halt the war two days later, and the survival of Saddam to plague the region ever after.

Haselkorn is clearly intelligent and knowledgeable about Iraq and weapons of mass destruction, but unfortunately the book he has written is a work of fantasy. There is simply no hard evidence for his most provocative claims; and for all his copious research, the book's major arguments rely on deductive logic and tendentious guesswork. Iraq does indeed seem

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to have fired a missile with a concrete warhead late in the war, for example, but in all probability, it was simply an error rather than a signal. There is no reason whatsoever to believe that the incident had any impact at all on Bush administration's thinking, and every reason to believe that termination of the war was driven by a host of other, more commonly cited factors. Haselkorn breezily dismisses all testimony by Bush administration officials on this point, giving the book an air of paranoid conspiracy theory.

Ironically, the author's broader and more forward-looking point is sound—that continued proliferation of unconventional weapons will create headaches and tough choices for future belligerents. The field of security studies does need to revisit fundamental questions about strategy, deterrence, and compellence in order to meet the challenges of a post-proliferation era, and does need to explore how new proliferators actually think about using their hard-won treasures. We can only hope that future works treat such critical topics more judiciously.

GIDEON ROSE
Council on Foreign Relations

What America Owes the World: The Struggle for the Soul of Foreign Policy *by H. W. Brands. New York, Cambridge University Press, 1998. 355 pp. Cloth, $54.95; paper, $17.95.*

Debates over the present and future course of American foreign policy would be so much easier to resolve if policy makers, scholars, and the mass public could agree on the answer to the question implied in H. W. Brands's latest book. Of course, as the author makes abundantly clear in his survey of the intellectual origins of foreign policy, Americans have rarely reached a consensus on what, if anything, the United States owes the world. While Brands himself does not provide an answer to the question he poses, *What America Owes the World* provides an effective overview of how significant individuals over the last two centuries have grappled with the question. According to Brands, two distinct groups, which he labels as "exemplarists" and "vindicators," have repeatedly struggled for the soul of American foreign policy. The exemplarists have largely been guided by John Quincy Adams's famous admonition that America should not go abroad in search of monsters to destroy. Not content with the limited moral responsibility and non-interventionist foreign policy inherent in an exemplarist foreign policy, vindicators have argued that America has both a moral obligation and a material interest in promoting democracy and freedom throughout the world. In a period where there is a strong tendency for both groups to demonize the other as solely responsible for both the past and current ills of American foreign policy, Brands provides a very timely and needed reminder that both approaches have had their successes and failures over the last two hundred years.

Despite its considerable strengths, *What America Owes the World* is an uneven book that will alternately stimulate and frustrate both general readers and specialists. It is often less than clear what criteria Brands employed in choosing various individuals as representative of his two schools in any given historical period. The best example of this flaw is Brands's chapter on Lincoln Steffens. While the chapter paints an interesting portrait of how a liberal progressive became an apologist for authoritarianism during the interwar period, it is not immediately obvious why Steffens merits the same intellectual scrutiny as the influential

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

historian Charles Beard. Beard's work clearly grapples with the same intellectual issues that Brands is concerned with, but it is hard to see this same struggle in Steffens's various writings of the 1920s and 1930s. A related problem with the book is the inclusion of individuals who have no connection at all to the debate between exemplarists and vindicators. For example, in a rather pedestrian chapter on Herman Kahn and the debate over American nuclear strategy, Brands simply abandons any pretense of relating his analysis to the intellectual struggle over what America owes the world. Since Brands eschews supplementing his accounts with archival research that might provide new evidence and insights into the thoughts of his subjects, specialists in American foreign policy might question the value or contribution of this book.

Nevertheless, even with its weaknesses and limitations, *What America Owes the World* is a valuable book. As one of the ablest and most prolific historians of American foreign policy, Brands could have easily written another archive-laden analysis of a particular subject or individual. Instead, he chose to write a book that introduces the general reader to the intellectual history of a central debate of American foreign policy and one that will surely reappear in the future. Such books are all too rare in the historical literature. Brands should be commended for writing a book that will lead many readers to the further study of America's role in international affairs.

JAMES MCALLISTER
Williams College

Unwelcome Strangers: American Identity and the Turn Against Immigration *by David M. Reimers. New York, Columbia University Press, 1998. 199 pp. $27.00.*

Immigration and Citizenship in the 21st Century *edited by Noah M. J. Pickus. Lanham, MD, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1998. 237 pp. Cloth, $63.00; paper, $23.95.*

Scholarly interest in the study of immigration has mushroomed in recent years, reflected by the burst of books and articles on the topic across academic disciplines. The rising importance of immigration-related research is also evident in increased funding from foundations and the emergence of new research centers. These changes in academia in the 1990s parallel changes in real-world politics: media coverage, policy discourse, and governmental funding all point to the heightened importance of immigration issues. Moreover, these shifts are evident not only in the United States but across much of the world.

A large part of American research on immigration has focused on the demographic profile of the immigrants themselves: that is, documenting who the immigrants are, where they come from, why they leave their homelands, how they do or do not integrate into American society, what kind of employment they find, what social services they use, and so on. This research has been very important and useful. Unfortunately, however, far less attention has been devoted to understanding the politics of immigration policy. David Reimer's new book, *Unwelcome Strangers: American Identity and the Turn Against Immigration*, is a welcome contribution in this direction.

Reimers, an historian at New York University, provides a clearly written and remarkably concise survey of the American anti-immigrant movement since the founding of the country. He integrates broad historical analysis with a more detailed tracing of the contemporary immigration debate. Easily accessible for both academic and nonacademic readers alike, the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

book is perhaps most valuable to those who are looking for a comprehensive, introductory "snapshot" of the complex and often contradictory politics of immigration in America. Although some chapters are a bit thin and would have greatly benefited from more detail, it is also refreshing to see that an historian can write a book that is under 200 pages in length.

While self-defined as a "nation of immigrants," the United States has also been defined by strong and persistent anti-immigration sentiment. Reimers identifies the most prominent and influential voices of the anti-immigration movement, and how these voices and the restrictionist arguments they make have shifted over time. For example, while race-based arguments were prominent in earlier eras and have now largely disappeared (except at the extreme margins), environmental-based arguments have emerged in the past few decades.

Reimers outlines how odd coalitions have pushed for or against various immigration policy reforms, culminating most recently in the legislative changes of 1996. Interestingly, while the latest American anti-immigration spasm generated new legislation, Reimers emphasizes that this has not translated into less immigration. Thus, the book is not only about the anti-immigrant movement in the United States, but also about how various counter-forces came together to strategically neutralize much of the restrictionist push. Reimers expects that the record levels of immigration will continue to add fuel to the anti-immigration fire in the years to come.

The volume edited by Noah M. J. Pickus, *Immigration and Citizenship in the 21st Century*, offers a diversity of well-argued—and often sharply conflicting—perspectives on the contemporary American debate over citizenship. The contributors, all well-known scholars in their field, are drawn from disciplines such as philosophy, law, political science, and history. The volume is less concerned with explaining American citizenship laws and the politics that promote or inhibit legal reforms, but rather with interrogating the meaning and role of citizenship, and how this should or should not change. Pickus, a professor of public policy and political science at Duke University, put the collection of essays together based on papers originally presented at a Duke conference to evaluate the recommendations of the 1997 report of the U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform.

The first part of the volume focuses on the meaning of "Americanization"—a term adopted and promoted in the commission's report. Not surprisingly, the term remains hotly debated and contested, as reflected in the contrasting essays by Charles Kessler and Juan Perea. Adding fuel to the fire is that the essays are paired with shorter critical commentaries. The second part of the volume is on nationalism and citizenship, focusing on the changing meaning of American national identity. For example, David Hollinger makes the case for a benign liberal form of nationalism, which he calls "cosmopolitan nationalism"—a term some may consider to be an oxymoron, but which Hollinger claims captures the distinct character and advantages of contemporary America.

The third part of the volume examines the debate about single and multiple membership status. Dual citizenship raises core questions about community, national unity, and loyalty. Peter Schuck's essay and the response by Michael Jones-Correa suggest that plural citizenships and American unity are actually compatible. For example, Jones-Correa points out that allowing dual citizenship encourages many immigrants in the United States to seek citizenship, which in turn has the positive effect of increasing their public participation and incorporation into society.

The volume makes no attempt to resolve the citizenship debate, but rather sharpens and extends it. In many ways, it is a permanent and irreconcilable debate: many of the visions of citizenship outlined in the essays are simply incompatible with each other, with very little middle ground. They are based on fundamentally different philosophical premises about

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the nature and meaning of membership in the good society. The volume would have been aided by more cross-national comparison, looking to conceptions of citizenship in other countries that may help inform the American debate. The volume's main contribution is to highlight the core issues that are at stake in the debate, to identify some competing models of citizenship that could be pursued as the country adapts to a rapidly changing world, and to deepen our appreciation of the normative consequences of how we manage the complex and emotionally-charged issue of citizenship in the next century.

PETER ANDREAS
Harvard University

The California Cauldron: Immigration and the Fortunes of Local Communities *by William A. V. Clark. New York, The Guilford Press, 1998. 224 pp. $27.95.*

Two important lessons have emerged from recent immigration research. One is that quantitative estimates of immigrant economic effects are complicated by the fact that most studies simply equate immigrants with all foreign-born persons and do not separate them by legal or citizenship status. The other is that there are differential spatial effects of in-migration, with smaller geographical areas having larger proportions of in-migrants bearing more of the costs.

The California Cauldron, although mostly ignoring the first lesson, is an impressive example of a recent study that builds on the second. Using various data, Clark focuses his demographic and geographic lenses on smaller communities within California and estimates whether recent immigration is merely stretching (creating a more complex but manageable multi-ethno-racial identity) or tearing (creating separate ethnoracial societies) California's "social fabric." His conclusions are straightforward. Not all immigration is socially damaging to California, but the state may be entering a Mexican-generated "era of separation and balkanization." Furthermore, while pluralism is desirable politically, socially it is not. A widening spatial and ethnoracial socioeconomic inequality in the midst of tremendous economic growth is Clark's paradox, and liberal U.S. immigration policy combined with a diminution of upward occupational and income mobility opportunities in California explain this. Clark's policy implications are also straightforward. In order to protect the most vulnerable residents and to improve California's overall skill level and international competitiveness, what is needed is a more selective immigration policy and a federalization of and a substantial increase in spending on education.

Clark develops his thesis in four steps. First, two global forces (geopolitical restructuring combined with improved informational and transportation technologies, and more migrants from developing countries) and two domestic conditions (a dual U.S. labor market and higher expectations concerning immigrant rights) threaten the national ideal of "cultural homogeny." Second, California is the nation's port of entry (Chapter 2), and Mexican migrants are driving population growth, causing poverty, increasing health and education needs, and placing stress on local communities (Chapters 3-6). Third, political redistricting based on the ethnoracial concentration of Latinos is no guarantee of equal voting power. Rather, the presence of many non-U.S. citizens in Latino communities grants greater representation to U.S. citizens residing in these versus other voting districts (Chapter 7). Fourth, California's migratory link with Mexico is the main reason why cultural separation contin-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ues to plague the state. The increasing demands of Latinos on public resources and extant racism across all ethnoracial groups suggest that political conflict is likely to overtake cultural conflict in the near future. The solution requires the maintenance of a multi-ethnic identity in California (Chapter 8).

Despite its contributions, the study has several serious shortcomings. First, Clark fails to reconcile his rather pessimistic results concerning Mexican immigrants with more optimistic evidence in the literature. Second, the author ignores the fact that Mexico is quickly approaching the completion of its demographic transition. Third, the book is unclear whether neoliberal U.S. economic policy, immigration policy, the education system in California, or Latino immigrants themselves are ultimately responsible for the forthcoming sociopolitical conflict that he fears. For instance, Clark writes, "the demand for [migrant labor] appears to be strong and sustained" (p. 6) and "it is also important to recognize the role that national policies play in creating, sustaining, and influencing migration" (p. 5). But he also tells us that "the poverty rate in California has increased as a direct result of large-scale immigration" (p. 50) and "immigrant-induced spatial inequalities" are to blame for undesirable local socioeconomic conditions. Overall, however, he downplays the role that U.S. policies have played in motivating Mexican migration—the Bracero program for Mexican guest workers in effect from 1943–1964, the 1986 Immigration and Control Act, the 1990 Act, and the North American Free Trade Agreement. Fourth, Clark argues that broad ethnoracial support for Proposition 187 suggests that restrictionist immigration policy sentiment emanates from more than racism, but evidence of widespread racism that he provides in the last chapter contradicts his interpretation. Finally, while Mexican immigration is Clark's most serious concern, he says nothing about deterring illegal immigration by increased border enforcement or by other means, or about the humanitarian and diplomatic trade-offs inherent in such efforts.

ENRICO A. MARCELLI
University of California, Los Angeles

The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention *by Steven L. Burg and Paul S. Shoup. Armonk, NY, M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1999. 520 pp. $49.95.*

This is an ambitious book that will serve as a valuable resource for those wishing to gain a deeper understanding of one of the key conflicts that defines the international agenda in the post-cold war era. Steven Burg and Paul Shoup, two veteran scholars of politics in the former Yugoslavia, go to great length to provide a balanced account of the war as well as an analysis of the war's settlement and prospects for peace in the region. The book opens with an excellent introduction to Bosnian politics before the war, offers a detailed account of the war structured around the conflict's major crises, and provides analytical sections on the major efforts to end the war.

In their historical account of the war, Burg and Shoup go further to develop the views of the local actors than any other published account on the topic, but they are still biased toward telling the story from an international perspective rather than from the viewpoint of the local participants. The major crises sparking international action are presented in impressive detail accompanied by keen analysis, but the political developments within the war's factions—Serbs, Croats, and Bosnians—receive far less attention. This is unfortunate,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

as these politics, especially within the Croat and Serb camps, account for much of the war's dynamics.

Burg and Shoup correctly point out that the rallying of the Bosnian Serbs around a separate nationalist party instead of around Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic's Socialist party is key to understanding the relations between the Bosnian Serbs and Milosevic's Serbia. The authors do not, however, offer any explanation of why this is the case. Why did Milosevic either not attempt or not succeed at rallying the Bosnian Serbs to his Socialist party? Similarly, Burg and Shoup discuss the Bosnian-Croat conflict in central Bosnia, but offer no explanation of either the causes or course of this part of the conflict. Without having been provided an explanation of why, after cooperating in the first year of the war, Bosnians and Croats fought one another in 1993 before papering over their differences in 1994, the reader is at a loss to grasp one of the war's central dynamics.

Elsewhere, the author's analytical efforts are generally well argued and extensively documented. Their analysis clearly identifies a reality gap "between the Western model of what Bosnia ought to be . . . and what Bosnia has become in the aftermath of the catastrophe" (p. 416). In so doing, Burg and Shoup correctly stress the gap between the media's presentation of the war and the developments on the ground. Occasionally, however, the authors leave the reader to wonder. In light of current events in Kosovo, the authors' contention that had Bosnia as a whole fallen into the "Serbian sphere of influence" it may have been possible for "Bosnia-Herzegovina to succeed in establishing a genuinely multi-ethnic, independent republic" (p. 45) seems somewhat implausible.

In the book's conclusion, the authors critique the Dayton peace accords that ended the war in late 1995. While Burg and Shoup rightly point to the agreement's shortcomings, they also realize that the accord could not have been more than an interim measure to prevent worse outcomes while new "post-nationalist" (p. 416) generations are given a chance to develop. In this context, Burg and Shoup emphasize the need for cultivating civil society in Bosnia as the only alternative to perennial international military occupation. Overall, Burg and Shoup's balanced account has moved the scholarly literature on the Bosnian war a significant step forward. Despite its shortcomings, Burg and Shoup have produced what is likely to become an essential book on the war.

RICHARD M. WILCOX
Harvard University

The Judicial Development of Presidential War Powers *by Martin S. Sheffer. Westport, CT, Praeger Publishers, 1999. 248 pp. $59.95.*

Ever since President Harry Truman sent troops to Korea in 1950 without requesting or receiving congressional authority, presidential war power has expanded beyond constitutional bounds to the point where President Bill Clinton engaged in offensive war against Serbia without once seeking statutory authority. Clinton had the approval of NATO members, yes; the approval of Congress, no. The contribution of courts to this development is the focus of Sheffer's book.

After an introductory chapter, Sheffer provides thumbnail descriptions of the leading cases, excerpts from the rulings, and often a note analyzing the decision. He groups the cases under these headings: the early period (1827 to 1860), Lincoln as commander-in-chief, the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

age of industrial disorder through Woodrow Wilson, Franklin D. Roosevelt and total emergency, the cold war cases, and the Vietnam and Gulf War cases. He concludes with observations about constitutional government and executive dictatorship. The result is a book that raises central questions and conveniently brings together important material that is not accessible to many readers.

The promotional flyer states that courts "seek to avoid having to rule on the president's conduct, but, when they do rule, they usually uphold the president." Sheffer makes the same point in his preface, where he says that courts "lie back" rather than rule on these questions, but "when they are forced to rule, they usually uphold presidential action" (pp. x-xi).

That is an overstatement, and part of the reason is Sheffer's decision to start the "early period" with *Martin v. Mott* (1827). Jumping almost forty years forward means that Sheffer gives little attention to such seminal cases as *Bas v. Tingy* (1800), *Talbot v. Seeman* (1801), and *Little v. Barreme* (1804). Although he discusses some circuit court decisions, including *Durand v. Hollins* and *Ex Parte Merryman*, he makes no mention of the important ruling in *United States v. Smith* (1806), in which a federal court strongly argued that the president had no power to make war: "That power is exclusively vested in congress."

When Sheffer does discuss the rulings from 1800, 1801, and 1804, he usually misses the main point. For example, in the opening paragraph of the preface he says that Thomas Jefferson's use of the navy against the Barbary pirates provoked debate "over the limitations on presidential authority to commit troops to hostilities without prior congressional authorization." He does not mention that Congress passed ten statutes authorizing Jefferson and James Madison to act militarily against the Barbary pirates. The footnote for Sheffer's statement cites the cases from 1800, 1801, and 1804. He summarizes the first case by saying that the Supreme Court decided that a formal declaration of war against France was not required. That was part of the ruling, but a declaration of war was not required because Congress had *authorized* it. In this footnote, Sheffer does mention that in the decision of 1800 the Court acknowledged that Congress "authorized the war." He repeats that point on page 147. However, nowhere does he say that in the 1801 case, Chief Justice John Marshall stated that the "whole powers of war being, by the constitution of the United States, vested in Congress, the acts of that body can alone be resorted to as our guides in this inquiry."

Little v. Barreme is cited in this footnote and in footnote 27 on page 196 but is never discussed. The case involved a proclamation by President John Adams to seize ships. His order exceeded the authority given him by Congress. In a major ruling, Marshall said that national policy is defined by statute, not by presidential announcements. By skipping these cases, Sheffer gives a misleading impression of courts during the important early formative period and encourages the mistaken notion that courts invariably defend presidential war initiatives. The record is much more complicated.

LOUIS FISHER
Congressional Research Service

Our Own Backyard: The United States in Central America, 1977–1992 *by William M. LeoGrande. Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1998. 790 pp. $39.95.*

Few analysts have followed U.S. policy in Central America as closely or for as long as Bill LeoGrande. This meticulous reconstruction of the policy debates, intrigue, and inside-the-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Beltway maneuvering is the definitive account of Washington's late cold war crusade, and a tale told with panache. As a case study of U.S. foreign policy in a period of flux, its lessons remain important long after Central America has disappeared from U.S. headlines.

LeoGrande argues that the Central American revolutions occurred while U.S. foreign policy makers were still badly divided over how to interpret and respond to the perceived post-Vietnam decline in U.S. global power. In the battle to exorcise the ghosts of Vietnam through Central America, liberals saw quagmire and an imperial presidency, while conservatives saw falling dominos and a fatally dithering Congress. This framework overlays a close-up bureaucratic politics analysis of interagency and personal rivalries and Congress/Executive wrangling.

Much of the chronicle itself is familiar, and readers will remember key episodes like scenes from an old movie. Yet reassembling the story highlights lessons regarding the foreign policy progress. The Reagan administration purged area specialists and Foreign Service professionals, creating information flows tailored to fit preconceived interpretations and prescriptions. The pervasive subversion of U.S. democratic processes by those convinced they are the true guardians of the national interest, extensively documented here, exposes their boundless capacity for delusion and rationalization.

As this narrative repeatedly demonstrates, congressional Democrats were generally willing accomplices in their own deception, rarely willing to call the administration on blatant lies, easily mollified by fig-leaf concessions and presidential certifications. LeoGrande attributes this to a combination of the traditional bipartisanship and deferral to executive authority on foreign policy matters, electoral jitters about facing down the Great Communicator, and Congress members' fears of the McCarthyist tactics of policy hardliners who accused them of "losing" Central America.

At a minimum, this study shows that the vaunted checks and balances—the power of the purse, legislative oversight, the War Powers Act—need to be tweaked up. But an alternative interpretation from outside the Beltway might suggest the problem was an imperial state, not just an imperial presidency. From a Central American perspective, the internal wrangling in Washington perhaps seemed irrelevant when the U.S. government frequently announced conditions and terms that it later felt free to revise unilaterally. Unfortunately, Central American perspectives are largely absent from this book, which draws heavily on U.S. media sources and government documents. Although the focus is on U.S. policy rather than on the revolutions, it would have been interesting to include interviews or writings from the Central American Left to see how their interpretations of U.S. policy shaped their actions at the time. The Washington-insider focus of the book also considerably downplays the role of the U.S. anti-intervention movement, which after all must have had some significance if the policy hardliners thought there was a Vietnam syndrome to be overcome.

The book's preface notes that investigative reporters uncovered key facts as these events were unfolding, but the full documentary record was not assembled until after the damage had been done. After 579 pages of detailed reconstruction of that record, readers might wish for more than the ten-page interpretive conclusion. This tome represents a valuable history of a tragic policy. Disasters of the magnitude recounted here require the equivalent of Senator Frank Church's investigation following the overthrow of Salvador d'Allende or a U.S. truth commission to declassify the rest of the record of Washington's role in Central America.

RICHARD STAHLER-SHOLK
Eastern Michigan University

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

American Foreign Environmental Policy and the Power of the State *by Stephen Hopgood. New York, Oxford University Press, 1998. 262 pp. $65.00.*

This book argues that the state, understood as an institution and the set of individual actors it empowers rather than as a territory or nation, plays an important role in determining policy that is separate from the pressures either of societal interests within the state or of the international system without. This approach, which Stephen Hopgood calls state-centric, is presented in contrast with pluralist and realist theories of foreign policy making and in opposition to arguments that sovereignty in the contemporary world is waning, that the state is fading as a central locus of decision making. The argument is made with reference to two cases, the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (UNCHE) in Stockholm in 1972 and the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio in 1992.

The ideas underlying this argument are intriguing and make the book conceptually interesting. The execution of the argument, however, is problematic, both in the development of the theory and in the research design. In creating a theory designed to show that the state still matters, Hopgood overstates his case. He presents his argument as a replacement for, rather than as a complement to, both realism and pluralism. In order to be able to do this, he is forced to make straw men of both. For example, his version of realism is in reality a very narrow and extreme neorealism. In the end, the state-centric argument comes down to the observation that politics matter, that both political context and individual personalities affect the details of policy outcomes. Few analysts would dispute this; by the same token, it is hardly a novel assertion.

The two cases provide interesting accounts of the American preparations for both conferences and present some intriguing primary research derived mostly from interviews with some of the major players in the making of policy for them. These cases are problematic in two ways, however: the research design is such that they represent easy cases for the theory; and even so, they fail to provide a convincing story to support the theory.

Hopgood tells us that he chose U.S. policy toward these conferences as his cases for two reasons. One, the United States is the single most important player in international environmental politics and, therefore, the most relevant object of study, is plausible. The other, he argues, is that they are hard cases for his theory. Since the conferences represent the most important moments in the creation of international environmental policy, they should have sparked the greatest amount of pluralist participation in policy making. But both conferences focused on general principles, not on specific behavioral requirements. As such, cases that affected specific domestic interest groups more clearly and directly may have made stronger cases. He also argues that the United States, given its reputation as an especially open polity, should allow more access to pluralist groups than other states. But he provides more evidence to refute this contention than to support it.

Finally, the case studies as presented simply do not support the theory. True, to understand the details of particular policies a study of intragovernmental process is necessary. Few would dispute this. More generally, however, the argument seems more than anything else to support a model of democratic politics in which national executives, in their desire to remain electable, will target the broad content of policy to the median voter, to the average of national opinion on the issue. In short, this book makes an interesting argument about the role of the state in international environmental politics, but not a convincing one.

J. SAMUEL BARKIN
University of Florida

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Evolution of International Human Rights: Visions Seen *by Paul Gordon Lauren. Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1998. 396 pp. Cloth, $49.94; paper, $29.95.*

It seems fitting that Paul Lauren's book should have been published in 1998, the fiftieth anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In it, he provides the most comprehensive and exhaustively researched history of human rights ideas and the institutions to implement those ideas that has been written to date. I expect it will become an indispensable reference source for scholars and students of human rights.

Lauren's eight main chapters cover the evolution of human rights ideas historically, beginning with the earliest references to visions of human responsibility to others in the world's great religious texts and early philosophical and political writings. In chapter two, Lauren outlines international efforts in the nineteenth century to put some of these ideas into action, highlighting the international campaigns against slavery, the formation of the Red Cross, and efforts to protect persecuted religious minorities. Chapters 3-8 focus on the twentieth century, with full chapters dedicated to the interwar period, World War II, the drafting of the United Nations Charter, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The final empirical chapter attempts to cover the entire fifty-year period since the Universal Declaration. Here the book takes on a breathless quality; at times paragraphs seem more like long lists of events and institutions than history. Crucial events are mentioned in passing, as for example when the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the cold war receive only a sentence. But the heart of the Lauren's book is in the first half of the twentieth century, and it is here that it makes its most substantial contribution. Many of these events and issues have been discussed elsewhere. Never have they been assembled all in one place and discussed with such detail and care. Lauren carried out extensive primary research in a range of archives in the United States and Europe, and his careful footnotes will provide important leads to future researchers.

As an oversize book of 380 pages, this is a very long book. The author writes clearly and avoids jargon, though at times the reading goes slowly because of its sheer comprehensiveness and wealth of historical detail.

Among the strengths of the volume are the author's success in truly documenting the universal roots and origins of human rights ideas. Lauren provides constant examples of global sources of human rights thinking and activism, thus refuting those who claim human rights are forms of Western cultural imperialism. Very occasionally, however, I think he lets his interest in the global origins of human rights interfere with a clear statement of exact origins of particular documents and provisions, such as those in the Universal Declaration. Though the overall message of the book is an optimistic overview of progress in the realm of human rights, Lauren shows a steady awareness of the limitations of many of the visions and institutions he surveys. Thus he points to many of the religious sources of human rights ideas and yet mentions that religion has historically also been a source of intolerance and human rights violations.

Finally, although the book is not overtly theoretical, it puts forward a strong implicit set of theoretical arguments. It does not survey the theoretical literature on the causes of human rights violations or the sources of change in the international system. Yet the overall message of the book stresses the power of ideas and norms, when propagated by specific individuals and activists. Lauren's most interesting argument is that human rights norms have made the greatest strides at times of war, revolution, and crisis. These crises have cracked both

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

old power structures and old ways of thinking, opening up possibilities for ideological and institutional change.

KATHRYN SIKKINK
University of Minnesota

Resisting the Bomb: A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement, 1954–1970
by Lawrence S. Wittner. Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1998. 641 pp. Cloth, $65.00; paper, $24.95.

Lawrence Wittner, professor of history at the State University of New York at Albany, is the preeminent historian of American pacifism. His *Rebels Against War* (1969, rev. ed. 1984) is the indispensable starting point for anyone interested in the history of mid-to-late twentieth-century peace movements in the United States. His most recent work, *Resisting the Bomb*, is the second in a projected trilogy chronicling the international nuclear disarmament movement. The first volume, *One World or None*, published in 1993, described the emergence of antinuclear sentiment in the eight years following the Hiroshima bombing. A third volume will conclude the series by examining the antinuclear movements of the final three decades of the twentieth century.

Throughout this trilogy, Wittner intends to explore one of the central historical questions of the cold war era: "How should we account for the fact that, since 1945, the world has avoided nuclear war?" (p. ix). The surviving architects of American foreign policy in those years would argue that it was their own wise stewardship—as expressed for nearly half a century in the linked commitment to contain the Soviet Union and to maintain a powerful nuclear deterrent force—that in the end saved humanity from the widely feared atomic holocaust. Many students of international relations and diplomatic history would agree. Wittner does not. What is "missing from the conventional explanation," in his view, is the existence of "the largest grassroots struggle in modern history, one that mobilized millions of people in nations around the globe: the world nuclear disarmament movement." To explain the eventual abating of the nuclear threat without paying due attention to this movement, is for Wittner akin to writing "the history of U.S. civil rights legislation without the civil rights movement" (p. ix).

The period covered by this second volume is, to my mind, the most important in the history of the antinuclear movement. The first decade after Hiroshima witnessed a heated debate over the meaning and future of nuclear weapons, but one that was conducted primarily among elites—policy makers, atomic scientists, and journalists. Only in the mid-1950s did people of less exalted rank enter the debate—and not simply with words but with actions. The audacious notion that one could resist the bomb and humanity's seemingly preordained fate to destroy itself were first put forward by small groups of pacifists in the United States and Britain. Within a remarkably short time hundreds of thousands of people from around the world joined in a common endeavor. The authorities often denounced advocates of nuclear disarmament as wooly-headed idealists, if not subversive intriguers. But Wittner is at pains to show that the movement had significant practical effects: "Aroused world public opinion contributed substantially to the nuclear testing moratorium of 1958, atmospheric test ban treaty of 1963, to the nuclear nonproliferation treaty of 1968, [and] to the first strategic nuclear arms controls . . ." (p. 466).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Exhaustively researched and heavily detailed, Wittner's book suffers the defect of its virtues: all but the most devoted specialist will eventually start to dread his "meanwhile in Scandinavia" passages. But should one ever need to know the percentage of Norwegians in 1955 who worried about atomic war, here is the place to go. *Resisting the Bomb* and its companion volumes may lack the narrative power of Wittner's earlier work, but they remain an essential addition to research library collections.

MAURICE ISSERMAN
Hamilton College

Public Health Policies and Social Inequality *by Charles F. Andrain. New York, New York University Press, 1998. 304 pp. $45.00.*

Parting at the Crossroads: The Emergence of Health Insurance in the United States and Canada *by Antonia Maioni. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1998. 205 pp. $37.50.*

In his comprehensive volume, Charles Andrain compares health policies in Canada, the United States, Germany, the Netherlands, Japan, France, Sweden, and Britain. Part I of the book describes the health care systems of these nations by using three analytical models: the liberal entrepreneurial, the organic corporatist, and the social democratic. The liberal entrepreneurial model "stresses 'liberal' promarket values. Government functions to preserve and expand the health care market . . . entrepreneurialism upholds voluntarism, free choice, equal opportunity, and equality before the law. Of all three models, the entrepreneurial one gives the highest priority to competitive individualism" (p. 14). The health policies of the United States and, to a lesser extent Canada, can be described as entrepreneurial. The second model, the organic corporatist model "highlights classical 'conservative' principles. Government should maintain social order, harmony, and sacred values linked to the family and religious institutions . . . elites have the duty to care for their subordinates' health needs . . . group obligations take precedence over the rights of individuals" (p. 15). Germany, the Netherlands, Japan, and France best fit the organic corporatist model. The social democratic model is used to describe Sweden and Britain. "Democratic socialists hold that government should enhance socioeconomic equality . . . public policies ought to increase the freedom and equality of women, low-income people, the marginalized, and those of low status" (p. 16). While each of the models has shortcomings in describing these countries' health policies, they nonetheless provide a framework for comparing these different nations.

In Part II of this book, Andrain looks for explanations for the differences among these national health care systems. He discusses the connection between political culture and health systems, finding that political culture analyses offer little in the way of specific explanations for differences in health system structures. He goes on to use several structural theories focusing on the power of various groups such as government agencies, political parties, social groups, and corporations to explain policy changes. He finds these explanations of health system differences more powerful than the political culture analysis. He also looks at the usefulness of rational choice theories for explaining health systems, finding them useful but flawed.

Part III of Andrain's volume evaluates the health outcomes of the health systems in the eight nations. He discusses the progress these nations have made in improving their populations' health and in achieving equality, effectiveness, and satisfaction.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Antonia Maioni's volume focuses on the development of health insurance in the United States and Canada. In an effort to explain the differences between the health systems of these two quite similar nations, she traces the historical development of health insurance from the 1930s to the present. She examines the effects that differences in the political resources of various interest groups, state structures, political parties, and culture have had on the development of health insurance in the two countries.

Both Canada and the United States saw serious discussion of options for widespread health insurance and for government involvement in the provision of health insurance during the 1930s, though neither nation made significant progress toward resolving the questions raised. In the United States, agreement on Social Security legislation was given greater precedence than health insurance, so resolution of the issue was postponed. In Canada, the lack of resolution at the federal-government level and the development of regional third parties with particular interest in health care issues paved the way for future provincial action on this issue.

The first serious proposals for federal government involvement in the provision of health insurance in both countries were formulated in the 1940s. President Harry Truman's proposal for national health insurance failed to garner sufficient Congressional support in part because of strong resistance from the American Medical Association (AMA). In Canada, a national health insurance plan was postponed because of fiscal conflicts with the provinces. Instead, more limited federal health grants were instituted.

The defeat of national health insurance in the United States in the previous decade set the terms of the debate in the 1950s. Discussions of government-sponsored health insurance were much more limited than before, resulting in the 1960 passage of the Kerr-Mills bill, which provided federal funds to help states cover the medically indigent elderly. In Canada, however, where national health insurance had not been decisively rejected, there was much more momentum for reform. Under pressure from organized labor and a strong third party, the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation, and despite the misgivings of the Canadian Medical Association (CMA), the Canadian parliament passed the Hospital Insurance and Diagnostic Services Act of 1957 which provided federal assistance for provincial efforts to provide hospital insurance for all Canadians.

The health insurance structures of the two countries were finally set in place in the 1960s with the passage of limited government health insurance programs in the United States (Medicare and Medicaid) and universal health insurance in Canada.

The different policy outcomes in these two nations were due, according to Maioni, to several factors. First, the influence of organized medicine against government involvement in health insurance provision was mitigated in Canada in part because of the difference in state structure in the two nations. The parliamentary structure and hence the stricter party discipline in the Canadian legislature forced the CMA to deal with the cabinet and government departments in their lobbying efforts, whereas the AMA lobbied individual members of Congress to great effect.

A second factor contributing to the different outcomes was the fact that organized labor in the United States had no viable third party to voice its support of national health insurance. Forced into the Democratic party, which represented a wide array of interests, labor in the United States had to compromise and support much more limited health insurance proposals than its Canadian counterparts.

The federal structures of the two nations affected health insurance reform efforts differently. While provincial involvement in Canada was initially used as an excuse for lack of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

federal reform, eventually the pressure of successful provincial reform pushed federal action. In the United States, the states and regional interests tended to work against federal efforts at reform.

Maioni concludes this fine volume with a consideration of how the historical context affects current health care reform debates. Students of comparative policy will find both of these volumes useful additions to the literature.

ANN LENHARD REISINGER
Columbia University

Germany's Second Chance: Trust, Justice, and Democratization *by Anne Sa'adah. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1998. 352 pp. $39.95.*

More than three decades ago, one of my colleagues, a West German reporter gathering material for a series of articles, was shot to death in cold blood by the East German border patrol as he walked along the western side of the iron curtain that separated the two Germanys. Thirty years later, his widow and daughters were present when several members of the former German Democratic Republic's border patrol were tried for murder in the eastern part of reunified Germany. But instead of finding belated justice, my friend's family faced day-in day-out the hostility of a courtroom crowd that resented the idea that *Mitlaeufer* (mere followers who executed the will of their leaders) should be held accountable and punished for the wrongs they committed during East Germany's communist past.

This particular case touched on some of the fundamental questions that arose in Germany after the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989, after the defeat of the Nazi dictatorship in 1945, and after the demise of oppressive regimes elsewhere as well. How do you deal with the starring and supporting cast of a system after its fall and during the democratization process of a new regime? Can you build a strong, broadly supported democracy based on citizens' mutual trust without systematically excluding members of the old regime's elites and followers who committed injustices against their fellow-citizens? Can a viable democracy emerge without dealing with the legacy of a dictatorial past? Is the future health of a democracy better served by emphasizing punishment, reconciliation, or a combination of both?

There are no simple answers to such complex questions. But Anne Sa'adah offers a thoughtful and thorough discussion that focuses mostly on responses in postunification Germany and, out of necessity, on those in the Bonn Republic following the odious crimes of the Nazi era. Moreover, the author transcends the German cases by examining the reaction to British loyalists in postrevolutionary America, the French responses to the reign of terror at the end of the eighteenth century, and collaborators during the Nazi occupation in World War II.

Democratization efforts in the wake of repressive regimes emphasize top-down institutional or bottom-up cultural strategies. While the former approach assumes that over time democratic institutions produce democratic citizens, the latter holds that a truly democratic house must rest on a societal foundation of honesty, trust, and solidarity. Throughout history seemingly successful democratization processes were associated with institutional strategies. But East Germany's citizens' movements pushed for a cultural approach that would come to terms with the GDR's past as a precondition for a strong democratic society.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Sa'adah provides a compelling description and analysis of the tensions between the institutional democratization approach along the lines of the West German model and the cultural approach advocated by a minority of grass-root activists—many of them dissidents and victims of injustices in communist East Germany. For these idealists the bloodless revolution of 1989 was lost when the eastern states were, as they felt, annexed by their western brethren instead of finding "a third way" between the West German-style liberal democracy and the socialist ideal, which was never realized in the East German state.

While New Forum, Buendnis '90, and other citizens' movements never mustered electoral strength, they were nevertheless successful in pushing for the incorporation of some important elements of the cultural approach. Thus, contrary to the Czech Republic, Poland, or other former Soviet satellites, German authorities opened the files of the East German State Security Service (Stasi) that revealed the identities of secret service informers and those they had spied on. But even the access to the Stasi files was a questionable victory for a movement that was more interested in the healing qualities of dialogues between perpetrators and victims than in mere punishment or revenge. The case of Manfred Stolpe, the popular governor of the eastern state of Brandenburg, demonstrated that open exchanges between those who had chosen accommodation or dissent remained the exception, not the rule.

While acknowledging from the outset that reunified Germany could risk to embrace part of the cultural strategies because of the strength of the Federal Republic's democratic institutions, the author agrees with critics who blame the Bonn Republic's institutional strategies for blocking the learning process of dealing with the legacy of the Nazi past. This broad assessment speaks to the years immediately following World War II and the establishment of the Federal Republic, but it discounts the impact of elite and public discourse, extensive educational measures, and the members of the 1960s protest movement who now occupy the most important political offices. It is just as questionable to argue that an anti-totalitarian consensus does not exist in contemporary Germany. While Germany, like most if not all comparable democracies, has its share of extremists, these individuals and groups have neither the numerical nor electoral strength of like-minded zealots in Austria, France, and other countries in western Europe.

At times Sa'adah's ambitious work seems to cover too much ground, explore too many details, and in the process stray from the central theme of Germany's second shot at democratization. Perhaps this was unavoidable in the face of the unique and complex characteristics of the German case. Nevertheless, this fine book is a must read for everyone concerned with democratization efforts after the fall of repressive regimes in general and the case of post-unification Germany in particular.

BRIGITTE L. NACOS
Columbia University

The Republican Legacy in International Thought *by Nicholas Greenwood Onuf. New York, Cambridge University Press, 1998. 284 pp. Cloth, $64.95; paper, $24.95.*

"Republicanism," Nicholas Greenwood Onuf reports, "is back." By republicanism he means—not, he firmly explains in the second sentence of his book, the current policies of "the Republican party in the United States"—but an ideological tradition that many recent

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

scholars have found flourishing in Western political thought and practice from the sixteenth to the late eighteenth centuries.

Onuf defines republicanism as rule "for the common good" by "those who are suited" (p. 7). It is not equalitarian or necessarily democratic. Republics, he candidly writes, are by nature "hierarchical and coercive" (p. 7). The goal of republicanism is "to insure that those few who can rule for the common good do so" (p. 7).

Like J. G. A. Pocock and other scholars of classical republicanism, Onuf holds that the republican tradition was supplanted at the beginning of the nineteenth century by liberalism—by which is meant, not the ideological orientation of the left wing of the American Democratic party, but the ideas and institutions of economic and social individualism associated with the philosophy of John Locke. Liberalism, after almost two centuries of substantial accomplishments, is now widely perceived to be a "spent force" (p. 118). The hour of republicanism, which presided over the birth of the United States, but then fell under almost total eclipse, may once more be at hand.

Onuf traces the roots of republicanism to the classical Greeks, particularly Aristotle. It first flowered in its modern form in Renaissance Florence. He distinguishes two main strands of republicanism: Continental, developed by, among others, Hugo Grotius, G. W. Leibnitz, and, most fully, Immanuel Kant; and Atlantic, initiated in England in the seventeenth century by James Harrington and most systematically formulated by the now little-read eighteenth century Swiss political theorist Emerich de Vattel. Continental republicans concentrated on uncovering and applying social laws revealed by "nature"; while Atlantic republicans were more interested in promoting social virtue through "convention" (pp. 21–25). Both, Onuf argues, provide lessons relevant to the crisis of the modern world.

Onuf gives particular attention to the bearing of republicanism on contemporary international relations, his specialty. The system of sovereign states, he maintains, is related to liberalism and is only about two centuries old. The concept of state sovereignty is simply liberalism's idea of the sovereign individual writ large. As independent states give way as principal actors in international affairs, republican theory provides a rich source for achieving Kant's ancient dream of "perpetual peace" in a world composed of free societies.

To deal with republicanism's problem of reconciling the priority of the common good with individual rights, Onuf presents a conceptual scheme he calls "constructivism." (He says he would prefer "constitutivism," but has trouble saying it.) Under constructivism, the tension between social needs and individual rights is dissolved through definition: "Individuals make societies through their deeds, and societies constitute individuals. . . . The co-constitution of individuals and societies has no beginning or end" (pp. 141–42).

Onuf has high hopes for establishment of republican communities governed by "stewards of the common good" (p. 275). But in the final paragraph of his book, he introduces a note of chilling realism: "Citizens of the ancient republics had slaves in their households; eighteenth century cosmopolitans had servants for all occasions. Republicans today have their equivalents" (p. 276).

Onuf lucidly sets forth the history, content, and current relevance of classical republicanism. Whether "constructivism" will solve the moral and practical problems that he forthrightly acknowledges is quite another question.

A. JAMES REICHLEY
Georgetown University

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

American Virtues: Thomas Jefferson on the Character of a Free People *by Jean M. Yarbrough. Lawrence, University Press of Kansas, 1998. 256 pp. $35.00.*

This well-written, carefully-crafted, and thoughtful volume provides the most penetrating discussion yet published of Thomas Jefferson's moral and political thought. Specifically, the author addresses the question of what Jefferson believed to be the ingredients that Americans as a people needed to cultivate "to ensure their freedom and happiness" (p. xv). To this end, she explores the principles Jefferson articulated in the Declaration of Independence and his understanding of rights, property, happiness, virtue, work, citizenship, and duty. One of her principal contentions is that Jefferson's conceptions of rights and virtue were increasingly informed by his belief in the Scottish notion of the moral sense, with its emphasis on benevolence and service to others, as well as justice. Jefferson's notions of virtue, she argues, underwent "a major change, from an early classical emphasis on individual excellence to be achieved through stoic resignation and control of the passions to a later Scottish and Christian emphasis on the social virtues, especially benevolence" (p. 15). This belief in the moral sense, according to Yarbrough, encouraged Jefferson to found his hopes for the success of the American liberal republic, not on institutional contrivances, but on the character and virtue of the people, who through a "long process of habituation" would acquire a "steady disposition to virtue" (p. 44), expressed in a series of moral traits that would enable them to fulfill their duties to themselves, their fellow citizens, and God.

The author is particularly effective in explicating Jefferson's ideas about the scope and nature of liberal republican government in America. His well-known beliefs that the powers of the national government should be drastically circumscribed and that the tasks of government at all levels in a republican polity should be merely to restrain people from aggression against one another, "compel them to contribute to the necessities of society, and require them to submit to an impartial arbiter" (p. 22). This did not mean, she insists in an important insight, that his political philosophy was "antigovernment," but that it was "self-government by citizens acting together in their local communities" (pp. 134–35). Self-government, in Jefferson's view, required that citizens participate directly in all "matters within their reach and competence" (p. 102). His famous proposal for a system of wards represented a call for them to take control of all local affairs. But this proposal, Yarbrough persuasively contends, did not derive from any conviction that people could only achieve virtue by participating in politics. Deriving from a recognition that citizens in a liberal republic would spend most of their time in private rather than public endeavors and that "the most important virtues, both moral and intellectual, [would] flourish outside the public realm" (p. 103), Jefferson's ward system was a product of his concern that citizens might become so absorbed in their private pursuits of happiness that they would neglect their public responsibilities. Like his proposals for a system of public education, it was designed to "draw people out of their own private worlds and into the public arena."

To a much greater extent than many works in this genre, Yarbrough's study has an informed sense of history. Yet, in tracing the origins of Jefferson's thought the author invariably focuses on the intellectual rather than the experiential. As a consequence, the volume leaves unexamined the important question of what in Jefferson's experience it was that made the Scottish moral sense philosophy and the idea of local self-government so compelling.

JACK P. GREENE
The Johns Hopkins University

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Political Policing: The United States and Latin America *by Martha K. Huggins. Durham, NC, Duke University Press, 1998. 247 pp. Cloth, $49.95; paper, $17.95.*

State practices often outlive their original justifications, and state bodies often outlive the regimes that created them. While government repression and national security have been recognized as primary elements in Latin America's history, few studies look at the police agencies that carry out those responsibilities on a daily basis in all sectors of society. For contemporary democracies, in fact, one of the most destabilizing forces is the power and unaccountability of police agencies built up during the authoritarian past. With vivid narration and sharp analysis, Martha Huggins puts the police in its rightful place at the center of Latin American studies.

Within a theoretical framework arguing that Latin American police forces went through a process of internationalization, centralization, and authoritarianization, the book carefully demonstrates how the United States created police agencies and directed police actions in Latin America throughout the twentieth century. From the establishment of Haitian constabularies in the 1920s to Brazil's massive counterinsurgency operations in the 1980s, this policy was both deeply ingrained in U.S.–Latin American relations yet flexible enough to encompass both Good Neighbor and violent clandestine approaches. Completing the book's theoretical and empirical study is the most recent stage of police development: devolution into fragmented state agencies, private security forces, and vigilante squads.

The book illustrates the importance of the police to the United States by detailing how the president, CIA director, and other top officials restructured and manipulated the U.S. foreign policy and national security establishments to carry out covert and overt programs through existing agencies as well as new agencies, such as the Office of Public Safety, set up entirely for this purpose. After World War II, the United States made the police an "early warning system" (p. 104) in the war against communism in Latin America, "based on the assumption that criminality and subversion had to be controlled before internal security had deteriorated to the point of requiring military action" (pp. 79–80). Police training and funding were placed squarely within both anti-Soviet containment doctrine and Third World modernization theory, reversing "the causal order" of the traditional emphasis on economic development "by proposing that security assistance could promote economic and social progress" (p. 94) and thereby undermine communism's appeal.

Meticulously documented information about the conduct of the police in Brazil and several other countries provides irrefutable evidence of how accountability decreased and repression increased under U.S. sponsorship. Interagency conflict, the promotion of violence-prone officials, elaborate interrogation methods, and dependence on high-technology equipment were all by-products of this relationship. Professionalization, centralization, and authoritarianization were not just about modifying government policy, but about making torture and killing "regular instruments" of the state (p. 170).

The book's focus on U.S. policy, however, sometimes gives short shrift to Latin America itself, stressing its police forces' "vulnerability and helplessness" (p. 200) instead of nineteenth-century patterns in which police edicts, the police's political influence, civil strife, and local militias were shaping Latin American policing well before U.S. intervention. Huggins says that "modern forms of devolution are not equivalent to what existed in Latin America before this century" (p. 21), but provides little insight into post-cold war, post-authoritarian developments such as the increasing involvement by the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration in Latin American policing of drug trafficking or citizen pressures for police reform at the local and provincial levels. But any look at the future requires an under-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

standing of the past, and no such understanding is complete without the invaluable and pioneering contributions of *Political Policing*.

MARK UNGAR
Brooklyn College–City University of New York

The Bully Pulpit: The Politics of Protestant Clergy *by James L. Guth, John C. Green, Corwin E. Smidt, Lyman A. Kellstedt, and Margaret M. Poloma. Lawrence, University of Kansas Press, 1997. 221 pp. Cloth, $35.00; paper, $19.95.*

The study of religion and politics has made considerable strides in the past decade. Where once political scientists merely described the partisan and behavioral differences between Protestants, Catholics, and Jews in the mass public, scholars have more recently explored the impact of religious doctrine, practice, and denomination in the study of mass politics. Political scientists and sociologists have examined political differences between congregations and the contextual effects of membership in different religious communities. These latter studies have shown that membership in a particular church can influence an individual's political attitudes and behaviors. This is true for a variety of reasons: individuals often select a church that promotes views they share, frequent interactions with other church members influence political attitudes, and religious elites (preachers, priests, rabbis) often teach particular religious and political doctrines.

Guth et al. do not focus on the attitudes of church members, but rather on the politics of Protestant clergy. These important cue-givers have seldom been studied in any systematic way (but see Ted Jelen's excellent book *The Political World of the Clergy*). This book provides an extremely valuable portrait of the political attitudes and behaviors of these religious elites. The authors surveyed more than 5,000 ministers in eight Protestant denominations and combine these data with earlier and later surveys of clergy in these denominations and with their large study of religious activists. Although we might wish for a random survey of all Protestant clergy rather than those from these eight denominations, these data are the richest available source of information on the politics of Protestant ministers. Moreover, many of the largest denominations are included in the study, including the Southern Baptists, Assemblies of God, United Methodists, and the Presbyterian Church, U.S.A.

The authors posit a model in which theological orientation (modernist or orthodox) is expressed in social theology (communitarian, individualist). This social theology leads pastors to choose among various political goals and activities, based in part on the social context. Denomination plays a role as well—both in shaping the social theology of the pastors and in providing other, more subtle influences on their behavior.

The authors see an emerging two-party system in American Protestantism, with evangelical churches headed by pastors with orthodox theology, individualistic social views, and preaching a message of moral reform—that is opposition to abortion, gambling, alcohol, and pornography. Mainline Protestant churches are more likely to have pastors with modernist theology and communitarian social views, who pursue a social justice agenda aimed at ending discrimination, war, and poverty. Their data often but not always support this claim. Although there is little question that the Southern Baptists and Assemblies of God embrace orthodoxy and are consistently conservative in their politics, there is more variation within the other denominations; indeed the smaller denominations occupy a middle ground be-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tween the two large orthodox denominations and their two large mainline counterparts. But the authors acknowledge the diversity within the two camps in their concluding chapter, where they develop a fascinating six-group typology of Protestant clergy.

This book is indispensable to anyone who hopes to understand American Protestant politics. Its considerable excellences include a delightful mix of anecdotes and hard data; some subtle distinctions between theology, social theology, and eschatology (all separately measured); a solid grasp of the way that social change influences politics; and a deep understanding of the eight denominations that are being studied. Although many will be drawn to the quantitative data analysis, I was also struck by the subtle and enduring influences of the ethnic and doctrinal roots of the smaller denominations.

Indeed, one of the minor problems with the book is that the authors sometimes assume that readers will possess more knowledge about Protestantism than most social scientists are likely to have. They suggest that "the ECC (Evangelical Covenant Church) is not creedal," and that it also practices "believer's baptism" (p. 32) for example—both terms readily accessible to those who study religion and politics but not perhaps to the broader social science community. Those who may not be familiar with these terms should not be deterred, however, for such lapses are few and confined almost entirely to the second chapter. A careful reading of this material is well rewarded, for this is a fine book that belongs on the bookshelves of anyone interested in religious mobilization in American politics.

CLYDE WILCOX
Georgetown University

War and the Illiberal Conscience *by Christopher Coker. Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1998. 240 pp. $39.00.*

Coker locates the conditions of possibility of warlike behavior in the modern era largely in the recurring attractions of an illiberal construction of collective identity that simultaneously sanctifies aggression against the "other." However, the liberal conscience is not thereby vindicated in any simple sense, since it is the very limits of modern liberalism—its oft incapacity to provide a secure and meaningful existence—that fuels this illiberal conscience. Coker proposes we embrace, instead, a more reflective, "postmodern" liberalism as an antidote to illiberal alibis for war, emphasizing less liberal proceduralism and more the liberal mind's capacity to accept moral ambiguity.

Coker presents the case summarized above in a series of millennium-end reflections on war and modern society. His reflections hinge on what he calls "alibis of aggression." These are ideas and practices that establish the boundaries of collective identity in relation to an excluded "outsider," which becomes an object of hatred and violence (p. 24). Especially potent in this regard and telling for illiberal nations' proneness to aggression, externally and internally, is the embrace of a heroic vision of history. Such a vision provides a sense of living in a defining moment, where one is called to struggle in order to bring that moment to fruition. This project divides the heroic self from the "other": history requires a hero that uniquely embodies its purposes and clears away or pushes aside those out-of-step with the historical march. Where groups or nations construct their identity in such terms, the consequences are usually disastrous, as in Germany's various aborted struggles to define a historical identity and the illiberal "settling" of the American West.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

However, Coker resists lending comfort to apologists for liberalism, though he accepts that "liberal nations rarely go to war against each other" (p. 93). The rise of liberalism has not inoculated the world against illiberal alibis of aggression. Rather, liberalism may magnify the uncertainties and fears that foster illiberal responses: livelihood and social position are sustained only via struggle against others within the nation and externally against other nations; familiar ways of life are undermined by institutionalizing forces of change; and a sense of meaning and purpose is progressively eroded by a "utilitarian ethic." Taking their principles as transhistorical truths, liberals have been complacent, thereby making the illiberal response a central and recurring feature of modernity.

Thus, the defeat of the latest illiberal challenge is not justification for further complacency, but for a call for the cultivation of a more self-reflective, perhaps "postmodern" liberal temperament. This requires recovering liberalism's strengths: its spirit of openness, its willingness to question, its capacity to entertain moral ambiguities. Indeed, Coker believes we have arrived at a time when developing this spirit can work to undermine the desire to rule over or go to war against others in the name of historical purposes, whether liberal or illiberal. He recommends instead a "prudence" born out of the recognition of the inevitability of irresolvable moral conflict and tragic loss.

There are provocative claims, and though some will remain unconvinced in the end, few will contest Coker's command of intellectual history or his aplomb in weaving Max Weber and Ludwig Wittgenstein, Thomas Mann and Robert Musil, Johann Fichte and Sigmund Freud, and looming very large, Friedrich Nietzsche, into an account of what makes war imaginable and compelling. His broad conceptualization of the project of international relations is quite refreshing. He challenges us to expand the bounds of our vision beyond that characteristic of all too much of the standard fare.

DAVID L. BLANEY
Macalester College

The Lebanese Conflict: Looking Inward *by Latif Abul-Husn. Boulder, CO, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998. 171 pp. $42.00.*

Many books have been written on the devastating Lebanon War that lasted for almost fifteen years, 1975-1990, and that cost around 150,000 casualties and billions of dollars in damage to the physical infrastructure of the country. Furthermore, an entire generation of Lebanon youth was born and socialized into this bloody and violent culture. Hundreds of thousands of Lebanese citizens left the country in search of security and peace. The social and political milieu was torn apart and fragmented further. Government institutions and agencies were marginalized. The country became a theater on which regional and great powers fought their dirty skirmishes and conflicts. For all these reasons, Lebanon came very close to the brink of collapse.

Three overarching explanations or hypotheses dominate the conventional views of the nature and causes of the war. The first hypothesis stipulates that the Lebanese conflict was determined solely by the intervention of foreign powers. An opposing second explanation places the core of the conflict on the collapse of the domestic sociopolitical and economic structure. The malfunctioning of this structure exacerbated dormant internal tensions that ultimately led to the outbreak of the civil war in 1975. Third, some analysts contend the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Lebanon War may be explained by the convergence of domestic politics with regional and international events.

Latif Abul-Husn, a career officer with the Lebanese Foreign Service, briefly lists the three hypotheses and finds them wanting. He contends that the origin of the war lay with the conflict within and between Lebanon's communal groups: "the social structure is the spawning ground of conflict, and that the conflict itself contributes to the potential (and eventual) weakening of the social structure" (p. 2). Abul-Husn notes that the 1975 war revolved around three main issues: reform of the political system; the national identity of Lebanon; and Lebanon's sovereignty. Although other issues emerged as the conflict evolved, only these three themes endured.

Abul-Husn notes that Lebanese communal society consists of several social layers that, while existing side by side, often in harmony, remain void of a basic central value system and widespread acculturation. Lebanese communities live next to each other and interact with one another economically, but this level of interaction was not strong and intense enough to integrate the various communities into one social system. Here lies Abul-Husn's central thesis: "The genesis of that conflict is the social structure; the war was born of the communal contradictions inherent in this structure and exacerbated by external contingent factors. The conflict process is itself cause as well as an outcome of change" (p. 6).

Abul-Husn tries to construct a conceptual framework by looking at the political power struggle in terms of Ibn Khaldun's concept of *asabiya*—solidarity or group consciousness—and Ralf Dahrendorf's notion of authority. Both sociologists share with Karl Marx the assumption that the social system is the spawning ground for conflictive tendencies. While Marx postulates that differential distribution of property is the major source of conflict, Ibn Khaldun and Dahrendof emphasize the role of *asabiya* and positions of authority. Abul-Husn uses these two conceptual keys to address two important questions: to what extent is the Lebanon War best understood by studying the active involvement of the conflict groups, or by investigating the contradictions and cleavages in the social structure?

The author suggests that political life in Lebanon, including political institutions, will be infected with sectarianism and factionalism so long as the communal social structure remains segmented and splintered. He raises but never answers fully the critical question of whether political institutions may succeed in the long run in accommodating and regulating the structural cleavages and ensuing divergent interests that beset multi-communal societies. This ambitious goal informed the attempt to reform the National Pact of 1943 that culminated in the 1989 Taif Accord, and which terminated the war and restored the basic principles of consociationalism to the Lebanese political system.

How successful has been the Taif Accord in addressing and trying to resolve the underlying three main causes around which the 1975 war revolved? Abul-Husn notes that although the Taif Accord resolved the political aspect of the conflict, it has not tackled its underlying social origins: "violence may erupt in the future if the contradictory social conditions again become salient" (p. 131). The author laments the fact that social institutions were retained, and their salience in the new Lebanon was reinforced, not diminished, by the Taif Accord.

What is to be done? Abul-Husn believes that certain basic features of the social structure must be changed, including the sectarian regime and communal relations vis-à-vis the authority structure. A divorce between communal identity and political access may be Lebanon's best hope for lasting peace, the author contends. He calls on Lebanon's decision makers to transform Lebanese society from a tribal-like structure into a society where the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

citizen is liberated from his provisional loyalties. He also calls on the state to establish a welfare system that provides a viable framework to address the individual's needs for stability, identity, and economic security.

The importance of *The Lebanese Conflict* is that it raises more questions than it attempts to answer. Abul-Husn's account is also politically balanced and conceptually rigorous. Although Abul-Husn's concept of the social structure is not original, he critically examines the evolution, growth, and operation of the social structure on the Lebanese polity, and his focused analysis convincingly shows its pernicious and dangerous repercussions.

However, the author uses the overarching notion of the social structure very liberally: the social structure not only causes conflict but also contributes to the further weakening of the social structure. It is a deadly, repetitive cycle that claims to explain everything. The difficulty with any concept that seeks to explain everything is that it ends up explaining nothing. Social and political phenomena are very complex and dynamic.

But the danger of overstretching the concept of the social structure leads to analytical distortion and simplification. One may easily lose sight of the important role of socioeconomic and political factors and the close links between internal and external politics. The establishment and continued survival of Lebanon owes much to this delicate balance. The author's prescriptions are also a little simplistic. His approach may simply be summarized as statist. Although state institutions need to be urgently and desperately reformed and modernized, neither a welfare system nor modernization from top down can do the trick.

The big challenge facing Lebanon is how to transform a communal, sectarian structure into a genuine civil society; how to inspire individuals, with tribal and sectarian loyalties, to become full-fledged citizens; how to establish and consolidate an independent legal system that protects citizens' rights. The struggle for civil society and true citizenship in Lebanon should take precedence over other priorities. Lebanese polity would likely remain volatile and unstable so long as civil society is subordinated to factional sectarian interests. Sad as it is, the transformation and creation of a genuine civil society in Lebanon will take generations, not years, to bring about. In this regard, education and historical evolution are as important, if not more so, as the role of political leadership.

FAWAZ A. GERGES
Sarah Lawrence College

Challenge to the Nation-State *by Christian Joppke. New York, Oxford University Press, 1998. 360 pp. $75.00.*

A Question of Numbers: High Migration, Low Fertility, and the Politics of National Identity *by Michael S. Teitelbaum and Jay Winter. New York, Hill & Wang, 1998. 290 pp. $26.00.*

Michael Teitelbaum and Jay Winter argue that the coincidence of declining birth rates with high levels of immigration has transformed politics and societies in the transatlantic area over the last thirty years. The result is highly volatile politics centered on immigration and identity. Christian Joppke and his co-authors agree that immigration greatly affects international and domestic politics. But they disagree whether a fundamental transformation has occurred. Saskia Sassen in the Christian Joppke volume views international migration processes as part of the warp and woof of globalization fostering transnational society. She

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

draws from recent writings on international society and migration scholarship to make her case that sovereign states are diminished in authority and control. Not so, argue Christian Joppke and several of his co-authors, most persuasively Gary P. Freeman. Their rebuttal of the decline of the sovereign state due to inability to control international migration thesis makes reading the volume imperative for all students of politics and international relations.

The Michael Teitelbaum/Jay Winter volume also merits close attention, particularly since the American co-author qualifies as the *eminence grise* of U.S. immigration policy. Addressed to a broad audience, the book is highly accessible and reads quickly. There is a journalistic, quite rudimentary quality to much of the description. There are two key problems with the analysis.

High rates of international migration to the United States and France are nothing new. Chapter one on Germany also emphasizes how important international migration has been in German history, a point curiously lost upon Christian Joppke, who contends that the guest worker recruitment period from 1954 to 1973 was an aberration in German history and unlikely to be repeated despite the reactivation of guest worker policy in 1990. The percentage of immigrants in France today is roughly the same as it was in the 1930s. French fertility has declined and immigration continues to alleviate demographic insufficiency. In the United States, immigration in the 1980s and 1990s approximates levels attained between 1880 and 1914, but immigrants comprise a smaller share of the total U.S. population. French, U.S., and German politics were greatly affected by conflicts and debates over immigration in earlier times. The presumption that the last thirty years have fundamentally changed politics and societies in the transatlantic area may be unwarranted.

A second problem arises in the chapter on Islamic fundamentalism and the West. Although the co-authors deplore the politicization of demographic study, their consideration of Islam and Muslim immigrants in transatlantic societies could be more balanced. They ignore evidence of an overall pattern of integration of Muslims in France such as produced by Michele Tribalat of the National Institute for Demographic Studies. This is curious, because most of the chapter on France analyzes the institute, and the highly publicized battles that have been waged there in recent years.

The threat of Islamic fundamentalism is overdrawn. The discussion of Islamic immigrants and political terrorism is alarmist, because it does not point out that very few Muslim immigrants have been mobilized into violent politics. Surely these are grounds for security concerns arising from massive immigration to transatlantic states from Dar el-Islam, but the vast majority of Islamic immigrants are law-abiding.

Christian Joppke agrees that Europe's immigrant integration issue centrally involves Muslim immigrants. However, his tome makes it clear that European states are not going to be overrun by unwanted migrants. It thereby provides a much needed antidote to fears fuelled by theorizing that the national state has become a residual variable in matters concerning international migration. Rey Koslowski explains the supercession of state sovereignty within the European Union in what concerns movements of European citizens. However, such freedom of movement has not been conceded to noncitizens, and European Union states cooperate on an intergovernmental basis to prevent unauthorized migration. Several contributions document the effectiveness of governmental measures, such as those affecting asylum-seekers. Gary Freeman suggests that obstacles to more effective policies are political more so than stemming from the putative decline of sovereign states. His analysis concurs fully with the highly authoritative analysis of the evolution of U.S. immigration policy in chapter seven of *A Question of Numbers*.

MARK J. MILLER
University of Delaware

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Poverty and Inequality in Latin America: Issues and New Challenges *edited by Victor E. Tokman and Guillermo O'Donnell. Notre Dame, IN, University of Notre Dame Press, 1998. 256 pp. $40.00.*

This is a surprisingly good book. I say "surprisingly," because it is an anthology, the result of a conference of "concerned persons," reflecting "diversity," sponsored by Coca Cola, and published under the auspices of the Kellogg Institute at Notre Dame. In places the book is uneven; is infused with a sometimes naive, moralistic "good government" approach; and is written in several of its chapters in the hushed, pious tones of the confessional. Nevertheless, it is the best book available on poverty and inequality in the new era of neoliberalism in Latin America.

The original conference out of which this book grew consisted of academics, politicians, labor leaders, clergy, and business leaders. It was held at Notre Dame in 1995. The theme was the challenge of resolving issues of rising poverty and inequality in Latin America. The approach was eclectic and multidisciplinary. The overall assumption of the conference was that the old, often corporatist models of "social protection" are in crisis and need to be jettisoned and/or reformed, and that new approaches to solving the problem of poverty and inequity need to be tried. These problems had recently been amplified by the march toward globalization and unregulated free markets.

Giving immediacy to these themes are recent studies that show that while Latin America's economies have been expanding in the 1990s, the distribution of income is the worst in the world. Hence among the political and economic elites of Latin America, the sense has grown stronger that something must be done about the maldistribution of wealth within the region—in part to reduce poverty, in part because statistics such as these are giving Latin America an international black eye, and in part because such extreme poverty is seen as producing unacceptable guerrilla violence as in Mexico or bringing to power upsetting demagogic populist politicians as in Venezuela. In co-editor Guillermo O'Donnell's chapter, the social situation of Latin America is pronounced a "scandal," but shortly thereafter comes his ultimately realistic admission that "not much" can be done about it.

The papers collected in this volume are of nearly uniformly high quality, but only rarely do they approach the sensitive social, cultural, racial, economic, and political causes of why Latin American poverty is so extensive and in quality so pervasive. CEPAL *Review* director Oscar Altimir, for example, provides a first-rate, technical analysis of changing employment in Latin America. Brazilian demographer José A. Mango de Carvalho similarly shows how Latin American population growth rates are declining and the population is beginning a demographic transition. Chilean ex-minister René Cortázar explores the relations between globalization and job creation, while Argentine sociologist María Antonia Gallart recommends greater education and training, and Uruguayan Carlos H. Filgueira examines the new vulnerabilities brought on by declining welfare programs. Sociologist Dagmar Raczynski has a marvelous chapter examining the traditional, corporately-based or sectoral models of social protection in Latin America, while Inter-American Foundation vice president Charles A. Reilly has a thoughtful albeit somewhat romantic analysis calling for a new balance between state, market, and civil society. Co-editor Viktor E. Tokman adds a useful introduction and conclusion that help integrate the diverse contributions.

All this is well and good and useful, but it fails to address the central issue. Poverty and inequality are pervasive in Latin America because of underlying social, cultural, economic, racial, and political structures that favor the elites at the expense of the mass. The elites trickle down just enough wealth and benefits to the masses so as to coopt them into the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

system and buy their continued loyalty, but without changing fundamental structures per se. Occasionally they miscalculate as in Chiapas and then have to pay the consequences. But fundamentally, despite the advance in electoral democracy in recent years, these are not at their core liberal, pluralist, egalitarian societies. Having interviewed many of their members over the years, I am not convinced that the elites of Latin America even now believe (continuing a sixteenth-century debate) that those Indians, blacks, and mestizoes filling the lower rungs of society have "souls" and are therefore fully equal. Latin America for the most part remains an Aristotelian society with its natural, God-given class structure, not a Lockean liberal or egalitarian one. And until these underlying beliefs and structures change—now virtually impossible because of the decline of Latin America's democratic-Left, the death of socialism, and the global triumph of neoliberalism—no contract will fundamentally alter the situation.

HOWARD J. WIARDA
University of Massachusetts Amherst

The Transformation of Political Community *by Andrew Linklater. Columbia, University of South Carolina Press, 1998. 269pp. Cloth, $39.95; paper, $19.95.*

Andrew Linklater rejects the modern interstate order, as well as the nation-state from which it is built, as sufficient or even suitable grounds from which to imagine or enact a truly civil international society. He argues that the relative affinity and unity displayed in any one state community is afforded only through the systemic exclusion and suppression of actual or potential dissent and difference. Sovereign bounds are founded on securing a specific normative outlook and order inside from challenges left or cast to the outside. He contends that native-states are morally deficient sites from which the ideal of a universal human community may even be approached.

However, Linklater submits that the combined universalism and social fragmentation resulting from contemporary forces of globalization offer an unprecedented opportunity in which to transform the international order into a broader overarching community capable of serving the full array of human interests. He claims that current challenges to the discrete boundaries of state sovereignty provide a moment in which social relations across the world may themselves become "... more universalistic, less unequal, and more sensitive to cultural differences ..." (p. 7). Essentially, Linklater argues that globalization is facilitating the formation of worldwide dialogic communities. And he insists that these expanding cosmopolitan relations undermine traditional divisions between citizen and stranger. In his view, all humans are faced with the chance and, at points, with the necessity to develop social norms not wedded strictly to the confines of any one state. The point is to encourage these dialogues in every possible manner. Thereby, the conventional exclusions of citizenship themselves may be rendered so multiple and ambiguous as to indicate a diverse and inescapably inclusive universe of human interest and identity.

Linklater's strategy here is to replace the nation-state with cosmopolitan citizenship as the particular from which the universe of human relations and differences may be resolved. While providing a sound and convincing analysis of how national citizenship necessarily confines political imagination, though, Linklater neglects to consider the limiting norms posed by the concept even in its most general form. Citizenship does not confer the notions

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of responsibility, unity, and affection in a simple, open fashion. As he himself acknowledges, it defines these ideas via a mode quite peculiar to the nation-state in the first place. Citizenship has to do with the rights and obligations of modern individuals conceived in reference to a common social body. Whether one thinks of this body in terms of a sovereign state or the variety of humanity, the concept of citizenship demands that the particulars from which the body is constituted are interpreted first as fundamentally autonomous and singular in themselves. To extend a transnational version of citizenship as the grounds upon which to build a final universal community of humans discriminates from any expression of difference that is not channeled through some form of the conventional liberal self.

Linklater does not seek to prefigure the ideal human community. He prefers to let the social and political norms for humanity be established through ongoing dialogue by which the multiple needs and cares of the species may finally gain voice. However, the dialogic community that Linklater envisions, in conjunction with a transformed concept of citizenship, does predetermine the kinds of ideals that may be entertained. Traditional resolutions of the universal and particular in human community are not brought into fundamental question in this model. They are merely cast in different terms.

MARK F. N. FRANKE
University of Northern British Columbia

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Reference Books and Other Publications of Interest Received

The Blackwell Dictionary of Political Science *by Frank Bealey. Oxford, UK, Blackwell Publishers, 1999. 384 pp. Paper, $29.95.*

Crisis and the Apocalypse of Man *edited by David Walsh. Vol. 8 of The History of Political Ideas. Columbia, MO, University of Missouri Press, 1999. 503 pp. $42.50.*

East Asia Strategic Review 1998–1999 *edited by Shigekatsu Kondo. Tokyo, Japan, The National Institute for Defense Studies, 1999. 312 pp. 3000 yen.*

A Handbook of International Human Rights Terminology *by H. Victor Condé. Lincoln, NE, University of Nebraska Press, 1999. 201 pp. $35.00.*

The Political Reference Almanac 1999–2000 Edition *compiled by Anthony Quain. Arlington, VA, Keynote Publishing Company, 1999. 904 pp. Paper, $44.95.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Correspondence

To the Editor:

I was one of the initial Joint Operations planners for Operation Restore Hope and a commander/Joint Staff director in Somalia. I must first compliment Barry M. Blechman and Tamara Cofman Wittes for "Defining Moment: The Threat and Use of Force in American Foreign Policy," *PSQ* 114 (Spring 1999). They have written a fine analysis that merits further study by both students and foreign policy and strategic planners. However, I am compelled to take issue with one incorrect assertion made in their article: U.S. and UNOSOM II forces "suffered a tactical defeat in October 1993."

There are three levels of operational war—tactical, operational, and strategic. The U.S. Army forces in Somalia in October of 1993 "kicked ass and took names," in the vernacular of soldiers, when they engaged the armed forces of Somali factional warlord Mohammed Farah Aideed. There is no doubt the ranger raid to capture Aideed and his primary staff was unsuccessful in capturing the warlord. They did, however, capture or kill several of his subordinate leaders. The U.S. Ranger company and Delta detachment raiders were surprised by the apparent pre-planned regimental-size ambush executed by Aideed's forces. The Special Operations Aviation unit also was surprised by volley-fire of hundreds of rocket-propelled grenades fired by the Somali warriors to shoot down two Blackhawk helicopters. But the counterambush reaction of those U.S. forces, and that of the U.S.–UN Quick Reaction Force that came to their rescue, resulted in a major tactical victory for the U.S. forces. I have conversed with veterans of that battle and read estimates that as many as 2,500 Somalis were killed in the intense combat. I know that while I was there (December 1992–March 1993) U.S. and Allied forces had killed an estimated 1200 Somali soldiers in several little known but intense firefights, including a three-day battle in February 1993. The United States lost 31 killed in action, 14 noncombat deaths, and 120 wounded; and our allies lost about three times that number in the almost two years we had forces committed to that Peace Enforcement (Chapter VII of the UN Charter) mission. In that one October 1993 battle, the Rangers and their rescue force substantially reduced the ability of Aideed to wage war on his own people and upon the humanitarian relief workers who

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

were there to assist the devastated populace of southern Somalia. Many of the key leaders of Aideed's faction were either killed, wounded, or captured in that same battle. However, based upon the reaction of Congress, the American public, and the current administration to the video news reports of American soldiers being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu, and the subsequent presidential decision to withdraw U.S. participation from the UN operation in Somalia, I must concede that the tactical victory was a strategic failure. There is no doubt in my mind that the overall mission in Somalia was a noble exercise in futility. After all, as a departure from the Caspar Weinberger Doctrine, no vital U.S. national interests were at stake in Somalia, and thus this was a commitment of forces based upon American values. I have sadly continued to note the on-going civil war, dismal lack of economy, continued famine and starvation of Somalia, which predictably accelerated upon the extraction of UN forces in March 1995.

What is most troubling to me as a professional soldier is the perception that any small loss of friendly forces, especially if the images of dead Americans are flashed across U.S. television, becomes the catalyst for loss of public support, hence precipitating loss of political determination and failure to achieve the strategic objectives that originally motivated the commitment of U.S. forces to achieve selected U.S. international foreign political goals.

LT. COL. MICHAEL M. TOLER
U.S. Military Academy at West Point

The author replies:

Not having first hand knowledge of the events in Mogadishu in October 1993, I am at a disadvantage in any argument with Lt. Col. Michael Toler about whether or not the incident represented a "tactical defeat" for the United States, as stated in our article. I would note, however, that the picture of the incident painted by Lt. Col. Toler is completely different from that portrayed by journalist Mark Bowden in his very well received book, *Black Hawk Down*. Regardless of how one evaluates the tactical outcome, it is clear that U.S. threats and limited uses of force were unsuccessful in achieving American strategic objectives, which, of course, is the central point of the article.

BARRY M. BLECHMAN, PRESIDENT
DFI International

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

STATEMENT OF OWNERSHIP, MANAGEMENT, AND CIRCULATION

(*Required by 39 U.S.C. 3685*)

1. Title of publication: *Political Science Quarterly*. 2. Publication number: 437260. 3. Date of filing: 21 September 1999. 4. Frequency of issue: Spring, Summer, Fall, and Winter. 5. Number of issues published annually: four. 6. Annual subscription price: individuals, $42.00; institutions, $193.00. 7. Location of office of publication: The Academy of Political Science, 475 Riverside Drive, Suite 1274, New York, New York 10115-1274. 8. Location of the general business office: same as 7. 9. Name and address of publisher; same as 7; name and address of editor: Demetrios Caraley, same as 7; name and address of managing editor: Allison Pretto, same as 7.

10. Owner: The Academy of Political Science (nonprofit corporation).

11. Known bondholders, mortgagees, and other security holders owning or holding 1 percent or more of total amount of bonds, mortgages, or other securities: none.

12. The purpose, function, and nonprofit status of this organization and the exempt status for federal income tax purposes have not changed during the preceding twelve months.

13. Extent and nature of circulation:

Extent and Nature of Circulation	*Average Number Copies Each Issue During Preceding 12 Months*	*Actual No. Copies of Single Issue Published Nearest to Filing Date*
a. Total No. Copies (*Net Press Run*)	8,293	8,240
b. Paid and/or Requested Circulation		
(1) Sales Through Dealers and Carriers, Street Vendors, and Counter Sales	838	740
(2) Paid or Requested Main Subscriptions	6,241	6,340
c. Total Paid and/or Requested Circulation	7,078	7,080
d. Free Distribution by Mail (*Samples, Complimentary, and Other Free*)	250	255
e. Free Distribution Outside the Mail (*Carriers or Other Means*)	20	20
f. Total Free Distribution	270	275
g. Total Distribution	7,349	7,355
h. Copies Not Distributed		
(1) Office Use, Leftovers, Spoiled	548	885
(2) Return from News Agents	346	0
i. Total	8,293	8,240
Percent Paid and/or Requested Circulation	96.33%	96.27%

I certify that all information furnished on this form is true and complete. I understand that anyone who furnishes false or misleading information on this form or who omits material or information requested on the form may be subject to criminal sanctions (*including fines and imprisonment*) and/or civil sanctions (*including multiple damages and civil penalties*).

(signed) Loren Morales, Business Manager

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

New & Recent Political Science



Drug Politics
Dirty Money and Democracies
By David C. Jordan
Jordan makes a strong case for a reexamination of American and foreign policies in the drug and culture wars.
$24.95 Hardcover



Barry Goldwater
Native Arizonan
By Peter Iverson
A biography.
$27.95 Hardcover
$14.95 Paper



Clinton and Congress, 1993-1996
Risk, Restoration, and Reelection
By Charles O. Jones
An analysis of Clinton's first term in office vis-á-vis the Congress.
$26.95 Hardcover

An Oklahoma Book Award Winner
Little Giant
The Life and Times of Speaker Carl Albert
By Carl Albert with Danney Goble
$14.95 Paper



Senators on the Campaign Trail
The Politics of Representation
By Richard F. Fenno, Jr.
Fenno's book is a culmination of 20 years of work on the Senate.
$27.95 Hardcover
$15.95 Paper



Pursuing Majorities
Congressional Campaign Committees in American Politics
By Robin Kolodny
An examination of the 4 congressional campaign committees.
$29.95 Hardcover
$18.95 Paper



Micro-Macro Dilemmas in Political Science
Personal Pathways Through Complexity
By Heinz Eulau
In this unusual book, Eulau addresses the problematic relationship between big things and little things in governance and society—a significant theme in the study of political behavior, institutions, and processes
$37.95 Hardcover
$21.95 Paper



Preparing America's Foreign Policy for the Twenty-First Century
Edited by David L. Boren and Edward J. Perkins
A foreign policy text for the 21st Century.
$24.95 Hardcover

University of Oklahoma Press

4100 28th Avenue N.W. • Norman, OK 73069-8218
405.325.2000 or 800.627.7377 • Fax: 405.364.5798 or Fax: 800.735.0476
www.ou.edu/oupress • AMEX • Visa • MasterCard

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The MIT Press

Industrializing Knowledge

University-Industry Linkages in Japan and the United States
edited by Lewis M. Branscomb, Fumio Kodama, and Richard Florida

A comparative study of the ways in which Japan and the United States have gone about transferring potentially valuable research from universities to industry.
550 pp. $45

Critical Masses

Citizens, Nuclear Weapons Production, and Environmental Destruction in the United States and Russia
Russell J. Dalton, Paula Garb, Nicholas P. Lovrich, John C. Pierce, and John M. Whiteley

Investigates how citizens in the United States and Russia have used the democratic process to force their governments to address the horrendous environmental damage caused by the nuclear arms race.
American and Comparative Environmental Policy series
502 pp., 31 illus. $27.50 paper

Toward Sustainable Communities

Transition and Transformations in Environmental Policy
edited by Daniel A. Mazmanian and Michael E. Kraft

Reviews and assesses environmental policy over the past three decades, looking at what does and does not work and how social, economic, and environmental goals can be integrated through policy strategies grounded in the concept of sustainability.
American and Comparative Environmental Policy series
308 pp. $25 paper

Should the United States Privatize Social Security?

Henry J. Aaron and John B. Shoven
edited by Benjamin M. Friedman

"Here's the deal. Spend a few hours with this book, and Aaron, Shoven and the others will bring you up-to-date on the most important social policy debate now going in America. Not only that, you'll enjoy the read." — Alan S. Blinder, Princeton University
Alvin Hansen Symposium
160 pp., 26 illus. $24.95

now in paperback

Investing in Innovation

Creating a Research and Innovation Policy That Works
edited by Lewis M. Branscomb and James H. Keller

"Professor Branscomb and his coauthors are to be complimented for well-crafted presentations of many points of view on a national innovation policy. Their book is an excellent contribution towards an improved national policy in this essential area." — Senator Pete Domenici (R-NM)
536 pp. $20 paper

To order call **800-356-0343** (US & Canada) or (617) 625-8569. Prices higher outside U.S. and subject to change without notice.

http://mitpress.mit.edu

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Best in Political Science from Cambridge

Negotiating Adolescence in Times of Social Change

Lisa J. Crockett *and*
Rainer K. Silbereisen, *Editors*

This important volume considers the processes through which societal changes exert an impact on the course of adolescent development and adolescents' social and psychological adjustment. Additionally, several chapters identify individual and contextual factors that can modify the impact of social change and enhance the likelihood of a successful transition to adulthood. Chapter authors include a diverse group of social scientists from Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

Contributors: *Lisa J. Crockett, Rainer K. Silbereisen, Glen H. Elder, Jr., Stephen T. Russell, Jeanne Brooks-Gunn, Sara Schley, Janet Hardy, Gisela Trommsdorff, Alice Schlegel, John Bynner, Michael J. Shanahan, Kathryn E. Hood, Peter Noack, Hans Bertram, Robert Sampson, Constance A. Flanagan, Katherine Jewsbury Conger, Martha A. Rueter, Rand D. Conger, John Schulenberg, Patrick M. O'Malley, Jerald G. Bachman, LLoyd D. Johnston, Klaus Boehnke, Stephen F. Hamilton, Mary Agnes Hamilton, Ruby Takanishi, Anne C. Petersen*

0-521-62389-8 Hardback $49.95

Post-Communist Party Systems

Competition, Representation, and Inter-Party Cooperation

Herbert Kitschelt, Zdenka Mansfeldova, Radoslaw Markowski *and*
Gabor Toka

Post-Communist Party Systems examines democratic party competition in four postcommunist polities in the mid-1990s, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. Legacies of pre-communist rule turn out to play as much a role in accounting for differences as the institutional differences incorporated in the new democratic rules of the game. The book demonstrates various developments within the four countries with regard to different voter appeal of parties, patterns of voter representation, and dispositions to join other parties in legislative or executive alliances. The authors also present interesting avenues of comparison for broader sets of countries.

Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics

0-521-65288-X Hardback $64.95
0-521-65890-X Paperback $24.95

Paths Toward Democracy

The Working Class and Elites in Western Europe and South America

Ruth Berins Collier

The question of whether democratization is an elite-led process from above or a popular triumph from below continues to be an area of contention among political scientists. Examining the experiences of countries that have provided the main empirical base for recent theorizing, namely, Western Europe and South America, this book delineates a more complex and varied set of patterns. The volume explores democratization through a comparative analysis that examines the role of labor in relation to elite strategies in both contemporary and historical perspectives.

Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics

0-521-64369-4 Hardback $49.95
0-521-64382-1 Paperback $17.95

A Unified Theory of Voting

Directional and Proximity Spatial Models

Samuel Merrill III *and*
Bernard Grofman

Professors Merrill and Grofman develop a unified model that incorporates voter motivations and assesses its empirical predictions—for both voter choice and candidate strategy—in the United States, Norway, and France. The analyses show that a combination of proximity, direction, discounting, and party ID are compatible with the mildly but not extremely divergent policies that are characteristic of many two-party and multi-party electorates. All of these motivations are necessary to understand the linkage between candidate issue positions and voter preferences.

0-521-66222-2 Hardback $54.95
0-521-66549-3 Paperback $19.95

Available in bookstores or from

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS

40 West 20th St., N.Y., NY 10011-4211
Call toll-free 800-872-7423
Web site: http://www.cup.org
MasterCard/VISA accepted.
Prices subject to change.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PUBLIC INTEGRITY

J. Patrick Dobel

"Never preachy, but always demanding, Dobel's accessible erudition persuades the reader of both the difficulty and the nobility of holding public responsibility. *Public Integrity* will attract some of America's finest into public life."—John E. Brandl, Dean, Hubert H. Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs, University of Minnesota

$38.00 hardcover

READING MIXED SIGNALS

Ambivalence in American Public Opinion about Government

Albert H. Cantril and Susan Davis Cantril

"It offers fresh insight into public opinion, as well as holding considerable implications for the effective conduct of government and successful political leadership."—Arthur H. Miller, University of Iowa

Woodrow Wilson Center Press

$18.95 paperback

JUDICIAL POLITICS IN THE D.C. CIRCUIT COURT

Christopher P. Banks

Because of its location in the nation's capital, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has evolved into a court where cases on administrative law predominate. Christopher Banks explains that this unique role evolved largely as a result of the politics of the nation's capital.

$38.00 hardcover

WELFARE REFORM

A Race to the Bottom?

edited by Sanford F. Schram and Samuel H. Beer

This timely collection presents research contributing to the ongoing debate over welfare reform in the 1990s, especially since the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996.

Woodrow Wilson Center Press

$22.50 paperback

PHOTOGRAPHY AND POLITICS IN AMERICA

From the New Deal into the Cold War

Lili Corbus Bezner

Bezner offers the first detailed analysis of social documentary photography from the Depression through the early cold war years.

$39.95 hardcover

POLITICAL PARTIES AND CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT

Remaking American Democracy

Sidney M. Milkis

Sidney Milkis explores the uneasy relationship between the Constitution and the party system to advance a novel argument: political parties arose as part of a deliberate program of constitutional reform.

Interpreting American Politics: Michael Nelson, Series Editor

$17.95 paperback

CONGRESS AND THE PEOPLE

Deliberative Democracy on Trial

Donald R. Wolfensberger

"This book contains the best and finest understanding of Congressional behavior I know."—Anthony C. Beilenson, former U.S. Representative from California

Woodrow Wilson Center Press

$34.95 hardcover

THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY PRESS

1-800-537-5487 • www.press.jhu.edu

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PRAEGER

Celebrating Excellence in Publishing since 1949

China and Israel, 1948-1998
A Fifty Year Retrospective
Edited by Jonathan Goldstein
Praeger Publishers • 1999 • 256 pages
0-275-96306-3 • $65.00

Post-Mao China
From Totalitarianism to Authoritarianism?
By Sujian Guo
Praeger Publishers • 2000
0-275-96780-8 • $58.00Est

Hegemonic Cooperation and Conflict
Postwar Japan's China Policy and the United States
By Qingxin K. Wang
Praeger Publishers • 1999
0-275-96314-4 • $59.00Est

Explaining Chinese Democratization
By Shaohua Hu
Praeger Publishers • 2000
0-275-96553-8 • $59.00Est

China and the South China Sea Dialogues
By Lee Lai To
Praeger Publishers • 1999
0-275-96635-6 • $55.00Est

War of Words
Washington Tackles the Yugoslav Conflict
By Danielle S. Sremac
Praeger Publishers • 1999
0-275-96609-7 • $39.00Est

Against Long Odds
Citizens Who Challenge Congressional Incumbents
By James L. Merriner and Thomas P. Senter
Foreword by Honorable Richard D. Lamm
Praeger Publishers • 1999
0-275-96642-9 • $30.00Est

Fixing the Spy Machine
Preparing American Intelligence for the Twenty-First Century
By Arthur S. Hulnick
Praeger Paperback • 1999
0-275-96653-4 • $18.00Est
A hardcover edition is available:
0-275-96652-6 • $65.00E

"We Get What We Vote For. . . Or Do We?"
The Impact of Elections on Governing
Edited by Paul E. Scheele
Praeger Paperback • 1999
0-275-96603-8 • $25.00Est
A hardcover edition is available:
0-275-96602-X • $65.00E

Voting Rites
The Devolution of American Politics
By Ron Hirschbein
Praeger Publishers • 1999
0-275-96095-1 • $53.00Est

Fiftieth Anniversary

Request a copy of the 1999 Praeger catalog online at www.praeger.com, or email catalogs@greenwood.com, or call 1-800-225-5800.

To order call 1-800-225-5800 / 88 Post Road West • P.O. Box 5007 • Westport, CT 06881-5007

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ANNOUNCING AN
ACADEMY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE/
POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY SYMPOSIUM

Independence or Limbo: What does Welfare Reform Have to do with Homelessness?

Co-sponsored by Columbia University, and the Institute for Children and Poverty

The conference will be held on Monday, October 25, 1999, at the School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University in New York City. The symposium will begin at 3:30 and will run until 6:00 p.m. It will cover such topics as foster care, post-welfare employment, and the impacts of welfare reform on families. The audience will include students, local and national policymakers, and press. The event will be followed by a reception.

Host:

Steven A. Cohen
Columbia University
School of Int'l and Public Affairs

Moderator:

Ralph Nunez
Columbia University
Institute for Children and Poverty

Speakers include:

- **Demetrios Caraley**
  Barnard College,
  Columbia University
  The Academy of Political Science
- **Deanna Carlson**
  Family Research Council
- **Lou Nanni**
  University of Notre Dame
- **John C. Weicher**
  Hudson Institute
- **Aurora Zepeda**
  San Diego Health and Human Services Agency

Monday, October 25, 1999

Columbia University
School of International & Public Affairs
420 West 18th Street
NY, NY 10027

Call 212-870-2500
for more information.
Free admission for APS members

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE ACADEMY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

BOARD OF DIRECTORS

George B. Munroe
Chairman of the Board

George T. Scharffenberger
William S. Woodside
Chairmen Emeriti

E. Virgil Conway
Vice Chairman of the Board

Demetrios James Caraley
President

Diana T. Murray
Vice President

Bill Green
Treasurer

Deborah Duff Milenkovitch
Secretary

Laura J. Corwin
General Counsel

C. Lowell Harriss
Senior Adviser

Conrad K. Harper
John Jay Iselin
Donald H. Layton
Frank J. Macchiarola
Ralph da Costa Nunez
Norma Pace
Robert D. Reischauer
Tomio Taki

HONORARY MEMBERS

Claude T. Bissell
Daniel J. Boorstin
George Bush
Roberto de O. Campos
Jimmy Carter
Barber B. Conable, Jr.
Abba Eban
Gerald R. Ford
Lee Hamilton
Lady Bird Johnson
Michael J. Mansfield
N. A. Palkhivala
Hugh B. Price
Ronald Reagan
David Rockefeller
Lord Roll of Ipsden
George P. Shultz
Robert Stanfield
Richard v. Weizsäcker

The Academy of Political Science, founded in 1880, promotes objective, scholarly analyses of political, social, and economic issues. Through its conferences and publications it seeks to inform the public by presenting divergent views of these problems. It does not make policy recommendations.

Regular membership: one year, $42.00; two years, $76.00; three years, $100.00; student, $27.00 a year. Libraries and institutions $193.00 a year. Second-class postage paid at New York, N.Y. and additional mailing offices. Foreign postage is $8.00 additional per year. Volume 114 Number 3, Fall 1999.

Special membership: contributing, $75; fellow, $150; patron, $250; benefactor, $1,000. *Contributions are tax deductible.* Credit cards accepted: American Express, MasterCard, and Visa.

THE ACADEMY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
475 RIVERSIDE DRIVE, SUITE 1274 / NEW YORK, NY 10115-1274
(212) 870-2500 / FAX (212) 870-2202

93>
0 74470 81197 8

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED